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Abstract 
The United Kingdom (UK)’s transposition of the European Directive on motor 
insurance1 (the Directive) is shot through with provisions that fall below the 
minimum standard of compensatory protection for accident victims prescribed 
under this superior law.  These expose third party victims to the risk of being left 
undercompensated, or recovering nothing at all. 
The author’s research has demonstrated that the handful of cases that had 
previously been perceived as isolated anomalies in the UK’s transposition of this 
European law are in fact symptomatic of a more extensive and deep-rooted 
nonconformity.  His published articles over the past five years were the first to 
reveal the prevalence of this problem and the resulting lack of legal certainty.  He 
has been the first to offer detailed proposals for reform, as well as fresh insights 
into legal remedies potentially available to private citizens affected by these 
irregularities.   
Sections 2 and 3 of this paper are a summary of the author’s views covered in 
his various articles and research into the causes and effects of this disparity.  
They explain that whilst both the UK and European Union’s legislature share a 
policy objective the different approaches to achieving that end have resulted in 
different standards of compensatory protection.   
Section 4 recounts the author’s empirical approach that led him to undertake the 
first comprehensive comparative law analysis in this field.   
Section 5 explains the original, if sometimes controversial, nature of the author’s 
case commentaries, articles and official reports proposing reform.   
Section 6 sets out the author’s contribution to legal knowledge and practice in this 
area.  This includes his opinion, contrary to long established precedent, that the 
Directive is capable of having direct effect against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau. 
  
                                               
1 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the 
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, sometimes referred to as the sixth 
directive on motor insurance 
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“When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it 
means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’ 
’The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master — that’s 
all.”3 
 
Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There, Lewis Carroll, 18714 
 
  
                                               
2 Illustration by Sir John Tenniel (b 1820, d 1914).  This is copyright expired 
3 The excerpt quoted above was written is by Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (b 1832, d 1898), whose 
nom de plume was as Lewis Carroll. It is also copyright expired 
4 Leggatt LJ may have been the first judge to quip, in the context of a commercial dispute, with a 
quote from Charles Dodgson’s children’s classic, in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West 
Bromwich Building Society, and others [1998] 1 BCLC 493 at 528 
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Introduction 
Our national law provision for guaranteeing that motor accident victims actually 
recover their full compensatory entitlement is defective.  It is peppered with flaws 
that diminish or deny the protection it is supposed to confer.   
All too often, the ordinary literal meaning of these provisions fail to reliably convey 
their true legal effect; they often say one thing but are capable of producing a 
different result if properly construed5.  This is because some of the domestic 
statutory provision relating to compulsory third party motor insurance, as well as 
the two collateral extra-statutory compensation schemes, do not conform to the 
more generous European law minimum standards that it is supposed to 
implement. 
This paper explains why our national law in this area must always be construed 
consistently with this governing European law.  Although it is possible to cure 
many (but not all) of these inconsistencies in implementation by contenting for a 
European law consistent construction, that process presupposes an 
understanding of basic comparative European law principles that is beyond the 
appreciation of most well educated individuals and, more to the point, it also 
seems to be beyond many personal injury practitioners.  In short, our domestic 
provision in this area lacks legal certainty6. 
The disparity between the literal meaning and the actual effect of our national law 
in this area is a central theme of this paper and the author’s published articles to 
which it refers.  
                                               
5 See APPENDIX item 9, On the Right Road 1, February 2013 under the heading Interpreting 
Community law 
6 This term is used in both its domestic and European law context.  In the former case, we have 
Lord Bingham’s first of eight principles of the rule of law from his 2010 lecture on the rule of law 
presented at the Bingham Centre for the Rule of law: ‘(1) The law must be accessible and, so far 
as possible, be intelligible, clear and predictable’, see also Bingham T, ‘The Rule of Law’ Penguin, 
(2011).  In a European law context this principle requires a consistent implementation of European 
Union law, as developed by the CJEU, throughout the member states, see Tridimas T, ‘The 
General Principles of EU law’, 2nd edn Oxford University Press (2006) pages 242 – 297 and 
Schonberg N, ‘legal Certainty and Revocation of Administrative Decisions: A comparative Study 
of English French and EC Law’ (1990-00) 19 YEL 257.   In the context of the UK’s transposition 
of the Directive see (Case C-63/01) Evans v Secretary of State for Transport and MIB [2003] ECR 
I-14447, para 48 and also Bevan N, Good Law?, New Law Journal (NLJ), 18 July 2013 [Not 
reproduced in the Appendix] 
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Sections 2 and 3 of this paper cover much the same ground as the first half of 
Mind The Gap7, albeit in reverse order.  The rearrangement is deliberate.  Mind 
The Gap was written to emphasise the pre-eminence of European law in this 
area, so it seemed apposite to open with an exposition of that primary law before 
undertaking a comparative analysis of the UK’s transposition.   
This paper seeks to demonstrate why the author’s contribution to knowledge is 
original.  Consequently, a chronological approach is called for: one that explains 
the conventional perceptions and practices that this author’s published articles 
confront.  This begins with the British legislation of 1930 that introduced the 
concept of compulsory third party motor cover.   
  
                                               
7 See APPENDIX item 7, Mind The Gap: Ongoing developments in the United Kingdom resulting 
from the Government’s failure to fully implement the sixth European directive on motor insurance 
(2009/103/EC), British Insurance Law Association Journal (BILAJ), online in January 2016 and 
later in issue 129 in October 2016 
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UK social policy  
This section examines the causes of the UK’s failure to properly implement the 
Directive8.  These originate in the common law origins and architecture of the 
UK’s pre-accession national law provision for third party motor accident victims9.   
 
First steps 
The UK introduced compulsory third party motor insurance under Part II of the 
Road Traffic Act 1930 (the RTA 1930)10.  The impetus for this initiative was the 
hazard posed to the public by the increasing prevalence of motorised transport.  
The parliamentary intention was simple: to ensure that motor accident victims 
were not deprived of their proper compensatory entitlement because of the 
inability of the responsible driver or owner to pay.  This was to be achieved 
through mutualising the financial hazard posed by motor vehicle road use and by 
funding this through mandatory insurance. 
Part II of the RTA 1930 was neither a self-contained nor a holistic endeavour.  It 
was an empirically derived construct that built on existing common law principles 
and which depended, for its administration, on the good offices of a nascent motor 
insurance sector.  With one notable exception11, the RTA 1930 did not interfere 
with the common law principle of contractual privity12.  Its scope was largely 
                                               
8 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the 
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, sometimes referred to as the sixth 
directive on motor insurance 
9 See Merkin R and Hemsworth M, ‘The Law of Motor Insurance’ (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell 
2016), pages 1 – 26, for an extensive account of the background and development of motor 
insurance law 
10 This was augmented by the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 that transfers the 
contractual right to indemnity of insolvent policyholders to entitled third parties, to prevent their 
claims from being lumped in with the insured’s assets for distribution amongst the general 
creditors.  It also entitles the third party to bring an action directly against the insurer but this right 
is only triggered by the insured party’s insolvency 
11 Section 38 of the RTA Act 1930 nullifies the effect of certain contingent exclusions of liability 
triggered after the event giving rise to the claim but only in so far as they affect a third party’s 
entitlement.  Even here, the same provision goes on to provide a statutory right for an insurer to 
recover its outlay from meeting such a claim from its policyholder. This recoupment provision 
survives as Section 148(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA 1988) 
12 A term often used synonymously with ‘the third party rule’. For a detailed exposition of the 
third party rule see Law Commission, ‘Privity of Contract: Contracts For The Benefit of Third 
Parties’ ( Law Cm no 3329, 1996) pages 1-38 available online from  
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/lc242_privity-of-contract-contracts-for-
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confined to ensuring that individuals using a motor vehicle on a road had third 
party cover motor insurance.  A wide degree of contractual autonomy was 
conferred.  Motor insurers enjoyed considerable latitude to qualify or circumscribe 
their exposure to this risk in almost any way they chose provided that, in the event 
that a contractual liability was triggered, the policies covered in full any civil 
liability for death or personal injury caused to a third party13.   
The contractual terms of cover were regulated only to the extent of the terms of 
cover stipulated by Section 36(1)(b)14.  This prescribes a policy that ‘insures such 
person, persons or classes of persons as may be specified in the policy in respect 
of any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or 
bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle on a 
road:...’15  It is worth noting Hailsham LC’s observation in Gardner v Moore and 
others16 to the effect that the certificate of cover issued under this legislation 
involves an element of trade’s description: since at some basic level the cover 
provided needs to be fit for purpose17. 
  
                                               
the-benefit-of-third-parties.pdf [last accessed on 1 March 2017].  A modern account of third 
party rights in this area that accommodates the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 
can be found in Merkin R and Hemsworth M, ‘The Law of Motor Insurance’ (2nd edn Sweet & 
Maxwell 2016) Chapter 5: Compulsory Liability Cover, pages 465-474 
13 In the words of Harman LJ’s analysis of Section 1(4) in Post Office v Norwich Union Fire 
Insurance Society Ltd [1967] 2 QB 363, 376, a third party ‘cannot pick out the plums and leave 
the duff behind.’ 
14 This survives in a largely altered form as Section 145(3)(a) of the RTA 1988 but the cover now 
includes damage to property and extends to use in any public place in Great Britain 
15 The same provision goes on to list three scenarios that are excluded from such cover: first, an 
incident where the liability arose out of and in the course of the victim’s employment; secondly 
where it resulted from the carriage of paying passengers or the transportation of employees and 
thirdly, where any contractual liability applied 
 
17 A view not shared by Ward LJ in EUI Ltd v Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 
1267, [2013] 2 WLR 1029 , see APPENDIX item 5, Marking The Boundary, Journal of Personal 
Injury Law (JPIL), [2013] issue 3 under The Court of Appeal’s judgment in EUI 
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A qualified success 
This laissez faire approach allowed insurers to rely on any breach of condition or 
warranty perpetrated by their policyholders to avoid liability.  Furthermore, the 
RTA 1930 conferred only an indirect or subrogated entitlement on third parties18.  
It was also only a qualified right:  the nature and extent of a third party victim’s 
entitlement to compensatory protection depended on the contractual terms of a 
policy previously agreed between the insurer and its policyholder.  
Consequently, whilst the introduction of compulsory third party motor insurance 
significantly improved the prospect that motor victims might ultimately recover 
their full compensatory entitlement regardless of the tortfeasor’s financial means, 
it did not guarantee that outcome.  These statutory rights were enjoyed vicariously 
and they were dependent on a variety of factors over which the victim, being a 
stranger to the contract, had no ability to influence or control.  It also left victims 
exposed to the fickle and forgetful: those who failed to comply with the statutory 
duty to insure imposed by Section 35(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1934 (RTA 
1934)19. 
The only statutory intervention affecting the contractual terms was confined by 
Section 38 of the RTA 1930 to protecting a third party from the effects of a breach 
of contract perpetrated after the event giving rise the claim.  It also conferred on 
the insurer a reciprocal statutory right to recover its outlay in this regard from its 
policyholder. 
The limitations of this statutory measure became apparent all too soon.  For 
example, insurers were able to rely on material misrepresentations or non-
disclosures in the proposal forms to treat the policy as void ab initio, even where 
these matters had no bearing on the event giving rise to the materialisation of the 
risk.  Others relied on contractual restrictions in use or other limitations in the 
terms of cover to repudiate liability.  Yet others sought to delay payment where 
the policyholder had sustained a critical injury, in the expectation of being 
absolved from liability by the application of the common law principle of actio 
personalis moritur cum persona20. 
                                               
18 A feature made explicit in the sibling legislation under Section 1(4) of the Third Parties Rights 
Act 1930 in its restatement of the relevant common law principles 
19 This survives in altered form as Section 143 RTA 1988 
20 By which principle a right of action in tort expires on the death of the tortfeasor 
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Declassified Cabinet Office records reveal that in early 1934 the Minister of 
Transport21 was concerned by the vagaries in cover provided under the RTA 
1930.  He wanted to bolster the compensatory protection of road accident victims 
by extending the concept of a direct right of action beyond insolvency and 
restricting the ability of insurers to rely on a policyholder’s misrepresentations or 
non-disclosures against third party victims.   
 
A policy compromised 
1934 was a pivotal year.  The government could have opted to make a victim’s 
entitlement a free-standing one: effectively ring fencing the third party’s vicarious 
entitlement from any contractual dispute between the principal parties.  Insurers 
would still have retained their ability to impose price and risk differentiation 
through the simple expedient of extending the statutory recoupment provisions of 
section 38 RTA 1930.  Instead, the government appears to have been persuaded 
by the concerns of a fledgling industry as to the impact this might have on the 
cost of motor insurance premiums and so, it opted it for a compromise. 
The RTA 1934 supplemented rather than replaced the ‘principal Act’.  Section 12 
was confined to nullifying the effect against a third party victim of eight different 
categories22 of policy exclusion23.  This survives in much the same form in section 
148 (1) and (2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA 1988): a necessary implication 
of such a provision being that any exclusion, restriction or precondition of liability 
not so nullified by statute remained fully effective24. 
Section 10 of the RTA 1934 conferred a direct right of action on third party victims 
to recover an outstanding judgment from the defendant’s insurer.  It also 
restricted insurers’ ability to evade this statutory liability (whether by cancelling 
their policies or exercising their right to treat a policy as void for misrepresentation 
                                               
21 The author acknowledges the kind assistance of Matthew Channon, researcher at the 
University of Exeter, for unearthing the relevant Cabinet Office papers, reference C.P.4 (34) of 11 
January 1934 and for his generous consent to their being referred to in this paper 
22 These included restrictions as to the age or mental state of the driver and various technical and 
mechanical restrictions relating to the vehicle, its load or the number of passengers 
23 According to Sir Felix Cassell, Report of the Committee on Compulsory Insurance, July 1937, 
Cmd. 5528, these contractual restrictions and exclusions had all been previously upheld against 
third party victims  
24 A point made by Ward LJ in his judgment in EUI Ltd v Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership [2012] 
EWCA Civ 1267, [2013] 2 WLR 1029, para 45 
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or non-disclosure) by requiring them to apply for a court declaration within strict 
time limits.  Sections 151 and 152 of the RTA 1988 incorporate these provisions.   
The RTA 1934 extended the concept of the ‘statutory insurer’25.  This expression26 
denotes a motor insurer on risk at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim, 
where the policyholder is in breach of a term which entitles the insurer to avoid 
its contractual indemnity but where, because of the statutory intervention alluded 
to above, the insurer remains liable to satisfy a third party claim27.   
The RTA 1934 left various lacunae in third party cover unaddressed.  Numerous 
exclusions and restrictions continue to apply to modern policies, such as the 
commonplace restrictions to ‘social, domestic and recreational use’, or the 
exclusion of liability for journeys to and from work or for ‘road rage’.   
In 1937 these shortcomings were considered in Sir Felix Cassell’s Report28, which 
noted the problem caused by insolvent insurers and the numerous contractual 
exclusions not nullified by Section 38, as well as the problem posed by completely 
uninsured drivers.  The exigencies of the Second World War intervened before 
any of this could be addressed.   
 
Further stop gap measures 
1945 marks another important milestone.  Instead of adopting a dirigiste 
approach, the Minister for War Transport chose to work in close collaboration with 
motor insurers.  Rather than imposing comprehensive and free-standing third 
party cover, he settled on devising a workable scheme that protected victims who 
fell through the anterior contractual or statutory schemes and decided to 
implement this through a series of negotiated private law agreements with the 
industry.   
                                               
25 A concept first coined by Section 38 of the RTA 1930, supra 
26 The term ‘statutory insurer’ is not a statutory definition, it is a term coined by the courts. 
27 See the discussion on Article 75 insurers below Comparison with the UK Provision under The 
Increasing influence of European law  and see also Merkin R and Hemsworth M, ‘The Law of 
Motor Insurance’ (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell 2016) pages 475 and 489 and again at 627 – 631 
on Article 75 
28 Supra 
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On 17 December 1945 he secured the collective agreement of every insurer 
providing motor insurance in the UK to incept and fund a central body29.  This 
would be responsible for compensating victims of incidents that should have been 
covered by third party insurance under Part II of the RTA 1930 but where either 
there was no insurance in place or the judgment remained unsatisfied for more 
than seven days.  The contract provided that the central body’s role would be 
further defined in a later agreement.   
The Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB) was duly incorporated on 14 June 1946 with 
the object of discharging the role of the central body and it entered into its first 
agreement with the Minister for Transport three days later on 17 June.  This was 
the progenitor of what are now two contiguous extra-statutory compensation 
schemes: one for uninsured drivers, the other for untraced drivers30. 
In anticipation of the UK’s accession to the European Community in 1973, The 
Road Traffic Act 1972 (RTA 1972) extended third party cover to property damage, 
albeit restricted by a financial ceiling.  This Act was superseded by Part VI of the 
RTA 1988 which is the UK’s primary legislative implementation of the Directive. 
 
Improved but incomplete protection 
By the time the UK became part of the European Community in 1973, the 
compensatory entitlement of third party motor victims was achieved by an eclectic 
mix of statutory and extra-statutory provision.  It involved three different levels of 
protection:  
 contractually derived compulsory third party cover31 
 additional protection imposed through statutory intervention (but restricted 
to a limited set of instances that required an insurer to treat a third party’s 
claim as though it were fully insured, notwithstanding the policyholder’s 
breach of contract)32  
                                               
29 This is set out in a memorandum of agreement between the Minister of War Transport and 
every insurer then transacting compulsory motor vehicle insurance business in Great Britain titled: 
‘The Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund’, originally published by the HMSO, London, now out of print 
but available on request from the Department for Transport. 
30 Currently the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2003 and the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreements 1999 
and 2015 
31 Originally Section 36 of the RTA 1930, later Section 143 of the RTA 1972  
32 Originally Section 38 of the RTA 1943, later Section 148 of the RTA 1972  
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 the two compensatory schemes managed by the MIB for victims of 
uninsured or untraced drivers 
Third party claims that fell through the contingent protection afforded by 
compulsory and statutory insurance were clearly intended to be caught by the 
compensatory schemes.  The fact that the same commercial interests managed 
and funded these tertiary safeguards produced a potential conflict of interest was 
ignored.  However, there is nothing intrinsically unsound in such an arrangement 
provided it is properly and impartially supervised by the state.  Indeed, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the protective aim is achieved. 
 
Emerging flaws 
Where these triple measures fail most obviously is at their tertiary stage.  It is 
evident that, from the outset, the Minister for Transport relied on the MIB to draft 
the terms of the extra statutory scheme it was to manage under the contract 
agreed between its members and the government in 1945.   
Over the years a progressively influential motor insurance lobby managed to 
persuade successive ministers to agree increasingly complicated and illiberal 
schemes whereby numerous exclusions, restrictions and pre conditions to MIB 
liability have been conceded.   
The burgeoning length and complexity of the schemes perhaps best 
demonstrates this phenomenon.  The 1946 agreement could be replicated on just 
two or three sides of A4 paper.  By 1999 the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement had 
expanded to fourteen A4 pages replete with technical terms.  This is 
accompanied by official guidance that adds half as much again to the bulk and 
which qualifies, and in places alters or even contradicts the main agreement33.   
What had originally been a simple and robust ‘catch-all’ compensatory safeguard 
had, by 1999, metamorphosed into an extensively qualified, excessively 
prescriptive and bureaucratic regime replete with exclusions, restrictions and 
conditions precedent to liability.  This allows the MIB to reject entirely legitimate 
                                               
33 These contradictions were the result of amendments introduced in 2001, following the threat of 
judicial review, designed to mitigate some of the scheme’s more offensive procedural conditions 
precedent of liability and to give effect to the House of Lords ruling in White (AP) v White & MIB 
[2001] UKHL 9, [2001] 1 WLR 481 
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claims, often for the most inconsequential procedural infraction34.  The Untraced 
Drivers’ Agreement 2003 has similar failings.   
  
                                               
34 See APPENDIX, item 2 – The Motor Insurers Role, and item 3 – Why the Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreement 1999 needs to be scrapped, JPIL [2011] issues 1 and 2 respectively.  The 1999 
scheme continues to apply to incidents that pre-date 1 August 2015 
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The increasing influence of European law 
One consequence of the UK’s accession to the European Community was that 
from 1973 the domestic law provision considered above became subject to the 
superior authority of the European Council Directive 72/166/EEC35 on motor 
insurance36.  This was to be the first of six directives on motor insurance.  As with 
Part II of the RTA 1930, it was also drafted in very broad terms.   
First steps 
Article 3.137 imposed a requirement on member states to: ‘.... take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally 
based in its territory is covered by insurance. The extent of the liability covered 
and the terms and conditions of the cover shall be determined on the basis of 
these measures.’  Article 3.2 stipulated that such cover should extend to ‘any loss 
or injury’.   
These Articles conferred a wide discretion on member states to devise their own 
terms of cover and level of indemnity.   
 
Increasing restrictions  
As with the RTA 1930, this imprecision set a low implementation threshold: all 
that was required was that some third party cover should be in place38.  This 
resulted in major disparities in the levels of protection provided by different 
member states.  This inconsistency was perceived to undermine the 
effectiveness of the Directive’s other legislative aim: of liberalising the movement 
of people and vehicles across the Community.   
  
                                               
35 Council Directive of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating 
to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement 
of the obligation to insure against such liability (72/166/EEC).  Subsequently consolidated into the 
Directive 
36 See Merkin R and Hemsworth M, ‘The Law of Motor Insurance’ (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell 
2016) pages 26 – 45, for a detailed account to the development and influence of European law in 
this area 
37 Of this first Directive on motor insurance (72/166/EEC) Article 3 survives as Article 3 of the sixth 
(consolidating) Directive on motor insurance, see below 
38 Which in 1973 the UK provision easily surpassed even with its limited nullification of exclusions 
of liability in what is now s148(=2) RTA 1988 and its imposition of unlimited liability for personal 
injuries 
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Accordingly, over the course of eighteen years, two successive directives39 almost 
entirely removed this wide legislative discretion on the terms of third party cover.  
The second Directive imposed minimum levels of financial cover.  It also provided 
that certain exclusions of liability would be ineffective against third party victims.  
It also obliged member states to ‘...set up or authorize a body with the task of 
providing compensation, at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation for 
damage to property or personal injuries caused by an unidentified vehicle or a 
vehicle for which the insurance obligation provided for in paragraph 1 has not 
been satisfied....’40.   
A third Directive followed in 199041.  It emphasised the need to protect particularly 
vulnerable categories of victim42, such as passengers (other than the driver), 
pedestrians and cyclists. 
 
Lock down of discretion and enhancement of rights 
In 1996 the European Court of Justice (hereafter referred to by its modern 
acronym CJEU43) delivered a landmark judgment in Bernaldez44.  It ruled that 
these three Directives should be interpreted collectively as requiring that 
compulsory insurance must enable third party victims of motor vehicle accidents 
to be compensated for all damage to property and personal injuries sustained45.  
It also ruled that this requirement precluded insurers from being able to rely on 
either statutory provisions or contractual clauses to refuse to compensate third 
party victims of an accident caused by an insured vehicle, save to the extent 
expressly permitted by the Directives46.   
                                               
39 Council Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983 and Council Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 
1990 
40 Article 1(4) of the Second Directive 84/5/EEC survives, duly amended, as Article 10 of the 
(consolidating) Directive 
41 Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles 
42 Article 1 
43 Court of Justice of the European Union 
44 (Case C-129/94) Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] ECR. I-1829  
45 Within the minimum levels of cover prescribed by Article 1(2) of the Second Council Directive 
(84/5/EEC)  
46 Professor Tridimas notes the significance of (Case C-129/94) Bernaldez (cited above) as a 
departure from the prohibition of the horizontal effect of directives.  See his article, ‘Black, White 
and Shades of Grey: Horizontality Revisited’, (2002) 21 YBL 327, at page 352.  He poses the 
question that as para 20 of that judgment clearly states that insurers are prevented from relying 
on statutory provisions or contractual clauses that purport to entitle them to refuse to compensate 
19 
 
The CJEU ruled that only one contractual exclusion could be relied on against a 
third party victim.  This applied to a passenger who voluntarily enters a vehicle 
knowing it is stolen47.  This decision was consistent with the seventh recital to the 
second Directive on motor insurance (84/5/EEC) which stated that: ‘...it is in the 
interest of victims that the effects of certain exclusion clauses be limited to the 
relationship between the insurer and the person responsible for the accident.’48 
Although Bernaldez did not feature an uninsured driver claim, its rationale was 
explained in wide and purposive terms and justified by reference to an underlying 
principle of protecting motor accident vicitims.  Accordingly, given the teleological 
nature of European directives, Bernaldez’s ratio applies to all motor accident 
claims governed by these directives.  They clearly extended to the Article 10 
authorised body responsible for compensating victims of uninsured and 
unidentified vehicles which in the UK is the MIB.  Thus the MIB is also obliged to 
restrict itself to the single exclusion permitted to it by Article 10.2 of the Directive 
that applies to a victim who voluntarily enters the vehicle as a passenger knowing 
that it is uninsured49.  The CJEU has recited and applied the protective principle 
                                               
third party victims, save were expressly provided for by Article 2(1) of the Second Council 
Directive 84/5/EEC (now Article 13.1 of the Directive) how can that result be distinguished from 
horizontal direct effect?  He argues that the inescapable conclusion must be that Article 3 of the 
Directive (as it is now) imposes an obligation on the insurance company.  Whilst that outcome 
might be explained by the fact that the defendant was a public prosecutor, this does not assist 
our understanding as four years after the professor’s perspicacious observation, the principle in 
Bernaldez was applied in (Case C-537/03) Candolin v Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola [2005] 
ECR I-5745 where the defendant, being an insurance company, was obviously not an emanation 
of the state.  Here, the CJEU ruled that the insurer was prevented from relying on a national law 
permitting an exclusion of liability where the victim bore a high degree of responsibility for their 
injury as this was not permitted by Article 2(1) of the Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC.  Twelve 
years on, the author is not aware of any instance where a third party victim has successfully 
argued for the horizontal direct effect of what is now Article 13.1 against an insurer in an action 
founded on the insurer’s statutory liability under s151 RTA 1988.  
47 This survives as Article 13.1 of the Directive 
48 This survives as Recital 15 in the Directive 
49 See also the Court of Appeal’s decision in Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] 
EWCA Civ 172 upholding Jay J’s first instance finding in this respect in Delaney v Secretary of 
State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB) 
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identified in Bernaldez in a long line of subsequent judgments50, most recently in 
Damijan Vnuk51.  
In May 2000 a fourth Directive (2000/26/EC) conferred on injured third party 
victims a direct right of action against the responsible party’s motor insurers, as 
well as making detailed provision to help expedite claims on behalf of individuals 
injured abroad in a foreign member state.   
A fifth Directive (2005/14/EC) made various revisions and clarified the importance 
of the protective principle as it applies to passengers and particularly vulnerable 
road users such as pedestrians and cyclists.  The minimum financial limits were 
increased and member states required to review these levels in line with inflation 
every five years52.   
On 16 September 2009 all five Directives were consolidated into a sixth 
(2009/103/EC) referred to here as ‘the Directive’, which remains in force. 
The first directive’s limited legislative objective has evolved over the past four 
decades into a broad encompassing principle that underpins the European law 
on motor insurance.  It can be summarised as requiring member states to ensure 
that no innocent third party injured or suffering loss caused by the use of a motor 
vehicle should go uncompensated, irrespective of the presence or absence of 
effective insurance. 
 
The European insurance requirement  
The following key principles can be distilled from the European law defining the 
comprehensive nature and scope of the insurance requirement as it applies to 
domestic claims53: 
                                               
50 (Case C-348/98) Ferreira v Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confianca SA [2000] ECR 1-6711; 
(Case C-537/03) Candolin (cited in note 28 above) (where its passages were quoted from 
extensively); (Case C-356/05) Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, The Minister for the Environment, 
Ireland and the Attorney General, Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland [2007] ECR I-3067; Case C-
442/10) Churchill v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans  [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1776; (Case C 409/11) 
Gábor Csonka v Magyar Állam [2014] 1 CMLR 14 
51 (Case C-162/13) Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d. d. [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2146 , 
[2014] All ER (D) 121 (Sep) 
52 The government recently increased the levels with effect from 31 December 2016, see the 
Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 2016 
53 See item 5, Mind The Gap!, The British Insurance Law Association Journal (BILAJ), January 
2016 under the heading On the duty to insure and the third party cover required under Article 3 
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First, the Article 354 minimum requirement for third party motor cover is mandatory 
and must extends to: 
(i) any vehicle conforming with the Article 1 definition55 
(ii) any civil liability arising out of a use consistent with the normal 
function of the vehicle56 
(iii) such use anywhere on land57 
Secondly, the duty to insure and the scope of cover are coextensive58. 
Thirdly, member states have no discretion to introduce or permit restrictions, 
exclusions or limitations in third party cover except as expressly provided for 
within the Directive.  This extends to contractual as well as statutory provisions59 
and, as indicated above, is restricted to the stolen vehicle passenger exception.  
Even then, as an exception to the general rule, it is one that must be construed 
strictly60. 
 
The compensating body’s role 
As to the role of the authorised Article 10 compensating body (ie the MIB) this is 
regulated in precise terms61. 
First, it is a strictly circumscribed role.  The body is only responsible for:  
(i) unidentified vehicle claims 
(ii) claims where there is no insurance in place62 
                                               
54 Which replicates Article 3 of the first Directive (72/166/EEC) on motor insurance 
55 Namely, ‘any motor vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power, but 
not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled.’ 
56 (Case C-162/13) Vnuk paras 56, 57 and 59 
57 (Case C-162/13) Vnuk paras 57 and 59 
58 (Case C-537/03) Candolin v Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola [2005] ECR I-5745, para 28 
requires that national provisions must not deprive the provisions of the Directive from their 
effectiveness.  See also (Case C 409/11) Gábor Csonka v Magyar Állam [2014] 1 CMLR 14, para 
28 from which it is evident that the protection is required at the anterior stage of insurance cover; 
not the Article 10 compensating body, see Csonka paras 30 to 32 
59 (Case C-129/94) Rafael Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] ECR. I-1829, para 20 
60 (Case C-537/03) Candolin, paras 18, 21, 22 and 34 
61 See APPENDIX item 7, Mind The Gap!, BILAJ, January 2016 under the heading On the 
Compensating Body – Article 10 and in particular (Case C-442/10) Churchill v Benjamin Wilkinson 
and Tracy Evans  [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1776, para 41; (Case C 409/11) Csonka, paras 31 and 32 
62 (Case C 409/11) Csonka paras 30 to 32 
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Secondly, only one exclusion of liability is permitted under either of the above 
scenarios and that only applies to a passenger who voluntarily enters the vehicle 
knowing that it is uninsured63.   
Thirdly, it must compensate at least up to the level of the third party cover 
requirement for identified insured drivers64. 
Fourthly, it must apply the European law principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness65 in the discharge of its role. 
Finally, the Article 10 body is permitted to treat its liability as subordinated to other 
sources of redress and, in the case of claims featuring unidentified vehicles, to 
exclude property damage claims in certain situations.  However, applying existing 
CJEU principles, these are to be construed strictly. 
 
Comparisons with the UK provision  
It follows from the above that the qualified nature of the UK provision for third 
party motor insurance and the third party rule (in both its common law66 and 
statutory manifestations67) are inimical to the free standing and holistic nature of 
the third party cover required under European law.  The Article 3 requirement 
obliges the third party cover against civil liability for the vehicle’s use (as opposed 
to the personal liability of the driver or owner68) to be fit for purpose.  Accordingly, 
                                               
63 (Case C-129/94) Bernáldez para 20 
64 This is taken from Article 10.1 of the Directive 
65 It is settled law that where, in the absence of EU law rules and procedure, a member state 
seeks to implement EU law, the domestic legal system of each state must lay down the detailed 
procedural rules to safeguard the rights conferred on individuals under that EU law, and it must 
do so in conformity with the EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness.  See the 
explanation given by the CJEU in (Case C-63/01) Evans v Secretary of State for Transport and 
MIB [2003] ECR I-14447 paras 27 and 28 and paras 41 – 46 - all fully cited above.  See also the 
following CJEU judgments for the application of the principle of effectiveness in this area: (Case 
C-129/94) Bernaldez, (Case C-537/03), para 19; Candolin, para 28; (Case C-356/05) Farrell, para 
34 and (Case C-442/10) Churchill, para 48.  The principle of equivalence was considered at some 
length by the House of Lords in Preston v Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2001] UKHL 5; [2001] 2 
AC 455, see also note 93 below 
66 Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762 and Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58, 72; 
to the extent abrogated by Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 and the other exceptions to this 
rule 
67 Section 1(4) Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930; Section 1(5) Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999, as to which note Harman LJ’s observations in Post Office v Norwich 
Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 577 at 376 and Regulation 3(2) European 
Communities Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Regulations 2002 and most recently the 
Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 that came into force on 1 August 2016 
68 As stipulated under RTA 1988 Section 145 (3) (a), as amended by Section 151 (2) (a), which 
restricts the scope of mandatory third party cover to the individual liability of those using the 
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subject to the single exception already noted, as long as there is some insurance 
in place for the vehicle responsible then the Directive requires that the insurer on 
risk must satisfy any liability arising out of its use for death, injury and loss up to 
the prescribed financial levels69.   
The Directive does not envisage any intermediate category of insufficiently 
insured vehicle that warrants either a statutory intercession70 or the intervention 
of an Article 75 insurer71.  Accordingly, Article 3 requires this third party cover to 
extend to any civil liability caused by any use consistent with the normal function 
of the vehicle during the term of the policy72.  This is qualified only by the single 
permitted exclusion of liability concerning a passenger with knowledge that the 
vehicle is stolen73.  Where the vehicle responsible is identified, Article 10 only 
permits the compensating body (MIB) to intervene, if there is no insurance in 
place74.  European law requires a binary approach that places a strong emphasis 
                                               
insured vehicle; thereby omitting cover for mechanical defects for which the user is not 
responsible 
69 Now set out in Article 9 of the Directive 
70 Such as Section 151(5) of the RTA 1934 (originally Section 10 of the RTA 1930) which provides, 
inter alia, that:  ‘Notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have 
avoided or cancelled, the policy or security, he must, subject to the provisions of this section, pay 
to the persons entitled to the benefit of the judgment....(a) as regards liability in respect of death 
or bodily injury...(b) as regards liability in respect of damage to property and  (c) any amount 
payable in respect of costs’ 
71 This term is used to describe one of the MIB’s members appropriating the role of the Article 10 
compensating body; which role, in the author’s view, is one properly reserved only to the UK’s 
authorised body and is restricted to incidents involving uninsured or unidentified vehicles  
72 It would appear that the government fails to appreciate that Article 3 requires any civil liability 
arising out of the vehicle’s use to be covered, as oppose to the user’s personal liability.  This issue 
lies at the heart of an ongoing RoadPece legal challenge.  It has been raised in the permission to 
appeal application to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal in Abdullah Sahin v 1) 
Cassandra Havard 2) Riverstone Insurance (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1202 based on the 
author’s advice. The government’s latest legislative proposals within the Vehicle Technology and 
Aviation Bill (HC Bill 143) ignore the fact that Article 3 already requires product liability cover, 
despite being advised of this fact by the author in his consultation response.  Section 2 (b) of the 
bill contains similar qualifications to the third-party protection for product liability caused by a 
defect in the vehicle’s automated systems and this conflicts with the same CJEU rulings 
considered above under ‘Lock down of discretion and enhancement of rights’, (These begin with 
(Case C-129/94) Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] ECR. I-1829 and continue with the other cases listed in 
note 53 above). It is clear that these that prohibit member states from introducing their own 
idiosyncratic exceptions and exclusions of product liability.   
73 Article 13 of the Directive.  Even then, The Directive does not prevent insurers enforcing their 
contractual rights against their policyholder, including any right of recoupment for liabilities 
incurred in breach of contract.  However, where the policyholder happens also to be an injured 
third party passenger neither the policy nor the state regulation can automatically preclude to a 
disproportionate degree such an individual from recovering compensation, (Case C-442/10) 
Churchill v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1776, para 44 
74 (Case C-442/10) Churchill, cited above, para 41 
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on the protective purpose being discharged by the comprehensive nature and 
scope of the anterior Article 3 insurance requirement75. 
However, the Court of Appeal in its unanimous decision in EUI v Bristol Alliance 
took a very different view76.  The court held that Sections 143 and 145 of the RTA 
1988, when read together, impose a duty on the user of a motor vehicle, as 
opposed to the insurer, to ensure that they have only sufficient insurance for any 
use actually made of that vehicle.  The onus is on the user to ensure that their 
use conforms to the cover provided under their policy; if they fail in this, then that 
non-contractual use is treated as being out of cover.  The implication of this 
reasoning is that insurers are not required to cover any and every use that the 
driver or policyholder might make of the vehicle.77   
Ward LJ’s judgment in EUI reflects long established jurisprudence, some of which 
predates the UK’s accession to the European Community.  It reposes great 
weight on the intentions of contracting parties and on the third party rule.  Under 
this orthodoxy, the contractual scope of third party cover is only modified to the 
extent provided for in the three instances allowed in the RTA 198878.   
Furthermore, according to this Court of Appeal decision, vehicles involved in a 
use that falls outside the terms of their contractual cover and not otherwise 
nullified by statute are to be treated as uninsured.  In that situation, a third party 
victim’s only recourse is to require the insurer to act as an Article 7579 insurer 
under the MIB’s uninsured drivers’ scheme80.  Insurers exploit this practice to 
subject victims of insured drivers who have breached a condition of their policy 
to the disadvantageous terms of the MIB’s scheme for uninsured drivers.  This 
misallocation would not matter quite so much if the MIB schemes complied with 
                                               
75 (Case C-162/13) Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d.d., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2146, [2014] All 
ER (D) 121 (Sep) , paras 56 and 59 
76 EUI Ltd v Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 
77 See Ward LJ’s judgment in EUI v Bristol Alliance supra, para 38 
78 Namely, (i) the nullifying provisions of Sections 148(1) and (2) of the RTA 1988; (ii) 
Unauthorised use under Section 151(2) and finally (iii) unlicensed use under Section 151(3) 
79 A term used to denote an insurer exculpated from its contractual liability to indemnify the 
policyholder but required, through the aforementioned statutory intervention, to satisfy a third 
party victim’s claim.  Practitioners use the terms ‘article 75 insurer’ and ‘statutory insurer’ 
interchangeably.  See Merkin R and Hemsworth M, ‘The Law of Motor Insurance’ (2nd edn Sweet 
& Maxwell 2016) pages 475 and 489 and again at 627 – 631 on Article 75 
80 i.e. under one or other of the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreements of 1999 or 2015 
25 
 
the European law obligation that the Article 10 body provide equivalent and 
effective third party protection to the Article 3 requirement, but they don’t81. 
The provenance of and use of the term ‘Article 75’, as a criterion for allocating 
claims against ostensibly insured drivers as ‘statutory insurer’ claims, has not 
been subjected to a legal challenge82.  ‘Article 75’ refers to a provision in the MIB’s 
Articles of Association that allocates responsibility between an insurer on risk and 
the MIB for investigating and settling an insufficiently insured claim, back dated 
policies or a claim on a policy rendered void by misrepresentation or non-
disclosure.  It is a pragmatic intra-insurer arrangement and no more.  Yet the 
Article 75 status of insurers is regularly associated with a collateral right to act as 
the MIB’s agent and to manage the claim under the terms of the MIB’s uninsured 
drivers’ scheme.  This practice has acquired, through long unchallenged usage, 
an aura of legitimacy as a rule of law, one that is capable of binding third parties.  
Yet it is one that does not bear close scrutiny.  The MIB’s internal arrangements 
have no legal relevance to defining a third party’s legal entitlement under either 
Article 3 or Article 10 of the Directive.  Unfortunately, the courts regularly treat 
Article 75 as if it was a common law or procedural rule and this uncritical approach 
is evident in Ward LJ’s judgment in EUI83.  
The erroneous view that member states retain a large measure of discretion to 
allocate their implementation between the Articles 3 and 10 regimes is one that 
seems to have gained wide judicial approval84. 
                                               
81 See APPENDIX item 3, Why the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 1999 needs to be scrapped, 
JPIL [2011] Issue 2 and APPENDIX item 7, Mind The Gap, BILAJ January 2016, under the 
heading Comparative law analysis, item 9 
82 Or at least, no such case has been reported 
83 EUI v Bristol Alliance, para 69 cited above in note 82  
84 See Ward LJ’s judgment in EUI, para 68, and Jay J in Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport 
[2014] EWHC 1785 (QB), para 21 
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European law remedies 
It is a basic precept of EU law that directives do not have direct effect85 because 
they are addressed to the member states who are required to implement their 
legislative aims86 within the time designated87.  Accordingly, individuals must 
usually depend on their member state to implement a directive by transposing 
them into their national laws and rules before they can rely, indirectly, on any 
rights conferred under the directive in their national courts.  
In consequence of the above, directives cannot impose legal obligations on 
individuals and so cannot be relied on by individuals directly against other 
individuals where a member state has failed completely or partially to transpose 
its objectives into national law88.  
Directives often confer a wide discretion as to the form in which member states 
implement their objectives.  This is particularly true of the way in which the 
motor insurance directives prescribe the role of the compensating body for 
victims of uninsured and unidentified vehicles under Article 10 of the Directive.  
Provided the arrangements satisfy the EU law principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness then member states have a relatively free hand in how they 
implement a directives’ legislative requirements89.  
                                               
85 Direct effect is an important principle of EU law.  It was developed by the CJEU in Van Gend 
en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 (Case 26/62).  It describes 
the ability of individual citizens to cite in proceedings and to rely directly on the provisions of EU 
law (initially treaty provisions) in private disputes with other citizens, private bodies and 
institutions, in the same way that they can rely on their own domestic law and statutes.  Direct 
effect is usually reserved to treaty articles, general principles of EU laws.  The origins of direct 
effect and its development by the CJEU are considered in Chalmers D, Davies G & Monti G, 
‘European Union Law’ (2nd edn Cambridge University Press, 2010, Chapter 7 Rights and 
Remedies in National Courts, pages 267-314 
86 Article 249 (3) EC, provides that: 'A Directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is directed but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods.' 
87 Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 is the domestic enabling measure 
88 (Case 152 / 84) Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
[1986] ECR 723 para 48.  However in recent years it has become apparent that individuals can 
be impacted by the collateral effects of another individual invoking rights conferred under a 
directive, such as where an individual is able to assert direct vertical effect against the state, a 
public authority or other body caught by the doctrine, see (Case C-201/02) Wells v SoSf Transport 
2004 ECR 10723, or where a general principle of EU law is invoked (that had s binding and direct 
effect) which the directive coincidentally seeks to implement, as to which see (Case C-144/04) 
Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2004] ECR I-0723 paras 83 and 84.   
89 see (Case C-63/01) Evans v Secretary of State for Transport and MIB [2003] ECR I-14447 
paras 27 -36 which explicate these two EU law principles.  These were successfully invoked iin 
(Case C-63/01) Evans by the UK to defend various contentions that its scheme for compensating 
victims of untraced drivers was incompatible with the motor insurance directives in Carswell v 
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There is a considerable body of academic commentary on the way the CJEU 
has developed exceptions to the rule against the horizontal direct effect of 
directives and which consider the tension between the need to retain the 
distinctive features of a directive and the remedies need to ensure their 
effectiveness. 90 
 
The doctrine of indirect effect and harmonious or consistent interpretation 
In 1984 the CJEU ruled91 that the provisions of a directive are capable of 
indirect effect92.  This is achieved by requiring national courts to interpret their 
domestic law in the light of the wording and the purpose of a directive.  The 
rationale then offered was that as national courts are part of the state, they are 
also subject to the member state’s treaty obligation to take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment the Member 
States' obligation arising from a directive93.  Accordingly, the courts are required 
when applying national law on matters within their jurisdiction to interpret them, 
as far as possible94, in the light of the wording and the purpose of any relevant 
                                               
Secretary of State for Transport & MIB [2010] EWHC 3230 (QB),.[2011] Lloyd's Rep IR 644.  See 
APPENDIX, item 2 – The Motor Insurers’ Bureau’s role, and item 3 – Why the Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreement 1999 needs to be scrapped, JPIL [2011] issues 1 and 2 respectively.  These twin 
principles are considered at greater length by Professor Takis Tridimas in ‘The General Principles 
of EU law’ (2nd edn Oxford University Press 2006), see Chapter 9 from page 418 and at pages 
423 - 427 
90 Some of which are listed here: Tridimas, ‘Black, White and Shades of Grey: Horizontality 
Revisited’ (2002) 21 Y.B.E.L. 327; A. Dashwood, ‘From Van Duyn to Mangold via Marshall: 
reducing Direct Effect to Absurdity’ (2006–07) 9 C.Y.E.L.S. 81; Dougan, ‘When Worlds Collide!’ 
(2007) 44 C.M.L. Rev. 931; P. Craig, ‘The Legal Effect of Directives: Policy, Rules and Exceptions’ 
(2009) 34 E.L. Rev. 349; M. de Mol, ‘Dominguez: A Deafening Silence’ (2012) 8 European 
Constitutional Law Review 280; Amstutz, M, ‘In-Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence 
of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning’ (2005) ELJ 11, Vol 6, 766-784 
91 (Case 14/83) Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891  
92 This exception to the non-horizontality of directives was initially believed to be confined to 
similar scenarios as the case facts: featuring an action against a state body where the directive 
relied on was insufficient clear to justify direct effect (see below).  However its application was 
extended in (Case C-106/89) Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA 
[1990] ECR I-4135 so as to apply to all national law, even laws that predated the implementation 
date of the directive concerned.  The origins and development of direct effect is extensively 
covered in textbooks, academic papers and journals, including:  Chalmers D, Davies G & Monti 
G, ‘European Union Law’ (2nd edn Cambridge University Press, 2010, Chapter 7 Rights and 
Remedies in National Courts, pages 294-314; Betlem, G, ‘The Doctrine of Consistent 
Interpretation—Managing Legal Uncertainty’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 22, No 3 (2002) 
397-418, some of them critical of the potential this has for generating legal uncertainty, G.de 
Burca, ‘Giving Effect to European Community Directives’ (1992) 55 ML 215  
93 (Case 14/83) Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, para 26 
94 The extent and limits of the duty of consistent construction are considered in some detail by the 
CJEU in (Case C-378/07) Kiriaki Angelidaki and Others v Organismos Nomarkhiaki Aftodiikisi 
Rethimnis and Dimos Geropotamou [2009] ECR I-3071, paras 197 – 202, with particular regard 
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directive ‘to achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby comply with the 
third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty’95.   
This principle of EU law consistent interpretation was developed further by the 
CJEU in 200496 when it ruled: first, that ‘when hearing a case between 
individuals, a national court is required, to provide the legal protection conferred 
on individuals under the rules of Community law and to ensure that they are 
fully effective’97; second, that when applying the provisions of domestic law 
adopted for the purpose of transposing obligations laid down by a directive, to 
consider the whole body of rules of national law98 and to interpret them, so far 
as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to 
achieve an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the directive.’99 It 
also ruled, that in so doing, the court must presume that the state had ‘intended 
entirely to fulfil the obligations arising from the Directive concerned.’100 
                                               
to restrictions resulting from the general European law principles of legal certainty and non-
retroactivity, as well as the rule that prevents an interpretation of national law that is contra legem.  
Aikens LJ provides a helpful exegesis in Churchill Insurance Co Ltd v Fitzgerald & Wilkinson & 
Ors [2012] EWCA Civ 1166, [2012] All ER (D) 47 (Dec). paras 45-49.  The limits of consistent 
construction were previously considered by Clyde LJ in Clarke v Kato and Cutter v Eagle Star 
Insurance Ltd [1998] All ER (D) 481, [1998] 1 WLR 1647.  See also Betlem, G, ‘The Doctrine of 
Consistent Interpretation—Managing Legal Uncertainty’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 22, 
No 3 (2002) 397-418 where the professor’s prescient analysis anticipates the references made 
by Aikens LJ in in Churchill (supra) to the analogous interpretive obligation imposed in the UK 
courts under the Human Rights Act 1998 
95 (Case C-106/89) Marleasing SA, (see citation in note 98 above) para 8 and referring to the 
Treaty of Rome 1957 
96 Case C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer et alia v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband 
Walshut eV [2004] ECR 1-8835 
97 Pfeiffer, cited above, para 111; this passage also confirms a new rationale to the estoppel 
argument given in Marleasing (of preventing member states from pleading their own failure to 
implement a directive against an individual) to a more positive dual imperative of (i) ensuring that 
rights conferred on individuals by a directive are actually put into effect under national laws, as 
well as (ii) the wider jurisprudential requirement of ensuring the effectiveness of directives, which 
appears to originate from (Case 8/81) Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, [1982] 
ECR 53, paras 210-23 in the context of direct vertical effect).  Further insight is provided by the 
CJEU (albeit in the context of a case where the claimant was seeking direct effect of a directive 
against a private individual) in (Case C-144/04) Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2004] ECR I-
0723, at para 77 the CJEU had the following to say on the role of national courts: ‘…it is the 
responsibility of the national court, hearing a dispute involving the principle of non-discrimination 
in respect of age, to provide, in a case within its jurisdiction, the legal protection which individuals 
derive from the rules of Community law and to ensure that those rules are fully effective, setting 
aside any provision of national law which may conflict with that law (see, to that effect, Case 
106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 21, and Case C-347/96 Solred [1998] ECR I-
937, paragraph 30).’ 
98 Hitherto the House of Lords had ruled that Marleasing’s purposive or consistent construction 
doctrine was confined to legislation; not private law agreements such as the Uninsured Drivers 
Agreement between the Secretary of State for Transport and the MIB, See Lord Nicholls judgment 
in White v White & MIB [2001] UKHL 9, [2001] 1 WLR 481, para 21.  
99 Pfeiffer, cited above, para 119 
100 Pfeiffer, cited above, para 112 
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In 2003 the CJEU ruled that state liability can attach where this interpretive 
obligation is not discharged by a court of final appeal101. 
The potentially far reaching nature of the indirect effect resulting from a directive 
is demonstrated by the way this doctrine can even require a court to preclude 
the application of conflicting domestic law provisions or contractual clause and 
to add wording.102  In discharging this obligation, national courts are free to use 
their own interpretive methods and a comprehensive explication, provided in the 
context of the Directives on motor insurance, is provided by Lord Aikens, in Part 
VI of his judgment in Churchill v Wilkinson in 2012103.   Here notional wording 
was added to s151(8) Road Traffic Act 1988 to bring it into conformity with 
these Directives.104   
A problem can arise where the parties are ignorant of or otherwise fail to raise 
the relevant EU law provisions in a dispute before the court105.  Although there 
is no general EU law principle that imposes a duty on national courts to raise 
points of EU law of its own motion106, the CJEU has demonstrated that it is 
prepared to forge exceptions on a case by case basis107.  In view of the 
importance attached to the protective purpose of the Directives on motor 
insurance by the CJEU108 it seems at the very least plausible to argue that the 
                                               
101 (Case C-224/01) Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2004] 2 WLR 976, paras 32 - 36 
102 (Case C-129/94) Rafael Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] E.C.R. I-1829, para 20; (Case C-356/05) Elaine 
Farrell v Alan Whitty, The Minister for the Environment, Ireland and the Attorney General, Motor 
Insurers Bureau of Ireland [2007] ECR I-3067, paras 20-30; (Case C-442/10) Churchill v Benjamin 
Wilkinson and Tracy Evans [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1776, para 33 
103 Churchill Insurance Co Ltd v Fitzgerald & Wilkinson & Ors [2012] EWCA Civ 1166, [2012] All 
ER (D) 47 (Dec). paras 45-49 
104 Churchill v Wilkinson 2012, cited above, para 75 
105 For example, this occurred in Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532, [2012] 1 WLR 2149 
where the Court of Appeal simply noted that neither party had raised the issue as to whether the 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement was compatible with the Directives on motor insurance before 
moving on to make a per incuriam finding as a direct result of failing to consider or apply the 
relevant EU law.  The claimant eventually pursued a successful Francovich action in Delaney v 
Secretary of State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 172, [2015] 1 WLR 5177 
106 (Joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93) Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis 
van Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ER I-4705, paras 17 – 22, 
especially where the parties had the opportunity, (In Joined Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05) J. van 
der Weerd et alia v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit [2007] ECR I-4233, paras 
31 - 41 
107 For example, it has justified a requirement that a court raise EU law points ex officio by 
reference to the equivalence principle in (Case C-72/95 ) Aannemersbedrijf PK Kraaijeveld BV v 
Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996] ECR I-5403 and, arguably of particular relevance 
to the Directives on motor insurance, in the case of consumer rights prescribed under the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive 85/577, it justified such an approach by the need to ensure the special 
protection conferred on the weaker party to such a consumer contract (Joined Cases C 240/98 
to C 244/98) Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores [2000] ECR I 4941, paras 25 -29 
108 (Case C-162/13) Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d. d. [2014] All ER (D) 121 (Sep) 
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UK courts have a legal obligation under EU law, to depart from its conventional 
passive stance and to undertake an EU law consistent interpretation of the UK’s 
transposition of these Directives ex officio.   
Unfortunately, a recent line of decisions indicate that the UK courts cannot be 
relied on to apply an EU law consistent construction correctly, even when 
seized of the need109.  Furthermore, as its exercise is perceived to be a matter 
discretion110, the parties are only able to influence the construction indirectly, 
through representations addressed to the court.   
 
Direct vertical effect 
The rule against direct effect has been modified by the CJEU which has 
consistently ruled that where a directive’s objectives are intended to confer 
rights on individuals and are set out in clear, precise and unconditional terms 
then individuals affected by a member states’ failure to fully implement them 
can be invoked in an action against the state111.   
This doctrine has been extended to embrace a broad range of bodies that are 
not part of central government but which are nevertheless tasked by the state 
with discharging an obligation imposed on it under the terms of a directive or 
bodies otherwise under the control or influence of the state or invested with 
special powers beyond those exercised by ordinary individuals112.   
                                               
109 See Clarke v Kato and Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Ltd [1998] All ER (D) 481, [1998] 1 WLR 
1647, which has been overturned by Vnuk, see citation above, and EUI Ltd v Bristol Alliance Ltd 
Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267, [2013] 2 WLR 1029 and more recently Abdullah Sahin v 1) 
Cassandra Havard 2) Riverstone Insurance (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1202, which this author 
has criticised in his article, Third time lucky?, New Law Journal, 13 January 2017, pages 13-14, 
(not supplied in the Appendix) permission to appeal to the Supreme Court in the latter case is 
awaited 
110 A point well illustrated by the authors in Lenaerts and Corthaut, ‘Of birds and hedges: the role 
of primacy in invoking norms of EU law’, European Law Review, 2006 page 7, when they state 
that there is ‘no obligation for the national judges to do the impossible’...and thus... ‘at the end of 
the day it is the national judge who decides where to draw the line and thus how much “as far as 
possible” really is.’  
111 See (Case C-271/91) Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53, para 24.  
Various different justifications have been offered by the CJEU to support this exception to the 
basic rule against the direct effect of directives:  one of which is to prevent member states from 
relying on their own failure, see (Case 152 / 84) Marshall, cited above, para 49; another has been 
that this is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of this form of secondary legislation, see (Case 
C-271/91) Becker cited above, paras 19-21 
112 The CJEU has ruled a directive could be relied on against tax authorities [see (Case 8/81) 
Becker, cited above, and in (Case C-221/88) ECSC v Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni ( in liquidation 
) [1990] ECR I-495 ], local or regional authorities [ judgment in (Case 103/88) Fratelli Costanzo v 
32 
 
Entities that fulfil this criteria113 are for these purposes to be treated as though 
they were the state and fixed with direct effect of the relevant directive, thus 
enabling an individual to cite its provisions in legal proceedings against such an 
entity.  The CJEU has sought to justify this exception to the general rule against 
horizontal direct effect in different ways114.  This doctrine has attracted its share 
of judicial analysis as to the broadest scope of which entities are capable of 
being caught by it115 and it has also generated a considerable body of 
secondary commentary116.  A definitive explanation of the legal principles and 
guidance on the criteria is expected imminently from CJEU in a reference the 
                                               
Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839 ], constitutionally independent authorities responsible for the 
maintenance of public order and safety [ judgment in Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 ], and public authorities providing public health 
services [ judgment in (Case 152/84) Marshall, cited above (Case C-188/89) Foster and others v 
British Gas Plc [1990] ECR 1-3313, paras 18-20].  Also of significance is the Court of Appeal’s 
ruling that a board of governors who possessed no special powers and who arguably were only 
under a tenuous degree of state control were subject to the direct effect of the Transfer of 
Undertakings Regulations or EEC Business Transfers Directive 77/187 in NUT v Governing Body 
of St. Mary’s Church of England School [1996] EWCA Civ J1212-7, [1995] ICR 317.  The 
increasingly wide application of this exception to bodies that are evidently not part of the state but 
merely charged with discharging a state obligation, suggests that the legal status of the body per 
se is no longer a decisive factor. 
113 See (Case C-188/89) Foster cited above, paras 18-20 for a broad statement of the criteria 
which in its concluding paragraph appears to favour a functionality test, (not unlike that which 
applies to public authorities that are subject to the Human Rights Convention) 
114 First propounded both in terms of ensuring the effectiveness of a directive and in terms of a 
correlative precept of preventing member states from relying on their failure to implement a 
directive in claims against it by individuals affected that failure, in (Case 41/73) van Duyn v Home 
Office [1974] 1 WLR 110 para 12; (Case 148/78) Ratti [1979] ECR 1629, para 21; and (Case 
8/81) Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, [1982] ECR 53, para 24.  Arguably this 
reasoning and its practical implications for individual claimants was taken to a new level in (Case 
C-424/97) Haim v Kassenzahnarztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein [2000] E.C.R. I-5123 at paras 27-
28, when the Court ruled in para 28 that ‘member states cannot, therefore, escape that liability 
either by pleading the internal distribution of powers and responsibilities as between the bodies 
which exist within their national legal order or by claiming that the public authority responsible for 
the breach of Community law did not have the necessary powers, knowledge, means or 
resources.’  See notes 98 and 100 above for some of the secondary commentary.  Professor 
Dashwood’s analysis of the conflicting EU law objectives of ensuring that EU law is given full 
effect with that of preserving the essential nature of directives is particularly helpful, see A. 
Dashwood, ‘From Van Duyn to Mangold via Marshall: reducing Direct Effect to Absurdity’ (2006–
07) 9 C.Y.E.L.S. 8  
115 Arguably the most helpful of these is Blackburn J’s first instance judgment in Griffin & ors v 
South West Water Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15 where he held that a privatised utility company 
was subject to the direct effect of Directive No.75/129 on collective redundancies. In doing so he 
emphasised that the determining factors in this exercise were the powers and duties conferred 
upon the organisation and on the control to which it is subject – as opposed to seeking to classify 
the entity itself (whether as an emanation of the state, a public body or otherwise). At paragraph 
94 of his judgment he expands on the Foster guidance with a clear and simple set of propositions 
of his own, which was approved of by Auld LJ in his leading judgment in the House of Lords in 
Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 
3) [2003] 2 AC 1 at page 99 
116 See note 96 above 
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Irish Republic’s Supreme Court concerning the Motor Insurers’ Bureau for 
Ireland117. 
 
The EU law doctrine of state liability 
If the above routes fail118 it is possible to claim damages against the state.  
Such a claim is based on the Francovich principle119 which requires a member 
state to make good the loss and damage caused by its failure to implement a 
directive.  It only applies to directives that confer rights on individuals that 
clearly and precisely articulated the state’s failure can be shown to be causative 
of the loss complained of120.  Unfortunately, it is rarely a cut and dry process, 
depending as it does on a wide range of contextual factors121 which the court 
must take into account when deciding whether a breach is ‘sufficiently 
serious’122 to warrant state liability.  This can make them a hazardous and 
prohibitive enterprise123. 
                                               
117 In (Case C-413/15) in Farrell v Whitty, The Minister for the Environment, Ireland and the 
Attorney General, Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland (MIBI) made on 27 July 2015 and which puts 
three questions:  
‘(i) Is the test in Foster and Others v British Gas plc (Case C-188/89) as set out at para. 20 on the 
question of what is an emanation of a member state to be read on the basis that the elements of 
the test are to be applied (a) conjunctively, or (b) disjunctively? 
(ii) To the extent that separate matters referred to in Foster and Others v British Gas plc (Case 
C-188/89) may, alternatively, be considered to be factors which should properly be taken into 
account in reaching an overall assessment, is there a fundamental principle underlying the 
separate factors identified in that decision which a court should apply in reasoning an assessment 
as to whether a specified body is an emanation of the State? 
(iii) Is it sufficient that a broad measure of responsibility has been transferred to a body by a 
member state for the ostensible purpose of meeting obligations under European law for that body 
to be an emanation of the member state or is it necessary, in addition, that such a body 
additionally have (a) special powers or (b) operate under direct control or supervision of the 
member state?’ 
118 For example, where for example a domestic court is unable to provide a consistent 
interpretation of a national law intended to give effect to a European directive, as in the case of 
Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB), [2008] 2 WLR 234 
where Flaux J took the view that although the MIB’s untraced drivers scheme failed to conform 
with the Second Directive on motor insurance he found the UK state liable to compensate to 
compensate the claimant because of its failure to implement the directive. 
119 (Case nos. C-6/90 and C-9/90) Francovich v Italian Republic and Bonifaci v Italian Republic 
Case [1991] ECR I I-5357 
120 Case nos. C-6/90 and C-9/90) Francovich, cited above, para 40 
121 Derived from the CJEU ruling in R v Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. Factortame in (No.5) 
[1999] 4 All ER 906, [1999] 3 WLR 1062 
122 (Case C-46/93) Brasserie Du Pecheur S.A. v Federal Republic of Germany, Regina v 
Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd (no4) [1996] ECR I-1029 
123 There are a number of reasons for this.  They are public law actions, where a claimant does 
not enjoy the protection conferred by qualified one-way cost shifting (under Part 44.12 to 44.17 
of the Civil Procedure Rules) that applies to a normal personal injury claim; furthermore if pursued 
as a separate action, it can add years to the litigation; it usually features a significant disparity in 
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the respective parties’ resources and know-how, and the Factortame criteria for assessing 
whether a breach of European law was sufficiently serious often confers a wide discretion on the 
court. Another potential disadvantage is that the award is assessed on a loss of chance basis 
rather than the tort law restitutio in integrum principle, which can result in a lower award 
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Review of author’s publications  
 
Case commentaries: 
The EUI case 
EUI v Bristol Alliance124 featured an ostensibly insured driver who breached a 
policy exclusion for deliberately caused damage when attempting to commit 
suicide.  He survived but his car caused extensive damage to prestigious retail 
premises in Bristol. 
Ward LJ’s judgment provides a meticulous explanation of his reasons for 
categorising the case as one against an uninsured driver.  In this, it reflects 
conventional legal perspectives.  He ruled that the claimant’s subrogated loss 
was an excluded liability under the relevant MIB agreement125. 
The author was the first to provide a critical analysis, published in the 
Butterworths’ Personal Injury Litigation Service (BPILS) Bulletin 108 in November 
2012126 and in Journal of Personal Injury Lawyers (JPIL) in early 2013 127.  He 
provides a more expansive critique in Marking the Boundary 128, which 
deconstructs various misconceptions underlying the Court of Appeal’s decision.  
It identifies seven different precepts relied on in the judge’s reasoning which 
subjects to a European law consistent analysis.  The article is forthright in 
expressing the view that the decision was made per incuriam.  It argues that the 
court relied on outdated UK authorities and the selective use of others such as 
Churchill v Wilkinson and, most significantly, it contends that the judge failed to 
apply the European law correctly.   
The gravamen of the article is that the RTA 1988, when properly construed in the 
light of the correct domestic and European law it is supposed to implement, 
requires even deliberately caused damage to be covered by the third party cover 
prescribed by Section 145.  It exposes the aforementioned misconception129 
                                               
124 EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 
125 Relying on purported exclusion of liability set out in clause 6.1(c) of the Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreement 1999 
126 The author’s Case commentary on EUI v Bristol Alliance, was published in BPILS Bulletin 108, 
Nov 2012 
127 See Case commentary on EUI v Bristol Alliance, JPIL, [2013] Issue 1; not supplied in the 
APPENDIX 
128 See APPENDIX item 5 Marking the Boundary, JPIL [2013] issue 3 
129 See above in this paper under Comparisons with the UK provision 
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relating to the status of an Article 75 insurer as inconsistent with the Directive.  
The article also questions the court’s assumption that the MIB can legitimately 
exclude subrogated claims.  This remains the only published article to openly 
criticise this decision as wrong in law and to argue for a different outcome130.   
The author’s views have since been vindicated, albeit indirectly, by the CJEU 
ruling in Damijan Vnuk131 which stressed the importance of the Directive’s 
protective purpose132 and ruled that the Article 3 insurance requirement and thus, 
by implication, the contractual terms of every motor policy, must cover any use 
that is consistent with the normal function of the vehicle133.  Although the 
defendant in EUI was deliberately driving his car at an excessive speed and to 
certain destruction, from a functional perspective, this was consistent with 
vehicular travel on land. 
 
The Delaney case 
The author’s critical commentary on the Court of Appeal’s unanimous decision in 
Delaney v Pickett134 is another example of his independent analysis and 
willingness to advance a controversial argument135.   
The case featured a passenger who sustained a serious brain injury.  Both the 
victim and the driver were found to be in possession of a large amount of 
marijuana.  The majority found that both driver and passenger had been en route 
to sell this consignment when the accident occurred.   
The court unanimously upheld the first instance findings that:  
(i) because the insurers had, after the accident, obtained a court order 
declaring the defendant’s driver’s policy void for non-disclosure of 
                                               
130 Margaret Hemsworth’s case comment published in The Journal of Business Law, [2013] issue 
3, 354-361 post dates the author’s by several months and she kindly acknowledges his 
commentary in the NLJ. She flags up some of the comparative law issues raised by the author, 
she points out their potential inconsistency with European law; reporting the outcome rather than 
advancing any particular view 
131 (Case C-162/13) Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d. d. [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2146, 
[2014] All ER (D) 121 (Sep) 
132 (Case C-162/13) Vnuk, paras 48 to 52 
133 (Case C-162/13) Vnuk, paras 56 to 59 
134 Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 
135 See APPENDIX item 4, Case commentary on Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532, JPIL 
2015, 3, C169-C174 
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material facts, under Section 152(2) of the RTA 1988 the driver was 
uninsured and as such the claim was governed by the terms of the 
Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 1999 
(ii) consequently, the MIB was exempted from any liability to 
compensate the claimant passenger because Clause 6(1)(e)(ii) 
excludes liability for a passenger who knew or had reason to believe 
that the vehicle responsible was being used in furtherance of a 
crime   
The author was the only commentator to offer robust criticism of this decision at 
the time:  arguing that it was per incuriam as its key findings were incompatible 
with the relevant European law: that places an emphasis on providing a 
consistent level of protection to third party victims.   
What was striking about this case was that two of the Lord Justices took care to 
note that the claimant did not raise any European law compatibility issues136.  
Also, although Ward LJ considered the relevant provisions of the Directive’s 
predecessors, he was influenced by a House of Lords ruling137 which was already 
obsolete following the CJEU ruling in Peiffer138, to the effect that the MIB 
agreements could not be subjected to a European law consistent interpretation.  
In doing so, the court failed in its constitutional duty to ‘... interpret national law, 
so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive 
concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive...’139. The court 
did not question whether the statutory power to declare a policy void ex post facto 
was consistent with the protective purpose of the Directives as interpreted by the 
CJEU in the Bernaldez 140and Candolin141 cases.   
The author’s commentary contended, admittedly somewhat controversially, that 
the UK did not have the discretion to permit a court to declare the protection 
afforded142 to third parties by the policy void against a third party victim.  It went 
                                               
136 Delaney, supra, Richardson LJ at para 67, and Tomlinson LJ at para 75, with Ward LJ  
137 White (AP) v White & MIB [2001] UKHL 9 
138 (Case C-397/01) Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut eV 
[2004] ECR I-8835, see paras 110 to 119 that applies the purposive construction principle beyond 
legislative measures: to all the domestic laws and rules implementing the relevant directive 
139 (Case C-397/01) Pfeiffer, supra, para 113 
140 (Case C-129/94) Bernaldez [1996] E.C.R. I-1829 
141 (Case C-537/03) Candolin [2005] ECR I-5745 
142 Pursuant to Article 3 of the Directive 
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on to argue with much greater confidence that, even if that order was valid and 
the driver had been properly categorised as uninsured, the exclusion of MIB 
liability under Clause 6 of the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 1999 was invalid as 
it did not conform to the single instance permitted under European law143.   
When the author wrote to the claimant’s solicitors to advise them of his views they 
did not reply.  However, when a new legal team brought a Francovich144 action 
against the Secretary of State for Transport on the passenger’s behalf145, it was 
divulged that a last minute attempt had been made to appeal to the Supreme 
Court: one that argued a European law construction of the 1999 Agreement.  
Permission was refused on the basis that these points had not been raised in the 
appeal below146.  The author’s New Law Journal (NLJ) articles and his response 
to the Department for Transport’s February 2013 consultation were referred to in 
the successful Francovich action and incorporated into the trial bundle147.   
The author analysed Jay J’s first instance decision upholding the Francovich 
claim in a NLJ article148 and again, more extensively, in a JPIL feature149 in 
advance of the Court of Appeal’s decision: which he identified as being probably 
the most important decision on motor insurance for nearly two decades150.  The 
Court of Appeal upheld Flaux J’s findings that the Clause 6 exclusion was 
unlawful and that this constituted a sufficiently serious breach of the Directive to 
warrant state liability. 
In his NLJ article ‘No Through Road’151 published on 17 April 2015 the author 
warned the minister that he must act immediately or expect a legal challenge 
about the extensive illegality that permeates the 1999 Agreement.  The minister 
responded promptly to Delaney with his July 2015 revisions152.  The author is not 
                                               
143 See above under The compensating body’s role 
144 (Case C-6/90) Francovich v Italian Republic and Bonifaci v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357 
145 In Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB) 
146 See Richards LJ’s judgment in Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 
172, para 3.  Arguably, in so doing, the Supreme Court exposed itself to liability under the principle 
set out in (Case C-224/01) Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2004] 2 WLR 976 
147 According to Mr Eric Metcalfe, barrister, of Monckton Chambers, Grays Inn, London 
148 See the author’s article, Second sight, NLJ, 3 October 2014 
149 See the author’s article, A World Turned Upside Down, [2014] JPIL Issue 3 
150 A view endorsed by Nigel Tomkins, editor of JPIL in his case comment on the appeal decision, 
JPIL [2015] Issue 3 
151 See the author’s New Law Journal article, No Through Road, NLJ, 16 April 2015 
152 See below under Other published articles and see the author’s New Law Article, A call for 
(more) reform, NLJ, 17 July 2015 
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aware of any other legal commentator who has openly disagreed with the Court 
of Appeal’s unanimous decision in the first action and criticise it for failing to apply 
a proper European law consistent construction of these domestic provisions.  
 
The Vnuk case 
The author had already anticipated certain aspects of this decision153 and his 
commentary was the first to explain the significance of the CJEU’s restatement 
of the importance of the Directive’s protective purpose and the way this should 
influence any Pfeiffer style construction of this and other domestic law or rules 
implementing it.154  His feature on Vnuk in the online journal, PI Bulletin Update 
Law Journal (PIBULJ), offers extensive practical guidance155. 
 
Proselytising articles 
The author has also taken a more proactive stance to law reporting.  When the 
MIB failed to propose satisfactory revisions to its agreements the author 
embarked on an awareness campaign to alert claimant practitioners that both its 
schemes contained unjust provisions that breached the Directive and the 
European law principles of equivalence and effectiveness156.  In comparison, the 
Law Society’s practitioner guidance continues to provide a largely uncritical 
account of the MIB schemes.  It is largely confined to an unquestioning reportage 
of the procedural requirements and limitations imposed by the scheme without 
questioning their consistency with European law157.   
The author’s articles in JPIL and the NLJ exposed various myths such as: 
                                               
153 See APPENDIX item 10, On the right road? (Pt II) within his critique of the House of Lords’ 
decision in Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance [1998] UKHL 4 All ER 417 
154 See the author’s article, Ignore At Your Peril, NLJ, 31 October, 2014, under the heading Far 
Reaching  
155 See the author’s article, Vnuk: End of the Road?, (PI Brief Update Law Journal (PIBULJ), 
October 2014; not annexed below 
156 See APPENDIX, item 2 – The Motor Insurers’ Bureau’s role, and item 3 – Why the Uninsured 
Drivers’ Agreement 1999 needs to be scrapped, JPIL [2011] issues 1 and 2 respectively 
157 Guide to Motor Insurers’ Bureau Claims, 10th Edition, 2012, Donald Williams and Malcolm 
Johnson 
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(i) the common misconception that the MIB is a government financed 
public body or quango with an impartial agenda unalloyed by the 
commercial interests it represents158 
(ii) the belief that the ‘Article 75 procedure’ mentioned above under EUI 
has any relevance to a victim’s entitlement to third party cover159 
In February 2013 the NLJ ran a four-part series of the author’s articles (in 
consecutive weeks). They offer a holistic review of the UK’s provision for third 
party victims.  They explain the significance of European law and its key principles 
in this area, before exposing the UK’s defective transposition of that law.  They 
call for urgent reform to bring the UK provision in keeping with the minimum 
standard required under European law and concluded with a warning to the 
Secretary of State that if he does not act, others might160.   
  
                                               
158 See APPENDIX item 3 Reforming the MIB, JPIL [2011] issue1; item 3 Why the MIB 
Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 1999 needs to be scrapped, JPIL [2011] issue 2, and APPENDIX 
item 8, Bridging The Gap, BILAJ, March 2016, under On the nature of the MIB; and items 9 – 12 
of the APPENDIX: On the Right Road, NLJ, all published in February 2013 and his numerous 
posts in his campaign blog: NOTA BENE: http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/ 
159 See the author’s article, A World Turned Upside Down, JPIL [2014] Issue 3, under the heading 
Was Pickett an uninsured driver? [not appendaged here] and see also APPENDIX item 7, Mind 
The Gap, BILAJ January 2016, under the heading 7 Misallocation of insured claims as uninsured 
claims 
160 See the author’s article, On the Right Road, NLJ, February 2013, the ongoing judicial review 
in RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport (MIB intervening) (CO/4681/2015) challenges 
the entire UK transposition of the Directive, are a direct consequence of these warnings being 
ignored  
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These articles may have goaded the Department for Transport into releasing its 
2013 consultation on the MIB Agreements161.  This is a plausible hypothesis given 
(i) the very close timing, after years of inaction, and (ii) the emphasis made in the 
covering letter as to ensuring conformity with European law, a topic that had been 
the central theme of the NLJ articles but conspicuously absent from the proposals 
themselves162.   
The author was then consulted by the Motor Accident Solicitors Society, APIL 
and through it the Personal Injury Bar Association, all of whom originally intended 
to submit responses that amounted to little more than uncritical encomia163.  The 
discussions that followed revealed that there was still a profound misconception 
in the legal profession as to the extent of the UK’s non-conformity with European 
minimum standards in this area.  Nevertheless, they later altered their stance 
(albeit to differing degrees) once the author had explained the basic European 
law non-conformity issues identified in his JPIL and NLJ articles.  These articles 
helped prepare the ground for various organisations to join in a concerted call for 
a much wider review to fully implement the Directive. 
During this period the author incepted his own blog, NOTA BENE164 to increase 
awareness about the consultation and to stress the need for informed responses 
calling for extensive reform.  He also contacted every leading personal injury 
practice and some road safety charities to brief them about the consultation.  He 
later posted links to his consultation response and other articles to maintain public 
awareness.   
In a recent blog posting from March 2016 the author exposes the government’s 
complicity in refusing to address these non-conformity issues, by providing a 
                                               
161 The consultation and report can be accessed online at the following location: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/review-of-the-uninsured-and-untraced-drivers-
agreements 
162 The author’s personal impression at the time was that the Department for Transport sought to 
placate the calls for reform by prematurely releasing a draft review that had been gathering dust, 
in the hope that this would at least give the impression that it retained the initiative in such matters. 
163 Because the practitioner representative bodies were gratified that the procedural knock-out 
clauses referred to in section 4 of this paper were to be excised under the government proposals 
164 NOTA BENE can be accessed at the following location: http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/ 
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detailed chronology from February 2013.165  The author’s recent NLJ article refers 
to this blog posting166. 
 
Other published articles 
In March 2014 the NLJ published the author’s article that exposed for the first 
time the complete lack of adequate safeguards for minors and protected parties 
under the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2003 and how this exposed the MIB to 
challenges in the future for under-settlements167.  The author’s own research 
revealed that the MIB was routinely settling minors’ claims without independent 
legal advice being obtained. 
When in July 2015 the government announced the revisions to the MIB 
Agreements the author added a last minute postscript to his article Tinkering at 
the Edges168 to provide the first (and probably only critical) analysis that belied the 
government’s empty claim that these changes brought the schemes into line with 
European law169.   
More recently, the author consolidated his thinking on the significance and effect 
of the Directive and on the relevant European jurisprudence on the UK’s domestic 
law provision for guaranteeing the compensatory entitlement of motor accident 
victims.  Mind the Gap, published in the BILAJ in January 2016, updated the 
author’s comprehensive comparative law analysis and, for the first time, grouped 
the numerous UK law infringements of the Directive under ten broad categories170.  
                                               
165 see the author’s online blog: Action Not Words, 29 March 2016 posted on Nota Bene: 
http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/action-not-words_29.html   
166 See the author’s article Still driving dangerously, NLJ, 8 April 2015 
167 See the author’s article, An untidy arrangement?, NLJ, 12 March 2014 
168 See APPENDIX item 6 for the author’s article, Tinkering At The Edges  [2015] JPIL issue 3; 
See also the author’s article, A Call For (More) Reform, NLJ, 17 July 2015 
169 Compare this to the approval given by the chairman of the Personal Injury Bar Association 
and head of chambers at 9 Gough Square, Andrew Ritchie QC: see MIB – New Uninsured 
Drivers’ Agreement 2015, accessible online at: http://www.9goughsquare.co.uk/news/970/.  
Another relatively uncritical appraisal can be found in the online Personal Injury Bulletin Update 
Journal at: http://www.pibriefupdate.com/content/law-journal-summaries/news-category-2/3560-
uninsured-drivers-agreement-2015-andrew-baker-horwich-farrelly-solicitors.  As it happens, the 
Government has conceded in an ongoing judicial review (RoadPeace v Secretary of State for 
Transport, in the High Court of Justice Administrative Court, no. CO 4681/2015) that the 
terrorism exclusion clause is unlawful.   
170 See APPENDIX item 7, Mind the gap!, BILAJ, February 2016, under the heading Comparative 
law analysis 
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It also identified the difficulties associated with the two main European law 
remedies in this area171.   
The second and most recent BILAJ article, Bridging the Gap, argues the case for 
direct vertical effect of Article 10 of the Directive against the MIB172.  It considers 
the European law doctrine of state liability under the principles formulated by the 
CJEU in Becker173, Johnston174 and Marshall175.  The article argues that the proper 
approach to fixing liability on public authorities and other emanations of the state 
is primarily informed by these authorities.  It reappraises the criteria devised by 
the CJEU in Foster176, which it describes as subordinate to the principles set out 
in the Becker line of cases.  It critically evaluates the UK elucidation of the CJEU’s 
decision in Foster in the House of Lords in Foster v British Gas plc177 and other 
UK authorities Doughty v Rolls-Royce plc178, Griffin v South West Water179, 
National Union of Teachers and ors v St Mary’s Junior School and others180.  It 
recommends an approach that concentrates primarily on the public service 
delegated to the body, rather than the organisation itself.  The article relies on the 
author’s independent research that reveals an abundance of evidence not only 
of state control but also for the MIB’s special powers concomitant to the role of 
the Article 10 compensating body.  These findings are impossible to reconcile 
with Flaux J’s findings in Byrne v MIB 181.  The article contends that Byrne and UK 
Insurance v Holden182were both wrongly decided.183 
The same article explains the profound impact that establishing direct effect 
against the MIB will have, namely, its potential for improving the facility with which 
third party victims can enforce their full legal entitlement to compensatory relief 
                                               
171 See APPENDIX item 7, Mind the gap!, supra, under the heading Emerging Issues 
172 See APPENDIX item 8, Bridging The Gap, BILAJ, March 2016  
173 (Case C-271/91) Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53 
174 (Case 222/84)Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] IRLR 263 
175 (Case 152 / 84) Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
[1993] ICR 893 
176 (Case C-188/89) Foster and others v British Gas Plc. [1990] ECR 1-3313  
177 Foster v British Gas plc [1991] 2 A.C. 306  
178 Doughty v Rolls-Royce Plc [1992] IRLR 126 CA 
179 Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15 
180 National Union of Teachers & Ors v The Governing Body of St Mary’s Church of England 
School [1997] IRLR 242 
181 Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB) 
182 UK Insurance Ltd v Holden & R & S Pilling trading as Phoenix Engineering [2016] EWHC 264 
(QB) 
183 These themes are also considered in the author’s New Law Journal articles, Putting wrongs 
to rights, Part I: NLJ, 27 May 2016 and Part II of 3 June 2016 
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under European law184.  The author argues that whilst he considers the MIB to be 
an emanation of the state, direct effect of Article 10 against it does not depend 
on that classification185.  One particularly significant aspect of this will be that it will 
allow third party victims to be compensated for incidents that are currently 
(wrongly) excluded from third party motor cover under UK law, through the simple 
expedient of bringing a claim against the MIB186   
  
                                               
184 See APPENDIX item 8, Bridging The Gap, BILAJ, March 2016, under MIB liability for non-
compliant statutory provision 
185 Arguably this assertion goes further than some commentators are prepared to concede.  In 
Steiner & Woods, EU law, (12th edn Oxford University Press 2012, the authors seem to consider 
that direct vertical effect of a directive is limited in its application to a state entities, albeit the entity 
is to be broadly construed after (Case C-188/89) Foster and others v British Gas Plc. [1990] ECR 
1-3313, see pages 118 & 119, a view apparently endorsed by Albors-Lorens, A, ‘The direct effect 
of EU Directives: fresh controversy or a storm in a teacup? Comment on Portgas’, ELR, 2014, 
and Professor Tridimas, whilst taking note of the Court of Appeal’s decision in NUT still perceives 
direct vertical effect of directives as being confined in its application to the state and emanations 
of the state.  Whereas this author adopts Blackburn J’s reasoning in Griffin v South West Water 
Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15 that the legal status and characteristics of the defendant is irrelevant 
and that para 20 of Foster looks primarily to the public service function that has been devolved. It 
is a functional test that requires responsibility for fulfilling this service to be devolved onto the 
entity by the state and subject to the control of the state, and for which purpose the entity is also 
conferred with special powers.  It is to be hoped that the CJEU will shortly clarify this point (see 
note 123 above on the impending CJEU ruling in Farrell v Whitty) 
186 For further reading on this theme, see Kvjatkovski V, ‘What is an ´Emanation of the State?´ An 
Educated Guess’ EPL, V3 I3, p. 329 338; O’Reilly, S, ‘The private enforcement of European 
Community laws in the Irish superior courts’, Dublin University Law Journal, 2009 
Quigley, C, ‘EC Law and the MIB agreements’, JPIL, 2001 
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Significance of contribution 
Contribution to legal knowledge 
The author’s articles and reports provide the first systematic appraisal of the 
extent to which our domestic law fails to meet the European law minimum 
standard of protection for third party victims of motor vehicles187.  The author’s 
consistent and disconcerting message is that our national law in this area is so 
defective that it simply cannot be taken at face value.  
The author’s research is the first to reveal the true extent of this failure and the 
way it permeates not only Part VI of the RTA 1988 but also both sets of MIB 
agreements.  It is also the first to identify the incompatibility of the common law 
third party rule as well as the way it influences the way the courts interpret 
Sections 145, 148 and 151 RTA 1988, and this has led him to reveal its statutory 
manifestations: in the European Communities (Rights Against Insurers) 
Regulations 2002 and the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.   
Other commentators tend to view and report individual legal challenges relating 
to the UK’s failure to properly implement the Directive as isolated anomalies.  
However, the sheer scale of the non-conformity unearthed by this author’s 
research suggests that they are better understood as being symptomatic of an 
underlying malady: resulting from the basic incompatibility of certain fundamental 
UK law principles with the European law it is intended to implement188.   
The author has argued the case, for the first time, that Article 3 of the Directive 
requires a free-standing compensatory guarantee189, a principle to which some of 
the abovementioned UK statutory provisions and common law precepts (such as 
the third party rule and the ex turpi causa non oritur actio) are inimical.  The 
                                               
187 A link to copy of the author’s Infringement Complaint to the European Commission, of August 
2013, is published via a link in the author’s 29 March 2016 Nota Bene blog entry, Action Not 
Words, (http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/action-not-words_29.html) [last accessed 
on 1 March 2017] see page 19 of the complaint under Summary of potential United Kingdom 
infractions for a sense of the sheer scale of the UK infringement, which list has since been 
augmented by further infringements that have come to light, and item 7 in the APPENDIX to this 
paper, for Mind The Gap, BILAJ, January 2016 
188 See the author’s article Trial And Error, NLJ, 20 April 2012 and in the APPENDIX items 9-12 
On The Right Road?, NLJ, February 2013 and item 5 in the APPENDIX to this paper, Marking 
The Boundary, [2013] JPIL, issue 3 
189 For a first indication, see APPENDIX item 9, On The Right Road? (Part II) NLJ, 8 February 
2013 under Other compensatory lacunae but for the developed argument see APPENDIX item 7, 
Mind The Gap, BILAJ, January 2016 especially the penultimate and final paragraphs under the 
heading: Csonka 
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effective ring fencing of these third party rights is a concomitant of this governing 
European law principle. 
The author’s articles identify that a different approach is required when 
interpreting or applying our domestic law in this area.  They advocate that 
whenever either a motor insurer or the MIB raise a technical issue to either defend 
or reduce a third party victim’s entitlement to compensatory relief, legal advisors 
should consider the relevant European law first, as this is the primary law that the 
domestic provisions are supposed to implement.  These articles explain that this 
European law is generally shorter, simpler and more generous in the 
comprehensive nature of the protection afforded to motor accident victims190.   
The author has also revealed the inconsistent approach of the judiciary to 
discharging its constitutional obligation to apply a European law consistent 
construction of our national law transposition of the Directive191.  Judges acting on 
their own initiative should undertake this routinely; notwithstanding the passivity 
rule192.   
The author was a lone voice in arguing that two unanimous decisions of the Court 
of Appeal were made per incuriam (see the references above to EUI and Delaney 
cases, above).  He was the first to offer any analysis on those cases193.  He has 
been the first to question the currency of a number of other well entrenched 
                                               
190 See for example the author’s article Changing Gear, PI Focus, published by the Association 
of Personal Injury Lawyers, in February 2015 under Better, Simpler, European law and see 
APPENDIX item 7, Mind The Gap, supra 
191 See APPENDIX item 7 Mind The Gap!, BILAJ, January 2016, under the heading The curative 
effect of consistent interpretation 
192 A commonplace practice, if not a common law doctrine, by which judges tend to restrict their 
inquiry and deliberations to the facts and matters raised and pleaded by the parties.  The CJEU 
authorities on this issue have been equivocal as to whether national court should of its own motion 
routinely apply a European law consistent construction of national law intended to implement a 
directive.  The author’s views on this point are argued on an a priori basis.  See the comments 
above under ‘the European law remedies’ heading.  The EU law doctrine of harmonious or 
consistent interpretation’ subheading.  Put another way, it is difficult to envisage how else a court 
can discharge the duty imposed on it to give full effect the EU law if when interpreting its domestic 
implementation, if it does not first appraise itself of that EU law.  This appears to the necessary 
corollary of the CJEU’s restatement of the duty of consistent construction in (Case C-397/01 to 
C-403/01) Bernhard Pfeiffer et alia v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut eV [2004] 
ECR 1-8835, paras 111 to 113 
193 Margaret Hemsworth’s later article, Insurance obligations, The Road Traffic Act 1988 and 
deliberately caused damage, JBL, 2013, 3, 354-361 offers some useful analysis of EUI without 
offering any view on whether it was erroneous 
47 
 
judicial decisions (such as the House of Lords ruling in White v White, and many 
pre-accession case authorities194).   
The way Delaney v Pickett195 was handled at first instance and on appeal 
demonstrates that European law considerations continue to be something of a 
blind spot for motor claims practitioners.  The imperative of routinely testing the 
European law compatibility of our national law in this area, and not just when a 
provision is ambiguous or produces unjust results, is a regular refrain in the 
author’s published articles in this field196.  
The author has exposed for the first time the mistaken adherence by many 
lawyers to certain long established practices that are inconsistent with the 
Directive; for example, the almost universal acceptance of the different procedure 
attending a ‘statutory insurer’ or an ‘article 75 insurer’, where European law does 
not allow such a distinction197.  Similarly, the commonplace view (endorsed by 
senior members of the judiciary198) that the MIB agreements are merely private 
law contracts and as such not subject to a European law consistent 
interpretation199 is also shown to conflict with European jurisprudence and basic 
rule of law principles200. 
The author’s articles and his official reports201 anticipated the final outcome in the 
Delaney case and the CJEU decision in Vnuk 202.  No other commentator has 
argued against the current orthodoxy (which views the MIB as little more than an 
outsourced private contractor free from state control and possessing no special 
                                               
194 See for example APPENDIX item 5 Marking the Boundary, JPIL, [2013] Issue 3 under What 
went wrong or APPENDIX item 8, Bridging The Gap, BILAJ, March 2016 under On the nature of 
the MIB 
195 Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 
196 See the author’s article, A World Turned Upside Down, JPIL [2014] Issue 3, under Points to 
take away, not included in the appendix 
197 See above under the heading: The EUI case 
198 See Hobhouse LJ’s judgment in Mighell v Reading, Evans v Motor Insurers' Bureau, White v 
White [1999] 1 CMLR 1251 and the comments of his colleagues 
199 See APPENDIX item 8, Bridging The Gap, BILAJ, March 2016 under On the nature of the MIB 
200 See for example (Case C-365/93) Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-499, paragraph 9 on 
the minimum requirements for legal certainty considered by the author in Good Law, NLJ, July 
2013; not supplied in the appendix that follows 
201 This refers to the author’s consultation response submitted in reply to the DfT’s February 
2013 review of the MIB Agreements. This was published via a link in the author’s 29 March 
2016 Nota Bene blog entry, Action Not Words, 
http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2016_03_01_archive.html  
202 A point raised by the author in his articles, see under Lack of Legal Certainty in APPENDIX 
items 6, Tinkering at the edges and 7 Mind the gap!, and in his Law Commission Report, 
December 2013, pages 14 and 18, the latter is not annexed here 
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powers), let alone advocated the vicarious state liability of the MIB for the 
government’s failure to properly implement the Directive.  The author was the first 
to undertake a comprehensive and critical appraisal of the MIB agreements’ 
extensive incompatibility with the Directive. 
The author’s advocation of his controversial view that Article 10 of the Directive 
has direct effect against the MIB203 opens up a third European law route to 
redress.  This should make it easier for individual motor accident victims to assert 
their full legal rights under European law.  This route may become even more 
important if judicial reticence against curing defective domestic provision, 
Pfeiffer204 style, increases with the impending referendum on the UK’s 
membership of the EU.  Direct effect involves considerably less judicial 
discretion.205 
 
Contributions to practice  
The author’s articles provide the only succinct explication of the third party motor 
insurance requirement under European law206.  His summary of its core principles 
have been adopted by leading counsel in the Statement of Case to serve as a 
paradigm for the European law requirement in an ongoing judicial review relating 
to the UK’s numerous breaches of European law in its transposition of the 
Directive207.   
The author has exposed the lack of safeguards in the Untraced Drivers’ 
Agreement 2003 for minors and protected parties.  This conflicts with the 
                                               
203 See APPENDIX item 8, Bridging The Gap, supra; see also the author’s New Law Journal 
articles: (i) Putting wrongs to rights Pt1, NLJ, 27 May 2016, and (ii) Putting wrongs to rights Pt2, 
NLJ, 3 June 2016, these NLJ articles are not annexed here 
204 (Case C-397/01) Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut eV 
[2004] ECR I-8835 
205 See APPENDIX item 7, Mind the gap!, for the author’s explanation of the problems associated 
with Francovich actions under the heading Seeking compensation from the state, in his BILA 
journal article Mind the Gap! (supra), see also Lord Clyde’s judgment R v Secretary of State for 
Transport Ex p. Factortame in (No.5) [1999] 4 All ER 906 
206 See APPENDIX item 7, Mind The Gap!, under the heading The culminating principles, also 
published more widely within the author’s New Law Journal articles such as Still Driving 
Dangerously, 8 April 2016 and Putting wrongs to rights (Part 1) 27 May 2016 and in A World 
Turned Upside Down [2014] JPIL issue 3, under European law in a nutshell and also in this paper 
under The European insurance requirement 
207 RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport, issued on 1 October 2015 in The High Court of 
Justice Administrative Court no. CO 4681/2015, where the author’s schedule of infringements is 
incorporated and attributed to him 
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European law equivalence and effectiveness principles208.  Practitioners should 
be able to insist on proper funding to allow them to represent these vulnerable 
individuals.  Furthermore, as none of these settlements have binding effect if 
these protective measures are not adhered to, they are avoidable, at least by an 
infant on attaining majority, according to the House of Lords ruling in Dietz v 
Lennig Chemicals209. 
The author’s simple approach to European law consistent construction210 and to 
identifying and tackling infringements211 improves the likelihood that an 
increasingly de-skilled profession will identify and challenge these European law 
infractions.  His classification of the ten different types of infraction may also 
assist212.  At least one legal commentator has adopted some of the author’s key 
points in their own analysis213. 
The promulgation of this message is still a work in progress: further articles are 
planned214.   
                                               
208 See APPENDIX item 7, Mind The Gap! under the heading Discrimination of minors and 
protected parties, the author’s article, a view more widely promulgated (and raised for the first 
time by as a potential infringement of European law) in the author’s New Law Journal article An 
untidy arrangement, NLJ, 12 March 2014 
209 Dietz v Lennig Chemicals [1969] 1 AC 170, [1967] 2 All ER 282 
210 See APPENDIX item 9, On The Right Road? (Pt I), NLJ, February 2013 under the heading 
Interpreting Community law, and APPENDIX item 10, On The Right Road? (Pt II), NLJ, February 
2013 under Interpretive tips; also covered in the author’s article, Case commentary on EUI v 
Bristol Alliance, published in JPIL 2013 Issue I under Practice Points and Interpretive Tips and 
his New Law Journal article, Still driving dangerously, NLJ, April 2016; see also his other articles 
Putting wrongs to rights (Part1), NLJ May 2016 and Putting wrongs to rights (Part2), NLJ June 
2016   
211 See the author’s New Law Journal articles: Second Sight, NLJ Oct 2014 and Still Driving 
Dangerously, NLJ, 8 April 2016 from Purposive construction with and edge onwards and more 
extensively in APPENDIX item 8 Bridging the Gap, BILAJ, March 2016 
212 see APPENDIX item 7, Mind The Gap, BILAJ, January 2016 under Comparative law analysis 
213 See Nigel Tomkins’s Case commentary on Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport in JPIL 
[2015] Issue 3, especially under his Practice Points heading; see also note 258 below concerning 
the publication by Marson, J, Ferris, K and Nicholson A, ‘Irreconcilable differences? The Road 
Traffic Act and the European Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives’, JBL, 2017 
214 See for example APPENDIX item 13, Self-driving vehicles: the road ahead, NLJ 2 September 
2016, alerts the profession to another newly discovered major flaw in the UK’s transposition of 
the Directive.  Section 145 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 restricts compulsory third party cover to 
a liability incurred by the user / driver whereas Article 3 of the Directive’s liability scope is much 
wider and embraces product liability.  This has important implications for the Government’s plans 
to introduce autonomous driving systems to replace driver control as the UK compulsory 
insurance requirement does not extend to product liability. The author has been consulted by the 
Association of Personal Injury Lawyers and RoadPeace and various leading firms, who support 
the author’s analysis and have joined him in calling for this lacuna to addressed. The author has 
submitted two detailed reports, one in response to the DfT’s consultation on driverless vehicles, 
the other in response to the House of Lords select committee on autonomous vehicles pointing 
out the need for urgent reform in this area as well.   
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Literature review 
The primary focus of the author’s work has been to expose the extensive nature 
of the UK’s infringements of the Directive215 as well as the unsatisfactory approach 
of the UK judiciary when discharging its obligation to interpret the UK’s 
transposition, in so far as possible, in the light of this European law.  A secondary 
and subordinate concern has been to argue the case for Article 10 having direct 
effect against the MIB, contrary the only UK authority on this point216.   
When the author’s articles were published, there was little detailed academic 
commentary on the UK’s transposition of the Directive217.  Indeed practically every 
text book in print at that time which covered motor insurance adhered to the 
conventional approach for explicating the third party motor insurance obligation 
– starting with the UK law and only raising the EU law it implemented where the 
domestic provision was unclear or obviously inconsistent with it218.  In the author’s 
view this put the domestic law cart before the European law horse219.  
                                               
215 A failing that his articles show spans the UK’s statutory and extra-statutory implementation of 
the Directive and which has been compounded in some instances by its courts, as in Clarke v 
Kato and Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Ltd [1998] All ER (D) 481, [1998] 1 WLR 1647; White v 
White & MIB [2001] UKHL 9, [2001] 1 WLR 481; Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532, [2012] 
1 WLR 2149, EUI Ltd v Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267, [2013] 2 WLR 
1029 and most recently in Abdullah Sahin v 1) Cassandra Havard 2) Riverstone Insurance (UK) 
Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1202 
216 Byrne v Motor Insurers' Bureau [2008] EWCA Civ 574; [2009] Q.B. 66, [2008] 3 W.L.R. 1421 
217 The author’s research and published work offer the first academic re-evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the UK provision for third party motor accident victims since the debate that followed 
in the wake of the Cassel Committee Report of 1937. 
218 The conventional approach of these secondary sources is evident in: Bingham and Berrymans' 
Personal Injury and Motor Claims Cases 14th edition, LexisNexis; Butterworths Personal Injury 
Litigation Service, where even the heading for the relevant section, ‘Division III Road Traffic 
Accidents’, is something of a misnomer following the CJEU’s judgment in Vnuk (see above) and 
the same can be said of the APIL Guide to Road Traffic Accidents, by Andrew Ritchie QC, 
Jordans, 2012.  Even Halsbury’s Laws of England offers a similarly conventional treatment of this 
subject in section (5) on Compulsory Insurance In Relation To Motor Vehicles (within Volume 60 
On Insurance; Chapter 9 Motor Vehicle Insurance).  Whilst offering a passing reference to the 
first five European Directives on motor insurance it goes on to offer a relatively uncritical account 
of the domestic law implementation of the Directive’s predecessors.  For example, at 738 its 
treatment of the Article 75 insurers and the MIB agreements gives little if any indication that they 
are incompatible with the Directive or its predecessors.  None of these works tackle head-on the 
fundamental European law incompatibility issues that pervade much of our domestic provision in 
this area. 
219 As the author explains above under the ‘European law remedies’ heading, any proper 
harmonious construction of the UK’s transposition of the direct must necessarily be predicated on 
the European law it is supposed to implement.  A view adopted by Jeremy Hyams QC in the 
pleading in the ongoing judicial review in RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport (MIB 
intervening) (CO/4681/2015).  The pleadings can be accessed by the public on payment of the 
requisite fee from the Court Service. 
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This trait is particularly noticeable in the APIL Guide to MIB Claims220, by Andrew 
Ritchie QC221. His useful book opens with the relevant UK statutory and extra-
statutory provision and although he subjects this to a meticulous analysis his 
conventional UK-centric focus leads him into error.  He fails to identify many 
serious infringements: such as the terrorism exclusion222; the flawed arbitral 
appeal process; the unlawful property damage exclusions223 and the lack of 
suitable protection for minors and the mentally handicapped.  He also fails to 
consider the possibility that the MIB is an emanation of the state, or that it might 
be subject to the direct effect of Article 10.  He does not question the legitimacy 
of the so called Article 75 procedure224 or consider whether under European law 
insufficiently insured vehicles can properly be treated as uninsured vehicles and 
so processed under the disadvantageous compensatory schemes managed by 
the MIB.  He promotes Francovich actions as his principal remedy, without 
offering warning of the substantial litigation risk, delay and cost involved.  He does 
not explore the full potential for a European law consistent interpretation as a 
potentially more immediate, affordable and effective remedy for these 
infringements225, whether under ordinary domestic construction principles226 or by 
applying Pfeiffer227, nor the possibility of Article 10 having direct effect against the 
MIB228.  
                                               
220 Jordan Publishing, March 2016 
221 Mr Ritchie is a particularly well regarded specialist in MIB claims. This very able silk has won 
numerous awards and is a general editor of Kemp & Kemp: Personal Injury Law, Practice and 
Procedure, published by Sweet & Maxwell and an author of several other personal injury 
practitioner guides.  He is the Chairman of the Personal Injury Bar Association and he is head of 
chambers at 12 Kings Bench Walk, a leading set of personal injury barristers 
222 Which exclusion the government has now removed from both schemes with effect from 1 
March 2017, arguably in response to the point being raised in the judicial review in RoadPeace v 
Secretary of State for Transport (MIB intervening) (CO/4681/2015).   See note 267 below below 
223 Also removed with effect from 1 March 2017 and for the same reasons, see note 267 
224 See above under Comparisons with the UK provision 
225 Most probably because he has not thought to review whether the House of Lords finding to 
this effect in White v White (supra) and the Court of Appeal’s obiter remarks in Mighell (supra) 
are consistent with Pfeiffer 
226 See the line of authorities relating to the courts’ approach to ascertaining the objective meaning 
to be derived from the contract terms from Lord Hoffman’s judgment in Investors Compensation 
Scheme Limited. v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896 through to Lord Clarke’s 
in Rainy Sky S.A. v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 
227 See Waller LJ’s analysis of (Case C-397/01) Pfeiffer’s significance in this area in McCall v 
Poulton [2008] EWCA Civ 1263, paras 35 to 39 
228 See above under Section 6: Significance of contribution for the significance of direct effect 
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Probably the most influential text in this area is The Law of Motor Insurance229, 
which gives the European law framework prominent treatment.230  Concerns first 
raised by this author surface in this 2016 edition.  For example, the book goes 
some way to questioning whether: (i) Ward LJ was correct in EUI231 to hold that 
there is no general prohibition on exclusion clauses affecting third party victims232; 
(ii) whether the EC Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002233 are compatible 
with the Directive and (iii) whether the MIB agreements are subject to a European 
law construction after Pfeiffer234 and (iv) the compatibility of the MIB’s terrorism 
exclusion235.  However, this seminal reference work does not have the space to 
subject the entire UK transposition of the Directive to a rigorous EU law compliant 
scrutiny236.   
There is also an extensive body of excellent and authoritative academic 
commentary on the general principles of European law and the relevant 
European law remedies237.  Yet this author’s published work on its implications for 
motor insurance and arguing the case for direct effect of the Directive against the 
MIB as well as his bolder approach to applying a European law consistent 
interpretation to its compensatory schemes are discrete points that were arrived 
                                               
229 Merkin R and Hemsworth M, ‘The Law of Motor Insurance’ (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell  2016) 
230The Law of Motor Insurance, exclusively so at pages 26 to 45 and extensively elsewhere in the 
text, especially in Chapter 5 on Compulsory Liability Cover 
231 EUI Ltd v Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267, [2013] 2 WLR 1029 
232 Ibid, page 464 
233 Ibid, 490-493 
234 (Case C-397/01) Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut eV 
[2004] ECR I-8835 
235 Ibid, page 627 
236 In keeping with the ‘APIL Guide to MIB Claims’, it does not flag up the illegality of the exclusion 
of property damage to uninsured vehicles, see pages 603-604, nor does it question the 
compatibility of Article 75 of the MIB’s Memorandum and Articles of Association with the insurance 
requirement prescribed by Article 3 in its extensive account of its workings (pages 475 and 489 
and again at 627 – 631). Whereas this author argues that the CJEU has ruled that member states 
have no discretion to treat victims of inadequately insured defendants as uninsured driver claims, 
see Appendix item 7 Mind The Gap under the heading ‘7. Misallocation of insured claims as 
uninsured claims’ and (Case C-442/10) Churchill v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans [2013] 
1 W.L.R. 1776, para 41 and (Case C 409/11) Gábor Csonka v Magyar Állam [2014] 1 CMLR 14, 
paras 30 – 32.  The need for concision may also explain why, whilst citing various obiter dicta and 
authorities against the proposition that the MIB is subject to direct effect of Article 10 (Ibid pages 
590 and 595-596), it does not go as far as this author in re-examining the evidence and case law 
in the light of (Case C-188/89) Foster (see note 194 above) to argue for direct vertical effect as a 
means pf remedying the numerous lacunae in the UK legislation explained above.  This latter 
issue is raised within the ongoing judicial review in RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport 
(MIB intervening) (CO/4681/2015) 
237 See the author’s bibliography post and note 92 above under the ‘European law remedies’ 
heading 
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at independently of those broader scoped works238.  However, the author’s work 
is based on the same core body of knowledge as those commentaries: consisting 
of the relevant judgments from the CJEU, UK and Ireland239 as well as various 
opinions of the advocates generals.  It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the 
author’s views on the discrete points of European law that he raises are broadly 
consistent with the academic consensus240, even if in places his specialist 
knowledge of the MIB and his expertise in motor insurance and liability practice 
has allowed him to develop his arguments a little further in practical terms.241 
 
Wider implications 
The author’s work has increased awareness within the legal profession (and 
beyond242) of the need for extensive reform in this area.  He is alone in having 
undertaken a detailed analysis of these third party rights, proposing detailed 
measures for reform243, and in re-evaluating and fully explicating the various legal 
                                               
238 The author’s research was the first to question the Flaux J’s findings in Byrne v Motor Insurers' 
Bureau [2008] EWCA Civ 574; [2009] Q.B. 66, [2008] 3 W.L.R. 1421 that the MIB was not an 
emanation of the state and that Article 10 of the Directive was capable of direct effect against it.  
Even now this view has only been adopted in one other paper, see Marson, J, Ferris, K and 
Nicholson A, ‘Irreconcilable differences? The Road Traffic Act and the European Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Directives’, JBL, 2017.  Even here it is difficult to discern any new insights, as the paper 
appears to achieve little more than traverse and represent the author’s previously published 
research in this area. 
239 Which informed the author’s principle understanding in this specific area after a critical study 
of Butterworths Personal Injury Litigation Service, ‘Division III Road Traffic Accidents’, Lexis 
Nexis; Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 60 On Insurance; Chapter 9 Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Section (5) on Compulsory Insurance In Relation To Motor Vehicles. Lexis Nexis and APIL Guide 
to MIB Claims, by Andrew Ritchie QC, 2nd Edn Jordans) 
240 As recounted above under the ‘The increasing influence of European law’ and European law 
remedies’ headings 
241 The reader will find further insight, covering a much wider spectrum, on the development of 
the exceptions to the no-horizontality of direct effect of directives in Professor Dashwood’s article 
‘From Van Duyn to Mangold via Marshall: reducing Direct Effect to Absurdity’, 9 CYELS (2006-
2007), 81 and Albors-Lorens, A and also ‘The direct effect of EU Directives: fresh controversy or 
a storm in a teacup? Comment on Portgas’, ELR, 2014 and Paul Craig’s article ‘The legal effect 
of Directives: policy, rules and exceptions’, European Law Review, 2009 along with a really helpful 
overview provided by Chalmers D, Davies G & Monti G, in their textbook ‘European Union Law’ 
(2nd edn Cambridge University Press, 2010, see Chapter 7 Rights and Remedies in National 
Courts, pages 267-314 
242 The European Commission’s Inception Impact Assessment of 8 June 2016 indicates an 
intention to undertake a wide ranging regulatory fitness review of the Directive. 
243 See APPENDIX items: no. 2: The Motor Insurance Bureau’s role, no. 3 Why the Uninsured 
Drivers’ Agreement 1999 needs to be scrapped, no. 29 Response to the DfT consultation on the 
MIB Agreements and in his Report on reform submitted to the Law Commission in December 
2013, not reproduced here but published via a hyperlink in his Nota Bene blog entry, Action not 
words, here:  http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2016_03_01_archive.html. 
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remedies in this area,244 including a new third route to redress by way of direct 
effect against the MIB245.   
His articles and activism have already provoked a modicum of reform246.  There 
is also the expectation of further concessions as the ongoing RoadPeace judicial 
review247 and the European Commission’s regulatory review proceeds248.   
It is a reasonable expectation that this reform will materialise, even though the 
Government has now triggered Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon249.  Clearly once 
the UK leaves the European Union in approximately two years’ time the European 
Communities Act 1972 will be repealed, effectively revoking the supremacy of 
European law in this jurisdiction and the European law remedies.   
However, a political decision will need to be made on whether the UK should fully 
implement the Directive regardless, including any successor into our national law.  
It should be remembered that there is a very considerable, if not complete, 
consensus of political and legislative intent between the UK and European 
                                               
244 See APPENDIX item 8, Bridging The Gap, BILAJ, March 2016 and his New Law Journal article, 
Still driving dangerously, NLJ, 8 April 2016 
245 See the author’s New Law Journal articles, Putting wrongs to rights (Pt1), NLJ May 2016 and 
Putting wrongs to rights (Pt2), NLJ June 2016, not included in the appendix 
246 Seen in the removal of various procedural conditions precedent to MIB liability from the 
Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015, that remain in clauses 9 to 13 of the Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreement 1999, these issues were raised by the author in his 2008 meeting with the MIB and 
subsequently in his articles, see APPENDIX item 3 Why the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 
1999 needs to be scrapped, JPIL [2011] Issue 2.  More recently, further events have vindicated 
the authors views, such as (i) within the government’s consultation on Vnuk (the consultation is 
available online: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/motor-insurance-consideration-
of-the-vnuk-judgment) and this finally concedes that the technical definition of ‘motor vehicle’ in 
section 185 RTA and the geographic scope of the third party insurance requirement in section 
145 are non-compliant (which defects it was alerted to in April 2013 in response to the 
Department for Transport’s February 2013 consultation on the MIB Agreements); (ii) the new 
MIB agreements introduced in March 2017 which remove the unlawful exclusions of liability for 
damage to uninsured vehicles and the exclusion of liability for victims of terrorism which the 
government conceded to be illegal in the ongoing judicial review in RoadPeace v Secretary of 
State for Transport (MIB intervening) (CO/4681/2015).  The victims of the 22 March 2017 
terrorism attack on Westminster bridge will now receive their full compensatory entitlement from 
the MIB as opposed to the substantially less generous award under the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme; (iii) Further concessions have been made by the government within the 
ongoing judicial review in RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport (MIB intervening) 
(CO/4681/2015), for example it concedes that the protection afforded to minors and the 
mentally handicapped under the Untraced Drivers Scheme is inadequate.  The author hopes 
that his other aspects of his work will be validated if the Supreme Court grant permission to 
appeal in Sahin v Havard  (see note 77 above) and when Ousley J gives judgment in the 
RoadPeace judicial review (see notes 186, 225 and 267 above).  This author has advised in 
both cases, see below under the ‘Wider implications’ heading. 
247 Which the author persuaded the claimant to initiate and where he continues in an advisory role 
248 See note 263 above 
249 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community [2007] OJ C306/01 
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legislatures in this area250.  The differences appear to lie in the execution of this 
policy; not in the policy itself.   
  
                                               
250 One need only compare Lord Mance’s account of the legislative aim of the MI directives in 
Moreno v MIB [2016] UKSC 52, [2016] 1 WLR 3194 [para 2] – ‘The expressed and obviously 
beneficial purpose of the arrangements introduced by the Directives … is to ensure that 
compensation is available for victims of motor accidents occurring anywhere in the Community 
(now the Union) and to facilitate their recovery of such compensation.’ …with Waller LJ’s account 
of the UK Parliament’s intention in Churchill v Wilkinson [2010] EWCA Civ 556 [para 3] – 
‘Compulsory insurance has been a feature of legislation in the United Kingdom for many years. 
The aim is to provide a guarantee that an injured person will obtain the compensation that he or 
she is awarded against the negligent driver.’ Lord Hailsham makes a similar observation in 
Gardner v Moore & Ors [1984] 1 All ER 100- ‘Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1972 is designed to 
protect the innocent third party from the inability to pay of a driver who incurs liability by causing 
him death or personal injuries.’ 
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The author has explained above, under the Literature review heading, that his 
research did not rely on conventional secondary sources for his analysis of UK 
motor insurance law.  He would argue that this approach and his views in this 
regard are supported by the way that the UK judiciary, on the subject of 
compulsory third party motor insurance, does not appear to rely on legal 
commentaries either; if they have been referred to, they are rarely, if ever, cited. 
His contribution to legal knowledge in this field was not developed in a vacuum.  
It builds on an extensive body of authoritative, erudite and often pellucid legal 
commentary and analysis.  This is to be found in the judicial interpretation of the 
primary sources of law by various members of the CJEU and by numerous UK 
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extended introduction.  The author’s independent research is based on his critical 
analysis of these sources. 
The author respectfully invites his examiners to assess his contribution to the 
existing body of knowledge by reference to these primary sources which are the 
most important, authoritative and readily accessible element of the wider body of 
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of legal opinions written by the various Advocates General, who have advised the 
CJEU on the European motor insurance requirement over the past two decades.  
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252 See below for the citation 
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The author has obtained the kid permission of Nigel Tomkins, solicitor and co-
editor of the Journal of Personal Injury Law to reproduce here Nigel Tomkins’ 
case summaries that prefaced the author’s own case commentaries, set out in 
Appendix as well as the permission of the publishers, Sweet & Maxwell.  All the 
other articles set out in the appendix are the author’s own work. 
The author has also obtained the kind permission every other publisher of the 
author’s articles (set out in this Appendix) to reproduce them here or he is 
otherwise contractually entitled to reproduce them for the purposes of this paper. 
Nicholas Bevan 
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A. The Journal of Personal Injury Law   
 
1. Case commentary on Churchill v Wilkinson and Evans v Equity Claims 
Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 556 
JPIL Issue 4, 2010         
 
[Nigel Tomkins, solicitor and JPIL editor, wrote the initial case summary and 
Nicholas Bevan, JPIL editor, the commentary that follows] 
 
CHURCHILL INSURANCE CO LTD v WILKINSON [1]  
EVANS v EQUITY CLAIMS LTD  
CA (Civ Div) (Lord Neuberger MR, Waller LJ (V-P), Wall LJ) 19/5/2010  
[2010] EWCA Civ 556  
 
PERSONAL INJURY: ROAD TRAFFIC: PASSENGERS: DAMAGES: 
COMPULSORY INSURANCE: UNINSURED DRIVERS : INSURED 
PERMITTING UNINSURED TO DRIVE: INDEMNITY: ABILITY OF INSURER TO 
RECOVER COMPENSATION FROM INSURED: EC/UK LAW : 
COMPATIBILITY:  S.151 (5) & s.151 (8) ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1988:  
DIRECTIVE 2009/103  
 
These were conjoined appeals in which the court was required to determine 
whether two insurers had a right of recovery against the insured Wilkinson and 
Evans. 
 
The facts in Churchill v Wilkinson 
This was tried as a preliminary issue on the following assumed facts.  In 
October 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Wilkinson, Benjamin Wilkinson’s parents, bought 
him a car for £1,600.  The car was insured through Churchill.  The policy holder 
was Mrs. Wilkinson, but Benjamin was a named driver.  On 23 November 2005, 
he met with a couple of friends, one of them being Mr Fitzgerald, who had been 
drinking.  Benjamin, who had not been drinking, drove them to a local 
MacDonald’s, where they had something to eat.  When they left, Benjamin 
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allowed Mr Fitzgerald to drive the car. It was accepted for the purposes of the 
preliminary issue that Benjamin knew Mr Fitzgerald was not insured under the 
policy.   Unfortunately, Mr Fitzgerald lost control, and the car collided with a 
vehicle driving in the opposite direction.  Benjamin, who was aged 20 at the 
time, suffered severe injuries.  Mr Fitzgerald was subsequently convicted of 
dangerous driving, driving with excess alcohol and driving without insurance.  
Blair J. found that by virtue of the Road Traffic Act 1988 s.151(5)254[2], 
Benjamin Wilkinson’s insurers were bound to compensate him and were not 
entitled to reclaim that compensation from him under s.151(8)255[3].   
 
The facts in Evans v Equity 
Tracy Evans owned a motorcycle. She insured the same with Equity under which 
she was insured to drive her motorcycle but no one else. On 4th August 2004 she 
permitted Adam Cockayne to drive her motorcycle with herself as pillion 
passenger. Through the negligence of Adam Cockayne he drove into the back of 
a lorry and Tracy Evans was seriously injured. Adam Cockayne had been insured 
under a policy to drive his own motorcycle but no other and was consequently 
uninsured. Tracey Evans was unaware that he was uninsured.  His Honour Judge 
Gregory found that in permitting Adam Cockayne to drive she had given no 
thought to the question whether Adam Cockayne was insured to drive her 
motorcycle.  She was awarded compensation, but the judge found that her 
insurers were entitled to reclaim that compensation from her under s.151(8).  
The Court of Appeal held that the effect of s.151(8) as a matter of English law 
was to exclude from the benefit of insurance a passenger who was the insured 
but who had given permission to an uninsured driver to drive. However, the 
question was whether European Community law would hold that such an 
exclusion was void and unenforceable, and whether s.151(8) could be interpreted 
so as not to breach Community law.  
 
                                               
254[2] see below for the provisions of s 151 (5) 
255[3] see below for the provisions of s 151 (8). 
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To reach a conclusion it was necessary to consider that question by reference to 
Directive 2009/103/EC256[4], since, although that directive had come into force 
after the relevant judgments, it was a consolidating directive which simply codified 
the previous directives.  Article 12(1)257[5] suggested to them that insurance was 
required to cover all passengers injured except those contemplated by the 
second paragraph of art.13(1)258[6]. 
They stated that if art.12(1) had that wide meaning then it seemed to preclude 
excluding from compensation a passenger who was an insured under the policy 
but was injured in an accident due to the negligence of a driver whom the insured 
had permitted to drive uninsured259[7].  That seemed to be the case, even if the 
insurer could prove that the insured passenger knew that the driver was 
uninsured.  
That result might not seem altogether satisfactory since if the driver was 
unidentified or there was no insurance at all, the Motor Insurers Bureau could 
exclude from compensation an injured passenger whom they could prove knew 
that the driver was uninsured.  It was unclear to the court why Community law 
suggested that so far as statutory insurers were concerned the position should 
be different.  They noted that there might also be a distinction between an insured 
passenger who permitted a person to drive whom he knew was uninsured, and 
an insured passenger who believed the driver had insurance, or who had not 
turned his mind to that question.  
As a result they held that it was therefore appropriate to refer to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union questions concerning (i) whether s.151(8) in its 
present form complied with Community law; (ii) whether some amendment or 
reinterpretation as to the degree of the insured's knowledge was necessary in 
order for s.151(8) to comply with Community law and they did so. 
                                               
256[4] Directive 2009/103 concerns insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of 
motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability. 
Directives 72/166, 84/5, 90/232, 2000/26 and 2005/14 were repealed by this Directive, 
which entered into force on October 27, 2009. 
257[5] see below for the provisions of Article 12 1. 
258[6] see below for the provisons of Article 13 1.  
259[7] Criminal Proceedings against Bernaldez (C-129/94) (1996) ECR I-1829 AGO, 
Candolin v Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola (C537/03) (2005) ECR I-5745 ECJ (1st 
Chamber) and Ferreira v Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confianca SA (C348/98) 
(2000) ECR I-6711 ECJ considered. 
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         [Nigel Tomkins] 
 
Commentary 
 
This case presents the reader with two interesting phenomena: both seemingly 
paradoxical in effect.  The first, stems from the wide ranging compensatory 
protection that the Road Traffic Act 1988 bestows on all victims of negligent 
drivers under s the provisions of 151 (5) Road Traffic Act 1988) and the fact that 
this protection is effectively negated where the victim happens (i) also to be 
insured under the policy covering the vehicle in which the he or she is a 
passenger and also (ii) where that victim permitted the negligent driver to drive 
whilst uninsured.  This coup de grace is delivered under s 151 (8).  Oddly, no 
such sanction is extended to a policyholder / passenger who allows an 
inebriated person to drive them.  Similarly, and just as perversely, a passenger 
who owns but does not insure the vehicle in which he or she is injured as a 
passenger will not be excluded from the benefit of s 151 (5) where they 
knowingly permit an uninsured driver to drive them.  Accordingly this seemingly 
arbitrary, and certainly isolated, exception sits at odds with the general tenor of 
s 151, whose object is to ensure that victims of negligent drivers are 
compensated by the policyholder’s RTA insurers.  The second phenomenon lies 
in the fact that two experienced first instance judges could, on near identical 
facts, draw such diametrically opposed conclusions about the import of s 151 
(8).  One is tempted to conclude that our national law in this regard is far from 
satisfactory and in need of clarification if not revision. 
When one is confronted with what appears to be something of a conundrum it is 
often sensible, metaphorically speaking, to take a step back and to view the 
problem from the wider perspective that distance affords.  In our case, and 
because our national law in this area is intended to implement the European 
Motor Insurance Directives, it is sensible to commence our analysis by 
considering the EU Directive itself.  This approach is also to be preferred as our 
national law is supposed to give effect to the United Kingdom’s obligations 
under Community Law.    
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The primacy of European law was most clearly expressed by Lord Denning in 
H.P. Bulmer Ltd v J. Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401 at 418 
‘The Treaty [of Rome] does not touch any of the matters which concern 
solely England and the people in it. These are still governed by English 
law. They are not affected by the Treaty. But when we come to matters 
with a European element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into 
the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back, Parliament has 
decreed that the Treaty is henceforward to be part of our law. It is equal 
in force to any statute.’ 
It is now a commonplace that when interpreting national law that is also 
governed by European law it is necessary to apply a purposive construction 
where possible to our national law so as to give effect ‘as far as is possible’ to 
the European law, this accords with the dicta propounded in Marleasing [1990] 
ECR 1-4135. 
EU law on the compensation of victims of motor accidents 
Although the accidents featured in both the Wilkinson and Evans appeals 
predated the 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive, as it was a consolidating 
directive, it seems sensible to follow Lord Justice Waller’s example by referring 
to the consolidating 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive as though it were in force. 
The relevant provisions of the 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive260 are as 
follows, beginning with the Recitals: 
(2) Insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles 
(motor insurance) is of special importance for European citizens, whether 
they are policyholders or victims of an accident. It is also a major concern 
for insurance undertakings as it constitutes an important part of non-life 
insurance business in the Community. Motor insurance also has an 
impact on the free movement of persons and vehicles. It should therefore 
be a key objective of Community action in the field of financial services to 
reinforce and consolidate the internal market in motor insurance. 
                                               
260 2008/0037(COD) 
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(3) Each Member State must take all necessary measures to ensure that 
civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory 
is covered by insurance. The extent of the liability covered and the terms 
and conditions of the insurance cover are to be determined on the basis 
of those measures. 
(12) Member States' obligations to guarantee insurance cover at least in 
respect of certain minimum amounts constitute an important element in 
ensuring the protection of victims. The minimum amount of cover for 
personal injury should be calculated so as to compensate fully and fairly 
all victims who have suffered very serious injuries, whilst taking into 
account the low frequency of accidents involving several victims and the 
small number of accidents in which several victims suffer very serious 
injuries in the course of one and the same event. A minimum amount of 
cover per victim or per claim should be provided. With a view to 
facilitating the introduction of these minimum amounts, a transitional 
period should be established.  However, a shorter period than the 
transitional period should be provided in which Member States should 
increase these ⌫ amounts to at least a half of those levels. 
(14) It is necessary to make provision for a body to guarantee that the 
victim [sic: of a motor accident] will not remain without compensation 
where the vehicle which caused the accident is uninsured or unidentified. 
It is important to provide that the victim of such an accident should be 
able to apply directly to that body as a first point of contact. However, 
Member States should be given the possibility of applying certain limited 
exclusions as regards the payment of compensation by that body and of 
providing that compensation for damage to property caused by an 
unidentified vehicle may be limited or excluded in view of the danger of 
fraud. 
(15) It is in the interest of victims that the effects of certain exclusion 
clauses be limited to the relationship between the insurer and the person 
responsible for the accident. However, in the case of vehicles stolen or 
obtained by violence, Member States may specify that compensation will 
be payable by the abovementioned body. 
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Within the main body of the Directive: 
Article 3 provides (amongst other things) for each Member State being 
obliged to take all appropriate measures ‘to ensure that civil liability in 
respect of the use of a vehicle normally based in its territory is covered 
by insurance. 
Article 10 imposes an obligation to set up a body to compensate for 
injuries caused by unidentified vehicles or an uninsured vehicle i.e. in the 
United Kingdom the Motor Insurers Bureau. It provides however that 
‘Member States may exclude the payment of compensation by that body 
in respect of persons who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused 
the damage or injury when the body can prove that they knew it was 
uninsured.’ 
Chapter 5 of the Directive is headed ‘Special categories of victim, exclusion 
clauses, single premium, vehicles dispatched from one Member State to 
another’.  
Articles 12 and 13 then provide as follows:− 
‘Article 12 
Special categories of victim 
1. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph of Article 13(1), the 
insurance referred to in Article 3 shall cover liability for personal injuries 
to all passengers, other than the driver, arising out of the use of a 
vehicle. 
2. The members of the family of the policyholder, driver or any other 
person who is liable under civil law in the event of an accident, and 
whose liability is covered by the insurance referred to in Article 3, shall 
not be excluded from insurance in respect of their personal injuries by 
virtue of that relationship. 
3. The insurance referred to in Article 3 shall cover personal injuries and 
damage to property suffered by pedestrians, cyclists and other 
non−motorised users of the roads who, as a consequence of an accident 
in which a motor vehicle is involved, are entitled to compensation in 
accordance with national civil law. 
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This Article shall be without prejudice either to civil liability or to the 
quantum of damages. 
Article 13 
Exclusion clauses 
1. Each Member State shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that 
any statutory provision or any contractual clause contained in an 
insurance policy issued in accordance with Article 3 shall be deemed to 
be void in respect of claims by third parties who have been victims of an 
accident where that statutory provision or contractual clause excludes 
from insurance the use or driving of vehicles by:  
(a) persons who do not have express or implied authorisation to 
do so; 
(b) persons who do not hold a licence permitting them to drive the 
vehicle concerned; 
(c) persons who are in breach of the statutory technical 
requirements concerning the condition and safety of the vehicle 
concerned. 
However, the provision or clause referred to in point (a) of the first 
subparagraph may be invoked against persons who voluntarily entered 
the vehicle which caused the damage or injury, when the insurer can 
prove that they knew the vehicle was stolen. 
Member States shall have the option in the case of accidents occurring 
on their territory of not applying the provision in the first subparagraph if 
and in so far as the victim may obtain compensation for the damage 
suffered from a social security body. 
2. In the case of vehicles stolen or obtained by violence, Member States 
may provide that the body specified in Article 10(1) is to pay 
compensation instead of the insurer under the conditions set out in 
paragraph 1 of this Article.  Where the vehicle is normally based in 
another Member State, that body can make no claim against any body in 
that Member State. Member States which, in the case of vehicles stolen 
or obtained by violence, provide that the body referred to in Article 10(1) 
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is to pay compensation may fix in respect of damage to property an 
excess of not more than EUR 250 to be borne by the victim. 
3. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any 
statutory provision or any contractual clause contained in an insurance 
policy which excludes a passenger from such cover on the basis that he 
knew or should have known that the driver of the vehicle was under the 
influence of alcohol or of any other intoxicating agent at the time of an 
accident, shall be deemed to be void in respect of the claims of such 
passenger.’ 
It is suggested that the correct way to view our national law in this area is 
through the lens of the European Directive it is supposed to transpose and 
implement.   
 
Our national law: 
The statutory duty to satisfy judgments is contained in s. 151(5) RTA which 
provides: 
‘Notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or 
may have avoided or cancelled, the policy or security, he must, subject to 
the provisions of this section, pay to the persons entitled to the benefit of 
the judgment 
(a) as regards liability in respect of death or bodily injury, any sum 
payable under the judgment in respect of the liability, together with 
any sum which, by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on 
judgments, is payable in respect of interest on that sum, 
(b) × 
(c) any amount payable in respect of costs.’ 
Secton 151 (4) RTA provides for an excluded category of cases where the 
insurers are not liable under s 151 (5), namely where the passenger  
‘…was allowing himself to be carried in or upon the vehicle and knew or 
had reason to believe that the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully 
taken, not being a person who− 
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(a) did not know or had no reason to believe that the vehicle had 
been stolen or unlawfully taken until after the commencement of 
his journey; 
and 
(b) could not reasonably have been expected to have alighted 
from the vehicle.’ 
Whilst S 151 (4) RTA has no direct application to the case facts in Churchill or 
Evans it does emphasise the otherwise very wide scope of the obligation to 
compensate within s 151 (5) RTA, set out below.   
However the right to recover from the policyholder is contained in section 151(8) 
RTA, which provides: 
‘Where an insurer becomes liable under this section to pay an amount in 
respect of a liability of a person who is not insured by a policy …, he is 
entitled to recover the amount from that person or from any person who 
( a) is insured by the policy….., by the terms of which the liability 
would be covered if the policy insured all persons × and  
(b) caused or permitted the use of the vehicle which gave rise to 
the liability.’ 
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Conclusions: 
The effect of s 151 (8) is to exclude from the benefit of insurance cover a 
passenger (who is also the insured) where that passenger has given permission 
to an uninsured driver to drive.  This has no parallel within the European 
Directive, as can been observed from the above excerpts.  It would follow 
therefore that in European Law a passenger’s knowledge that their driver is 
uninsured cannot be excluded from the protection afforded by our national law, 
either under contract or by national / statutory provision.  
Furthermore, as Waller LJ observed, we have the Advocate General’s opinion 
in Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] ECR 1-1847 to the effect the list of void exclusions set 
out in Article 12 are not exhaustive: so in Bernaldez, an exclusion of liability 
imposed on the insured due to his knowledge that the driver was intoxicated 
was deemed void.   The European Court of Justice took the same view and this 
resulted in the 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive’s predecessor being amended 
to include what is now Article 13 (3).   
Nevertheless s 151 (8) has the ostensible result of excluding an injured person 
from a remedy prescribed by Articles 3 and 12 of the 6th EU Motor Insurance 
Directive.  If this view is correct then s 151 does not implement E U law 
completely. 
If s 151 (8) is in conflict with the Directive, then it is necessary to ask whether it 
is in fact possible to interpret s 151 (8) purposively so as to give effect to the 
Directive or whether the Road Traffic Act 1988 needs amending.  This is the 
object of the referral to the European Court of Justice. 
 
Practice Point 
Where any national law provision is supposed to implement our government’s 
obligations under a European Directive, one must begin the interpretation of 
that provision by studying the European directive and then construing the 
provision in the light of that Directive.   
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This approach is also good for construing the Uninsured and Untraced Drivers 
Agreements261 entered into between the Secretary of State for Transport and 
the Motor Insurers Bureau in order to compensate victims of uninsured and 
untraced drivers.  Any cursory study of which will reveal a number of glaring 
inconsistencies with the directives, but that is the subject of another article. 
 
         [Nicholas Bevan] 
 
  
                                               
261 Dated 1999 and 2003 respectively. 
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Reforming the Motor Insurers’ Bureau’ 
[The two articles below were published under the heading ‘Reforming the Motor 
Insurers’ Bureau’ ] 
 
 
2. Part I the Motor Insurers Bureau’s role 
[2011] J.P.I.L., Issue 1262  
 
The Bureau 
The Motor Insurers Bureau (MIB) has been in existence for approximately 64 
years.  It plays a vital role in the framework of protective measures designed to 
ensure that road accident victims recover their full compensatory entitlement. The 
service it provides is crucial—especially for those unfortunate enough to be 
victims  of up to 1.5 million uninsured drivers that plague our roads.  Without this 
safety net many injured victims would be unable to recover their compensatory 
entitlement because most uninsured drivers have little or no means to satisfy a 
judgment themselves.   
Yet, the MIB does not enjoy the universal esteem of claimant representatives and 
commentators.  Indeed its fitness for purpose is coming under increasing scrutiny 
amidst calls for a radical reform to the compensatory scheme it operates on 
behalf of the State.  This arises out of a growing appreciation within the legal 
profession that the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 that MIB administers on 
behalf of the State is potentially under compensating many victims of uninsured 
and untraced drivers. 
                                               
262 J.P.I. Law 2011, 1, 39-53 
In the first of a two-part article Nicholas Bevan looks at the origins and evolution of 
the MIB and examines its role and the legal structure within which it operates with 
particular reference to the State’s European obligations. In the second article 
Nicholas will examine whether the MIB is fit for purpose and outline areas for 
reform. 
Muiris Lyons, partner of Stewarts Law solicitors, JPIL general editor 
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Any fair assessment of the MIB and its role in delivering the State’s policy aims 
should commence with an appraisal of the MIB itself, as an institution and this is 
where this paper will begin.  It will review the historical background against which 
the MIB was incepted, its principal objects as well as the much extended role 
embraced over the past decade.  Its function as a compensatory safeguard for 
victims of uninsured and untraced drivers will then be critically examined but with 
particular emphasis being placed on the substance and operation of the 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999.  The preeminence of the EU Motor 
Insurance Directives and its related jurisprudence, both as a source of primary 
law and principle and as a means of interpretation, will also be considered.  The 
Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003 will only be mentioned in passing as it is a very 
different creature. 
Origins 
Both the formation of the MIB and its continuing role are inextricably linked with 
the passing of the Road Traffic Act 1930.  This made it obligatory for the user of 
a motor vehicle on a road in Great Britain to be insured against liability for 
personal injury caused by or arising out of that use.  This requirement is now 
contained within sections 143 to 145 Road Traffic Act 1988.  Unfortunately the 
legislative purpose was frustrated by difficulties right from the outset. 
Two key failings were identified.  The first was that many drivers were simply 
failing to purchase the third party motor insurance.  The second problem was that 
even where such insurance cover existed, any material breaches by the policy 
holder entitled the insurer avoid its contractual liability to indemnify.  In either 
case, the social policy aim of ensuring that victims would recover their full 
compensatory entitlement from the responsible party’s insurer, regardless of the 
financial circumstances of the defendant, was being frustrated.   
This unsatisfactory state of affairs was highlighted in 1937 by the Cassel 
Committee (chaired by the eminent jurist Sir Felix Cassel QC, PC). It made two 
principal recommendations: firstly that further legislation be enacted to regulate 
motor insurance contracts more stringently, so as to restrict the ability of insurers 
to impose policy conditions and exclusions that would enable them to avoid 
liability to compensate and secondly, to set up a National Guarantee Fund that 
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would compensate victims of uninsured drivers.  Both measures also conferred 
on the compensator a right of recovery from the policyholder / uninsured driver.  
The Second World War intervened before these recommendations could be 
implemented.  However, in its aftermath and with the prospect of imminent 
statutory intervention, the insurance industry took the initiative and agreed a non-
statutory scheme that it would administer; this was the genesis of the Motor 
Insurance Bureau.  
Objectives 
The MIB was established by the insurance industry as a private company limited 
by guarantee on 1 July 1946  It was set up to facilitate the motor insurance 
industry to contract with the State to deliver a compensatory scheme for victims 
of negligent uninsured and untraced motorists.  It is a not for profit organisation.  
The MIB entered into the first of a series of formal agreements with the State, 
undertaking the role of compensating victims of negligent uninsured motorists.  
The first scheme was set up under The Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1946, 
which has since been modified by various later agreements from time to time: 
most recently in 1972, 1988 and currently 1999.  The first Untraced Drivers 
Agreement was entered into in 1969 and the current version is dated 2003.  
These two compensatory regimes are known as the ‘Domestic Agreements’.  
The agreements are self contained, in the sense that they remain in force even 
when superseded, so that different regimes co-exist: prescribing different 
compensatory regimes that remain in force from the date of their commencement 
to the date of any successor agreement.  This policy worked well enough up to 
and until the UK’s accession to the European Community in 1973.  However, this 
paper will demonstrate below that this arrangement has become an anachronism 
and is unsuited to the task of ensuring the UK’s implementation of EU Law. 
Every authorised insurer that underwrites compulsory motor insurance in the UK 
is obliged, by virtue of S 145 (5) of the 1988 Act, to be a member of MIB and to 
contribute to its Guarantee Fund.  The MIB’s management board comprises 
senior representatives appointed by the major insurance companies.  Accordingly 
the motor insurance industry not only have a direct role in the management of the 
MIB itself but they are able to influence the Secretary of State in any negotiations, 
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not just through the organ of the MIB, which they control, but also by direct 
lobbying. 
Ultimately, the National Guarantee Fund is not a creation of the motor insurance 
industry’s largess because every penny expended by the MIB in satisfying claims 
under the Uninsured and Untraced Drivers Agreements and in managing the 
seemingly ever widening role of the MIB is eventually recouped from the premium 
paying public.  The State has in effect empowered the representative body of a 
commercial consortium to impose indirect taxation in order to implement its social 
policy aims.  The MIB estimates that the additional cost to each insured driver of 
funding the MIB is approximately £30 a year.  However, recent research 
published by Cooperative Insurance puts the additional cost at £50.263 
 
Widening scope of operations 
1. The MIB is acquiring a steadily widening agenda and influence.  In addition 
to serving as an extra statutory compensator under the two Domestic 
Agreements it has taken on the following roles for the State: 
 It operates what is known as the ‘Green Card Scheme’ in this 
jurisdiction.  This scheme was set up under the Uniform Agreement 
1949 that the United Kingdom Government entered into as a member 
of the Council of Bureau264.  It provides what is in essence an 
international certificate of motor insurance limited to the territories of 
the contracting states.  The MIB has several roles.  One is to act as a 
handling agent to ensure that residents who are injured in this 
jurisdiction by a foreign driver265 temporarily visiting under a Green 
Card is compensated.  The Bureau will investigate and settle the claim 
before recovering its outlay from the foreign bureau concerned. The 
MIB also serves as an information bureau, helping the victim to trace a 
foreign insurer.  Another major role for the MIB under this Agreement 
                                               
263  Uninsured drivers cost motorists £1.25 million a year, Calum Mcintyre Rogers, Daily 
Telegraph, 28 August 2010 
264 This Council was set up under the aegis of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe and although its members are primarily confined to Europe its remit extends 
to the Urals, the Caspian Sea and other countries around the Mediterranean Sea. 
265 The Scheme only applies between the contracting states. 
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is to meet claims by foreign nationals injured by UK residents 
temporarily visiting member state under a Green Card insurance 
scheme.  . 
 The MIB enforces an intra-insurer agreement, set out in Article 75 
within the MIB’s Articles of Association.  Article 75 fulfills the purpose 
imposed on EU Member States by what is now Article 11 of the 6th EU 
Motor Insurance Directive of providing a mechanism to deliver 
compensation without delay where there is a dispute as to which is 
liable. 
The MIB’s activities were extended significantly under the Motor Vehicles 
(Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) 
Regulations 2003266.  These regulations appoint the MIB as the Compensatory 
Body for the United Kingdom and confer extensive powers and duties on the MIB.  
Acting in this role, the MIB has an important compensatory role for a claimant 
resident in this jurisdiction but who has been injured abroad (in a foreign state 
within the EEA).  Under this scheme the MIB will stand in the shoes of any foreign 
insurance representative that has failed to respond to a claim promptly orif no 
claims representative has been appointed or if the vehicle or driver is not insured 
or cannot be traced.  . 
 The MIB also acts as the Information Bureau under the Motor Vehicles 
(Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation 
Body) Regulations 2003267.  If the Motor Insurance Information Centre 
(MIIC) receives a written request containing sufficient information to 
identify the vehicle concerned and is accompanied by a fee of £10, it 
will, through the network of other national bureaux, provide the victim 
with details of the name, address and policy number of the insurer of 
the vehicle, the identity of its UK representative and, where the victim 
                                               
266 These regulations were introduced to implement the Fourth Motor Insurance Directive 
2000/26/EC whose principal object was to make it easier for victims of road traffic 
accidents injured in a foreign EU member state to claim compensation against a foreign 
representative of the third party insurer and (perhaps most significantly) to do so in the 
victim’s own country of residence.  The Fourth Directive was passed by the European 
Union on 16 May 2000 and the Regulations came into force on 18 January 2003 
267 Regulation 1 provides for the setting up of the Motor Insurers Information Centre which 
based at the MIB in Milton Keynes. 
90 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
has a 'legitimate interest', the registered keeper of the vehicle.  The 
MIB is responsible for maintaining an insurance database for vehicles 
registered in the UK and has the power to fine insurance undertakings 
that fail to submit details. 
  
2. The MIB has assumed a number of other roles, over and above 
implementing the UK’s treaty obligations: 
 The MIB shares the data acquire in its role as the Information 
Bureau with the police, operating a 24 hour telephone helpline, to 
enable the police to enforce the requirement imposed by s143 
Road Traffic Act 1988 for road users to have third party insurance 
cover for their vehicles.  According to the MIB millions of insurance 
checks are made by the police every month.  The MIB claims that 
this has reduced the incidence of uninsured driving from around 2 
million a few years ago to about 1.5 million today and since 2005 
approximately 600,000 cars have been seized and about 40% of 
these were crushed under this initiative.  According to the MIB this 
initiative appears to have reduced the number of uninsured and 
untraced driver claims by 20 %.  However, it seems likely that we 
will witness an increase in uninsured driving following the recent 
announcement by some motor insurers of their intention to 
increase the premiums for young drivers by as much as 51%. 
 The MIB has become a very effective lobbyist in furtherance of its 
declared mission: to reduce the incidence of uninsured driving.  It has 
successfully campaigned for the introduction of a continuous 
insurance enforcement policy, enforced as a new offence under s22 
of the Road Safety Act 2006 of keeping a vehicle without insurance.  
When this comes into force in early 2011 it will amend s144 Road 
Traffic Act 1988 to make it an offence to keep a motor vehicle off road 
without insurance unless the owner has filed a Statutory Off Road 
Notice at the Department of Vehicle and Licensing Authority.  The 
DVLA and police will be able to undertake database searches to track 
down potentially uninsured drivers.  In its 2009 report the MIB reported 
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remarkable success in its campaign to reduce uninsured drivers and 
as a result it spent £69m less last year than predicted and paid a 
substantial rebate to its members.  It also lobbied for a new offence of 
causing death by driving where the driver is uninsured is also planned; 
presumably with an enhanced penalty.  It is questionable whether the 
latter initiative will influence uninsured drivers to any significant extent.  
Many uninsured drivers are probably motivated more by their inability 
to afford the very high premiums than by sanctions. 
 The MIB also undertakes its own research into the incidence of 
uninsured and untraced drivers.  It recently enquired into the 
demographic makeup of uninsured drivers.  This identified that a 
typical uninsured motorist is male and aged between 17 and 29; that 
10 % of 18-24 year olds are not aware you need insurance to drive 
legally in the UK and that of the 1.2 million drivers aged 17-20, 
243,000 (20 %) are believed to be driving without insurance.   
 More recently the MIB has set up a management service for the online 
portal through which claims are notified and processed under the new 
Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents Scheme.  
 It has also set up a subsidiary company to operate the Employers 
Liability Insurance Database that was an initiative of the last 
Government.  The ELID is an electronic record of employers' 
insurance policies.  Its objective is to make it easier for victims of long 
tail / historical industrial disease to recover compensation by enabling 
them to trace their (often former) employers’ insurance records. 
 It has been proposed by various stakeholders in the field of industrial 
injury and disease litigation, including the author, that the MIB should 
manage an Employers Liability Insurance Bureau.  Such a Bureau 
would be tasked with raising a levy on EL / PL insurers underwriting 
business in this company and with compensating victims of industrial 
disease or injury claims where the insurer cannot be traced but for 
incidents which employers were obliged to have been covered by 
insurance under Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 
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1969.  It is not known if this initiative, adopted by the previous 
Government, will survive the present Government’s sweeping cuts. 
It will be readily appreciated that the MIB has evolved into a major enterprise with 
a much extended scope of operations from that originally conceived.  In 2009 MIB 
employed about 320 and handled approximately 60,000 uninsured and untraced 
driver claims from its premises in Milton Keynes; roughly half of those were 
untraced / hit and run accidents.  All of its activities are paid for by the insurance 
premium paying public.  In 2009 its total income amounted to £ 226,662 million.   
Mission Statement 
According to its website it describes a strategic mission that is not directly 
concerned with its original objective but which is laudable all the same, namely: 
‘to significantly reduce the level and impact of uninsured driving in the UK’.   
Innovation 
During the past 10 years, the MIB has been a powerhouse of innovation across 
an impressively wide range of activities.  The brief account that follows does not 
do justice to the outstanding dynamism of its executive managers over the past 
decade.   
It developed a motor insurance database of insured vehicles to tackle fraud, long 
in advance of The Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre 
and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003; it centralized the claims handling of 
claims to deliver a more efficient and consistent approach; it provides training to 
claimant representatives at its offices; it introduced an MIB Legal Expenses 
Scheme to assist claimants fund their claims, without the need for expensive after 
the event insurance premiums; introduced the MIB / MASS Fast Track 
Understanding that streamlined and expedited low to moderate value accident 
claims, which was later extended to all claimants; it devised an MIB Customer 
Charter that treats claimants as well as their legal representatives as customers; 
It introduced a complaints policy;  it actively encourages claimants to use 
periodical payments as a means of compensating injury claims featuring a 
significant element of future loss; it instituted an MIB Training Academy for 
insurance claims handling; it lobbied successfully for  police powers to search 
and seize uninsured vehicles, resulting in the Serious Organised Crime and 
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Police Act 2005 and the Road Safety Act 2006; it has introduced an online 
process for lay applicants to submit claims direct, an finally it claims that it has, 
as a result of efficiencies and improvements in its claims handling processes, 
reduced the number of outstanding claims and its response times for dealing with 
correspondence substantially compared with what they were two years ago.   
Thus far the MIB, as an institution, comes through with flying colours.  Its scope 
of operations has expanded considerably and it has successfully introduced a 
number of innovations which have improved its accessibility and the efficiency of 
its operations.  Its close cooperation with the Government and the police appear 
to have reduced the incidence of uninsured driving.  .These are remarkable 
achievements by any standard and they indicate that the MIB’s senior 
management is innovative and effective.  But is the MIB fit for purpose as a 
compensator of victims of uninsured and untraced drivers?  The answer to that 
question lies in examining its own stated objectives and the compensatory role it 
has assumed under its Domestic Agreements and then to compare these with 
what is required under national and European law. 
Constitution  
This is to be found in the MIB’s Memorandum and Articles of Association.  The 
Memorandum is publicly available from Companies House and is downloadable 
for free from the MIB’s website.  It sets out a long list of objects in Article 3. 
As recently as 2008 Article 3 (A) (i) used to provide that the MIB would operate: 
‘As a fund of last resort to satisfy, or provide for the satisfaction of, claims, 
judgements, awards or settlements in respect of any liability required to be 
covered by contracts of insurance or security under Part VI of the Road Traffic 
Act 1988 or by any other statute, ……. ‘ 
For roughly 62 years was an oft quoted precept that the MIB’s Guarantee Fund 
was a fund of last resort.  This inculcated the perception in many that MIB’s 
obligation under the Domestic Agreements was limited to topping up the shortfall 
in the victims compensatory needs, taking into any account funds were received 
from any other source.  Indeed this principle underscores various exceptions to 
be found within the Uninsured Drivers and Untraced Drivers Agreements and 
which the MIB have relied upon to justify reducing the level of compensation 
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some claimants would otherwise have rightly expected; had the defendant been 
insured.  These will be alluded to later on.  Suffice it to say here that under this 
principle, and over many years, very substantial savings have been achieved by 
the MIB and the insurance companies who comprise its membership – a saving 
made at the expense of many claimants’ compensatory entitlement and one that 
the industry was not entitled to make.   
It is therefore of particular significance that the reference to ‘a fund of last resort’ 
has been removed from the 2010 edition of the MIB’s Memorandum and Articles 
of Association, although the Uninsured and Untraced Driver’s Agreements that 
reflect this principle remain unaltered.  Article 3 now provides that the objects of 
the bureau are: 
‘A (i) To provide a safety net for innocent victims of identified and uninsured 
drivers to satisfy, or provide for the satisfaction of, claims, judgements, awards or 
settlements in respect of any liability required to be covered by contracts of 
insurance or security under Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988 or by any other 
statute, statutory instrument, rule, regulation, order, directive or similar measure 
introduced by any competent authority or at common law or by custom.’ 
The MIB’s role, as a compensatory safety net, is set out clause 5 of the Uninsured 
Drivers Agreement 1999, entered into between the MIB and the Secretary of 
State for Transport on 13 August 1999.  The adequacy of this safety net, in so far 
as it effects uninsured driver claims, will be examined in Part II.  
Returning to the MIB’s constitution, Article 3 (B) (i) provides that the MIB will: 
‘… enter into any agreements or arrangements with any governments or 
authorities, municipal, local or otherwise…………. that may seem conducive to 
the Bureau’s objects………………. and to carry out, exercise and comply with 
any such agreements, arrangements, rights, privileges and concessions. 268’ 
In short, and in so far as victims of uninsured and untraced drivers are concerned, 
one can readily discern that the MIB has two primary functions: Firstly to enter 
into agreements with the Government (for the delivery of a suitable compensatory 
safety net for this class of victim) and secondly, to comply with these agreements 
(i.e. to manage the compensatory scheme).  Any assessment of the MIB’s fitness 
                                               
268 The bold text is the author’s own emphasis. 
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for purpose must include an assessment of the fitness for purpose of the 
agreements themselves, since not only was the MIB was a contracting party to 
and proponent of those agreements but also it is obliged by its constitution to 
adhere to them; and by and large, so it does. 
The MIB’s Memoradum and Articles of Association can be downloaded free of 
charge from the MIB website: http://www.mib.org.uk.  .  The current version is 
dated 10 June 2010.   
 
The nature of the MIB Domestic Agreements 
 
We have seen that the Domestic Agreements are a series of agreements 
between the State and the motor insurance industry in the UK.  These 
agreements define the scheme under which the National Guarantee Fund is 
administered to deliver the Governments’ social policy aim of ensuring that 
victims of motor accidents recover their compensatory entitlement and in order to 
comply with the State’s treaty obligations.   
The MIB’s compensatory role is restricted under the terms of the Domestic 
Agreements to claims arising out of a liability for which compulsory road traffic 
accident insurance applies: this is what the MIB means by a “relevant liability” in 
Clause 5 of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement269.  Conversely, where the party 
responsible for the claimant’s loss was not obliged under Part VI of the Road 
Traffic Act 1988 to have third party insurance, then the MIB has no obligation to 
compensate under the Clause 5.   
The requirement to have third party insurance is set out in s 143 Road Traffic Act 
1988: 
s 143 (1)   Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act—   
   (a)    a person must not use a motor vehicle on a road [or other public place] 
unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person such a 
policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies 
with the requirements of this Part of this Act, and   
                                               
269 see Lees v MIB [1952] 2 QB 511 
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   (b)    a person must not cause or permit any other person to use a motor vehicle 
on a road [or other public place] unless there is in force in relation to the use of 
the vehicle by that other person such a policy of insurance or such a security in 
respect of third party risks as complies with the requirements of this Part of this 
Act.   
The extent of the insurance indemnity required is defined within section 145 of 
the Road Traffic Act 1988.  This includes the following extract: 
….any liability which may be incurred in respect of the death of or bodily injury to 
any person or damage to property caused by, or arising out of, the use of the 
vehicle on a road in Great Britain.   
Accordingly the scope of the Uninsured Drivers Agreements and the Untraced 
Drivers Agreements are drafted in such a way as to be coextensive with the 
obligation to to have insurance under Part VI of the 1988 Act. 
The first MIB Agreement, dated 17 June 1946, only concerned itself with 
uninsured driver claims, however untraced driver claims were also compensated 
at the MIB’s discretion.  There have been a series of revisions to these Domestic 
Agreements, culminating in the MIB Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 
(effecting accidents occurring on or after 1 October 1999) and, the MIB Untraced 
Drivers Agreement 2003 (effecting accidents on or after 14 February 2003). 
The precise nature of the Domestic Agreements has been the subject of some 
judicial comment.  They are arguably quasi-regulatory and extra legislative but 
they are certainly not legislation and nor do they confer any direct contractual 
right of action upon a victim.   
Whenever the MIB is potentially involved in a claim against an uninsured driver, 
it has a right to intervene as an interested party in an action against an uninsured 
driver on the basis that it is party potentially liable to satisfy any judgment against 
the uninsured defendant270.  The MIB now insists that it is joined as a party to any 
claim against an uninsured driver271 
                                               
270 Gurtner v Circuit [1968] 2 QB 587 
271 See clause 14 (b) of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 and also the Revised 
Notes for Guidance, clause 5.3 
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The style and substance of the agreements have more in common with an 
insurance policy than with what one might expect from a extra statutory 
compensatory scheme: as they are hedged with liability exclusions and impose 
the most draconian penalties for a wide range of relatively minor administrative 
and procedural stipulations (which are themselves imposed as conditions 
precedent of any liability).  These requirements go far beyond anything imposed 
under the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA 1988), a fortiori the EC Motor Insurance 
Directives.  They produce a regime that many contend to be unjust, arbitrary and 
excessive.  These will be considered in more detail below as the agreements are 
considered in turn.  Suffice it to say here that these provisions seem to be at odds 
with Sir Felix Cassel’s original objective of providing motor accident victims with 
a safety net through the institution of a National Guarantee Fund. 
 
Constitutional safeguards 
 
One remarkable characteristic of the MIB is the way in which its different functions 
and responsibilities are fused.   
We have seen that the MIB acts as an outsourcing agency for the State in the 
provision of its social law policy of compensating uninsured and untraced drivers.  
This was its genesis.  However, that relationship extends much further than that 
of any ordinary contracting party at arms length.  There is a clear interdependency 
between successive Governments and the motor insurance industry: one that 
provides the industry with a captive market and assured revenues by imposing 
on road users the obligation to take out insurance but in return requires the motor 
insurance industry to serve as a safety net for injured victims.  There is nothing 
bye or sinister in principle with this pragmatic approach.  However, as this paper 
will demonstrate, there are insufficient safeguards to balance the conflicting 
interests of the public, who rely on the Agreements as a safety net, and the 
commercial interests of the motor insurance industry, to maximise its revenue.   
A cursory examination of the Domestic Agreements shows the hand of the 
insurance interests that drafted them.  This is revealed in their layout and 
structure, the insurance terms employed, their use of conditions precedent and 
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imprecisely defined exclusions.  All these features are redolent of an insurance 
policy and are quite unlike any compensation scheme one might expect from 
Parliamentary draftsman.  It is unfortunate that their complexity defeats a cardinal 
principle of any sensible scheme of redress: that it should be clear and readily 
understandable by those affected.    
We have seen from the MIB’s constitution and the way in which its role has 
increased over recent years and from its widening scope of operations that it has 
moved on from this original compensatory function to become a significant 
presence in the insurance and motor accident claims industry.  The insurance 
companies that dominate this market also control the MIB’s management board.   
The critique of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 that follows will 
demonstrate that many of the exclusions, limitations and strike out clauses cannot 
be justified because they conflict with the Government’s obligations under EU 
Law.  It must follow therefore the arrangement, in its present form works against 
the public interest.  How then could this have been permitted to subsist and for 
so many years?   
One answer lies in the fact that there are no adequate constitutional safeguards 
and controls on the way in which the MIB operates.  Given that the MIB funds 
ultimately derive from the tax paying public, would it not be reasonable to expect 
a more representative composition within its board of management?  This should 
involve the secondment to its board of representative members of APIL or MASS 
and perhaps a consumer association.   
Would it not also be reasonable to require the MIB to account more precisely for 
its different revenue streams?  The MIB has become a multi-million pound 
business with a wide range of activities.  It is likely that most members of the 
public would expect the insurance levy that is ultimately derived from their 
premiums would be hypothecated solely for the purposes of the National 
Guarantee Fund.  This may well be the case but given the origin of these funds, 
greater clarity is desirable.  Detailed accounts should be published to 
demonstrate the use to which these funds are being applied so they are not 
diverted elsewhere.  The need for open disclosure of its detailed accounts 
becomes ever more pressing as the range of the MIB’s commercial interests and 
its role widens.   
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For example, it is understandable that the motor insurance industry might wish to 
employ the MIB to conduct research or to otherwise lobby the Government to 
represent its interests; but is it right that these activities be funded by the 
taxpayer?  At the very least this is an issue that should be debated. 
One further area of concern is that there is insufficient independent control over 
the manner in which the MIB investigate claims under the Untraced Drivers 
Agreement 2003.  The sufficiency of this non-contentious extra statutory 
compensation scheme has been the subject of a number of legal challenges.  
Whilst the efficacy of the procedure has not been successfully challenged todate, 
that negative establish the contrary: namely that the procedure is fair or that it 
produces a just outcome.  Indeed there is legitimate cause for concern that it may 
not deliver a fair outcome in many cases.  For example, there is notorious 
injustice associated with the MIB’s investigation of a claim presented by the actor, 
Mr Kenneth Moore in 1997272.  It seems probable that this resulted in that 
applicant being denied a fair and proper level of compensation.  His Francovich 
action was only defeated on the ground that it was statute barred, due in large 
part to the inordinately long time that it took to deal with this claim.  Nor should it 
be forgotten that until 2007 the MIB’s policy was to unjustifiably refuse 
applications made on behalf of minors where more than three years had elapsed 
since the date of the injury273  Furthermore, as the Untraced Drivers Agreement 
attempts to limit, except and exclude liability in almost identical terms as under 
the Uninsured Drivers Agreement, it follows that where these are established to 
conflict with the EU Directives in the Uninsured Drivers Agreements, the same 
will apply with equal force to claims under the former agreement.  It would be a 
simple matter for the MIB to agree protocols with representative bodies such as 
APIL and MASS and to set up a simple audit and regulatory process to ensure 
that these claims are being processed and adjudicated fairly.   
  
                                               
272 Moore v Secretary of State & MIB [2007] EWHC 879 (QB) 
273 Byrne v Secretary of State & MIB [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB) 
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The impact of Europe 
 
Prior to the United Kingdom’s accession to Europe in 1973 the entire issue as to 
the nature and extent of compensation provided under the National Guarantee 
Fund fell entirely within the province and control of the contracting parties: namely 
the insurance industry acting through the MIB and the Government.  Accordingly, 
if the Government of the day considered it just or expedient to either restrict 
access to or to limit the level compensation under the Domestic Agreements then 
it could do so, and with impunity. 
However the Government’s position following its accession to The European 
Economic Community in 1973 Directives is a very different matter.  In the words 
of Lord Denning:  
 ‘The Treaty [of Rome, 1957] does not touch any of the matters which concern 
solely England and the people in it. These are still governed by English law. They 
are not affected by the Treaty. But when we come to matters with a European 
element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the 
rivers. It cannot be held back, Parliament has decreed that the Treaty is 
henceforward to be part of our law. It is equal in force to any statute.’274 
Indeed, there is an established corpus of judicial rulings which demonstrate that 
many of the restrictions and limitations within the Domestic Agreements conflict 
with the more generous and less restricted compensatory regime prescribed by 
the EU Motor Insurance Directives.   
The first of these Motor Insurance Directives was passed shortly before the UK’s 
accession to the Treaty of Rome.  This First EU Motor Insurance Directive275 
imposed on member states an obligation to require insurance against civil liability 
for the use of motor vehicles, along the lines of our existing national legislation.  
This directive and three successive Motor Insurance Directives are now all 
consolidated within a codified 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive (Council Directive 
2008/0037(COD)).  However, whilst the first EU Motor Insurance Directive may 
have done no more that bring some of our putative European partners into line, 
                                               
274 H.P. Bulmer Ltd v J. Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401 at 418 
275 First EU Motor Insurance Directive (Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972) 
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the relatively unqualified nature of the compensatory safety net prescribed by 
subsequent EU Motor Insurance Directives contrast sharply with the regime in 
this jurisdiction. 
It is long established that an English court is under an obligation to interpret all 
national legislation (primary and secondary) as far as possible, in a way which 
gives effect to the Directive, - Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentación SA (Case C-106/89) [1990] ECR I-I4135.  Furthermore, as Lord 
Oliver of Aylmerton observed in Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co Ltd 
[1990] 1 AC 546, 559: 
‘a purposive construction will be applied to legislation even though, perhaps, it 
may involve some departure from the strict and literal application of the words 
which the legislature has elected to use.’ 
Judicial interpretation of the 1999 Agreement 
It will be noted that the Domestic Agreements are a series of private contracts 
between the Secretary of State acting on behalf of the Government and the MIB 
acting on behalf of the motor insurance industry; not legislation.   
Even so, the House of Lords employed a remarkably similar process of reasoning 
when construing the contractual terms of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1988 
in White v White [2001] UKHL 9.  It applied what was in effect a purposive 
construction of clause 6 of the 1988 Agreement that excluded any liability to 
compensate in certain circumstances. 
In White claimant had been severely injured whilst riding as a passenger in a car 
driven by his brother who was not only uninsured but also drunk.  The MIB 
intervened and sought a declaration that it was not liable to compensate the 
claimant on the grounds that the Clause 6.1.(e) of the 1988 Agreement  excluded 
any liability to compensate a passenger who knew or ought to have known their 
driver was uninsured.  
The claimant contended that whatever the UDA 1988 might provide, Article 1 of 
the Second Motor Insurance Directive (84/5/EEC) only permitted member states 
to exclude liability to a passenger in such circumstances where there was actual 
knowledge. 
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The House of Lords upheld the Court of Appeal’s finding in the claimant’s favour: 
His claim was not excluded notwithstanding the provision within the UDA 1988 to 
the contrary.  Although technically speaking Marleasing had no application, the 
use of conventional contractual construction principles produced the same result.   
There is also ample authority from the European Court of Justice that any 
exception within a Directive should be constructed restrictively.  Accordingly the 
House of Lords ruled that it must have been in the mind of the contracting parties 
at the time of entering into the UDA 1988 that they wished to comply with the 
Second Motor Insurance Directive so that the relevant phrase within clause 6 of 
the UDA 1988 (knew or ought to have known) should be taken to mean ‘knew’ 
and not ‘ought to have known’  
A consequence of this landmark ruling is that, as a matter of contract law 
construction, the Domestic Agreements are to be interpreted in a purposeful 
manner in recognition of the contracting parties presumed intention to comply 
with the Government’s obligations under EU Law. 
If the result prescribed by a directive cannot be achieved by way of judicial 
interpretation, the remedy lies in an action by the victim affected against the 
member state in accordance with Francovich and others [1991] ECR 1-5357.  
In Evans v Secretary of State for Transport & MIB C-63/01 [2003] ECR I-14 the 
High Court referred a challenge under the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1972 to 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a ruling.  
This case is notable for the crucially important EJC ruling that the effect of the 2nd 
Motor Insurance Directive276 was to ensure that the protection provided is 
‘equivalent to and as effective as’ the protection available under the domestic 
legal system to victims of insured drivers (i.e. equivalent and effective to the 
protection afforded to victims of drivers who are insured under national law, be 
this the Road Traffic Act 1988 or any other statute that has the same purpose).  
Similarly, the procedural process should be no less favourable than those 
governing similar claims against insured drivers.   
                                               
276 The 2nd Motor Insurance Directive imposed on member states the obligation to put in 
place compensation for victims of uninsured and untraced drivers. 
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However, as Mr Justice Hickinbottomrecently observed in Carswell v Secretary 
of State & MIB [2010] 277, the burden is a heavy one for a claimant to discharge. 
In Evans, the ECJ ruled: 
45. It is settled case-law that in the absence of Community rules governing the 
matter it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the 
courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural 
rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from 
Community law, provided, however, that such rules are not less favourable than 
those governing similar domestic actions (the principle of equivalence) and do 
not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred by Community law (the principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, 
Case C-120/97 Upjohn [1999] ECR I-223, paragraph 32). 
46. As regards application of the principle of effectiveness, each case which 
raises the question whether a national procedural provision renders application 
of Community law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by 
reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special 
features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In the light of 
that analysis, the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as 
protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the 
proper conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate, be taken into 
consideration (see Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel and Van 
Veen [1995] ECR I-4705, paragraph 19). 
It should be appreciated however that both Evans and Carswell featured untraced 
driver claims.  These were non-contentious applications for compensation where 
the ‘equivalence’ principle can hardly apply.  This would suggest that it is easier 
to challenge the sufficiency of the procedure for an uninsured driver claim, 
particularly where there are such gross detractions from the normal procedure 
against an insured and identified defendant. 
Between them, White and Evan,s provide the interpretive mechanism for the 
agreements.  Accordingly, the House of Lords ruling in White is that where 
possible the Domestic Agreements should be interpreted in such a way as to give 
                                               
277 Carswell v Secretary of State & MIB [2010] EWHC 3230 (QB), para 17 
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effect to the presumed intention of the Government and the MIB: which is that it 
should comply with the EU Motor Insurance Directives.  The European Court of 
Justice ruling in Evans indicates in the clearest terms that the level of protection 
afforded to a victim of an uninsured or untraced driver under either of the 
Domestic Agreements should, taken as a whole, be equivalent to and as effective 
as the protection available the Road Traffic Act 1988  
Given the primacy of European Law, and the EU Motor Insurance Directives in 
particular, this paper will consider the relevant EU Motor Insurance Directives first 
before moving on to critically examine whether the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 
1999 provides the scope and level of protection prescribed by these Directives.  
The correct way to view our national law in this area is through the lens of the 
European Directives it is supposed to transpose and implement. 
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The European Motor Insurance Directives 
The EU Motor Insurance Directives fulfil an important role in promoting the free 
movement of persons, goods, services (and implicitly, vehicles) within the 
European Union, which the UK has been a full member since 1973. 
We have seen that EU Directives are important sources of law and that where 
the conflict with national law, European law will prevail.  Where the construction 
of statute or regulation is at issue, the courts will often consider the relevant EU 
Directive.  They have influenced our road traffic law and they also effect the 
obligations of the MIB. 
It has already been observed that the first four EU Motor Insurance Directives 
have been codified within a new 6th Motor Insurance Directive.   
The 5th EU Motor Insurance Directive (2005/14/EC) is of limited relevance to this 
paper.  It is sufficient to note that it abolished the excess on property damage 
claims.  Hitherto the MIB had deducted an excess on property damage claims of 
brought under the Uninsured Drivers Agreement of £350. It also required the 
maximum statutory property and injury cover limits to be regularly increased, in 
line with inflation.   
In this regard, the MIB demonstrated that it could act decisively, as the Uninsured 
Drivers Agreement 1999 was amended in short order by a Supplemental 
Agreement dated 7 November 2008 that gave effect to these changes.  The other 
changes introduced by this Directive are not germane to the MIB’s management 
of the compensatory regime for uninsured and untraced drivers.   
The 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive 
As has been stated, the 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive (2008/0037(COD) 
consolidates and clarifies the first four EU Motor Insurance Directives.  Of 
particular relevance are the following articles: 
Article 3: Compulsory Insurance of Vehicles 
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Each Member State shall, subject to Article 5278, take all appropriate measures 
to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its 
territory is covered by insurance.  The extent of the liability covered and the terms 
and conditions of the cover shall be determined on the basis of the measures 
referred to in the first subparagraph  
Each Member State shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the 
contract of insurance also covers: 
(a) according to the law in force in other Member States, any loss or injury which 
is caused in the territory of those States; 
(b) …… 
The insurance referred to in the first subparagraph shall cover compulsorily both 
damage to property and personal injuries. 
The principal obligation within Article 3 is that member states should: ‘take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles 
normally based in its territory is covered by insurance’.   
 
 
 
Article 10: Body responsible for compensation  
 
1. Each Member State shall set up or authorise a body with the task of providing 
compensation279, at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation for damage 
to property or personal injuries caused by an unidentified vehicle or a vehicle for 
which the insurance obligation provided for in Article 3 has not been satisfied.  
The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to the right of the Member 
States to regard compensation by the body as subsidiary or non-subsidiary and 
                                               
278 The reference to Article 5 is to the right of member states to derogate from the 
obligation to impose an obligation to insure for certain persons.  This applies to exempt 
Ministry of Defence vehicles and local authorities, that are able to self insure, from the 
obligation to purchase compulsory third party cover under the Road Traffic Act 1988. 
 
279 In this jurisdiction: the Motor Insurers Bureau. 
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the right to make provision for the settlement of claims between the body and the 
person or persons responsible for the accident and other insurers or social 
security bodies required to compensate the victim in respect of the same 
accident. However, Member States may not allow the body to make the payment 
of compensation conditional on the victim establishing in any way that the person 
liable is unable or refuses to pay. 
2. The victim may in any event apply directly to the body which, on the basis of 
information provided at its request by the victim, shall be obliged to give him a 
reasoned reply regarding the payment of any compensation. Member States 
may, however, exclude the payment of compensation by that body in respect of 
persons who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the damage or injury 
when the body can prove that they knew it was uninsured.  
3. Member States may limit or exclude the payment of compensation by the body 
in the event of damage to property by an unidentified vehicle. However, where 
the body has paid compensation for significant personal injuries to any victim of 
the same accident in which damage to property was caused by an unidentified 
vehicle, Member States may not exclude the payment of compensation for 
damage to property on the basis that the vehicle is not identified. Nevertheless, 
Member States may provide for an excess of not more than EUR 500 for which 
the victim of such damage to property may be responsible. 
The conditions in which personal injuries are to be considered significant shall be 
determined in accordance with the legislation or administrative provisions of the 
Member State in which the accident takes place. In this regard, Member States 
may take into account, inter alia, whether the injury has required hospital care.  
4. Each Member State shall apply its laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions to the payment of compensation by the body, without prejudice to any 
other practice which is more favourable to the victim. 
The most important part of Article 10 is set out in the first subparagraph. This sets 
the standard by which the MIB’s fitness for purpose as a compensatory agency 
is to be tested, namely of: 
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 ‘providing compensation, at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation for 
damage to property or personal injuries caused by an unidentified vehicle or,….. 
[uninsured]… vehicle …’  
As to the right to exclude subrogated claims, it is to be remembered that this, as 
with any exception, is to be construed restrictively.  It is suggested that the right 
to deduct subrogated claims from a victim’s compensation is confined by the use 
of the phrase: ‘…other insurers or social security bodies’ to subrogated claims by 
insurance undertakings and state run social security bodies.’   
If this interpretation is correct, then it would appear that the ability of the MIB to 
make deductions is limited to two circumstances:  firstly, where a deduction is 
already imposed by the State for the recovery of state benefits received as result 
of the accident (as under the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Regulations 
1997) and secondly, where there is a subrogated insurance claim, such as where 
the victim had a comprehensive motor insurance policy that had already paid out 
the damage on the victim’s vehicle.  Both circumstances amount to a concession 
limiting the liability of the MIB to compensate where there is in effect no actual 
loss sustained by the victim. 
There is no indication within Article 10 or elsewhere of any intention that the victim 
should recover any anything other than his or her full compensatory entitlement 
as guaranteed by the first subparagraph of Article 10.  Nor is there any provision 
that permits any deduction of other payments or benefits independently accruing 
to the victim as a result of the accident, such as under a life or health insurance 
policy. 
The only other exception within Article 10 of relevance lies in sub paragraph 2 of 
Article 10.  That entitles the MIB to refuse to compensate a passenger whom they 
can prove knew that the vehicle they were travelling in was uninsured.  However 
it requires the MIB to establish actual, not deemed, knowledge of this fact.  We 
have seen from the White case that the Clause 6 of the Uninsured Drivers 
Agreement is misleading. 
Articles 12 and 13 of the 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive are relegated to a 
separate Chapter within the Directive.  They are a hotchpotch of special 
categories of claimant, exclusions of liability and restrictions on the right to 
exclude liability. They are of limited relevance to this paper save to the extent that 
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within Article 13 is to be found a further passenger exclusion, entitling member 
states to exclude from the compensatory safety net passengers who knew the 
vehicle was stolen.   One late amendment, originally introduced by the 4th EU 
Motor Insurance Directive is the proscription against exclusions of liability for 
passengers who knew or ought to have known that the driver of the uninsured 
vehicle was intoxicated.  
The critique of the 1999 Agreement that follows in Part II will reveal, within clause 
6 and elsewhere, major and wholesale infractions of the State’s obligations under 
the EU Motor Insurance Directives. 
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Is the MIB an emanation of the state? 
The relevance of this issue lies in the fact that it is established law that whilst a 
directive cannot be relied on against an individual it can be relied on directly 
against a state.   
In McCall v Poulton & Ors [2008] EWCA Civ 1263, the Court of Appeal referred 
to the ECJ the thorny issue as to whether the MIB is an emanation of state.  
Although this issue was considered by the Court of Appeal in Evans v Motor 
Insurers Bureau (Mighell v Reading) [1999] LRIR 30 it did not decide the issue 
either way.  However it was considered in the High Court by Flaux J in Byrne v 
The Secretary of State and The MIB [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB) where the judge 
thought that the MIB was not an emanation of the state.  The McCall case was 
settled and so the reference to the ECJ on this issue was also withdrawn.  So the 
question of the MIB’s status in this regard has yet to be decided in the Country 
by a senior appellate court.   
Had the ECJ ruled that the Bureau was an emanation of the state then the EU 
Motor Insurance Directives would have had direct effect.  This would have had a 
profound impact on the way in which our national courts could approach 
challenges to the Domestic Agreements.  This is because it would be possible for 
individuals, offended by the numerous procedural knock-out clauses and 
technical conditions precedent to liability, to require the courts to resolve these 
discrepancies with the 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive directly against the MIB; 
without obliging the claimant to pursue a separate Francovich action for damages 
against the Secretary of State.   
A Southern Irish High Court ruling is also worthy of note.  In Farrell v Whitty and 
the MIBI [2008] IEHC 124, the court reviewed the EU jurisprudence and the 
English authorities and came to the conclusion that the Irish Bureau (founded on 
almost identical principles and in a very similar context) was indeed an emanation 
of the state.   
This issue is a topic for another article.  However it seems likely that the MIB is 
indeed an emanation of the State.  Clearly the Court of Appeal thought there was 
at least some merit in the proposition for it to refer the issue to European Court 
of Justice.  Certainly, if a private utility company can be deemed to be an 
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emanation of the State280 it does not take too great a leap of interpretation to 
confer the same status on the MIB.  The MIB has been tasked by the State with 
implementing its obligations under the EU Motor Directives and as we have seen, 
these are not merely confined to managing the Guarantee Fund281.  It has had 
conferred upon it a special status that enables it to levy a tax on its insurance 
company membership, ostensibly to fund the State’s compensatory safety net, 
and to investigate and determine claims under the Untraced Drivers Agreement 
2003.  Its activities are controlled and directed by the State, however imperfectly, 
through its constitution, a series of agreements with successive Secretaries of 
Sate and by regular meetings.  It would be rather odd if such an entity were not 
an emanation of the State.  
Whatever its status, sufficient safeguards should be imposed to ensure that the 
MIB is properly regulated and accountable.  It is wholly inappropriate for any 
Government to avoid its treaty obligations by effectively hiding behind a private 
limited company tasked with implementing such a wide range of its treaty 
commitments. 
 
 
  
                                               
280 Foster and Others v British Gas [1991] 2 AC 306 
281 See above under ‘Widening Scope of Operations’ 
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3. Part II: Why the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 needs to be scrapped 
[2011] J.P.I.L., Issue 2282 
 
An overview of the main defects 
 
The most offensive defects in what is now commonly perceived by most claimant 
practitioners to be a notoriously unjust and unsatisfactory compensatory regime 
are:  
 The unjustified exclusions of liability under clause 6;   
 The requirement, imposed as a condition precedent of any liability, that 
all claimants should complete the MIB’s own very detailed claim 
notification form, when the form itself has recently been changed so as 
to require applicants to supply unwarranted and wide ranging mandate 
that provides access to highly personal and privileged information; 
clause 7; 
 The imposition of numerous disproportionate and heavy handed 
procedural requirements imposed as conditions precedent to any 
liability within clauses 7 to 12.  These run a coach and horses through 
the overriding objective of Article 10;  
 A bizarre penalty imposed on an innocent victim should he or she fail 
to request the other driver’s insurance details or to pursue a formal 
complaint to the Police, where there are in fact no insurance details to 
disclose in the first place, under clause 13; 
                                               
282 J.P.I. Law 2011, 1, 39-53 
In the second of his two-part article Nicholas Bevan examines whether the MIB is fit 
for purpose and outlines areas for reform. 
Muiris Lyons, partner of Stewarts Law and JPIL general editor 
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 The assertion that any sums received by the claimant as a result of the 
accident fall to be deducted from the compensation, clause 17; 
The combined effect of these deficiencies is to deter or disentitle some claimants 
from making any application and to deny to many others their full proper 
compensatory entitlement.  There is a strong case to argue that even if these do 
not individually amount to the degree of impediment that would trigger a 
Francovich action, taken as a whole they fail to provide an effective 
implementation of the 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive. 
The intricacies of the procedural requirements within the 1999 Agreement seem 
occupy something of blind spot in many practitioners’ competence.  Ideally, they 
should be handled by dedicated specialists and where not, practitioners will need 
to appreciate how these claims differ from a typical RTA claim; case management 
systems and protocols should distinguish MIB claims as a separate category of 
claim.  Many lawyers fall into the trap of treating an MIB claim as though it were 
an ordinary RTA claim.  This can often have disastrous consequences.  Even 
where claimants manage to successfully sue their legal representative in 
negligence, the compensation awarded for professional negligence is almost 
inevitably reduced to take into account the risks of litigation; representing as they 
do only the lost prospect of recovering their full entitlement. 
The Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 was drafted long before the inception of 
the Civil Procedure Rules and prior to the pre action protocols that provide for the 
free exchange of information before proceedings are commenced.  However it 
was left to languish for a couple of years before being nonchalantly waived 
through, presumably unexamined and as drawn, by the new incumbent at the 
office of Secretary of State for Transport; without any proper consultation with 
other stakeholders.  The result produced a predictably one sided compensation 
scheme that prejudices the legal entitlement of innocent victims. 
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Amended Notes For Guidance 
Whilst the amended Notes For Guidance do mitigate some of the more obvious 
procedural failings and remove the earlier declaration that the notes for guidance 
do not ‘control or influence the legal interpretation of the Agreement’, their effect 
is limited.  Many of the procedural strike out clauses remain and there is 
uncertainty regarding their legal provenance.   
They do not constitute an amendment of the Agreement itself, as this would 
require the Secretary of State’s fiat.  However, the MIB does act in good faith and 
it honours the Amended Notes.  Presumably, were it to attempt to renege on the 
softened procedural approach it would be possible to argue that the MIB is 
nevertheless bound by them, or at least estopped from raising technical 
objections to a step taken in accordance with these notes: on the grounds that 
they constitute a waiver.  It is not suggested that the MIB do not act in compliance 
with these notes or otherwise other than in good faith.  Even so, this widespread 
inconsistency between the Agreement and the Guidance (and indeed the case 
law) is confusing to lay applicant. 
An insurer’s perspective 
Whilst it is easy to criticise the Domestic Agreements regime it should be 
remembered that many of the conditions precedent have been introduced in an 
attempt to restrict improper claims and dubious tactics.   
When the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 was being formulated the motor 
insurance industry was having to cope with an unprecedented number of 
uninsured and untraced driver claims.  A significant proportion of these claims 
were being made late in the day, probably as a result of the late presentation of 
claims in response to television and radio advertisement by compensation claims 
agents and referrers, giving the MIB little opportunity to trace the drivers 
responsible or to investigate the accident circumstances and the claim.  The 
Bureau also faced reluctance by some practitioners and claimant’s to cooperate 
with the provision of information. 
In 2006, the MIB estimated that there were approximately 2 million uninsured 
drivers.  The numbers have reduced since the introduction by the MIB of its MID 
helpline that enables the police to confirm whether a vehicle is insured or not.  
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These measures are thought to contributed to a declined in numbers to 1.5 million 
in 2010. 
It appears that the MIB’s Domestic Agreements reflect the Bureau’s harsh 
experience in dealing with uninsured driver claims in prior in the 1990.  This may 
explain the extraordinary increase in the procedural conditions precedent and the 
excessive bureaucratic controls imposed under the 1999 Agreement.  The MIB 
contend that their principally concern is with preventing fraudulent and 
exaggerated claims and vetting claims; not depressing the value of legitimate 
claims; 
Unfortunately, this empirical approach to shoring up the MIB’s defences and 
revisions made to the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1988, implemented without 
proper consultation with strategic and other interested parties, only served to 
exacerbate further the UK Government’s existing failures to properly implement 
the First and Third EU Motor Insurance Directives.  The current Agreement 
contains so many procedural conditions precedent to any liability, unjustified 
exclusions of cover and knock out clauses and results in a regime so draconian 
and unjust to make the 1999 Agreement completely unsalvageable.   
What follows is a critique of the most egregious failings within the Uninsured 
Drivers Agreement 1999, it is not intended to be a comprehensive commentary. 
 
 
 
Specific instances considered 
 
Unjustified exclusions of certain categories of claim 
 
We have seen from reviewing the EU Directives that some exceptions are clearly 
permitted by 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive.  The following section will identify 
which exceptions within the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 fall outside those 
permitted by the Directive. 
Subrogated claims 
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Under clause 6.1 (c) the MIB seeks to exclude liability to compensate persons 
other than the individual sustaining the injury or loss, whether the claim is based 
on a subrogated right of action, an assignment or other right.  This rather 
convoluted clause (and until recently the notion that the Guarantee Fund was a 
fund of last resort) has been relied on in the past to justify the MIB’s refusal to 
pay a number of legitimate heads of claim: legal costs and expenses incurred by 
a legal expenses insurer; legal expenses insurance premiums; success fees 
under a conditional fee agreement; credit hire costs; medical expenses incurred 
under a health policy or provided by an employer; sick pay claims and monies 
already advanced by a motor insurer under a comprehensive motor policy.  With 
the exception of the last category, we have seen from Article 10 that it provides 
in the clearest possible terms that the MIB should compensate: 
 ‘at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation for damage to property or 
personal injuries…’  
It is interesting to note that the issue that precipitated the dispute in McCall v 
Poulton was the MIB’s refusal to pay the claimant’s credit car hire charges.  Even 
more significant is the fact that this head of damages appears to have been 
conceded in those proceedings, eventually. 
It is unfortunate that Article 10 is less clear in the second paragraph in stating that 
member states may regard compensation as ‘subsidiary or non-subsidiary to 
other compensation arranged by the MIB, whether paid direct by the uninsured 
driver, an insurer or social security body.  What is abundantly clear however is 
that nowhere, by implication or otherwise, does the Directive permit the level of 
compensation received by the claimant, from whatever source or sources, to fall 
below the level of a comparable claim against an insured driver.  Accordingly 
whenever the MIB reduce a claimant’s net entitlement to compensation on the 
basis that all or part of the claim is a subrogated claims, then this is in 
contravention of the EU Directive.  This could occur, where for example, the 
claimant is contractually obliged to repay the cost of treatment received under a 
private medical health insurance policy from any damages received or where the 
claimant receives a payment under a personal health insurance policy as a result 
of the accident. 
 
117 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
Passenger’s with culpable knowledge 
One further area of controversy in clause 6 concerns the exclusion of liability to 
compensate a passenger who knew or ought to have known about any one of 
five different facts, these are set out in sub-clause 6.1 (e) and sub-clauses 6.2 to 
6.5.  Whilst there may well be sound policy reasons for penalising irresponsible 
behaviour, it should be remembered that Parliament has already addressed this 
issue when it passed the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.   
We will begin by examining the treatment of ‘passenger knowledge’ after reprising 
the relevant provisions within Articles 10 and 13, considered above.  It will be 
remembered that EU Directive permits member states to exclude the payment of 
compensation to passengers who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused 
the damages or injury when the compensatory body (i. e. the MIB) can prove that 
they knew either that it was uninsured (Article 10) or that they knew that the 
vehicle was stolen (Article 13).   
It is interesting to compare the exclusions of cover within s 151 of the Road Traffic 
Act 1988283 with and Clause 6.1 (e) of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999: 
Section 151 of the 1988 Act provides: 
 
(4)   In subsection (2)(b) above “excluded liability” means a liability in respect of 
the death of, or bodily injury to, or damage to the property of any person who, at 
the time of the use which gave rise to the liability, was allowing himself to be 
carried in or upon the vehicle and knew or had reason to believe that the vehicle 
had been stolen or unlawfully taken, not being a person who—    
  (a)    did not know and had no reason to believe that the vehicle had been stolen 
or unlawfully taken until after the commencement of his journey, and     
  (b)    could not reasonably have been expected to have alighted from the vehicle.     
                                               
283 s 151 otherwise obliges insurers to satisfy judgments against their insured for any 
third party liability covered by the 1988 Act 
118 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
   In this subsection the reference to a person being carried in or upon a vehicle 
includes a reference to a person entering or getting on to, or alighting from, the 
vehicle284.   
 
Clause 6.1 Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 provides 
 
6.1 Clause 5 [which sets out the MIB’s obligation to compensate] does not apply 
in the case of an application made in respect of a claim of any of the following 
descriptions (and, where part only of a claim satisfies such a description, clause 
S does not apply to that part) 
     (a)…. 
     (c) a claim by, or for the benefit of, a person ("the beneficiary") other 
          Than…… the person suffering death, injury or other damage which is made         
 either – 
 
(i) in respect of a cause of action or a judgment which has been assigned 
to the beneficiary,or 
(ii) pursuant to a right of subrogation or contractual or other right belonging 
to the beneficiary; 
         ………..…. 
(e) a claim which is made in respect of a relevant liability described in paragraph 
(2) by a claimant who, at the time of the use giving rise to the relevant liability was 
voluntarily allowing himself to be carried in the vehicle and, either before the 
commencement of his journey in the vehicle or after such commencement if he 
could reasonably be expected to have alighted from it, knew or ought to have 
known that - 
(i) the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken, 
                                               
284 The underlining is added by the author for emphasis 
119 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
(ii) the vehicle was being used without there being in force in relation to its 
use such a contract of insurance as would comply with Part VI of the 1988 
Act, 
(iii) the vehicle was being used in the course or furtherance of a crime, or 
(iv) the vehicle was being used as a means of escape from, or avoidance 
of, lawful apprehension. 
6.2 The relevant liability referred to in paragraph (1) (e) is a liability incurred by 
the owner or registered keeper or a person using the vehicle in which the claimant 
was being carried. 
6.3 The burden of proving that the claimant knew or ought to have known of any 
matter set out in paragraph (1)(e) shall be on MIB but, in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, proof by MIB of any of the following matters shall be taken as 
proof of the claimant's knowledge of the matter set out in paragraph (1)(e)(ii) - 
(a) that the claimant was the owner or registered keeper of the vehicle or 
had caused or permitted its use; 
(b) that the claimant knew the vehicle was being used by a person who 
was below the minimum age at which he could be granted a licence 
authorising the driving of a vehicle of that class; 
(c) that the claimant knew that the person driving the vehicle was 
disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence; 
(d) that the claimant knew that the user of the vehicle was neither its owner 
nor registered keeper nor an employee of the owner or registered keeper 
nor the owner or registered keeper of any other vehicle. 
 
Both s 151 and clause 6 impose constructive or deemed knowledge.  However, 
we have seen from the House of Lords ruling in White, that a purposive 
interpretation of clause 6.1 (e) this requires actual knowledge.  Extending this 
rationale and applying the Marleasing principle to the s 151 of the 1988 Act 
achieves the same result.  Section 151 should be amended in any event. 
However that is not the least of it, because it is clear that the two passenger 
knowledge exclusions permitted by Articles 10 and 13 of the 6th EU Directive do 
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not extend to a knowledge that the vehicle was being ‘used in the course or 
furtherance of a crime’, nor to a knowledge that the vehicle was ‘being used as a 
means of escape from, or avoidance of, lawful apprehension’.  These additional 
culpable knowledge categories were not present in the 1988 version of the 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement.  They are not permitted by the Directive and thus 
expose the state and the Bureau to a legal challenge.  It is noteworthy that in 
Farrell, the European Court of Justice ruled that Member States are not entitled 
to introduce additional restrictions to the level of compulsory insurance cover to 
be accorded to passengers. 
Assumption of the court’s role and prescribing rules of evidence 
Another curious irregularity is the MIB’s attempt, at clause 6.3 to 6.5 to abrogate 
to itself the right to introduce rules of evidence to establish what a claimant knew 
or ought to have known.  In this jurisdiction we do not operate a dual set of civil 
law codes; we are all equal before the same law and it is simply not within the 
MIB’s remit of authority to prescribe the approach our civil courts should take to 
the evidence before it.  This clause can safely be ignored. 
 
 
Offsetting monies received from other sources 
Another category of excluded claim is featured in clause 17 where the MIB claims 
to be entitled to deduct any compensation arising from a different source that has 
resulted from the occurrence of the death, injury or loss to which the proceedings 
relate.  Presumably, the intention of the MIB is to catch any accident or sickness 
insurance policy payment received by the victim and to deduct its compensatory 
payment pro rata.  However under our tort law jurisprudence the rule against 
double recovery does not extend to an insurance payment where the claimant 
has paid or contributed towards the premium.  No such concession is made by 
clause 17. 
Clause 17 is clearly inconsistent Article 10 because that the MIB should provide 
compensation, at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation for the damage 
to property or personal injuries caused by the untraced or uninsured driver.  It 
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also runs contrary to the equivalence and effectiveness principle propounded by 
Evans. 
 
Unjustified insistence on an applicant making enquiries 
 
Under clause13.1 of the 1999 Agreement the MIB contends that it will incur no 
liability to compensate unless the claimant has as soon as reasonably practicable 
- 
(a) demanded the information and, where appropriate, the particulars 
specified in section 154(1) of the 1988 Act, and 
(b) if the person of whom the demand is made fails to comply with the 
provisions of that subsection - 
(i) made a formal complaint to a police officer in respect of such 
failure, and 
(ii) used all reasonable endeavours to obtain the name and address 
of the registered keeper of the vehicle or, if so required by MIB, has 
authorised MIB to take such steps on his behalf. 
It will be recalled that s 154.(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 imposes an obligation 
on a person against whom a claim is made (not the claimant) where their liability 
arises out of an event that ought to be covered by a policy of insurance under 
section 145 of this Act must, on demand by or on behalf of the person making the 
claim (i.e. the claimant) —  
‘(a) state whether or not, in respect of that liability—  
(i) he was insured by a policy having effect for the purposes of this 
Part of this Act or had in force a security having effect for those 
purposes, or 
(ii) he would have been so insured or would have had in force such 
a security if the insurer or, as the case may be, the giver of the 
security had not avoided or cancelled the policy or security, and 
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b) if he was or would have been so insured, or had or would have had in 
force such a security—  
(i) give such particulars with respect to that policy or security as 
were specified in any certificate of insurance or security delivered 
in respect of that policy or security, as the case may be, under 
section 147 of this Act, or 
(ii) where no such certificate was delivered under that section, give 
the following particulars, that is to say, the registration mark or other 
identifying particulars of the vehicle concerned, the number or other 
identifying particulars of the insurance policy issued in respect of 
the vehicle, the name of the insurer and the period of the insurance 
cover.’ 
The object of s 154 is to aid a victim to identify the insurer liable to indemnify the 
responsible driver under s 151 to enable the victim to recover compensation 
Clause 13 of the 1999 Agreement subverts this principle to produce the very 
opposite effect. 
Few motorists are aware of s 154 Road Traffic Act 1988 and far fewer still have 
any inkling about the not inconsiderable burden placed on them by clause 13.  
Where information is not provided by the other driver at the accident scene, 
innocent claimants (often injured) are obliged by clause 13 to undertake their own 
investigation and to attempt to ascertain the defendant’s insurers, without any 
clear guidance on the extent of these inquires or on what ‘as soon as reasonably 
practicable means’.  Many injured motorists will be unaware that the defendant 
was uninsured until several weeks after the accidents.  Arguably, obtaining even 
part of the information listed in s 154 (such as the name of the insurers or the 
policy number) would be insufficient and thus risk breaching this condition 
precedent of MIB liability.   
This clause clearly discriminates against this category of claimants, as opposed 
to those pursuing claims against insured defendants, and there is a strong case 
to argue that this contravenes the EU Motor Insruers Directives.  This oppressive 
clause is also unnecessary, with the advent of the Motor Insurers Database.   
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Fortunately, in Shapoor v Promo Designs & MIB (Romford CC) 2009 a piece of 
flawless common sense has mitigated the harsh effect of clause 13.  In Shapoor 
the MIB had sought to reject a claim under the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 
where the defendant mistakenly provided false insurance details in the erroneous 
belief that he was insured and where the claimant did not report the failure to 
provide this information to the police.  The judge held that the MIB were 
attempting to import into their agreement an obligation to report the accident 
where C was uninsured or gave conflicting answers.  This was held to be contrary 
to EC Law as it attempted to impose an additional burden on a claimant’s right to 
compensation provided under the EU Motor Insurance Directives, one that was 
in conflict with the EU Directives themselves.  Furthermore, a driver who honestly 
but mistakenly believes that they are insured does not commit an offence under 
s 154 (2) RTA 1988, even if they are guilty of driving without insurance under s 
143.   
H H J Platt held that Clause 13.1 only applies to circumstances where the third 
party has insurance; not where the third party is uninsured. 
 
Breach of the right to privacy 
 
Under clause 7 MIB shall incur no liability under MIB's obligation unless an 
application is made to the person specified in clause 9(1) - 
(a) in such form, 
(b) giving such information about the relevant proceedings and other 
matters relevant to this Agreement, and 
(c) accompanied by such documents as MIB may reasonably  
It is necessary to use the MIB’s application form.  The prescribed form is available 
from the MIB website or by phone request. 
In its notes for guidance the Bureau has adopted a more lenient stance on the 
completion of the application form, provided that it is signed. 
There are two versions of this application form.  The latest version obliges an 
applicant to make a declaration; this is set out at section 12.  At clause 4 of this 
declaration the applicant must consent to the disclosure of personal information 
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and the form explicitly authorises the release to the MIB of confidential data from 
their employers, any government department, insurance companies, local 
authorities and even their medical records.  These are unjustified demands which 
go beyond anything that the MIB have a right to demand.   
Any applicant that does not complete the application form is at risk of being 
deemed by the MIB to have committed technical breach of clause 7, which is itself 
a condition precedent of any MIB liability.  The imposition of this excessive and 
unwarranted level of disclosure exposes the Government and the MIB to the 
accusation that it is committing a breach of Article 8 of the Human Rights 
Convention, which confers the right to privacy.  Any solicitor that fails to properly 
advised client on this issue is at risk of professional misconduct285.   
The MIB should instead rely on the usual pre action and post issue provisions for 
disclosure within the Civil Procedural Rules, along with every other litigant in our 
civil justice system.   
 
Disproportionate insistence on disclosure 
 
As with clause 5.1 under the UDA 1988, failure to serve the requisite notice in the 
form prescribed is fatal to an MIB claim.  This is because this requirement is set 
as a condition precedent of any liability. 
Under Clause 9 an applicant must within 14 days after issue give the MIB and 
any relevant/potential insurer “proper” notice that he has commenced 
proceedings, and at the same time the applicant must supply a substantial 
dossier comprising:  
(a) notice in writing that proceedings have been commenced by Claim 
Form, Writ, or other means,  
(b) a copy of the sealed Claim Form, Writ or other official document 
providing evidence of the commencement of the proceedings (i.e. notice 
of issue), 
                                               
285  See rules 1 and 4 Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 
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(c) a copy or details of any insurance policy providing benefits in the case 
of the death, bodily injury or damage to property to which the proceedings 
relate where the claimant is the insured party and the benefits are available 
to him, 
(d) copies of all correspondence in the possession of the claimant or (as 
the case may be) his Solicitor or agent to or from the Defendant or the 
Defender or (as the case may be) his Solicitor, insurers or agent which is 
relevant to - 
(i) the death, bodily in jury or damage for which the Defendant or 
Defender is alleged to be responsible,  
or 
(ii) any contract of insurance which covers, or which may or has 
been alleged to cover, liability for such death, injury or damage the 
benefit of which is, or is claimed to be, available to Defendant or 
Defender, 
(e) subject to paragraph (3), a copy of the Particulars of Claim whether or 
not indorsed on the Claim Form, Writ or other originating process, and 
whether or not served (in England and Wales) on any Defendant or (in 
Scotland) on any Defender, and 
(f) a copy of all other documents which are required under the appropriate 
rules of procedure to be served on a Defendant or Defender with the Claim 
Form, Writ or other originating process or with the Particulars of Claim, 
(i.e. medical report and schedule of special damages) 
(g) such other information about the relevant proceedings as MIB may 
reasonably specify. 
The over-elaborate nature of this ‘proper notice’ is at stark odds with the simple 
obligation imposed on victims of insured drivers under s 152 of the 1988 Act: to 
give notice (written or oral) ‘before or within seven days after the commencement 
of the proceedings’. Clause 9 does not permit notice to be given prior to the 
commencement of proceedings.  It also imposes a completely disproportionate 
burden on the applicant, one that arguably constitutes an unwarranted 
impediment to an applicant’s right to compensation.  It is conceivable that there 
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will be occasions when the notice provisions within clause 9 are practically 
impossible or excessively difficult to comply with. 
In Silverton v Goodall [1997] an MIB claim was dismissed because the claimants 
served their notice (under the UDA 1988] a few days late.  The primary cause 
was a delay at the local court office in posting out the issued summons.  This 
unjust windfall resulted notwithstanding the fact that the court held the MIB had 
suffered no prejudice.   
Clause 9 requires the applicant to search for and obtain copies of all insurance 
contracts that may cover a relevant liability.  This would appear to extend to: 
private healthcare for treatment received as a result of the accident; household; 
credit card policies; employers insurance; union benefits; personal accident 
cover.  It also requires disclosure of all correspondence between applicant / 
claimant and the defendant or insurer.  No road traffic insurer would be entitled 
to demand so much information.  Furthermore, it ought not to be within the power 
of the MIB to dictate a much heavier level of pre action disclosure to that 
prescribed by the Civil Procedure Rules still less to impose such an oppressive 
sanction for any non compliance.  There is a strong case to argue that rule 9, 
taken as a whole, constitutes yet another instance of the 1999 Agreement failing 
to implement the 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive by raising unwarranted 
difficulties in the path of legitimate claims. 
Imposition of excessive post issue notices  
 
Under Clauses 10 and 11 the MIB shall incur no liability to pay a penny in 
compensation unless the applicant has, no later than 7 days after the occurrence 
of any of the following events, given notice in writing of the date of that event to 
the MIB or insure, and supplied a copy of the relevant document: 
 On the service of the proceedings, but see clause 10 
 On the filing of a defence, clause  
 Any amendment of the Particulars of Claim 
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 Any addition to any schedule or other document required to be served 
with the Particulars of Claim (i.e. medical report or schedule of special 
damages) 
 Either when setting down of the case for trial or where the court gives 
notice to the claimant of the trial date, then 7 days from when that notice 
is received 
Once again the Notes for Guidance relax some of the notice requirements, where 
the MIB is joined as a party. 
Under clause 12.1 MIB shall incur no liability unless the claimant has, after 
commencement of the relevant proceedings and not less than 35 before the 
appropriate date, given notice in writing of his intention to apply for or to sign 
judgment in the relevant proceedings. 
It is entirely right that the MIB, like any other party in our civil justice system, 
should be informed of relevant steps within the proceedings by a claimant.  It is 
also appropriate that any party failing to adhere to the principles set out in 
overriding objective in Part I of the Civil Procedure Rules or who otherwise acts 
unreasonably should be subject to a costs sanction.  The Civil Procedure Rules 
provide adequate safeguards and sanctions for all litigants and there is no reason 
or justification to confer extra rights and privileges on the MIB.  Furthermore the 
excessive penalties imposed for failing to adhere to these notice provision, 
whether innocently made or deliberately contrived, is wholly excessive.  There is 
a very strong case to argue that these clauses constitute a breach of the UK 
Government’s implementation of the 6th Motor Insurance Directive because they 
infringe the ‘equivalent and effective’ principle set by the European Court of 
Justice in Evans and because they constitute an restriction to the basic right to 
recover compensation under the EU Directives. 
Fit for purpose? 
There can be little doubt that the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999, is unfit for 
purpose.  This Agreement along with its predecessor needs to be revoked and 
substituted by a shorter, simpler, fairer agreement in conformity with the 6th EU 
Motor Insurance Directive, and given retrospective effect. 
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As a statement of a claimant’s legal right to compensation, we have seen from 
the extracts set out above that it is highly misleading.  How then can it be 
reasonable to assume that any lay claimant, pursuing an online application for 
compensation, would be able decipher his or her legal entitlement from reading 
the Agreement.   
It is unacceptable that any Government backed compensation scheme should 
require an applicant to have to contend with the crypotographical task of devising 
which clause is valid and which is not.  As we have seen, a correct understanding 
cannot be achieved merely be reading the Agreement itself; not even in if 
undertaken in conjunction with the MIBs’ notes for guidance (which are not 
comprehensive anyway).  A proper understanding can only be attained by 
someone that has a working knowledge of the 6th EU Motor Insurance Directive 
as well as an appreciation of the purposive approach to the judicial interpretation 
of the Domestic Agreements, propounded by the House of Lords in White.  To 
add further impediment, the bewildering panoply of procedural conditions 
precedent to liability constitute, in themselves, an unwarranted barrier to 
claimants’ accessing their compensatory entitlement, and has been argued by 
some to constitute a breach of Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention.   
Who is to blame? 
Ultimate responsibility must rest with the Secretary of State for Transport, a Mr 
John Prescott, for blithely approving this manifestly unjust anachronism back in 
1999 and for the successive holders of that office under the previous 
Government: all of whom have failed abysmally to protect the legitimate rights of 
injured victims by not properly implementing the relevant EU Motor Insurance 
Directives.  The past 12 or more years has demonstrated that is naive to rely on 
a private commercial contractor to act altruistically and in the public interest 
without sufficient supervisory safeguards being put in place.  Any commercial 
operator will wish to maximise its commercial interests and those of its members 
and their shareholders.   
There is little that is objectionable in the pragmatic approach of successive 
Governments to employ the private sector to deliver part of its social law policy 
aims.  It is well recognised that the insurance industry has in effect funded the 
tort law civil justice system in this country for many decades, and by and large it 
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has been a positive experience.  However, there will always be a natural tension 
between motor insurance company interests and the wider, social policy and tort 
law objectives of our compensatory system.  It is the duty of any competent 
government to ensure that its policy aims are properly implemented and to take 
decisive action when these are threatened or undermined.  No Government 
should rely excessively on the inventiveness of the Judiciary to bridge the void 
between what is an equivalent and effective delivery of the compensation scheme 
imposed under the European Directives and what provided by this agreement.  
The obscurity and lack of accountability associated with the present set up seems 
increasingly out of keeping with modern times and thinking.   
All this begs the question: how is it that such a large constituency of citizens have 
so little influence on the extra statutory compensatory schemes devised in their 
name and for their protection and which, they also fund? 
MIB’s board of management cannot wash its hands of its responsibility either: for 
proposing such a harsh and unconstitutional compensation regime in the first 
place and for failing to replace it, despite numerous calls for its revision. 
Whilst the MIB and the motor insurers it represents have legitimate interests that 
require protection, especially from the risk of fraudulent claims under the 
Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003, this should not extend to conferring upon it 
rights superior to any other litigant in our civil law system of justice.  The Civil 
Procedure Rules and the Courts inherent jurisdiction confer abundant powers on 
the courts to discourage fraudulent, reprehensible or contumelious behaviour by 
claimants.  The MIB should be content to rely on those, along with other user of 
the civil justice system.   
We should never loose sight of what should be the overriding imperative: that an 
injured victim is entitled to fair and just compensation.  Nor should we forget that 
the insurance premium paying public have a right to expect fair and equal 
treatment under the legal system they fund through their premiums and this 
should extend to providing them with their full compensatory entitlement where 
they are unfortunate enough to be injured or sustain loss through the fault of an 
uninsured driver.  
The MIB has, under the dynamic leadership of its current chief executive officer, 
demonstrated that it is capable of acting very effectively and efficiently as an 
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enterprise.  However there is a limit to what the MIB senior management and its 
staff can do to mitigate the injustices perpetrated by the Uninsured Drivers 
Agreements, when they are constitutionally obliged under Article 3 (B) (i) of the 
MIB Memorandum and Articles of Association to adhere to the very Domestic 
Agreements that inflict them in the first place. 
Each member of the MIB’s management board shares a collective responsibly 
for the MIB’s failure to fulfil the MIB’s single most important role: of providing an 
equivalent and effective  safety net for innocent victims of uninsured and untraced 
drivers in accordance with the EU Directives.  We have seen in Part I of this paper 
that Article 3 A (i) of the MIB’s Memorandum of Articles imposes a constitutional 
obligation on the MIB to fulfil that compensatory role, whether imposed under our 
national law or through EU directives.  We have seen from Part II of this paper 
that the MIB board has signally failed to deliver a compensatory safety net that is 
equivalent to and as effective as that which would result in a claim against an 
insured defendant.  The roll call of MIB Board members, published within their 
2009 Report, include some very senior executives from within the world of motor 
and liability insurance.  It is inconceivable that the Board was unaware of the 
defects within the Domestic Agreements.  It is abundantly clear that the regime 
is biased in favour of the motor insurance companies who provide the levy and it 
stands to reason that this has resulted in many innocent victims being under 
compensated.  On the other hand, it could be argued that far from serving the 
motor insurers interests, the Domestic Agreements have the ultimate effect of 
reducing the cost of insurance premiums.  The casuistry of such an argument is 
exposed as soon as one returns to the simple principal within the 6th EU Motor 
Insurance Directive.  This requires the Member States to ensure that victims 
recover at least up to the level of compensation recover from an insured driver; 
this is standard that successive Government have failed to meet. 
It seems implausible that the MIB should have proposed so many exclusion and 
strike out clauses in the first place and then to have so trenchantly defended them 
if they did not intend to exercise them.  However the fragmented nature of the 
solicitors’ profession, comprising s it does over 10,000 independent practices, 
makes it practically impossible for them to collectively establish whether or not 
the MIB is systematically under compensating victims of uninsured and untraced 
drivers.  That is a task better suited to the Government. 
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The Secretary of State could do worse than require the board to account for their 
actions over the past decade.  He might wish to invite the MIB to account for 
every wrongful deduction, limitation or exclusion of liability made under the 
Uninsured and Untraced Drivers Agreements between 2009 and 2010, for 
example.  If this information is not forthcoming, perhaps the services of an 
independent auditor could be suggested.   
It is to be hoped that the present incumbent at the office of the Secretary of State 
for Transport will take expeditious action to remedy the failings of his 
predecessors.  The current regime must be replaced by a short, clear and above 
all fair compensatory mechanism.  Furthermore, constitutional safeguards must 
be introduced to the MIB to ensure that rights of innocent victims are never again 
compromised.  The case for reform is so strong that if the Secretary of State will 
not act, others will, either by bringing Francovich claims that will revive the whole 
issue as to whether the MIB is an emanation of the State or by means of Judicial 
Review should anything short of a complete overhaul be countenanced when the 
current regime is eventually revised. 
 
Proposed reforms  
The defects in the current compensatory regime and their causes suggest the 
following measures: 
1. Rescission of the MIB Uninsured Drivers Agreements 1988 and 1999 
(including the November 2008 Supplementary Agreement) with immediate 
effect; 
2. The substitution of a new, much shorter, agreement concurrently with the 
rescission or new legislation; that: 
 is shriven of all inconsistency with the 6th EU Motor Insurance 
Directive and  
 imposes no additional procedural hurdles to those imposed by s 152 
Road Traffic Act 1988 or otherwise, and 
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 sets out in unambiguous terms the right to compensation: that is at 
least to the standards and extent required under the 6th Motor 
Insurance Directive, and  
 is retrospective in effect so that it applies to all relevant claims that 
occurred on or after 31 December 1988.  (The Government is unlikely 
to be exposed to a raft of Francovich claims arising out of the 1988 
Agreement since the 6 year time limit for making such claims runs 
from the date when the original cause of action against the uninsured 
driver occurred, Moore v Secretary of State for Transport and the MIB 
[2007] EWHC 879.) , and 
 is written in plain English so that it is readily understandable without 
separate interpretive notes, and 
3. Reform of the MIB to make it more accountable for its conduct in 
administering the functions it fulfils on behalf of the Government under the 
EU Motor Insurance Directives.  This accountability should not be limited 
to supervision by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Government but 
it should extend to the public at large and major stakeholders operating in 
the civil tort law compensatory regime.  This could involve: 
 The inception of a stakeholders committee that meets regularly to 
voice concerns and to report to the Secretary of State on the MIB’s 
administration of the Domestic Agreements, and 
 The co-option to its management board of representatives nominated 
by professional associations such as MASS or APIL who have an 
expertise in this field. 
4. A clearer breakdown within the MIB’s financial accounts and an agreement 
that the levy raised from its insurance members, raised from increased 
premiums charged to the premium paying public, should be hypothecated 
to the National Guarantee Fund. 
5. Improving the dialogue between the MIB and those who represent the 
interests of injured victims by creating a joint working party to devise new 
protocols and procedures under a reformed set of Domestic Agreements 
to help identify potentially fraudulent claims, to avoid incurring 
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unnecessary legal costs and encouraging the early and economic disposal 
of claims. 
6. To appoint an independent arbitrator or commissioner to deal with any 
complaints in the way claims has been handled by the MIB. 
It is suggested that the new Uninsured Driver’s Agreement include an obligation 
on both the applicant and the MIB to participate in an initial mediation assessment 
process or that it should otherwise encourage alternative dispute resolution, 
perhaps restricted to claims that fall outside the Fast Track and Low Value 
Personal Injury Claims in RTA scheme. 
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4. Case commentary on Delaney v Pickett [2012] EWCA Civ 1532 
 
[Nigel Tomkins, solicitor and JPIL editor, wrote the initial case summary and 
Nicholas Bevan, JPIL editor, the commentary that follows] 
 
DELANEY v PICKETT286 
CA (Civ) (Ward, L.J.; Richards, L.J.; Tomlinson, L.J.) 21/12/2011 
[2011] EWCA Civ 1532 
 
PERSONAL INJURY: ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS: DAMAGES: INDEMNITY: 
INSURANCE: CRIME: EX TURPI CAUSA: MOTOR INSURERS' BUREAU: 
UNINSURED DRIVERS AGREEMENT MADE ON 13TH AUGUST 1999: 
DIRECTIVE 2009/103/EC 
 
On 5th November 2006 Shane Pickett, negligently drove the Mercedes 500 SL 
sports car in which Sean Delaney was the front seat passenger, head on into an 
oncoming Toyota people carrier.  Delaney was very seriously injured.  When 
being rescued from the car, Pickett was found to have sufficient cannabis to make 
170 cigarettes stuffed down his sock, while Delaney had a package sufficient to 
make 1,200 cannabis cigarettes under his jacket.  
Delaney’s substantial claim for damages against Pickett was dismissed by His 
Honour Judge Gregory287 as was his claim against Tradewise Insurance Services 
Ltd288 brought under the provisions of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement made on 
13th August 1999.  The judge rejected the claimant's case that Pickett had taken 
him out for a drive in his new car.  Instead he held that the two men were in 
possession of the cannabis with intent to supply it.   
 
                                               
286 J.P.I. Law 2015, 3, C169-C174 
287 Sitting in the Coventry County Court on 26th January 2011 
288 Pickett's insurer who had avoided his policy 
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The judge said:  
“As I have already found as a fact the purpose of the journey in this case 
was the collection and transportation of illegal drugs for subsequent re-
sale. It follows in my judgment that the Claimant's action arises directly ex 
turpi causa and for that reason must fail.  Alternatively in my judgment the 
conduct upon which the Claimant was engaged in concert with the first 
Defendant was sufficiently anti-social that public policy prevents him from 
pursuing a claim arising out of it.” 
He accordingly held that Delaney’s claim had arisen ex turpi causa and therefore 
failed. As against the insurers, he found that liability was excluded under the 
clause 6(1)(e)(iii) of the Motor Insurers' Bureau Agreement because the vehicle 
was being driven in the course or in furtherance of crime.  Permission to appeal 
was given to consider both the extent of the ex turpi causa defence and the proper 
interpretation of the Agreement.  
The Court of Appeal held on the facts289 that the judge had been correct to find 
on the balance of probabilities that the transportation of illegal drugs had been 
the purpose of the journey. He had therefore proceeded on a correct factual basis 
when considering ex turpi causa and the MIB Agreement issue.  However the 
judge had been wrong to uphold the ex turpi causa defence.  The damage 
suffered by the claimant had not been caused by his, or his and the defendant's, 
criminal activity.  It had been caused by the defendant's tortious act in the 
negligent way in which he drove his car. In those circumstances the illegal acts 
were incidental and Delaney was entitled to recover his loss from Pickett290. 
They concluded that although the MIB Agreement was intended to give effect to 
Directive 2009/103291, the Directive gave only limited assistance in the 
                                               
289 Ward L.J. dissenting as to the judge's factual findings and on the MIB Agreement 
issue.  His view was that the MIB Agreement had to be construed restrictively as it was 
an exception to the purpose of the Directive. Clause 6(1)(e)(iii) could not mean that 
compensation was excluded if the vehicle was being used for any crime, as that could 
be disproportionate; "crime" had to mean serious crime. The crime in the this case had 
not been heinous enough to be the kind of crime covered by the clause.  
290 Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] 1 A.C. 1339 and Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 Q.B. 24 
followed 
291 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability 
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interpretation of cl.6(1)(e) as it contained nothing corresponding to the clause.  
The most that could be derived was that a restrictive interpretation of the clause 
was required by the fact that it was an exclusion from the general principle of 
compensation set out in the Directive.  
In the majority view it was obvious on the facts that the vehicle was being used 
in the furtherance and in the course of a crime within the meaning of the clause.  
"Crime" could not be read as being restricted to "serious crime"; that would leave 
the clause with little practical purpose.  In any event, possession of a commercial 
quantity of cannabis with intent to supply was a serious crime to which the clause 
applied; given the finding that the very purpose of the journey had been the 
transportation of the drugs, the situation fell squarely within the wording of the 
clause. Use of the vehicle did not have to constitute an ingredient of the offence 
for the exclusion to apply; in any event, the vehicle had been an essential element 
in the crime, as the men would not have wanted to carry so large a packet of 
drugs on public transport. 
The appeal was dismissed. 
[Nigel Tomkins] 
 
Comment 
 
The Court of Appeal treated us to a truly extraordinary decision in the lead up to 
Christmas.  The ingredients to this veritable fruit cake of a case feature a road 
accident injury; a couple of Dell-boys a’dealing a footie of cannabis; an 
unappealing appellant; an insurer avoiding its policy; two queen’s counsel 
a’muddling the issues and three Lords Justices of Appeal, all a’leaping – 
unfortunately to a wrong conclusion.  Comical as some of this may seem, it left a 
seriously injured petty criminal bereft of his compensatory entitlement.   
As the summary above indicates, the respondent insurers succeeded before HHJ 
Gregory in the court below on two issues; both of which were subsequently 
appealed.  Their first line of defence was tenuous at best, their second wholly 
misconceived.   
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The first issue: was there no primary liability to indemnify? 
The first defence consisted of Tradewise contending, in effect, that there was no 
relevant liability to trigger their duty to indemnify under the Road Traffic Act 1988 
(the 1988 Act).  They argued that because the claimant happened to be up to no 
good when he was injured, the negligent driver should be absolved from any 
liability whatsoever on public policy grounds.   
 
The maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio was deployed in support.  However 
intrinsic to the maxim is the requirement that the illegality should be causative 
and not merely incidental.  One instance where this public policy defence 
succeeded is Pitts v Hunt292.  That case featured a motorcycle accident where 
both the claimant (riding pillion) and the defendant driver were intoxicated.  Worse 
yet, the claimant had encouraged and abetted the driver in the reckless and 
dangerous manoeuvres which lead directly to the accident itself.  Compare Pitts 
with Delaney: where although the claimant’s presence in Pickett’s car was 
incidental to an illegal activity, that had absolutely no bearing on the driver’s 
reckless driving.  In this jurisdiction, the medieval concept of outlawry has long 
been abolished, with the result that petty criminals are entitled to the same civil 
law rights as their law abiding compatriots.  Little wonder then that Delaney’s 
appeal was upheld on this issue. 
That then left Pickett liable to compensate his passenger, Delaney.   
 
Tradewise’s second line of defence can be summarised thus. Although they were 
the 1988 Act insurers for the Mercedes at the time of the accident, upon learning 
of Pickett’s habitual cannabis smoking they were able to take proceedings to 
avoid the policy on the ground of the policyholder’s material non disclosure of this 
fact; obtaining a declaration to that effect, presumably under s 152 of the 1988 
Act. 
 
                                               
292 Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 Q.B. 24 
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The second issue: could the insurers avoid their statutory duty to 
compensate? 
Two excerpts from the 1988 Act which concern a RTA insurer’s obligation to 
compensate are particularly worth noting: 
S 151 (5) 
(5)   Notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or 
may have avoided or cancelled, the policy or security, he must, subject to 
the provisions of this section, pay to the persons entitled to the benefit of 
the judgment—   
  (a)    as regards liability in respect of death or bodily injury, any 
sum payable under the judgment in respect of the liability, together 
with any sum which, by virtue of any enactment relating to interest 
on judgments, is payable in respect of interest on that sum,   
  (b)    as regards liability in respect of damage to property, any sum 
required to be paid under subsection (6) below, and   
    (c)    any amount payable in respect of costs.   
 
S 152 (2) 
(2)   .......... no sum is payable by an insurer under section 151 of this Act 
if, in an action commenced before, or within three months after, the 
commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment was given, he 
has obtained a declaration—   
   (a)    that, apart from any provision contained in the policy or 
security, he is entitled to avoid it on the ground that it was 
obtained—   
      (i)   by the non-disclosure of a material fact, or   
    (ii)   by a representation of fact which was false in some 
material particular, or   
    (b)    if he has avoided the policy or security on that ground, that 
he was entitled so to do apart from any provision contained in it   
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 [and, for the purposes of this section, “material” means of such a nature as to 
influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether he will take 
the risk and, if so, at what premium and on what conditions.]   
It is apparent from the above that the default position, imposed by s 151 of the 
1988 Act, is that an insurer must indemnify its policyholder against a liability 
required to be covered by a policy of insurance under s 145, notwithstanding the 
policyholder’s breach of contract.  However that obligation can be avoided if an 
insurer obtains a declaration before or within three months of the proceedings 
that ultimately lead to the judgment against its insured, under s 152 (2).   
 
So much then for our national law which appears to excuse Tradeswise from its 
statutory obligation to indemnify Pickett s under s 152 (2).  However, this 
provision inconsistent with European law. 
At the time of the accident, in 2006, the position was covered by three successive 
directives, the First, Second and Third EU Motor Insurance Directives293 (the 
Directives).  The Court of Appeal referred instead to a later consolidating 
Directive294. 
 
The First Directive imposed the obligation on member states to ‘take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles 
normally based in its territory is covered by insurance’295.  This has been partially 
transposed into s 143 of the 1988 Act.   
The Second Directive sets out one instance where insurance cover can be 
excluded in a policy issued under the First Directive:  namely, where a passenger 
enters the vehicle that causes the damage knowing that it has been stolen.  This 
is transposed into our national law by s 151 (4) of the 1988 Act296.  The Directive 
also allows Member States to permit state benefits to be deducted from the 
                                               
293 The First Motor Insurance Directive 72/166/EEC (4); the Second Motor Insurance 
84/5/EEC (5) and the Third Motor Insurance Directive 90/232/EEC 
294 The Sixth Motor Insurance Directive 2008/0037(COD) of 28 February 2008 
295 Article 3(1) of the First Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 
296 Section 151 (4) contains the exclusion where the passenger enters the vehicle 
knowing that it has been stolen or unlawfully taken. 
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compensation.  It then provides a non-exhaustive list of contractual clauses that 
are void in so far as they seek to exclude the cover imposed by the First 
Directive297.   
Furthermore, Recital 7 of the Second Directive states: 
“… it is in the interest of victims that the effects of certain exclusion clauses 
be limited to the relationship between the insurer and the person 
responsible for the accident; whereas, however, in the case of vehicles 
stolen or obtained by violence, Member States may specify that 
compensation will be payable by the abovementioned body;” 
 
The clear implication of this Second Directive is that, subject to the stolen vehicle 
exception, the legal effect of any exclusion of liability within a policy of insurance 
should be confined to the policyholder / tortfeasor; not third parties.   
These two directives still left Member States free room to legislate certain 
exceptions or exclusions in the insurance cover extended to third parties.  
Consequently, and in order to guarantee that the victims of accidents receive 
comparable treatment irrespective of where in the Community the accident 
occurred, the EU Council legislated again, to bolster the rights of third parties, 
with a special emphasis being placed on passengers.  
Accordingly, and with effect from 31 December 1992 in this jurisdiction, the Third 
Directive298 declares in Recital 5: 
“… there are, in particular, gaps in the compulsory insurance cover of 
motor vehicle passengers in certain Member States; whereas, to protect 
this particularly vulnerable category of potential victims, such gaps should 
be filled” 
As though to emphasise the imperative nature of this objective, the first paragraph 
of Article 1 provides: 
“Without prejudice to the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of [the 
Second Directive299], the insurance referred to in Article 3(1) of the [First 
                                               
297 Article 2 (1) of the Second Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983. 
298 The Third Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 1990. 
299 See above for Article 2 (1) and the stolen vehicle exception. 
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Directive] shall cover liability for personal injuries to all passengers, other 
than the driver, arising out of the use of a vehicle.” 
If we apply the Delaney facts to these three European directives, Tradewise are 
the statutory insurers and furthermore, they are obliged by the Second and Third 
Directives to compensate Delaney.  The position is just as clear under the 
consolidating Sixth EU Motor Insurance Directive300. 
The approach to interpreting our national law (i.e. the 1988 Act) in the light of 
European Law is well established.  The Marleasing 301principle applies.  
Consequently the Court of Appeal should have applied ss 151 and 152, so far as 
is possible, in a way that gives effect to the EU Motor Insurance Directives.  It 
should have either have held that s 151 (2) was inconsistent with EU Law and 
given preference to s 151 (5) in so far as it concerned passengers, or it should at 
least have referred the issue to the European Court of Justice: to determine of 
whether s 152 (2) is incompatible with European law.  It is regrettable that it did 
neither.   
The Court of Appeal seems to have accepted the implications of s 152 (2) at face 
value; to have wrongly assumed that Delaney did not benefit from statutory 
insurance provision under EU Law and then treated the claim as though it were 
an uninsured claim.  It further compounded its error by assuming that Tradewise 
were entitled to rely on a private law agreement between the Secretary of State 
and the Motor Insurance Bureau and then added insult to injury by applying the 
wrong interpretive test to clause 6 of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999.  The 
end result is a per incuriam decision. 
This was never an uninsured driver claim. It was instead a claim where the injured 
claimant was entitled to the benefit of insurance cover through a combination of 
national and European law, as opposed to private contractual law.  The 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement has no bearing on the claim as it is confined to 
claims where this is no insurance; contractually conferred or statutorily imposed.  
                                               
300 The Sixth Motor Insurance Directive 2008/0037(COD) of 28 February 2008, which 
post dates the Delaney case. 
301 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA (Case C-106/89) 
[1990] ECR I-I4135 
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Even if it did, the clause 6 (i) (e) (iii) exception cannot be sustained under 
European law, but that is the subject of another article. 
If a circuit judge, two QC’s and three very learned and experienced Lords Justices 
of Appeal are all baffled by our national law provision for compensating victims of 
road accidents, then surely it is time to reform this unsatisfactory and ramshackle 
regime. 
 
Practice Points 
Whenever national law provision is supposed to implement the Government’s 
obligations under a European directive, one must begin the interpretation of that 
provision by studying the European directive and then construing the provision in 
the light of that Directive, applying the Marleasing302 principle.   
This approach holds good for construing the Uninsured and Untraced Drivers 
Agreements303 entered into between the Secretary of State for Transport and the 
Motor Insurers Bureau for compensating victims of uninsured and untraced 
drivers.  In these circumstances, the House of Lords ruling in White v White304 
offers guidance on the correct approach.  Any cursory study of which will reveal 
a number of glaring inconsistencies between what the European directives 
dictate and what the present compensatory regime delivers.   
Practitioners should ensure that they have the right risk management procedures 
in place to identify these inconsistencies.  This case, or one like it, will expose the 
deficiencies in our national law provision, this could expose firms to negligence 
actions. 
 
  
                                               
302 See above 
303 Dated 1999 and 2003 respectively. 
304 White v White [2001] UKHL 9, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 481 
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5. Marking the Boundary305 
JPIL Issue 3, 2013 
 
The Department for Transport (DfT) is due to announce its plans for reforming 
our national law provision for guaranteeing the compensatory entitlement of road 
accident victims, in July.  Whilst the initiative is as welcome as it is long overdue, 
there are growing concerns that instead of addressing the urgent need for major 
reform, all we are likely to see is some superficial tinkering at the edges of the 
problem. 
The compensatory guarantee scheme is currently delivered by a curious mix of 
closely interlinked statutory and extra-statutory provisions.  The former consists 
of the statutory duty to insure the use of a motor vehicle on a road or other public 
place against third party liabilities under by s143 of the Road Traffic Act (RTA 
1988) together with a corresponding statutory indemnity imposed on motor 
insurers to satisfy third party claims by s151 RTA.   
The extra-statutory provision is contained in two agreements between the Motor 
Insurers Bureau (MIB) and the Secretary of State for Transport.  These are the 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 and the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003.  
Between them they require the insurance industry to extend the statutory 
indemnity to victims of (i) drivers who are uninsured (the 1999 Agreement) and 
(ii) hit and run and other unidentified drivers (the 2003 Agreement).  The 
insurance industry’s collective liability to meet these uninsured losses is a 
mutualised one: every authorised insurer contributes to a central fund that is 
managed by the MIB under its contractual arrangement with the DfT.  The MIB 
also investigates and settles individual claims.   
One of the many problems with the extra statutory schemes is that over the years 
successive amendments have resulted in their becoming skewed in the favour of 
the motor insurers; at the expense of the victims they are supposed to serve.  
This is because the DfT has given the MIB a wide latitude to dictate the terms of 
the extra statutory schemes it operates.  The very form and structure of the MIB 
agreements is redolent of an insurance policy.  They are packed with 
                                               
305 J.P.I. Law 2013, 3, 151-161 
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impenetrable jargon and over elaborate procedural sophistication.  They impose 
arbitrary conditions precedent and limitations of liability as well as numerous 
arbitrary strike-out clauses that completely disentitle any hapless victim who falls 
foul of them.  They allow for unlawful deductions to be made to an applicant’s 
compensatory entitlement306 that are not to be found under the statutory scheme.  
The end result is that the MIB’s extra statutory regime offers an inferior level of 
compensatory protection to victims than under the statutory indemnity scheme.  
The egregious deficiencies and irregularities within the Uninsured Drivers 
Agreement 1999 have already been covered in some detail in a previous article 
published in this Journal307.   
Because the MIB Agreements contain so many disadvantages, it is important to 
identify precisely where the boundary lies between claims that are subject to the 
statutory indemnity imposed under s151 RTA 1988 and those that fall within the 
DfT’s extra statutory schemes.  Obviously the extra statutory schemes apply 
where a defendant driver is one that either has no insurance in place at all or who 
cannot be identified.  However, the position is less clear for the growing number 
of incidents where there is some motor insurance in place for the vehicle 
responsible but, for one reason or another, the insurers contend that it is 
insufficient to cover the accident. What happens then?  Is such a claim still 
covered under the statutory indemnity imposed on all motor insurers under 
s151(5) of the 1988 Act or does it fall within the less advantageous scheme 
provided within the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999?   
This article will consider statutory provisions that impose the duty to insure and 
the statutory right of indemnity conferred under Part VI of the 1988 Act. It will 
analyse the most recent attempt to interpret and apply Part VI of the 1988 Act by 
the Court of Appeal.  It will review the conventional approach to interpreting 
victims’ rights under the Road Traffic Act 1988, it will then explain why a radically 
                                               
306 For example, in the 1999 Agreement, clauses 6 permits the MIB to exclude 
subrogated claims (otherwise recoverable under the common law against an insured 
driver) and 17 permits the deduction of any other sums received by the applicant as a 
consequence of the accident (this far exceeds the ambit of the common law ‘rule 
against double recovery’) of the 1999 Agreement.  
307 ‘Why the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 Needs To Be Scrapped’, Nicholas 
Bevan, JPIL [2011], issue no 2. 
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different approach is required if our national provision is to comply with 
Community law.   
Whenever a UK court seeks to interpret either Part VI of the 1988 Act, the 2002 
Regulations or one of the aforementioned agreements between the Secretary of 
State’s and the Motor Insurers Bureau, they must always be construed, as far as 
possible, purposively; not only in the light of the relevant EU Directives but also 
in accordance with any ECJ interpretation of those same Directives. 
In EUI Ltd v Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 the Court of 
Appeal had to decide whether a claim fell under the statutory indemnity scheme 
or under the DfT’s extra statutory arrangement with the MIB.  Unfortunately, as 
this article seeks to explain, it reached the wrong conclusion and in doing so has 
set a very unfortunate precedent that conflicts with superior Community law 
jurisprudence. 
The EUI case involved an insured driver, a Mr Williams, who was suffering from 
acute depression.  He determined upon a dramatic exit by deliberately crashing 
his car at a high speed into the prestigious House of Fraser store at the newly 
constructed Cabot Circus retail complex in Bristol.  He left a trail of devastation in 
his wake, and the impact caused in excess of £200,000 damage to the store’s 
massive plate glass windows.   
The property insurer Bristol Alliance Limited Partnership (BA) met the store’s 
repair bill and then claimed by subrogation against Williams and his insurers, EUI 
Limited Partnership (who trade as Admiral Group).  Judgment was entered 
against Williams for damages to be assessed.  However, EUI’s motor policy 
excluded cover for ‘damage...’arising as a result of a...deliberate act caused by 
you...’ They claimed that they were not liable under s151 of the RTA 1988 to 
compensate BA.  
What followed was in essence a dispute between two insurers.  EUI argued that 
because its contractual liability did not extend to deliberate damage a proper 
construction of s151 meant that they were not obliged to provide statutory 
indemnity cover either.  BA contended that a proper construction of s145, 151 
and the EU Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID) means that EUI were 
obliged to honour its statutory indemnity and to satisfy its claim, regardless. 
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Master Eyre sensibly ordered a trial of this question as a preliminary issue.  At 
first instance Tugendhat J found in favour of BA.  He held that a proper 
interpretation of s145 (3), one that takes into account the objectives of the EU 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives, is that it requires a motor policy to provide 
statutory cover for any damage caused by the use of a vehicle on the road.  The 
judge relied on the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Charlton v Fisher [2000] QB 
578 and on a European Court of Justice ruling in Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] ECR 1-
1929. 
Bernaldez308 featured a claim where a drunk driver crashed his car causing 
property damage.  The vehicle’s insurance policy excluded cover where the driver 
was intoxicated and this exclusion was permitted under Spanish law.  At first 
instance, his insurers were completely absolved from any liability to indemnify the 
accident damage and Bernaldez was held personally liable to compensate this in 
full.  That decision was overruled after a reference to the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) on whether such an exclusion of liability was lawful.   
At that time, article 2 (1) of the Second MVID309 expressly provided that certain 
specific exclusions of liability (featuring persons not authorised to drive the 
vehicle, persons not holding a driving licence, persons in breach of the statutory 
technical requirements concerning the condition and safety of the vehicle) were 
void as against a third party claimant.  It also set out a single instance where a 
policy exclusion is permitted.  This was confined to a claim by a passenger that 
voluntarily entered the vehicle that caused his loss but only where the insurer can 
prove that he knew the vehicle was stolen 
In essence, what the referring Court had sought to establish in Bernaldez was 
whether the list of invalid policy exclusions set out in article 2(1) was exhaustive 
or illustrative.  Put another way, were other policy exclusions, not specifically 
made void by article 2 (1), permitted by the MVIDs?   
In Bernaldez, after recounting the way in which the legislative objective of the 
MVIDs had developed310, the ECJ ruled as follows: 
                                               
308 Criminal Proceedings against Bernaldez (C-129/94) [1996] E.C.R. I-1829 
309 The identical provision is now to be found in article 13.1 of the consolidating Sixth 
MVID (2009/103/EC). 
310 Bernaldez: see paragraphs 13, 15 and 16 and also 18 to 21. 
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 Article 3(1) of the First Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive, as 
developed and supplemented by the Second and Third MVID, must 
be interpreted as meaning that compulsory motor insurance must 
enable third-party victims of accidents caused by vehicles to be 
compensated for all the damage to property and personal injuries 
sustained by them. 
 That this interpretation precludes an insurer from being able to rely 
on statutory provisions or contractual clauses to refuse to 
compensate third-party victims of an accident caused by the 
insured vehicle. 
So according to Bernaldez, the list of void exclusions merely illustrated a general 
principle, namely that, subject only to the single instance of stolen vehicle 
exception, insurers are not able to exclude their liability to compensate a third 
party victim.    
Nevertheless, in EUI the Court of Appeal distinguished Charlton and Bernaldez 
and upheld EUI’s appeal.  Ward LJ provided the only reasoned judgment and this 
was endorsed unanimously by the other two Lords Justices.  However, in the 
writer’s respectful opinion, the ratio is seriously flawed.  However, before we turn 
to consider where the Court of Appeal may have erred, it is worthwhile reviewing 
the reasoning within Ward LJ’s carefully argued judgment as this accurately 
reflects traditional perceptions about the restricted nature of the compensatory 
guarantee afforded under our national law provision. 
The Court of Appeal’s reasoning in EUI: 
Seven principles can be distilled from Ward LJ’s judgment: 
1. A third party victim’s right to claim against a defendant motor insurer does 
not depend on an interpretation of the insurance contract alone.  His 
entitlement also rests instead upon the proper construction of s151.  This 
confers an independent statutory right on a victim to recover an unsatisfied 
judgment arising out of a liability for which compulsory insurance is 
required under s143 and s145. [see para 33 of the judgment];   
2. S143 and s145 when read together impose a duty on the user of a motor 
vehicle, as opposed to the insurer, to ensure that he has in place insurance 
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that covers any use actually made of that vehicle.  It is up to the user to 
ensure that his use conforms to the cover provided under his policy; if he 
fails in this, he is driving uninsured.  There is no concomitant requirement 
on the insurer to provide cover in respect of any and every use to which 
the user puts the vehicle.[38]  The following factors were held to be 
consistent with this view: 
 The wording within s 143 only imposes the duty to have insurance 
that provides cover ‘in relation to the use of the vehicle by that 
person’.  That is a qualification that does not extend to any use.  
[36].  
 S145 (4) lists liabilities that are not required to be covered by 
compulsory third party insurance, such as property damage in 
excess of £1,000,000 and damages to goods for hire or reward 
within the vehicle.  Ward LJ construed this as being a non 
exhaustive list on the ground that it that had been Parliament’s 
intention it would have said so. [39]  
 The inference that policy exclusions are valid against a third party 
can be drawn from the fact that s148 only prevents an insurer from 
relying on a limited number of exclusions that are listed in s 148 (2) 
(such as the invalidation of any restrictions on the age or physical 
or mental condition of the driver) [42].  A similar conclusion arises 
under s151 (3) from the nullification of any restriction of cover to 
persons holding a driving licence.  Whilst some limitations of liability 
are specifically expressed to be void; the correlative implication is 
that all other limitations are valid. [51] 
 The recognition that some limitations on cover are permitted under 
s145 was considered by Ward LJ to be ‘time-honoured’ and ‘never 
doubted’.  This was a point that BA conceded when it acknowledged 
that in the not altogether uncommon scenario where a car is put to 
business use or taxi hire under a motor policy that is in fact 
restricted to social and domestic use, then the vehicle’s use not 
being covered by that policy [53].  This is certainly borne out by a 
number of authorities, such as in Keeley v Pashen [2004] EWCA 
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Civ 1491.  Keeley featured a deliberate running down of a fare 
paying passenger by a taxi driver insured under a ‘social and 
domestic pleasure purposes’ restriction. [24]  Fortunately for the 
victim, he was deemed to be entitled to recover from the driver’s 
insurers due to a convenient factual finding that contrived the 
driver’s use of the vehicle had reverted to ‘social and domestic’ use, 
by the time of the incident. 
 Thus according to the Court of Appeal, the fact that a compulsory 
third party motor insurance policy has been issued and delivered 
under s145 and s147 is no guarantee that the policyholders’ liability 
is covered.  Furthermore, it should also be noted that some events 
cannot be insured against as a matter of public policy: such as an 
intentionally criminal act, Hardy v Motor Insurers' Bureau [1964] 2 
All ER 742.  The qualified nature of the statutory third party cover 
provided under Ward LJ’s interpretation seems to fly in the face of 
the underlying protective purpose of Part VI of the 1988 Act.  There 
is a strong case to argue that properly construed, the legislative 
purpose of s143 and s145 is to provide statutory cover to innocent 
third parties, free from any contractual impediment that may exist 
between the insurer and its policyholder; 
3. That it has ‘never’ been doubted ‘from the earliest days’ that the certificate 
of insurance does not trump the policy [40].  Although an insurer is required 
to state on its policy certificate that the policy ‘satisfies the requirements of 
the relevant law applicable in Great Britain’ (see The Motor Vehicles (Third 
Party Risks) Regulations 1972) this does not extend the policy cover to all 
or any uses.  That remains true, even where the insurer does not set out 
the relevant policy restriction on the certificate.  
4. S151 sets out four preconditions that a third party victim must establish if 
he is to exercise his statutory right against the defendant’s motor insurer 
[34]: 
a. that ‘a certificate of insurance has been delivered under section 
147’ (section 151); 
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b. that ‘a judgment to which this subsection  applies is obtained’ 
(section 151(1)); 
c. that the judgment relates ‘to a liability with respect to any matter 
where liability with respect to that matter is required to be covered 
by a policy of insurance under section 145’, (section 151(2)); and 
d. that the liability is ‘covered by the terms of the policy … to which the 
certificate relates’, (section 151(2)(a));   
Thus for the insurer to face any liability to indemnify its insured the liability 
must not only be one required to be covered by a policy of insurance under 
ss143 and 145 but it must also be one that is actually covered by the policy 
to which the certificate relates; [52] 
5. That Community law does not prevent a Member State’s freedom to 
determine the extent of compulsory insurance, citing Andrew Smith J in 
AXA Insurance UK plc v Norwich Union Insurance [2007] EWHC 1046 and 
Lord Clyde in the House of Lords ruling in Clarke v Kato 1998 1 WLR.  
Furthermore, that the European Court of Justices’ ruling in case C-129/94 
Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] ECR 1-1929, which had influenced Tugendhat J 
below is confined to its facts and does not have a general application; [66 
& 67] 
6. If a use is made of the vehicle outside the terms of the policy cover then 
the vehicle is effectively uninsured and the compensatory needs of a third 
party victim are caught by UDA 1999.  This reasoning is consistent with 
the dicta of Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone LC in the House of Lords in 
Gardner v Moore [1984] 1 AC 548; [23, 54 & 69] 
7. The provisions of Part VI of the Road Traffic Act and the MIB Uninsured 
and Untraced Driver’s Agreements are sufficient to satisfy the spirit of the 
EU Motor Vehicles Insurance Directives as between them they ‘enable 
third-party victims of accidents caused by vehicles to be compensated for 
all the damage to property and personal injuries sustained by them’ as set 
out in paragraph 18 of the ECJ’s ruling in Bernaldez. [68] 
All seven principles will be familiar to most lawyers practicing in this field. 
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The Court of Appeal’s judgment in EUI:  
Applying these principles to the case facts, Ward LJ ruled that W should have 
restricted his use of the insured car so as to comply with the contractual limitations 
imposed by the insurance policy.  By deliberately crashing his car, his use fell 
outside the policy cover; that made W, to all intents and purposes, an uninsured 
driver.  Furthermore EUI were not liable as statutory insurers either as under s151 
W’s actions were not a use ‘to which the certificate relates’.  The fact that W could 
not have obtained insurance for his suicidal use was ignored.  Accordingly the 
fourth criterion listed above under section 151 (2) (a) was not satisfied and thus 
BA were unable to recover from EUI under s151.  Interestingly, the judgment 
does not reveal whether anyone thought to enquire whether the driver was 
mentally ill or otherwise incapable of forming the necessary intent to constitute 
‘deliberate damage’.  
As to BA’s potential right to claim from the Motor Insurers Bureau under the 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 Ward LJ opined that the MIB would not liable 
to meet such a claim, if presented.  His explanation was that clause 6 of that 
agreement specifically excludes liability for compensating subrogated claims.  
Accordingly BA, whose locus standi was that of a subrogating insurer, was left 
empty handed. 
Whilst this judgment offers a painstaking analysis of the conventional approach 
to construing s151, it fails to give the correct interpretation and in doing so it has 
seriously undermined the statutory compensatory guarantee for victims arising 
out of the use of motor vehicles.  It should be considered per incuriam.   
 
What went wrong 
Where, in the writer’s opinion, the judgment comes to grief is in its selective 
treatment of both domestic law and Community law.  After identifying the relevant 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives and conceding that if the ratio in Bernaldez 
had a wide application so that it applied to s 151 (2) (a) then ‘....the way the Road 
Traffic Act combined with the MIB scheme has always operated is not compliant 
with the Directives.’ [65] Ward LJ then appears to have sought a means of 
reconciling our national law provision with the relevant European law.   
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Rather than considering the extensive corpus of European jurisprudence, as was 
the court’s constitutional requirement, Ward LJ appears to have decided to look 
elsewhere to shore up the status quo.  In doing so he followed very closely the 
line of obiter reasoning employed by a high court judge in a criminal appeal ruling 
in Singh v Solihull MBC [2007] EWHC 552 (Admin). That judgment referred to a 
number of decisions, now of questionable relevance and currency, and it is 
regrettable that Ward LJ incorporated these into his judgment [65 – 67].  As it 
happens, Collins J, arrived at the right conclusion in the Singh case. In that case 
he concluded that the wide scope that the Bernaldez interpretation gave to Article 
3 of the First Directive did not have the effect of exculpating a defendant in a 
criminal prosecution for driving without insurance where he drove a car for 
commercial hire that was only insured for ‘social, domestic or pleasure purposes’.  
This was a valid position to take because the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives 
do not seek to harmonise the criminal or civil law of Member States, except where 
they contradict or undermine the Directive’s legislative purpose.  They grant 
Member States a wide discretion on how they choose to implement and enforce 
the obligation to insure against civil liability.  However where the Directives touch 
upon the nature and extent of the compulsory insurance guarantee extended to 
third parties, as in the EUI appeal, then the Directives are most certainly binding 
on Member States (Article 288 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) 
and it should also be remembered that under Articles 220 and 234 The European 
Community Treaty the Court of Justice is the final arbiter on the interpretation of 
Community law (see also s3 (1) European Communities Act 1972).  Accordingly 
it behoves any national court to interpret a Directive by considering first any 
relevant rulings by the Court of Justice, instead of referring to relatively obscure 
domestic decisions even if they may offer a more palatable construction.  
In EUI it seems that whilst the Court of Appeal paid lip service to the importance 
of Bernaldez, it went on to disregard its implications.  What makes this so odd is 
that Benaldez featured another ostensibly insured driver whose use contravened 
a limitation in his cover; the parallels with the EUI case are striking.  Yet as 
Johnathan Swift wryly observed ‘there's none so blind as those who will not see’.   
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The wide import of Bernaldez 
There can be little doubt that Bernaldez has extended the scope of a Member 
State’s duty to ensure that civil liability is covered by insurance under Article 3 (1) 
of the First Directive.  It achieved this by construing the list of void exclusions in 
Article 2 (1) of the Second Directive as amounting to no more than a restatement 
of the all encompassing duty imposed by the First Directive – and in doing so it 
has arguably taken the original meaning of the wording employed within Article 3 
(1) beyond what many would consider to be its ordinary and natural meaning.  
However, this is hardly a new proposition: Bernaldez is now 16 years old!  What 
is more, it has attracted its own coterie of like minded European Jurisprudence 
which uniformly endorses this interpretation.  It has been followed in Ferreira v 
Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confianca SA 2000 ECR 1-6711; Case C-
348/98; Candolin [2005] ECR I-5745;Case C-537/03; Farrell v Whitty 2007 ECJ 
Case C-356/05; and most recently in Churchill v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy 
Evans 2011 Case C-442/10 where various limitations in the insurance cover 
afforded to third parties were challenged successfully by the third party victims 
affected.   
Of all the European Court rulings that follow in the wake of Bernaldez, perhaps 
the most relevant is Candolin where not only was the driver drunk but so were all 
three passengers.  Finnish law permitted motor insurers to exclude liability to 
passengers who knew or ought to have known that their driver was intoxicated, 
unless special circumstances applied. That law was held to infringe the Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Directives.  Candolin restated and affirmed the Bernaldez 
principle thus: 
17     As a preliminary point it must be recalled that the First, Second and 
Third Directives are designed to ensure the free movement of vehicles 
normally based on Community territory and of persons travelling in those 
vehicles and to guarantee that the victims of accidents caused by those 
vehicles receive comparable treatment irrespective of where in the 
Community the accident has occurred (Case C-129/94 Ruiz Bernáldez 
[1996] ECR I-1829, paragraph 13).  
18     In view of the aim of protecting victims, the Court has held that Article 
3(1) of the First Directive precludes an insurer from relying on statutory 
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provisions or contractual clauses in order to refuse to compensate third-
party victims of an accident caused by the insured vehicle (Ruiz Bernáldez, 
paragraph 20).  
19     The Court has also held that the first subparagraph of Article 2(1) of 
the Second Directive simply repeats that obligation with respect to 
provisions or clauses in a policy excluding from insurance the use or 
driving of vehicles in particular cases (persons not authorised to drive the 
vehicle, persons not holding a driving licence, persons in breach of the 
statutory technical requirements concerning the condition and safety of the 
vehicle) (RuizBernáldez, paragraph 21).  
20     By way of derogation from that obligation, the second subparagraph 
of Article 2(1) provides that certain persons may be excluded from 
compensation by the insurer, having regard to the situation they have 
themselves brought about (persons entering a vehicle which they know to 
have been stolen) (RuizBernáldez, paragraph 21).  
21     However, as it is a provision which establishes a derogation from a 
general rule, the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the Second 
Directive must be interpreted strictly.  
The last point is made even more explicit in the Advocate General’s 
opinion in Bernaldez:  
‘42. The Community legislature's intention with this provision (i.e. the 
stolen vehicle exception in Article 2 (1)) was to provide for an exception to 
the rule that statutory provisions or contractual clauses in an insurance 
policy may not be relied on as against passengers and third parties who 
are the victims of an accident. This exception must be interpreted narrowly 
and as being exhaustive since it forms a departure from the general 
rule…..’ 
The ECJ judgment in Candolin goes on to state:  
23     It follows that the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the Second 
Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a statutory provision or a 
contractual clause in an insurance policy which excludes the use or driving 
of vehicles from the insurance may be relied on against third parties who 
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are victims of a road accident only where the insurer can prove that the 
persons who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the injury knew 
that it was stolen. 
….. 
27     The Member States must exercise their powers in compliance with 
Community law and, in particular, with Article 3(1) of the First Directive, 
Article 2(1) of the Second Directive and Article 1 of the Third Directive, 
whose aim is to ensure that compulsory motor vehicle insurance allows all 
passengers who are victims of an accident caused by a motor vehicle to 
be compensated for the injury or loss they have suffered.  
28     The national provisions which govern compensation for road 
accidents cannot, therefore, deprive those provisions of their 
effectiveness.  
Other relevant Community law 
Ward LJ’s judgment in EUI recites other ECJ rulings which endorse Benaldez but 
then appears to ignore the implications to be drawn from them, such as: 
 The judgment cites the ECJ ruling in Churchill: 
’41.  … The payment of compensation by a national body is considered to 
be a measure of last resort, provided for only in cases in which the vehicle 
that caused the injury or damage is uninsured or unidentified or has not 
satisfied the insurance requirements referred to in Article 3(1) of the first 
Directive.’ [61] 
 It also quotes from the Advocate General’s opinion in Churchill: 
‘27.  …  The Court’s case-law teaches us that, unless one of the 
exceptions laid down by the Directive is applicable, the victims of an 
accident are always entitled to be compensated by the insurer’, (his 
emphasis) [62]. 
Paragraph 11 of the EUI judgment refers to the recital within the Second 
Directive, also quoted at paragraph 4 of the ECJ Churchill judgment: 
‘… it is in the interest of victims that the effects of certain exclusion clauses 
be limited to the relationship between the insurer and the person 
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responsible for the accident; whereas, however, in the case of vehicles 
stolen or obtained by violence, Member States may specify that 
compensation will be payable by the abovementioned body;’ 
It is striking that the Court of Appeal should decide, contrary to established 
Community jurisprudence, that EUI’s exclusion of deliberate damage was valid, 
not just against their insured but also against any third party.  , In Bernhard Pfeiffer 
and others v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, and others ECJ 2004 C-297/01, paragraph 
119 the Court of Justice prescribed the correct approach:  
‘when hearing a case between individuals, a national court is required, 
when applying the provisions of domestic law adopted for the purpose of 
transposing obligations laid down by a directive, to consider the whole 
body of rules of national law and to interpret them, so far as possible, in 
the light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to achieve an 
outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the directive.’   
Whilst the Court of Appeal rightly took into account the First and Second 
Directives it erred in applying its own construction, since it is one that conflicts 
with a line of well established jurisprudence from the Court of Justice, which has 
precedence in matters of Community law interpretation.   
 
Revisiting the Court of Appeal’s Seven Principles 
It is perhaps worthwhile revisiting the seven principles set out in the first part of 
this article in the light of the Community law:  
1. A third party’s statutory right to compensatory cover is indeed independent 
of the insurer’s contractual relationship with its insured. It is easy to 
mistakenly conflate the two: the MVIDs apply to the former; not the latter;. 
2. Whilst the contractual autonomy between the insurer and insured remains, 
the statutory rights of a third party remain inviolate.  Consequently, 
restrictions in scope and use are not relevant to the statutory rights of a 
third party. Recital 7 to the Second MVID (84/5/EEC) clearly states that: ‘it 
is in the interest of victims that the effects of certain exclusion clauses be 
limited to the relationship between the insurer and the person responsible 
for the accident’; 
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3. It remains true that limitations and exclusions within a policy are not 
‘trumped’ by the certificate, as between the contracting parties; when it 
comes to third party victims, they are most certainly trounced by 
Community law; 
4. The Court of Appeal’s interpretation of s151 (2) (a), is inconsistent with 
what we have seen from the relevant Community law.  The impact of 
Bernaldez in the way it has interpreted article 3 is clear.  Its effect on our 
national law is that a third party victim is entitled to benefit from the 
statutory provision conferred by s 151 (5) free of any policy restrictions that 
apply against the insured, unless the stolen vehicle exception applies.  
This also accords with Lord Denning’s dicta in Hardy v Motor Insurers 
Bureau [1964] 2 QB 745 and Lord Hailsham’s concluding obiter statement 
in the House of Lords judgment in Gardner v Moore [1984] 1 AC 548; 
5. The ECJ consistently refers to and applies the Bernaldez interpretation in 
its rulings whenever it considers on the nature and scope of the insurance 
cover required by article 3.  It has consistently interpreted the MVIDs as 
conferring the widest extent of protection to third party victims; an 
interpretation that is starkly at odds with our national law provision. The 
plain fact of the matter is that, subject to the stolen vehicle exception, the 
UK Government has no choice but to ensure that any motor insurance 
policy issued in compliance with article 3 MVID is good for any use to which 
the insured vehicle it is put so far as a third party claim is concerned.  The 
ECJ rulings leave no room for the UK to argue any discretion on this point.  
They afford no legal basis on which the UK can lawfully treat an 
underinsured or insufficiently insured vehicle as an uninsured vehicle for 
the purposes of a third party claim;  
6. The use of a vehicle outside the scope of the policy terms does not convert 
a statutory insurance claim into a claim under the Uninsured Drivers 
Agreement 1999.  See the ECJ Churchill dicta set out above; 
7. The assertion that taken together Part VI of the Road Traffic Act and the 
MIB Agreements are sufficient to satisfy the UK Government’s obligations 
under the Directives is self evidently false.  Firstly, we have seen that the 
Court of Justice has been expressly stipulated the wide ranging nature of 
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the insurance cover that must be provided to a third party by an insurer.  
Secondly, in EUI, the property insurer was denied any compensation on 
the grounds (i) that statutory insurance cover did not apply to deliberate 
damage as it was an excluded liability, and (ii) on the basis that any claim 
it might make to the MIB under the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 
was excluded under clause 6 as a subrogated claim.  It is almost certain 
that the Court of Appeal was wrong on the first proposition and there is a 
very strong case to argue that it also erred on the second, hypothetical 
proposition.  The excerpt from the Fourth Directive quoted at [70] of the 
EUI judgment in support of its arguments in favour of excluding subrogated 
claims actually refers not to MIB claims (which are dealt with in the Second 
Directive) but to the compensatory body appointed to deal with foreign 
claims.  Subrogated claims are not mentioned in the earlier Directives.  
Nowhere in any of the six Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives do they 
contemplate that a third party victim should recover anything less than their 
full compensatory entitlement.  The EUI judgment fails to cite the Court of 
Justice’s ruling on the principles of ‘equivalence’ and ‘effectiveness’ in 
Evans v Secretary of State for Transport and the MIB 2003 ECJ  Case C-
63/01,.  The Court of Appeal’s views on this point are obiter anyway.  
Furthermore there is no clear authority that supports the MIB’s claim to be 
entitled to deduct subrogated claims. The EUI judgment ignores the fact 
that in McCall v Poulton the Court of Appeal ordered this specific issue to 
be referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, the claim was 
subsequently compromised. 
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Conclusion 
Where the Court of Appeal is unquestionably right is in confirming that if 
Bernaldez does have the wide and general application, which our review of the 
authorities supports, then our national law provision under the Road Traffic Act 
and the MIB Agreements infringes Community law. 
The implications flowing from Mr Williams’ attempted suicide are not limited to the 
injuries caused to himself and the other luckless driver, nor do they stop at the 
extensive damage to the House of Fraser store, or even the property insurers 
who were denied their compensatory entitlement.  The contrasting outcome in 
the Court of Appeal, between the EUI decision and its two rulings in Churchill, 
have punctured any remaining complacency that our national law provision for 
third party victims is consistently interpreted and applied, still less fully compliant 
with Community law.  If one compares Part VI of the 1988 Act with the MVID and 
the extensive body of ECJ rulings in this area, as one must, it is abundantly clear 
that our national law fails to confer the extensive level the protection to third party 
victims required by Community law.   
Innocent victims will continue to fall through the gaps in the compensatory 
safeguards provided under our national law as long the Government continues to 
procrastinate over the long overdue reform of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the 
MIB Agreements.  This sorry state of affairs is compounded by what appears to 
be a widespread confusion in our profession as to the significance and 
applicability of Community law in this area.  Unless the shortcomings in our 
national law are challenged, injustices will continue to be perpetrated.   
Returning to the Department of Transport’s consultation, rather than restricting 
its review to peripheral, albeit important, procedural issues concerning its extra-
statutory compensatory safety net for victims of uninsured and unidentified 
drivers, perhaps the Department of Transport would be better advised to review 
its entire provision in this area.  It might also sensibly review whether the MIB 
Agreements, in their present highly unsatisfactory form, comply with the UK’s 
Treaty obligation to implement Community law that conforms to the legal certainty 
161 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
principle311.  It would be also be interesting to know what is the enabling Act or 
other lawful provision or constitutional right that the MIB rely on to implement 
Community law, apparently independently of the Minister, within Article 75 of its 
Articles of Association312.  In the writer’s view, the UK’s arrangements for 
providing a compensatory guarantee are shambolic and require extensive and 
far ranging reform.  If the Department ignores the calls for urgent reform it will be 
exposed to the risk of judicial review and the near certainty of an infringement 
complaint. 
Leave to appeal has been sought in both EUI and Churchill but it is understood 
that the EUI claim has been compromised, leaving us with an unsatisfactory Court 
of Appeal precedent that appears to have failed to apply the correct Community 
law. However, it is one that, in the writer’s respectful opinion, is of questionable 
authority   
 
 
 
  
                                               
311 See Case C-365/93 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-499, paragraph 9, and 
Case C-144/99 Commission v Netherlands [2001] ECR I-3541, paragraph 17 
312 This question is relevant to the legality of the current arrangements for 
compensating victims of an increasing number of drivers who either have insufficient 
insurance cover for the use to which the vehicle is put or whose insurance cover is 
otherwise vitiated by the policyholders’ breach of contract.  These arrangements do not 
appear to conform to the Government’s own recently launched Good Law campaign. 
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6. Tinkering at the Edges 
[2015] J.P.I.L., Issue 3 
 
Every motor liability practitioner knows that their clients’ compensatory recovery 
is predicated on motor insurance.  We all pay a small fortune in premiums every 
year to ensure this.  Unfortunately, as I hope to demonstrate, the product we are 
sold is not fit for purpose.   
Compulsory third party motor insurance was introduced under the Road Traffic 
Act 1930 and over the years the scheme has been extended to include ancillary 
measures to protect innocent victims from the risk posed by uninsured and hit 
and run drivers.  Now 84 years on the entire third party motor insurance is in a 
shambles and in urgent need of reform.  
Origins 
It is clear from the early case authorities and from Sir Felix Cassell’s Board of 
Trade report of the Committee on Compulsory Insurance, 1937 [Cmd. 5528] that 
the underlying objective of the 1930 legislation was as simple as it was 
compelling: to mutualise the financial hazard posed to private citizens from the 
risk of being injured by motor vehicles.   
Instead of incepting a state run scheme, the government sensibly opted for a 
private sector solution that was already in place: one provided by a nascent motor 
insurance sector.  The 1930 Act made it a criminal offence to use a motor vehicle 
on a road without third party cover.  This pragmatic measure was intended to 
guarantee that motor accident victims were able to recover their full 
compensatory entitlement, independently of the wrongdoer’s ability to pay.   
It was the mass production of affordable cars that made statutory intervention 
necessary.  The arrival of the Austin 7 in 1922 and other reasonably affordable 
Nicholas Bevan looks at the issue of motor insurance. He examines the history 
behind the introduction of compulsory motor insurance and the policy decisions 
which have shaped how it developed. He identifies the current issues arising from 
exclusions and limitations and illustrates how these are in breach of European 
requirements and describes how in his view the current system is unfit for purpose. 
He then discusses the reform necessary. 
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vehicles transformed car ownership; it was no longer the preserve of the rich.  
This exposed members of the public to the increased likelihood that a wrongdoer 
might not be able to afford to satisfy the damages for which they were liable.  The 
imposition of compulsory third party insurance was a common sense measure 
designed to bolster the civil law rights of motor accident victims.  
Evolving Scope 
Responsibility for overseeing this scheme has reposed in a long succession of 
ministers, currently the Secretary of State for Transport, Patrick McLoughlin.  This 
responsibility has three important facets.  First and foremost, the moral imperative 
of ensuring that the motor insurers, whom the department for Transport licences 
to operate in this captive market, honour the original 1930’s legislative objective 
of guaranteeing the compensatory entitlement of third party victims.  Another is 
to modify our national law provision in this area so that it keeps pace with 
technological and social change.  Thirdly, to honour the Government’s treaty 
obligation to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to fully 
implement the six European motor insurance directives on motor insurance.   
We might be excused for thinking that the quid pro quo for paying our expensive 
premiums under compulsion of the law is the knowledge that if we are unfortunate 
enough to be injured by a careless driver, then our full compensatory entitlement 
will be guaranteed, independently of the driver at fault’s ability to pay.  What is 
not so readily appreciated is the haphazard way in which these provisions have 
evolved over the past 84 years has degraded the quality of the central social 
policy aim.  They are in fact an eclectic mix of different statutory and extra-
statutory initiatives, each developed and refashioned in response to various 
discrete issues and bolted on as accretions to the whole, sometimes without any 
apparent concern for the way they interact with one another.  Small wonder then 
that such a regime should have its flaws or that some victims’ should fall through 
the gaps that such an empirically derived regime inevitably produces.   
Unfortunately, whilst government was quick to impose criminal sanctions on its 
citizens for driving without insurance it had been surprisingly reluctant to interfere 
with the insurers’ autonomy to play the system by hedging their risk through 
numerous preconditions of cover, restrictions in cover and exclusions of liability.   
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Recent events have forced the hand of the government.  Two recent judgments 
have punctured any illusion the government may have entertained as to its 
domestic law provision in this area being compliant with the minimum standards 
of protection required under European law; it isn’t.  
Adverse influence 
The motor insurance industry has enjoyed its monopoly for over eight decades.  
And how it has prospered!  It has grown into a multi-billion pound state sanctioned 
cartel that is able to indulge in lavishly funded advertising and lobbying of 
ministers and MPs to win concessions at the expense of the hapless premium 
paying public who are compelled by law to purchase their products.  It also enjoys 
a strategic advantage over individual claimants in the way it can compromise 
claims that pose a threat to its commercial interests; which in turn, allows it to 
shape the common law by influencing the legal issues that are referred to the 
senior appellate courts.  This confers a strategic and tactical advantage on 
insurers in any civil liability dispute that the courts are ill equipped to confront313.  
So it should come as no great surprise to find that the simple inclusive nature of 
original 1930’s legislative objective has been compromised. 
A bad start 
Shortly after the Road Traffic Act 1930 came into effect, its shortcomings became 
apparent.  A swathe of technical challenges were raised by different insurers, 
who relied on various contractual restrictions and exclusions of liability to avoid 
their contractual liability to indemnify their insured; something s third party victim 
has no control or influence over.  It soon became clear that the legislative aim of 
the 1930 Act was being frustrated because it did not confer a direct and 
independent right on third party victims: ‘direct,’ in the sense of conferring on third 
party victims a direct right of action against the responsible drivers’ insurers; 
‘independent,’ in the sense that the victim’s statutory right would be free from any 
defence that an insurer might have against its policyholder.  This was because 
the 1930 Act did not attempt to interfere with the common law doctrine of privity 
of contract by which a contract does not generally confer rights or impose 
                                               
313 Part 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules seeks to put the parties on an equal footing.  
However, in individual cases, insurers enjoy a huge disparity in resources allied with 
decades of accrued specialist knowledge of an unnecessarily complicated and over 
technical medley of different legal provisions.   
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obligations on those who are not party to the contract (the ‘third party rule’).  
Furthermore, in the exceptional instances where a third party is entitled to claim 
the benefit of a contract, such rights are deemed to be subject to any contractual 
conditions and defences that the promisee may have against the promisor.  As 
Harman LJ so memorably put it, in Post Office v Norwich Union fire Insurance 
Society Ltd [1967] 2 QB 363, 376, a third party cannot ‘pick out the plums and 
leave the duff behind’.   
Parliament’s reaction was to legislate again, unfortunately by half measures, so 
the Road Traffic Act 1934 proved to be something of a curate’s egg.  On the 
positive side, section 10 gave every appearance of abrogating the third party rule.  
It provided that once an insurance policy has been issued and delivered and a 
relevant judgment obtained against the insured, ‘then, notwithstanding that the 
insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled, the 
policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the 
persons entitled to the benefit of the judgment any sum payable thereunder in 
respect of the liability, including any amount payable in respect of costs and any 
sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating 
to interest on judgments.’ This survives in section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 
1988.   
Unfortunately the third party rights that section 10 conferred was promptly 
qualified by two additional provisions. First of these was section 10(3) which 
enabled motor insurers to avoid their newly imposed statutory liability by allowing 
it to seek a court declaration that the policy was void for a material non disclosure 
or misrepresentation.  That measure survives as section 152 Road Traffic Act 
1988.  Secondly, in section 12, by nullifying the effects of eight categories of 
policy restriction against a third party, it opened the door to the argument that by 
implication all other policy conditions and restrictions not so nullified remain valid 
against the very third party victims the system is supposed to protect.  This 
survives in section 148 of the 1988 Act and this argument was deployed with 
devastating effect by insurers and most recently in the Court of Appeal in EUI v 
Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
Exclusions of liability 
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In EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership an ostensibly fully insured motorist attempted 
to commit suicide by driving his car into a department store in Bristol.  He caused 
extensive damage to the building and badly injured another motorist.  All three 
Lords Justices held that the insurer’s policy term that excluded liability for 
deliberate damage was effective against third party victims because it was 
effectively permitted by implication in the statute.   
The ruling appears to give insurers a free hand to restrict or exclude their statutory 
liability to third party victims; save where expressly precluded from doing so by 
the Road Traffic Act 1988.  Unfortunately the Act only addresses a limited number 
of specific exclusions, leaving insurers a free hand to hedge their liabilities 
elsewhere; at the expense of the law abiding road using community and the wider 
public interest.   
The same court also came to the bizarre conclusion that whilst motorists must 
ensure that any use they actually make of a vehicle is always covered by third 
party insurance, there is no corresponding obligation on motor insurers to provide 
such a wide ranging scope of cover.   
The result is that every year thousands of accident victims’ claims are treated as 
uninsured driver claims even though some motor cover is in place.  Insurers 
exploit the restrictive nature of the protection afforded by the 1988 Act to evade 
liability in numerous scenarios.  This would not matter quite so much if the 
government’s extra statutory regimes for uninsured and untraced drivers 
provided an equivalent level of protection but they don’t.   
Both of the Uninsured and Untraced Driver Schemes are riddled with vicious, 
oppressive and disproportionate, strike out clauses that permit the MIB to escape 
any liability even for the smallest procedural infraction.  They also exclude liability 
for certain heads of loss and permit deductions from an applicant’s proper 
compensatory entitlement in situations that would not be permitted in a normal 
civil action against an insured driver.  These are decidedly third rate schemes. 
This author provided a detailed critique of the judgment in EUI in this journal back 
in 2013314, arguing in robust terms that it was wrong both in law and logic.  The 
fundamental failing is that Court of Appeal’s conclusions are impossible to 
                                               
314 Marking the Boundary, Nicholas Bevan, JPIL [2013] issue no.3. 
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reconcile with a long line of Court of Justice rulings referred to below.  In the two 
years that have followed, not a single dissenting opinion has been published or 
otherwise made known to this author, yet the EUI decision endures as an 
unfortunate and misleading legal precedent. 
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Restrictions in the scope of cover 
Another major flaw in our national law safeguards is the restricted geographic 
and technical scope of the third party insurance requirement.  The statutory 
scheme only extends to the use of motor vehicles ‘on a road or other public place’.  
This excludes all private property, even forecourts and driveways leading onto 
public highways.  The insurance requirement is also restricted to motor vehicles 
‘intended or adapted for use on a road’.  This anachronistic restriction exempts 
many off-road motor vehicles from the duty to insure, even when used on public 
highways.   
APIL, PIBA, and MASS and a number of law firms joined this author in 
highlighting this problem in our responses to the minister’s abortive review of the 
MIB Agreements315 back in April 2013.   
Better, simpler, fairer European law 
The qualified and restrictive nature of our national law provision contrasts sharply 
with the European directives on motor insurance that the UK Government is 
obliged to implement.   
A consistent line of Court of Justice rulings, originating in case Case C-129/94 
Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] ECR 1-1929 and Candolin and Others v Pohjola and 
Others [2005] CJEU (Case C-537/03) through to Case C-442/10 Churchill 
Insurance Company Ltd v Wilkinson [2011] and Case C-409/11 Csonka v Allam 
[2013] confirms that under European law only one exclusion of liability is capable 
of affecting a motor insurer’s liability to compensate a third party316.  This single 
derogation from cover is limited to a passenger whom the insurer can prove knew 
the vehicle he was riding in was stolen.   
                                               
315 Review of the Uninsured and Untraced Drivers Agreements, Department for 
Transport, February 2013 
316 In Candolin and Others v Pohjola and Others [2005] CJEU (Case C 537/03) 23 the 
Court of Justice said: ‘     It follows that the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the 
Second Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a statutory provision or a 
contractual clause in an insurance policy which excludes the use or driving of vehicles 
from the insurance may be relied on against third parties who are victims of a road 
accident only where the insurer can prove that the persons who voluntarily entered the 
vehicle which caused the injury knew that it was stolen.’  
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The basic premise of the European directives on motor insurance is that third 
party cover should to be good for any use made of the vehicle, provided it is 
consistent with its normal function, at least in so far as it concerns a third party 
victim’s claim.  The directives stipulate that an insurer’s liability to compensate a 
third party victim is independent of any contractual restrictions between the 
insurer and the policyholder.  So under European law (and subject to the single 
proviso mentioned above) provided the vehicle has some insurance in place, the 
insurer on risk must satisfy a third party claim, regardless.  Furthermore, the MIB 
has no authority to deal with the non-contractual use of an ostensibly insured 
vehicle; except in that single instance.   
All this makes perfect practical sense from a social policy perspective.  It protects 
local authorities and the State from the risk of incurring responsibility for funding 
the extensive long term care of seriously injured but destitute motor accident 
victims. 
The obligation imposed on member states is to put in place suitable measures to 
ensure that third party victims’ compensatory entitlement is guaranteed.  
Unfortunately, there are over forty instances where our defective national law fails 
to fully implement this simple imperative. 
Ministerial inaction  
I have been campaigning for reform in this area for some time now and the 
Minister for Transport is well aware of the many defects in the national law 
provision for he is responsible for and how this exposes accident victims to the 
risk of either of being undercompensated and in extreme cases to recovering 
nothing at all.   
In early 2013 an Under Secretary of State for Transport initiated what was 
possibly a well intentioned but misconceived consultation on reforming both MIB 
Agreements.  A number of law firms and claimant representative organisations 
joined me in explaining why the proposals did not go nearly far enough and in 
calling for a much wider ranging review of the Governments provision in this area.  
My consultation response provided a detailed critique of the defective national 
law provision for third party victims.  He was informed that the geographic and 
technical scope of the duty to insure and the nature and extent of the insurance 
requirement specified within the Road Traffic Act 1988 was far too narrow to 
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conform with the minimum standards imposed under European law.  He was 
provided with chapter and verse for the numerous unlawful exclusions, limitations 
and restrictions of liability under both MIB Agreements.   
His response was to reject calls for a dialogue and later to simply abandon the 
review, without offering any explanation.   Later on he blocked the involvement of 
the Law Commission when it offered its assistance.   
It seemed that the minister was unequal to the task of bringing the powerful 
insurance lobby into line.  The only people who benefit from these flaws in the 
UK implementation of European law are the motor insurance companies, who 
exploit the numerous loopholes.  The minister was warned that if he did not act, 
others were ready and willing to encourage him.   
A detailed infringement complaint has been lodged at the European Commission.  
And now two judgment’s that vindicate some of these earlier criticisms look set 
to finally force the minister’s hand: one delivered by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union317, the other by a brilliant High Court judge318, and recently 
upheld by the Court of Appeal319. 
The Vnk ruling 
In September last year, in Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d.d. [2014] 
CJEU Case C-162/13, the Court of Justice confirmed that the third party 
insurance requirement extends to: 
 any motor vehicle,  
 to any use made of it (provided its use is consistent with its normal 
function) and  
 that this applies to any location, whether on public or private property.   
Compare this to the qualified and geographically restricted scope of the third party 
insurance requirement that we have become so used to working with under our 
statutory and extra-statutory provision in the UK.  At the very least, we are bound 
to see some changes to Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988 being proposed 
                                               
317 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d.d. [2014] CJEU Case C-162/13 
318 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB) 
319 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 172 
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sometime this year.  This is one infraction that the European Commission cannot 
ignore. 
The same court also elevated the importance of the protective aim of the 
directives on motor insurance to joint equal place with the liberalisation of the 
movement of people and vehicles across the European Union.  This means that 
any failure by a member state to fully implement the objectives of a directive in 
this regard will almost certainly be treated as a serious breach of European law.  
This has implications for state liability in a Francovich action. 
The Delaney decision 
In March this year the Court of Appeal upheld a first instance finding by Mr Justice 
Jay that the Department for Transport was guilty of a serious breach of European 
law when it introduced a new exclusion of liability in the Uninsured Drivers 
Agreement 1999.  He held that the meaning of the European directives on motor 
insurance would have been clear and obvious back in 1999 and that minister had 
no discretion to introduce his own idiosyncrasies into what is a highly regulated 
regime for guaranteeing victims compensatory rights.  The Department was held 
liable to compensate the victim under the Francovich principle.  This writer has 
provided a detailed commentary on this case in this Journal320. 
Of even greater significance is the way the Court of Appeal upheld the first 
instance finding to the effect that the protective principle which the Court of 
Justice announced in Bernaldez has a wide and general application.  This is 
impossible to reconcile with its earlier judgment in EUI.   
Stark contrasts 
Vnuk and Delaney leave us in no doubt that our national law, as interpreted and 
applied by the Court of Appeal in EUI is inconsistent with the superior and binding 
effect of the Court of Justice’s ruling in Bernaldez nineteen years ago and as such 
it is bad law.  Similarly there can be little doubt that sections 143, 145, 185 and 
192 of the 1988 Act are all inconsistent with Vnuk.  Unfortunately the UK’s 
defective  implementation of the European directives on motor insurance is not 
confined to the geographic and technical scope of the compulsory third party 
                                               
320 A World Turned Upside Down, Nicholas Bevan, JPIL, [2014] issue 3. 
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motor insurance requirement imposed under article 3 of the Sixth consolidated 
directive, they are legion. 
  
173 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
 
European law in a nutshell 
The European third party motor insurance requirement can be summarised in the 
following six core principles: 
1. The duty to insure and the scope of third party motor insurance cover are 
coextensive.  In other words, authorised motor insurers must provide third 
party cover that is fit for purpose. 
2. The nature of the third party cover is wide and inclusive and it extends to: 
• almost any use; 
• almost any motorised vehicle; 
• anywhere on land. 
3. Member states have no discretion to introduce their own exclusions or 
restrictions of liability. 
4. The Motor Insurers Bureau’s role, as the article 10 compensating body is 
strictly circumscribed.  It is a last resort, only to be utilised where: 
• the vehicle responsible for causing the loss or injury is 
untraced, or 
• where there is absolutely no insurance in place, or 
• where the insurers can prove the claimants had actual 
knowledge at the time they entered the vehicle in which they 
was riding that it was stolen, where the insurer has also 
excluded that particular liability in its policy terms 
5. The Motor Insurers Bureau must compensate at least up to the limits of 
the third party motor insurance obligation.  In doing so it must apply the 
EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 
6. The Motor Insurers Bureau can only exclude liability to compensate a 
victim of an uninsured driver where it can prove that the victim had actual 
knowledge at the time they entered the vehicle in which he or she was 
riding that it was uninsured. 
 
The irony 
The legislative objectives of the European directives on motor insurance bear a 
very close affinity to the original social policy aims that engendered the passing 
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of the Road Traffic Act 1930, which coined the very concept of compulsory third 
party motor insurance.   
Unfortunately over the past eight decades, a well resourced and highly influential 
motor insurance lobby has managed to extract numerous concessions from a 
succession of credulous and easily manipulated ministers, beginning as we have 
seen in 1934321 and more recently in a series of unlawful revisions to its 
arrangements for victims of untraced drivers322.  This has undermined the 
effectiveness of the 1930’s objective of protecting accident victims.  For all its 
many faults, the European Union is less susceptible to this kind of 
unconstitutional interference.  We have every reason be grateful to these sensible 
and pragmatic directives and the European law remedies that enable us to 
challenge the longstanding indifference of successive ministers and the 
insurance industry that cynically exploits this captive market for its own ends. 
Lack of legal certainty 
Meanwhile, we cannot take our national law at face value.  Incompatibility defects 
riddle Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988.  They also infest the European 
Communities Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002 and both the Uninsured 
Drivers Agreement 1999 and the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003.  All of this 
law fails to fully implement the European Directives on motor insurance.  The 
                                               
321 See above under ‘A bad start’. 
322 In Byrne v Secretary of State for Transport & MIB [2008] EWCA Civ 574 Mr Justice 
Flaux held that the MIB’s strict and arbitrary three year limitation period imposed in 
clause 4(3) for bringing a claim infringed the European law principle of equivalence and 
wrongly denied a minor from bringing a claim when section 28 of the Limitation Act 1980 
would have stopped time running in a normal civil action against an identified driver.  That 
was subsequently amended by a supplemental agreement that is only available on 
request or from the MIB website.  However, nothing was done to strike out the arbitrary 
and draconian strike out penalty for failing to report the accident to the police under 
clause 4 (c) that clearly infringe the principles that underscore rationale from Bernaldez.  
Then In 2011 the 2003 Agreement was amended again to exclude property damage for 
the vast majority of claims by the deviously way it defined ‘significant personal injury’ 
(intended by the European Council simply to refer to an injury of sufficient note to result 
in an independent record being made of the incident - as a means of enabling 
Compensating Bodies to counteract the risk of fraud in untraced driver claims) with what 
is in effect a grievous injury requirement.  It achieved this by substituting the natural 
meaning of ‘significant’ with ‘serious’ by restricting property damage to claims that feature 
a ‘bodily injury resulting in death or for which 4 days or more of consecutive in-patient 
treatment was given in hospital, the treatment commencing within 30 days of the 
accident.’   
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government’s failings are so egregious and wide-ranging as to be unsustainable 
in the face of a properly prepared legal challenge.   
The inevitability of reform 
It is no longer a question of whether there will be reform, only the form it will 
eventually take: whether by the government’s own initiative or as a result of a 
succession of legal challenges that apply a European law consistent 
interpretation of our defective national law provision.   
The Department for Transport has revealed that it is planning to amend the 
geographic scope of the duty to insure and the insurance requirement in Part VI 
of the Road Traffic Act 1988, in the light of the Vnuk decision.  One would expect 
that a minster acting in good faith in the light of the Delaney decision will remove 
all the unlawful exclusions and exceptions of liability within the Uninsured and 
Untraced Drivers Agreements.  The shameful fact remains that the minister was 
warned about these very defects in explicit terms in his own consultation exercise 
back in February 2013 but chose to do nothing.  If the minister confines his 
reforms to the immediate and obvious implications of Vnuk and Delaney, he will 
simply be tinkering at the edges of the problem.  Profound and widespread 
revision is necessary if he is to avoid further costly legal challenges in the years 
ahead. 
Recipe for reform 
The scale of the reform is indicated by the following non-exhaustive mandatory 
to do list: 
 Removal of the unlawful geographic and technical restrictions in the scope 
of the duty to insure and the insurance cover required under sections 
143,145,195 and 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 as well as in the 
corresponding provisions in both MIB Agreements.  Regulation 2 of the 
European Communities Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002 should 
have the United Kingdom restriction removed. 
 The abolition of every exclusion or restriction of liability to third party 
victims: whether contained within our UK statutory provision, within the 
minster’s arrangements with the Motor Insurers Bureau or in the motor 
insurance policies that the minister is responsible for regulating.  This 
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should encompass revising section 151 (4) of the 1988 Act and discarding 
the nullifying provision in section 148 and the car sharing exception in 
section 150.  All those offensive and oppressive procedural conditions 
precedent of MIB liability that enable the MIB to evade any liability to 
compensate for the most trivial procedural infraction should be excised, 
along with those absurd exclusion in clause 13 of the 1999 agreement and 
clause 4 of the 2003 Agreement for failing to report the incident to the 
police.  Indeed any exclusion or restriction of liability not expressly 
permitted by European law should be removed, with retrospective effect in 
view of the fact that they have been clearly in conflict with European law 
since the Bernaldez ruling 1996, in which the UK government intervened 
unsuccessfully.  The common law policy of ex turpi causa non oratur actio 
will need to be reviewed in the light of the Court of Justice’s comments in 
Candolin323 and Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson; Evans v Equity Claims 
CJEU 01.12.2011 C-442/10324.  The notional wording added to section 151 
(8) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 as part of the emergency repair effected 
by the Court of Appeal in Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson; Evans v Equity 
& Secretary of State for Transport [2012] EWCA Civ 1166 will need to be 
incorporated into the amended statute and an explanation of precisely 
what is meant by a proportionate reduction would also be helpful. 
 The abolition above involves the abrogation of the common law third party 
rule in so far as it affects the right of third party motor accident victims to 
exercise the free standing direct right of action conferred under article 18 
of the Sixth European directive on motor insurance.  This will require 
statutory provision to amend section 153 of the 1988 Act and possibly also 
                                               
323 The Court of Justice ruled, at paragraph 28 of its judgment in Candolin, that ‘The 
national provisions which govern compensation for road accidents cannot, therefore, 
deprive those provisions of their effectiveness’.  It also ruled, in the context of a case 
where the victims were passengers who had knowingly entered a vehicle driven by 
someone whom they knew to be intoxicated ‘It is only in exceptional circumstances that 
the amount of the victim’s compensation may be limited on the basis of an assessment 
of his particular case.’ 
324 Where the Court of Justice ruled, in the context of a policyholder who had knowingly 
permitted an uninsured / unauthorised individual to drive him, that: ‘national rules, 
formulated in terms of general and abstract criteria, may not refuse or restrict to a 
disproportionate extent the compensation to be made available to a passenger by 
compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles solely 
on the basis of his contribution to the occurrence of the loss which arises.’ [para 49]. 
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the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010, when that eventually 
comes into force.  It will require regulation 3 of the aforementioned 2002 
Regulations to be amended as it wrongly dilutes the direct right of action 
by expressly permitting the insurer to raise any defence it has against its 
policyholder against a third party claimant. 
 Attention will need to be given to section 144 of the 1988 which exempts 
certain legal persons from the compulsory insurance obligation, to ensure 
that unauthorised use of such vehicles is covered by the MIB Agreements. 
 The commonplace practice whereby motor insurers treat statutorily 
insured claims as uninsured claims under the prejudicial terms of the 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 needs to be abolished. 
 Minors and other protected parties should no longer be prejudiced by the 
absence of any effective safeguards for their fair treatment.  The minister 
would be well advised to study the Supreme Court’s judgment in Dunhill v 
Burgin [2014] UKSC 18.  Over the years, many thousands of settlements 
have been concluded without any independent approval mechanism, 
raising serious doubt as to their validity. 
 All unauthorised deductions from the compensatory entitlement of victims 
of uninsured and untraced drivers should be abolished and those affected 
reimbursed. 
This seems to be an opportune moment to rescind both MIB Agreements and to 
substitute them both by a much shorter, clearer codified scheme.  The operative 
provisions for compensating uninsured drivers should be confined to no more 
than two A4 sides of paper and both agreements need to be in plain English, 
easily available from a government website and regularly updated.  The 
governance of the MIB could also be improved and made more accountable, as 
suggested in 2011 by this writer within this very journal325.   
 
                                               
325 Why the MIB Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 needs to be scrapped, Nicholas 
Bevan, JPIL [2011] issue no 3. 
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The Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015 
My original article was submitted on 15 June, since when the Government has 
announced its new scheme for uninsured drivers.  This development warrants 
further comment by way of a post script. 
Don't be fooled, its business as usual  
Any hopes of a Damascene change of mind by the Department for Transport in 
the wake of the Vnuk and Delaney decisions appear to have been misplaced.  
After a delay of more than two years from its aborted 2013 consultation, the 
Government announced on 6th July that it had agreed a new scheme with the 
MIB.  The new agreement was presented as a fait accompli; coming into effect 
on 1 August.  The timing is noteworthy.  The surprise 2013 consultation was 
announced just weeks before what many in our blighted sector have since 
dubbed ‘Jackson day’: when our profession was preoccupied fire-fighting the 
government’s botched implementation of the most extensive and damaging civil 
justice reforms in living memory.  Now, the announcement just happens to 
coincide with the summer vacation.   
The new agreement is misleadingly presented as the product of the 2013 
consultation exercise; it is nothing of the kind.  It is a chimera made up of (i) the 
MIB’s original proposals, (ii) the minimum changes necessary to implement the 
more obvious implications Delaney without risking an outright accusation of bad 
faith and (ii) new provisions that present the MIB with further opportunities for 
windfalls that clearly conflict with European law.   
The minister has studiously ignored the numerous calls for wide-ranging reform 
to bring our statutory and extra statutory implementation of the European directive 
on motor insurance into line with the minimum standards of compensatory 
protection required under that law.  Not only does this new scheme fail to remove 
all the clear and obvious obstacles to full compliance in its 1999 predecessor but 
it compounds its default by introducing entirely new infractions.   
Some welcome changes 
One significant innovation is the excision of the two unlawful passenger exclusion 
clauses which it was warned about in the consultation responses.  Yet these are 
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presented as being introduced so as to comply with the Court of Appeal’s ruling 
in Delaney; as though to demonstrate the 2013 consultation was a sham.   
Another welcome change includes the removal of the MIB’s ability to strike out 
valid claims for trivial procedural infractions and the simplification of the claims 
process, which are both positive steps and they make the agreement that much 
shorter.  This is gratifying for someone who has campaigned for the removal of 
these pointless and unjust anachronisms for several years326.  However, they 
should never have been permitted in the first place.  Nothing has been done to 
revoke their application to the thousands of claims left to run under the current 
discredited regime that remains in force for all accidents predating 1 August 2015. 
Serious flaws 
Unfortunately the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015 contains a number of 
serious flaws and basic drafting blunders.  These include a number of exclusions 
of and restrictions in the MIB’s liability to compensate that are not only unjust in 
so far as they prejudice the legal entitlement of accident victims but they also 
conflict with European law.  Take for example the unlawful concession in clause 
6 that allows the MIB to offset life assurance or other such payments triggered as 
a result of the same accident in circumstances that are ignored under normal civil 
law quantification rules.   
Then there is the flagrant introduction of the terrorism exclusion in clause 9.  It 
doesn’t make any sense in policy terms.  Presumably car bombs are the chief 
threat it envisages but as such use is clearly inconsistent with the normal function 
of a motor vehicle it is excluded from the insurance requirement under European 
law anyway.  What possible public good is achieved from the arbitrary distinction 
that allows a claim by a child cyclist who is grievously injured by an uninsured 
get-away driver escaping from a bank heist where a cashier has been murdered 
but not where the uninsured driver is an anti-abortionist lunatic who has just 
assassinated a physician at a local clinic?   
There are also grave concerns about the way caluse 17 removes the right to 
appeal the reasonableness of the MIB’s decisions to the Secretary of State for 
                                               
326 See Nicholas Bevan,“Why the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 needs to be 
scrapped” [2011]J.P.I.L123. 
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Transport and substituting this with a paper appeal process to an arbitrator whose 
decision will be final and determined on the strict wording of the agreement 
without reference to the European law context.  This offends basic rule of law and 
HRC principles.  So it has been distressing to see at least one well known 
practitioner in this field provide an ill considered endorsement of the new regime. 
We have been here before 
This agreement’s much discredited predecessor was introduced in 1999 without 
proper consultation and that agreement contained numerous drafting errors and 
bodges along with provision that conflicted with the minimum standards of 
protection required under the European directives on motor insurance.   See my 
earlier articles here and elsewhere.  That agreement needed immediate 
rectification and a number of its provisions were later successfully challenged and 
either amended by the courts applying a European law consistent interpretation 
or they were the subject of a award in damages against the Secretary of State for 
Transport under Francovich principles. 
It seems that history is repeating itself.  The minister has, once more without 
proper consultation, approved a bodged scheme in which the MIB has abrogated 
to itself powers to exclude claims and to restrict its liability in circumstances that 
clearly contravene European law. 
Call to action 
The Government is clearly unequal to the task of standing up to the undue 
influence exerted by the powerful insurance lobby.  It is therefore down to the 
legal profession to uphold the legal rights of our fellow citizens and to challenge 
the infractions in the new 2015 Agreement and its predecessor as well as the 
numerous breaches of European law that infest Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 
1988, the EC Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002 and the Untraced Drivers 
Agreement 2003.   
Our national law provision is so defective that it cannot be taken at face value.  
Competence in this area of practice requires a working knowledge of basic 
European law principles, a detailed knowledge of the consolidated directive on 
motor insurance (2009/113/EC), the extensive corpus of Court of Justice rulings 
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interpreting its meaning and effect and the relevant remedies under European 
law. 
The author’s public training on the new Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015 is 
provided through the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. 
 
The author 
 
Nicholas Bevan is an award winning solicitor, legal commentator and mediator.  
He has been campaigning for extensive reform to our statutory and extra-
statutory provision for motor accident victims for many years and his blog, Nota 
Bene (http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/), is devoted to this issue. In 2013 he 
was consulted by the Law Commission on the reforms needed.  His numerous 
articles in the Journal Of Personal Injury Law and The New Law Journal 
anticipated Vnuk and Delaney. 
  
182 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
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7. Mind the gap! 
BILA Journal, issue 129, October 2016328 
 
 
 
Ongoing developments in the United Kingdom resulting from the Government’s 
failure to fully implement the sixth European directive on motor insurance 
(2009/103/EC) 
 
Introduction  
The European Council Directive 2009/103/EC 329on motor insurance (the 
Directive) requires every member state to ensure that the compensatory 
entitlement of individuals who sustain injury or other loss caused by the use of 
motor vehicles in their territory should safeguarded.  They are to realise this 
objective primarily through civil liability insurance.  Where the responsible vehicle 
is uninsured or unidentified the compensatory safeguard is achieved by the 
adoption or inception of a compensatory body to assume the role of an insurer.   
It is the responsibility of member states not only to implement that law but to make 
sure that none of its domestic laws and provision undermine the effectiveness of 
the Directives’ legislative aims330.  It is well known that a directive is only binding 
as to the result to be achieved331, they often confer a wide discretion on the 
member states as to how their aims are implemented.  This is probably the 
                                               
327 The BILA Journal is the official journal of the British Association of Insurance Lawyers  
328 First published by BILA Journal online in January 2016, and republished in Italy in 
Direitto Del Mercato Assicurativo E Finanziario, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, issue 1 of 
2016 
329 Council Directive (2009/103/EC) of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against 
civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation 
to insure against such liability.  Official Journal L 263 , 07/10/2009 P. 0011 – 0031 
330 Case C 537/03 Candolin and Others [2005] ECR I 5745, paragraph 17 
331 Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012/C 326/01 
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principal reason why they do not generally have direct effect, in the sense that 
they cannot be relied on in national courts in disputes between private individuals.  
The basic premise is that citizens depend on their member state transposing a 
directive into its domestic law provision before they can assert the rights 
conferred on them through it.   
To properly implement a directive member states must ensure that the legal rights 
conferred under it are transposed in such a form as to be sufficiently precise and 
clear and that individuals are made fully aware of all their rights and, where 
appropriate, that they can rely on them before the national courts332.  Most 
personal injury representatives are aware of the Directive, at least in broad terms, 
and that our national law provision in this area is supposed to implement this 
European law.  However what is not so well known is the egregious extent to 
which the United Kingdom’s (UK) implementation fails to meet the minimum 
standard of protection required under this European law.  One explanation for this 
might be a trusting faith in the Department for Transport’s good offices.  Another 
might have something to do with the fact, after lecturing on this theme for nearly 
a decade now, that the vast majority of personal injury practitioners this author 
has encountered have not thought it necessary to acquaint themselves the 
Directive, still less the extensive body of rulings from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) that has been so instrumental in shaping the significance 
and extent of its scope. 
This paper focuses on two particular aspects of the Directive: namely the third 
party motor insurance obligation, imposed under Article 3 and the provision for 
authorised compensating body for victims of unidentified and uninsured vehicles 
under Article 10.  It will begin by summarising the minimum standard of 
compensatory protection imposed by the Directive for third party victims of motor 
accidents, explaining how this has evolved into a widely scoped protective 
principle.  It will then briefly outline the UK’s domestic transposition of this law.  A 
comparative law analysis is then offered of some of its provisions to indicate the 
nature of the gaps in protection that span the UK’s entire national law 
                                               
332 Case C-63/01 Evans v Secretary of state for Transport and the Motor Insurers Bureau 
[2003] paragraph 35 referring in turn to Case C-365/93 Commission v Greece [1995] 
ECR I-499, paragraph 9, and Case C-144/99 Commission v Netherlands [2001] ECR I-
3541, paragraph 17 
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transposition of the Directive, before moving on to the various ways in which 
these infractions are being challenged.  Finally, it will consider some emerging 
issues in this dynamic area of the law and it will outline the alternative routes to 
redress for individuals adversely affected by the UK’s incomplete implementation. 
 
The Directive 
The Directive creates the legal framework for ensuring that persons injured or 
suffering loss caused by the use of a motor vehicle, wherever registered in the 
Community, are guaranteed that they will either be able to recover their full 
compensatory entitlement from the responsible vehicle’s insurers or, failing that, 
from the relevant authorised compensating body set up in each member state for 
compensating victims of uninsured or unidentified vehicles.  These legislative 
objectives have an important role in furthering the European Union’s policy of 
promoting the free movement of persons, goods, services (and implicitly, 
vehicles) within the European Union.  The Directive does not seek to alter the 
domestic laws and rules relating to civil or criminal liability.   
 
An evolving legislative scope 
The Directive consolidates five earlier directives and it is the product of an 
evolving policy to facilitate the free movement of people and vehicles.   
First tentative steps 
The process began with Council Directive 72/166/EEC (the First Directive) which 
first set out in broad terms the obligation to take out civil liability insurance for 
motor vehicle use within the relevant territory of each member state.  This 
measure, which survives as article 3 of the (sixth) Directive, had relatively limited 
ambitions.   
Article 3 of the First Directive provided: 
1. Each Member State shall, subject to Article 4, take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles 
normally based in its territory is covered by insurance. The extent of the 
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liability covered and the terms and conditions of the cover shall be 
determined on the basis of these measures.  
2. Each Member State shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that 
the contract of insurance also covers: - according to the law in force in 
other Member States, any loss or injury which is caused in the territory of 
those States; 
Article 1 defined a ‘vehicle’ as:  
 ‘any motor vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical 
power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled’ 
This Article 3 cover was restricted to personal injuries, initially.   
The First Directive also required member states to designate a national guarantee 
fund to be set up for each member state, to (i) facilitate the free movement of 
people and vehicles throughout the European Community (by discarding the 
need to display a green card and to take out separate cover to driver abroad 
within the EC) and (ii) facilitate the compensation of victims in cross border claims 
within the European Union.   
The UK was at this stage arguably ahead of the game, so to speak, in its national 
law provision for guaranteeing the compensatory entitlement of victims of road 
accident.  Compulsory insurance had been in force since 1930 and the first 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement dated back to 1946. 
Unfortunately the First Directive provided a wide margin of discretion on member 
states as to how its legislative objective was implemented both in form and 
substance.  This resulted in considerable disparities in the levels of protection 
between the different member states in a number of areas.  For example, there 
was no attempt to harmonise the way member states defined the terms of cover.  
This left them free to permit contractual preconditions to cover333; restrictions in 
cover334; exclusions of liability335, financial limits to the cover and to determine the 
                                               
333 For example, relating to the state of health of the user or requiring the vehicle insured 
to be a road worthy. 
334 For example, restricting the cover to social and domestic use.  In some jurisdications, 
third party cover for passengers was confined only to those parts of the vehicle equipped 
with seating. 
335 For example, where the driver responsible was intoxicated or claims by passengers 
or relatives of the responsible driver. 
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amount of any excess.  Whilst this wide degree of autonomy was entirely 
justifiable between the contracting parties themselves, as it enabled insurers to 
offer differentiated pricing of their policies, it left third party victims exposed to 
considerable uncertainty because their entitlement to cover was dependent on a 
contract to which they were neither a party and on circumstances that they in a 
position to to control or influence.  Furthermore this wide discretion on 
implementation also permitted significant variations in the degree of protection 
afforded across the European Community. 
 
The Second Directive 
As these variations were perceived as undermining the effectiveness of the 
legislative aims of this legislation, the Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC (the 
Second Directive) had three principle aims in this regard.  The first being to 
impose a degree of conformity in the amount of cover; the second, to restrict the 
ability of the contracting parties (the insurer and policyholder) from excluding their 
liability to the third party victims and the third, was to require each member state 
to approve or institute a compensating body responsible for meeting the claims 
of victims of uninsured and unidentified drivers. 
As to the first aim, Article 1 extended the third party cover to embrace property 
damage336 and it imposed minimum financial levels of cover and set a limit on the 
policy excesses337.   
The second objective was addressed in Article 2(1) which was drawn in very 
specific terms to nullify the effect of certain types of exclusion clause338, as 
follows:   
‘Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any 
statutory provision or any contractual clause contained in an insurance policy 
                                               
336 Property damage is now incorporated into the definition of insurance within the Article 
3 of the Directive. 
337 Third party excesses were subsequently abolished by the Fifth Directive, save in 
relation to a claim in respect of an unidentified vehicle where the compensating body can 
apply a property damage excess of EUR 500 where it cannot exclude such loss entirely 
under Article 6.  This provision survives in Article 10.3 of the Sixth Directive. 
338 This survives as Article 13.1 of the Directive. 
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issued in accordance with Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166/EEC, which 
excludes from insurance the use or driving of vehicles by: 
 persons who do not have express or implied authorisation thereto, or 
 persons who do not hold a licence permitting them to drive the vehicle 
concerned, or 
 persons who are in breach of the statutory technical requirements 
concerning the condition and safety of the vehicle concerned, 
shall, for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166/EEC, be deemed to 
be void in respect of claims by third parties who have been victims of an 
accident.’ 
The same provision continued by specifying a single permitted exclusion of 
liability339: 
‘However the provision or clause referred to in the first indent340 may be 
invoked against persons who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused 
the damage or injury, when the insurer can prove that they knew the 
vehicle was stolen.’ 
This produced a degree of ambiguity.  Whilst, on the one hand, there is a strong 
argument to the effect that, properly construed in a European purposive manner, 
Article 2(1) requires every other statutory or contractual exclusion to be deemed 
void against third parties – as from the implementation date set for the UK, in 
1987, on the other hand, the natural implication of a finite list of exclusions 
deemed to be void against third parties is that all other exclusions are prima facie 
permitted.   
However, an important and possibly decisive indication is provided within the 
prefatory recitals341, of which the following is particularly noteworthy: 
‘Whereas it is in the interests of victims that the effects of certain exclusion 
clauses shall be limited to the relationship between the insurer and the 
                                               
339 This is also included in Article 13.1. 
340 The reference to  “the first indent” is to the immediately preceding paragraph quoted 
above that nullifies the effect of the three categories of contractual or statutory exclusions 
against third party victims.  . 
341 Recitals are intended to explain the rationale underlying the objectives set out in the 
articles of a Directive.  
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person responsible for the accident; whereas, however, in the case of 
vehicles stolen or obtained by violence, Member States may specify that 
compensation will be payable by the aforementioned body;’ 
Article 3 of this Second Directive provided that ‘members of the family of the 
insured person, driver or any other person who is liable under civil law’ should 
not be excluded from cover in respect of their personal injuries solely on account 
of that relationship.  Here again, the draftsman ship is somewhat ambiguous as 
if the natural meaning of the recital quoted above is that Article 2 should be 
construed as limiting the discretion of member states to permit any other 
exclusion of liability, what purpose does Article 3 serve other than perhaps to 
illustrate the principle?  
The third measure was to require the authorisation of a compensating body in 
each member state.  Article 1 provided the following: 
‘4. Each Member State shall set up or authorise a body with the task of 
providing compensation, at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation 
for damage to property or personal injuries caused by an unidentified 
vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligation provided for in 
paragraph 1 has not been satisfied ... 
The victim may in any case apply directly to the body which, on the basis 
of information provided at its request by the victim, shall be obliged to give 
him a reasoned reply regarding the payment of any compensation. 
However, Member States may exclude the payment of compensation by 
that body in respect of persons who voluntarily entered the vehicle which 
caused the damage or injury when the body can prove that they knew it 
was uninsured. 
Member States may limit or exclude the payment of compensation by that 
body in the event of damage to property by an unidentified vehicle. 
... 
Furthermore, each Member State shall apply its laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions to the payment of compensation by this body, 
without prejudice to any other practice which is more favourable to the 
victim.’ 
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It is now well established that the compensating body’s role is governed by the 
European law principles of equivalence and effectiveness342. These principles 
require member states to ensure that proceedings intended to ensure the legal 
protection of rights which individuals derive from Community law must be no less 
favourable than the rules governing similar domestic actions (equivalence) and 
neither must they render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise 
of such rights (effectiveness).  This was specifically considered by the Court of 
Justice in relation to the UK’s compensating body in Evans v Secretary of state 
for Transport and the Motor Insurers Bureau [2003] where the court ruled: 
‘ [27] It is thus clear that the Community legislature's intention was to entitle 
victims of damage or injury caused by unidentified or insufficiently insured 
vehicles to protection equivalent to, and as effective as, that available to 
persons injured by identified and insured vehicles. ‘ 
... 
‘ [34] The fact that the source of the obligation of the body in question lies 
in an agreement concluded between it and a public authority is immaterial, 
provided that that agreement is interpreted and applied as obliging that 
body to provide victims with the compensation guaranteed to them by the 
Second Directive and as enabling victims to address themselves directly 
to the body responsible for providing such compensation.’ 
On the equivalency principle, the Court ruled that the compensating body did not 
necessarily have to be on the same footing as a defendant of an identified and 
sufficiently insured vehicle343.  It remains to be seen how the subsequent 
introduction of the Article 18 direct right344 has altered this, as this now offers a 
direct procedural comparator that did not exist at the time of the Evans ruling. 
It is also worth noting that the Second Directive sets out the only two permitted 
exceptions345 to the obligation to protect and guarantee payment of the 
                                               
342 See Evans v Secretary of State for Transport and MIB  2003 ECJ Case C-63/01, paras 
45 and 46. 
343 Evans, para 28. 
344 The direct right was first introduced in Article 3 of the Fourth Directive 2000/26/EC. 
345 Whilst these are the only permitted exclusions of any liability, certain restrictions in 
liability are allowed by the directives, such as (i)  financial limits exceeding the minima 
prescribed by Article 2 of the Second Directive as updated by Article 1 of the Fifth 
Directive (now set out in article 9 of the Sixth Directive) and (ii) the property damage 
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compensatory entitlement of accident victims.  Both exceptions (one restricted to 
the insurance policy, the other to the compensating body’s duty to compensate) 
are restricted to passengers who bear a high degree of responsibility for their loss 
by agreeing to ride in a motor vehicle either in the knowledge that it has been 
stolen or that it is uninsured.   
The Third Directive 
It is clear from the recitals to the Council Directive 90/232/EEC (the Third 
Directive) that the First and Second Directives still allowed too wide a discretion 
for member states to introduce their own idiosyncratic variations346.   This 
directive continued the work of its immediate predecessor in restricting the 
discretion of individual member states to restrict or exclude liability.   
In its third recital it acknowledged the fact that considerable disparities existed in 
the insurance cover provided for under different member states’ national law.  Its 
fifth recital went on to declare the following aim: 
‘Whereas there are, in particular, gaps in the compulsory insurance cover of 
motor vehicle passengers in certain Member States; whereas, to protect this 
particularly vulnerable category of potential victims, such gaps should be filled.’ 
In its sixth recital it declared an objective of removing any uncertainty as to the 
geographic scope of insurance policies required by article 3 of the First Motor 
Insurance Directive (MID); cover should not be restricted to the territory of 
individual member states.  This does not appear to be addressing the topical 
scope of cover within individual member states territory; it’s aim is extra -
territorial.  It explains the requirement in Article 2 that a policy issued in one 
member state should extend to the entire territory of the Community, without the 
need for a separate premium charge. 
                                               
exclusion permitted to the compensating body in respect of unidentified vehicles by 
Article 1.4 of the Second Directive, as amended by Article 2 of the Fifth Directive that 
removed this exclusion where a significant injury had been sustained in the accident, 
which now survives in Article 10.3 of the Sixth Directive. 
346 It is arguable that the very existence of this recital militates against a construction of 
Article 2(1) of the Second Directive as imposing an outright ban on any exclusions of 
liability in cover other than that expressly provided there.  However, it is clear that the 
Third Directive has an entirely different focus, such as the need to harmonise the 
provision for the territorial scope of cover in cross border incidents within the Community.  
It does not mention exclusions of liability.   
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In its thirteenth recital it explains its objective of extending the mandatory cover 
to all passengers in terms of providing ‘a high level of consumer protection’.  This 
indicates that, by this stage at least, directives were perceived as not only 
providing protection for accident victims but also ‘a high level of consumer 
protection’ to the individuals purchasing the third party motor insurance cover 
required by article 3 of the First MID347. 
Article 1 of the Third Directive provides: 
‘Without prejudice to the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of Directive 
84/5/EEC, the insurance referred to in Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166/EEC 
shall cover liability for personal injuries to all passengers, other than the 
driver, arising out of the use of a vehicle.’ 
The recitals to the Second Directive set out two important underlying principles:  
(i) to ensure the free movement of vehicles normally based on territory of 
the Union, as well as the people on board and  
(ii) to ensure that that accident victims caused by those vehicles receive 
comparable treatment. 
These first three directives introduced the concept of a European wide 
requirement for third party motor cover and then proceeded to harmonise some 
of this provision across the different member states by locking down the ability of 
individual member states to allow their own limitations, exclusions and restrictions 
in the compensatory protection afforded to third party victims.  Their effect was to 
oblige all motor vehicles in the European Community to be covered by 
compulsory third party insurance and ensure the abolition of border checks on 
insurance so that vehicles can be driven as easily between Member States as 
within one country. They also progressively enhanced the compensatory 
safeguards for victims of accidents, including those caused by unidentified or 
unidentified vehicles. All passengers in the vehicle (including the family of the 
driver) were expressly required to be covered by compulsory insurance. 
The Fourth Directive 
                                               
347 The use of the phrase ‘consumer protection’ is missing in the Sixth Directive 
2009/103/EC. 
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Council Directive 2000/26/EC (the Fourth Directive) established mechanisms to 
increase the speed with which claims are settled for accidents in any given 
Member State involving a victim who is a citizen of another Member State 
(“visiting victims”). This complements the first three Directives and it also ensures 
that local victims should be compensated for accidents where the responsible 
party is from another Member State. 
Recital 27 introduced the first mention (omitted from the first three MID) of 
subrogated claims.  It provides that subrogated parties (e.g. other insurance 
undertakings or social security bodies) should not be entitled to present the 
corresponding claim to the compensation body.  There is no corresponding 
provision in the operative part of the Fourth MID.  It is unclear whether this applies 
only to the direct right conferred under the Fourth MID or generally; quite possibly 
the latter.  The provision is incorporated in the Sixth MID as recital 49. 
Article 18 conferred a direct right of action against the responsible party’s motor 
insurers.  This was transposed into UK law by the European Community Rights 
Against Insurers Regulations 2002.  
The Fifth Directive 
The Council Directive 2005/14/EC (the Fifth Directive) increases the minimum 
compensatory levels and it extends the right of direct action provided for by the 
Fourth Directive to all injured victims, whether the accident occurs at home or 
abroad in a foreign EU or EEA member state..It also amended the Third Directive 
by inserting the following provisions:  
‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any 
statutory provision or any contractual clause contained in an insurance 
policy which excludes a passenger from such cover on the basis that he 
knew or should have known that the driver of the vehicle was under the 
influence of alcohol or of any other intoxicating agent at the time of an 
accident, shall be deemed to be void in respect of the claims of such 
passenger348. 
‘The insurance referred to in Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166/EEC shall 
cover personal injuries and damage to property suffered by pedestrians, 
                                               
348 Article 4.1 of the Fourth Directive. 
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cyclists and other nonmotorised users of the roads who, as a consequence 
of an accident in which a motor vehicle is involved, are entitled to 
compensation in accordance with national civil law. This Article shall be 
without prejudice either to civil liability or to the amount of damages.’349 
Unlike its immediate predecessor, the Fifth Directive does address exclusions of 
liability.  This time in the context of declaring void exclusions of liability to 
passengers who knew or should have known that the driver was intoxicated350.  
Whilst this might at first glance appear to cast doubt on the absolute and free 
standing nature of the compensatory cover required for third party victims, it is 
just as arguable that this is no more than an emphatic statement.  This is because 
it is highly likely that it was made in the knowledge that the Court of Justice was 
at that time considering a case on all fours with this scenario, namely: Katja 
Candolin and Others. v Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtiö Pohjola and Others 
[2005]351. 
Candolin featured a claim where the responsible driver and all the other 
passengers were drunk and where it was established that they knew the driver 
was highly intoxicated.  Under the relevant Finnish law352 applicable to the date 
of the accident such culpable knowledge coupled with their conduct in allowing 
themselves to be driven by someone in that state constituted gross negligence 
and furthermore it which allowed the third party motor insurers to exclude any 
liability to compensate them, unless special circumstances justified a different 
outcome.   
The Court of Justice, after quoting extensively from its earlier ruling in Ruiz 
Bernaldez [1996]353 ruled as follows.  Firstly, that in permitting an exception to 
the general compensatory principle against a passenger who knows the vehicle 
is stolen, as this “establishes a derogation from a general rule, the second 
subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the Second Directive must be interpreted strictly”.  
                                               
349 Artile 4.2 of the Fourth Directive. 
350 See recitals 15 and 16 and the extract quoted above from the Fifth Directive. 
351 Katja Candolin and Others. v Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtiö Pohjola and Others [2005] 
CJEU Case C-537/03 
352 The Finnish law on motor vehicle insurance (Liikennevakuutuslaki (279/1959), 
Paragraph 7(1) and (3). 
353 Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] CJEU (C-129/94) E.C.R. I-1829, see the commentary on this 
case below under the Purposive interpretation heading. 
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Secondly, that member states “must exercise their powers in compliance with 
Community law and, in particular, with Article 3(1) of the First Directive, Article 
2(1) of the Second Directive and Article 1 of the Third Directive, whose aim is to 
ensure that compulsory motor vehicle insurance allows all passengers who are 
victims of an accident caused by a motor vehicle to be compensated for the injury 
or loss they have suffered.”  Thirdly, that national provisions of member states 
which govern compensation for road accidents “cannot deprive the directives on 
motor insurance of their effectiveness”.   
Accordingly these principles, based on the first three directives, preclude any 
national rule that allowed an insurer to refuse to compensate a third party victim 
or to limit the compensation in a disproportionate manner on the basis of the 
passenger’s contribution to the injury or loss he has suffered.   
Although the Court’s judgment on 30 June 2005 post dated the passing of the 
Fifth Directive on 11 May 2005 21 by several weeks, the accident date in April 
1997 required the Court to decide the issue without reference to the Fourth 
Directive.  In the circumstances it would seem that Article 4.1 of the Fifth Directive 
in 2005 is no more than an elucidatory statement of existing principles based on 
the first three directives.   
Consolidation not rearticulation 
One of the problems with the present form of the (Sixth) Directive (2009/103/EC), 
is that it is essentially a reassemblage of its five predecessors.  For the purposes 
of this paper, its core provisions are to be found first in Article 3 which repeats 
the insurance obligation354 from the First Directive and secondly in Article 10 that 
defines the role of the authorised body responsible to compensating victims of 
uninsured and unidentified vehicles355.  One must look to Article 9 for the 
minimum levels of cover356; Article 12 for the wide and inclusive categories of 
passenger and ‘other road users’ covered by the protective principle357; Article 13 
for the permitted and void exclusions358 and finally Article 18 for the direct right of 
                                               
354 Originally conferred under Article 3 of the First Directive. 
355 Originally conferred under Article 1.4 of the Second Directive. 
356 Originally imposed by Article 1 of the Second Directive 
357 Introduced under both the Third and Fifth Directives. 
358 Originally set out in Article 2 of the Second Directive 
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action359.  This approach has perpetuated certain differences of emphasis and 
terminology, such as the retention of potentially restrictive terms introduced in the 
later Directives such as ‘accident’ or ‘road’ that were absent from the First.  
Certain other provisions, particularly the list of exclusions deemed void against 
third party victims in Article 13 and the clarification of the inclusive nature of the 
categories of third party victims subject to the protective principle in Article 12 - 
now appear rather anachronistic if not entirely redundant in the light of the Court 
of Justice rulings interpreting the meaning and scope of the protective purpose. 
 
A purposive interpretation 
The Directive cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of to the 
extent to which its legislative objectives have been further enhanced by the Court 
of Justice’s purposive interpretation.  Three judgments are of particular note. 
Bernaldez 
The first landmark ruling was in Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] CJEU (C-129/94) E.C.R. 
I-1829, nearly two decades ago.  That case featured a claim where a drunk driver 
crashed his car in Spain causing extensive property damage.  A civil award of 
damages was made within the prosecution proceedings that followed.  The driver 
sought indemnity from his insurers.  However, the vehicle’s insurance policy 
excluded cover where the driver was intoxicated and this was permitted under 
the national law.  At first instance, his insurers were absolved from any liability to 
indemnify the policyholders’ accident damage and so the third party was unable 
to look to the motor insurers to recover their loss.   
That decision was appealed and the case was referred to the CJEU for guidance.  
It will be recalled that, Article 2(1) of the Second Directive expressly provided that 
certain specific exclusions of liability were void as against a third party claimant.  
It also set out the single instance where a policy exclusion is permitted by the 
Directives: namely where the insurer can prove that the passenger knew that the 
vehicle is stolen. 
In essence, what the referring Court sought to establish in Bernaldez was whether 
the list of invalid policy exclusions set out in the Directive was exhaustive or 
                                               
359 Introduced under the Fourth and Fifth Directives. 
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illustrative.  Put another way, were any other policy exclusions, not specifically 
made void by article 2(1), permitted by the Directives?   
The Court ruled, as follows: 
 Article 3(1) of the First Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive , as developed 
and supplemented by the Second and Third MID, must be interpreted as 
meaning that compulsory motor insurance must enable third-party victims 
of accidents caused by vehicles to be compensated for all the damage to 
property and personal injuries sustained by them.360 
 That this interpretation precludes an insurer from being able to rely on 
statutory provisions or contractual clauses to refuse to compensate third-
party victims of an accident caused by the insured vehicle361. 
 That the list of void exclusions merely serves to illustrate the 
comprehensive nature of the insurance requirement imposed by article 
3(1)362. 
 That any other interpretation would have the effect of bringing about 
disparities in the treatment of victims depending on where the accident 
occurred, which is precisely what the directives intend to avoid363. 
 That this did not preclude the insurer pursuing a claim against its 
insured364. 
So according to Bernaldez, article 2(1) of the Second Directive did not confine 
the instance of void exclusions to those instances specifically listed365.  Instead, 
the comprehensive nature of the insurance requirement imposed by article 3(1) 
of the First MID was emphasised.  The Court ruled that subject to the single 
instance of the stolen vehicle exception, insurers could not rely on a contractual 
or statutory exclusion of their liability to compensate a third party victim.  
                                               
360 Bernaldez, para 18. 
361 Bernaldez, para 20. 
362 Bernaldez, para 21. 
363 Bernaldez, para 19. 
364 Bernaldez, paa 22. 
365 Contrast this interpretation with that given by the UK Court of Appeal in EUI v Bristol 
Alliance Partnership in 2013, considered below under The United Kingdom’s 
transposition / Limitations in cover headings. 
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A raft of subsequent Court of Justice rulings have consistently and uniformly 
endorsed the general application of the comprehensive principle first propounded 
in Bernaldez.  Its ratio has been followed and recited with approval in Ferreira v 
Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confianca SA 2000 CJEU (Case C-348/98) 
ECR 1-6711366; Candolin [2005] CJEU (Case C-537/03) ECR I-5745 (where its 
passages were quoted from extensively)367; Farrell v Whitty 2007 CJEU (Case C-
356/05)368; and more recently in Churchill v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans 
[2011] CJEU (Case C-442/10)369.   
The case of Farrell is particularly significant in the way it resulted in the Irish 
Republic’s compensating body370 being held liable to compensate a victim of an 
uninsured driver in circumstances where the national law did not require third 
party cover for those parts of a vehicle not equipped for seating.  In the words of 
one English High Court judge, ‘Farrell is the taking of the final short step - the 
express application of the comprehensive code principle to Article 1.4 cases371 - 
left untaken in Candolin’.372 
                                               
366 In Ferreira the Court of Justice ruled (i) that a Portuguese law that allowed liability to 
be apportioned to take account of the responsibilities of the parties involved did not 
infringe the protective principle of this insurance. 
367 See above for the commentary on Candolin under The Fifth Directive heading. 
368 Farrell concerned a passenger claim that had been rejected by the Irish Republic’s 
compensating body on the ground that as the victim was travelling in part of a van not 
designed to accommodate passengers. The Irish MIB claimed that it was not liable to 
compensate because the Irish legislation imposing compulsory third party insurance did 
not extend to that part of the vehicle.  The Court of Justice ruled that the right to derogate 
from the obligation to protect accident victims is defined and circumscribed by the 
directives on motor insurance and that member states are not entitled to introduce 
additional restrictions to the compulsory insurance cover to be accorded to passengers 
under that Community law.   
369 In Churchill the Court of Appeal in the UK was confronted by two competing statutory 
provisions in the Road Traffic Act 1988.  Section 151(5) imposed a statutory duty on 
motor insurers to satisfy third party claims and S151(8) conferred on such an insurer a 
right to recover that outlay from its policyholder.  The case featured a claimant who was 
both policyholder and passenger where it was established that he knew his driver was 
uninsured.  Here the Court of Justice referred to Bernaldez and Candolin and ruled that 
the only situation in which a third party who has been a victim of an accident may be 
excluded from insurance cover is that specified in the second subparagraph of Article 
2(1) of the Second Directive (ie where the passenger knew it was stolen – now set out 
in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive).  According any national rule that automatically 
excluded such a passenger from cover was not permitted.  
370 i.e. responsible to compensate victims of uninsured and unidentified vehicles under 
Article 10 of the Directive. 
371 Article 1.4 of the Second Directive, now Article 10 of the Sixth Directive. 
372 Jay J in Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB), in which 
the UK Government was held liable under Francovich principles for permitting its 
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Vnuk 
The second landmark judgment was delivered in September in Damijan Vnuk v 
Zavarovalnica Triglav d. d. [2014] CJEU (Case C-162/13).  Its significance 
derives from two aspects of the judgment, the first relates to the way it elevated 
the status of the protective purpose of the directives on motor insurance, the 
second is the holistic manner in which it defined the scope of the insurance 
obligation itself. 
On the first point, the Court of Justice ruled that the Directives on motor insurance 
have a dual purpose, firstly of facilitating free movement of people and vehicles 
throughout the Union and secondly the protection of those affected by the use of 
motor vehicles.  It went on to indicate that that the latter social policy aim was of 
equal importance to its twin objective.  . 
The case featured a Slovenian farmworker had been knocked off a ladder by a 
reversing tractor and trailer, whilst he was stacking bales of hay in a barn loft.  
The incident occurred in a farm yard on private property.  The claim against the 
driver’s motor insurers failed at first instance.  It held that the duty to insure did 
not extend to the use of motorised machinery.   When he appealed the Slovenian 
Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
to determine whether the duty to insure ‘the use of vehicles’ within the meaning 
of Article 3(1) of the First Directive on motor insurance (72/166/EEC) covered the 
accident circumstances 
The Court of Justice, after considering and explaining the importance of the 
protective purpose of the directives, proceeded to rule that the accident 
circumstances were capable of falling within the scope of insurance cover 
required under the directives.  It also ruled that even though the tractor was being 
used as a piece of farm machinery and not to transport people, that use was 
covered by the motor insurance obligation, which extended to ‘any use of 
a vehicle that is consistent with the normal function of that vehicle’  
                                               
compensating body to include an exclusion of liability that was not expressly provided 
for by Community law. 
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Prior to Vnuk it had been feared by some that the reassembled provisions within 
the codifying Sixth Directive may have introduced a degree of unwelcome 
inconsistency in the way they set out the protection to be afforded to passengers 
and other especially vulnerable categories of victim set out in within Article 12 of 
the Directive (see under Consolidation not rearticulation above). This is because 
sub paragraph 3 of that Article states:  
‘The insurance referred to in Article 3 shall cover personal injuries and 
damage to property suffered by pedestrians, cyclists and other non-
motorised users of the roads who, as a consequence of an accident 
in which a motor vehicle is involved, are entitled to compensation in 
accordance with national civil law.’ 373 
It is worth noting that the use of the term ‘road’ was not employed throughout the 
first three EU Motor Insurance Directives that introduced and then refined the 
concept of compulsory third party insurance.  However, post Vnuk, it would seem 
that Article 12 is to be construed as amounting to no more than a non-exclusive 
illustration of the type of cover to be included within Article 3, in much the same 
way that the list of void exclusions within Article 13 has been held by the CJEU 
to be a non-exclusive reaffirmation of Article 3’s predecessor (Bernaldez, para 
21).  In which case it would seem that the qualified nature of the compensatory 
protection under our National law and its restrictive territorial scope conflicts with 
the absolute and extensive remit of the EU law requirement.   
Csonka 
Gábor Csonka v Magyar Állam [2014] CJEU (Case C-409/11) was a reference 
from the Hungry to the CJEU concerning a number of cases where ostensibly 
insured motorists found themselves personally liable for the claims arising out of 
the road accident that they had caused because their motor insurer, MÁV General 
Insurance Company, became insolvent374.  The victims sought to recover their 
compensatory entitlement from the Hungarian Article 10 authorised body375.  The 
Hungarian government wanted to know whether the directives were intended to 
                                               
373 Bold text added for emphasis. 
374 In the UK when an insurer goes bust its liabilities are met in full by the FSA under the 
Financial Services & Markets Act 2000.  Independent Insurance and Quinn were covered 
by a similar scheme under the Policyholders Protection Act 1975. 
375 The Kártalanítási Számlát Kezelő MABISZ GKI. 
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confer a complete long stop guarantee or whether (what is now the article 10 duty 
to compensate) was restricted in a way that would prevent recovery from their 
compensating body. 
The Court ruled that a member state’s obligation under Article 3 of the First (and 
Sixth) Directive is to ensure that the use of motor vehicles in its territory is insured 
against civil liability at least to the minimum levels prescribed under the Directive.  
This had been complied with.  The obligation of the compensating body to 
compensate under Article 10 is confined to specific, clearly identified, sets of 
circumstances: first, and in the context of this case, to compensate a victim of 
motor vehicle use of ‘a vehicle in respect of which no insurance policy exists’376; 
secondly, where the vehicle responsible is unidentified377.  Clearly in the Csnoka 
case a policy of insurance did exist.  The Hungarian compensating body was not 
therefore obliged to compensate victims of policyholders whose insurers have 
become insolvent. 
The significance of this case lies in the fact that that the Court of Justice 
found it necessary to define the circumscribed role of the compensating 
body.  In paragraph 31 it stated: 
‘As regards the determination of the actual circumstances in which the 
insurance obligation laid down in Article 3(1) of the First Directive may be 
regarded as not having been satisfied, it is significant – as the Advocate 
General stated in point 32 of his Opinion – that the European Union 
legislature did not confine itself to providing that the body must pay 
compensation in the event of damage caused by a vehicle for which the 
insurance obligation has not been satisfied in general, but made it clear 
that that was to be the case only in relation to damage caused by a vehicle 
for which the insurance obligation provided for in Article 3(1) of the First 
Directive has not been satisfied, that is to say, a vehicle in respect of which 
no insurance policy exists.’ 
This suggests that the Article 10 compensating body is not intended to provide a 
catch-all fund to meet claims where some motor insurance is in place but it is 
inadequate to meet the risk that has eventuated.  The compensating body’s role 
                                               
376 Csonka, para 31. 
377 Csonka, para 30. 
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is confined to situations where the vehicle responsible has absolutely no 
insurance in place at all or where an insurer has excluded liability to passengers 
who know the vehicle has been stolen and the insurers are able to prove this.  
The corollary of this is that provided the vehicle responsible for causing the third 
party victim’s loss or injury has some insurance in place, then regardless of its 
contractual liability to its policyholder, its third party cover must be good for any 
use actually made of the vehicle.  Accordingly, insurers cannot use the 
compensating body, whether as a mutualised fund or otherwise, to compensate 
victims of insufficiently insured vehicles or in situations where they have cover in 
place notwithstanding that the policyholder is otherwise in breach of a policy term 
that would otherwise entitle the insurer to avoid the policy378.   
The implication of Bernaldez and Csonka combined, augmented by the new gloss 
bestowed on the protective purpose by Vnuk, means that the compensatory 
protection afforded to third party victims of motor vehicle use under Article 3 of 
the Directive is a free-standing entitlement under European law.  This is 
consistent with the recital considered above in the Second Directive379, now 
incorporated in the Sixth Directive as Recital 15. 
  
                                               
378 The only conceivable exception to this principle is the Article 13.1 permitted exception 
that can be relied on against a passenger whom the insurer can prove voluntarily entered 
the vehicle in the full knowledge that it was stolen. 
379 ‘Whereas it is in the interests of victims that the effects of certain exclusion clauses 
shall be limited to the relationship between the insurer and the person responsible for 
the accident.’ 
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The culminating principles  
When the Directive is read in the light of the underlying principles that feature in 
the Bernaldez and Vnuk judgments, its various provisions are capable of being 
distilled into the following colligate propositions: 
On the duty to insure and the third party cover required under Article 3 
1. Third party cover must be good for:  
 Any motor vehicle conforming with the article 1 definition380 
 Any use consistent with the normal function of the vehicle381 
 Anywhere on land382 
2. The duty to insure and the scope of cover are coextensive383 
3. Member states have no discretion to introduce new restrictions, exclusions 
or limitations.  
 Only one exclusion of cover is permitted: this applies to passenger 
who voluntarily enters the vehicle knowing that it has been 
stolen384. 
On the Compensating Body– Article 10 
1. The compensating body has a strictly circumscribed role385.  It can only 
deal with:  
 Unidentified vehicle claims, or 
 Claims where no insurance in place at all 
                                               
380 The Article 1 definition of "Vehicle" means any motor vehicle intended for travel on 
land and propelled by mechanical power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, 
whether or not coupled”. 
381 Vnuk, paras 56 and 59. 
382 Vnuk, para 59. 
383 This is the inescapable implication of Bernaldez, Candolin, and Farrell and it is subject 
only to the single exception permitted by Article 13.1 of the Directive. 
384 See ante, for the commentary on Benaldez and Candolin. 
385 Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans v Equity 
Claims Limited [2011] CJEU Case C-442/10, para 41; Csonka, paras 31 and 32. 
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o Subject only to the passenger exclusion that applies to 
someone who voluntarily enters the vehicle knowing that it is 
uninsured 
2. It must compensate at least up to the level of TP cover requirement for 
identified insured drivers386 
3. It must apply EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness387 
It follows from the above that member states retain a relatively wide discretion as 
to how they choose to implement the Directive and whilst it does not directly 
interfere with the autonomy of the insurer and policyholder to agree terms of cover 
between themselves, when it comes to the substantive law rights that this cover 
confers on third party victims there is very little, if any discretion, for member 
states to permit variations in what is now a highly prescriptive social policy 
objective of protecting their compensatory entitlement. 
  
                                               
386 Evans, para 66. 
387 Evans, paras 45 and 46. 
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The United Kingdom’s transposition 
The UK’s compensatory guarantee is currently delivered by a curious blend of 
closely interlinked statutory and extra-statutory provisions.  The former consist of 
the statutory duty to insure the use of a motor vehicle on a road or other public 
place against third party liabilities under section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 
(RTA), along with the terms of cover required under section 145 RTA together 
with a corresponding statutory obligation imposed by s151 RTA on motor insurers 
to satisfy third party judgments relating to an event subject to the insurance 
obligation.  The European Communities (Rights Against Insurers) Regulations 
2002 are considered below388. 
The extra-statutory provision is contained in a series of agreements between the 
Motor Insurers Bureau (MIB) and the Secretary of State for Transport on behalf 
of the UK Government.  There are separate schemes: the first is intended to 
protect victims of uninsured drivers (currently set out in the Uninsured Drivers 
Agreements 1999 & 2015); the second, unidentified drivers (currently set out in 
the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003 as amended by five successive 
supplementary agreements).  The insurance industry’s collective liability to meet 
these uninsured losses is a mutualised one: every authorised insurer contributes 
to a central fund that is managed by the MIB under its contractual arrangement 
with the Department for Transport.  The MIB also investigates and settles 
individual claims under the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003.   
Antecedent origins 
Compulsory third party motor insurance was introduced under Part II of the Road 
Traffic Act 1930, long before the UK’s accession to the European Community.  
The underlying objective of the 1930 legislation (including its sibling measure: the 
Third Party Rights Against Insurers Act 1930389) was as simple as it was 
compelling: to mutualise the financial hazard posed to individuals from the risk of 
                                               
388 See under: The Third Party Rule, a common law anachronism heading and in 
particular under the subheading, Direct right against insurers under the Comparative Law 
analysis heading. 
389 The provisions of the Third Party Rights Against Insurers Act 1930 are largely 
subsumed and enhanced by s153 of the 1988 Act and by the European Communities 
Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002.   
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being injured by motor vehicles; so no victim should be left uncompensated.  The 
focus was on protecting victims; not policyholders, nor motor insurers390.   
A flawed execution 
Two statutory provisions in the RTA lie at the heart of the UK national law 
provision for guaranteeing the compensatory entitlement of third party victims: 
 The first of these are Sections 143 and 145.  Section 143 imposes on users 
of motor vehicles to insure against third party liability.  Its sibling, Section 
145, defines the nature and scope of the third party cover required under 
Section 143.  These are original to the 1930 Act.  These provisions bear a 
very close resemblance to the original 1930 wording391.   
 The second duo, consist of Section s148 and 151.  These were an 
afterthought, introduced under sections 10 and 12 of the Road Traffic Act 
1934.  Section 148 lists of eight different types of exclusion of liability made 
ineffective against third party victims.  Section 151 is an odd medley of 
different provisions but chief amongst these are (i) the insurer’s duty to 
satisfy judgments in favour of third parties, (ii) a provision that expressly 
authorises insurers to exclude liability to passengers who know or ought 
to know that the vehicle in which they are riding is stolen or unlawfully 
taken, and (iii) two further instances where a breach of policy term is 
ineffective against third party victims.   
What is not so readily appreciated is that the piecemeal way in which these 
provisions have evolved over the past 84 years has detracted the central social 
policy aim of protecting motor accident victims.  Take for example, Section s 148 
and 151, these were a stop gap measure.  They were introduced in 1934392 to 
address a fundamental flaw in the new regime: the lack of any free-standing direct 
right of action393.  Unfortunately, they failed to address the underlying problem. 
                                               
390 This objective is clearly discernible from the 1930 Act itself, the early case law such 
as Lord Denning’s judgment in Hardy v MIB 1964 2 All ER 587 and also Lord Hailsham’s 
judgment Gardner v Moore [1984] A.C 548 and also from Sir Felix Cassell’s 1937 report 
reviewing the national law provision in this area. 
391 Sections 35 and 36 of the Road Traffic Act 1930. 
392 In sections 10 and 12 of the Road Traffic Act 1934. 
393 Except where the Third Party Rights Act 1930 applied to transfer an insolvent 
policyholder’s rights.  
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The Third Party Rule, a common law anachronism 
Problems surfaced almost immediately the Road Traffic Act 1930 was 
implemented.  Its legislative aim was compromised by common law rules that 
allowed insurers to avoid compensating third parties.  This was achieved through 
the simple expedient of insurers (i) restricting their contractual liability to their 
policyholders and then arguing that the claim was not coved by the policy, and 
(ii) by refusing to settle claims direct, as the victims were non-contracting parties 
and the legislation did not confer a direct right on third parties.   
These failings arose out of the common law rules on privity of contract under 
which the actionable benefits and burden of a contract are generally confined to 
the contracting parties.  So whilst a contract’s performance may be intended to 
benefit a third party, the general rule was (and remains) that it cannot not be 
enforced by a third party394.  This is usually referred to as the Third Party Rule.   
The harsh effect of the Third Party Rule has long been criticised and a number of 
exceptions395 have evolved over the years but it was upheld by the House of 
Lords in 1915 when it ruled that it was a fundamental principle of English law that 
only a party to a contract who had provided consideration could sue on it396; and 
again in 1965397.  As recently as 1983, Lord Diplock referred to the Third Party 
Rule as ‘an anachronistic shortcoming that has for many years been regarded as 
a reproach to English private law’, see Swain v Law Society398.   
Some of these concerns were remedied by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999 that conferred on non contracting third parties a statutory right to enforce 
a contract that purports to confer on them a benefit in certain specified 
                                               
394 Tweddlev Atkinson [1861] 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762 
395 Not least being Lord Atkins landmark tort law ruling in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] 
AC 562 where the manufacturer of a ginger beer was liable to a non-contractual 
consumer; Ross v Caunters [1980] Ch 297 where solicitors were held liable to a 
beneficiary for not warning the testator about formal witnessing requirements, to a failure 
to draw up a will  
396 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847. 
397 Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd [1962] AC 446 (Lord Denning dissenting) note 
also and Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 in which the House of Lords upheld the third 
party rule but then opened the door to the possibility of specific performance serving as 
a remedy for enforcing promises made contracts for a third party’s benefit, where the 
third party rule would otherwise produce an unjust result. 
398 [1983] 1 AC 598, 611. 
207 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
circumstances399.  However this measure did not address a further difficulty with 
the Third Party Rule. 
Even where Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 Act applies so as to 
allow a non contracting party to enforce a term that “purports to confer a benefit 
on him”, that entitlement is a subrogated one.  In the context of a contract of 
insurance, the subrogated third party is deemed to stand in the insured party’s 
shoes400.  The problem with this being that the transferee is generally entitled to 
no more than the transferor’s contractual entitlement.  Accordingly where an 
insurer has a contractual defence against its policyholder this will hold good 
against a subrogated party.  As Harman LJ so aptly put it, in Post Office v Norwich 
Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd401, , “One cannot ...pick out the plums and leave 
the duff behind.” 
It is interesting to note that the Third Party Rights Against Insurers Act 2010402, 
which has been sitting in the wings for the past five years in a perpetual state of 
imminent but unrealised implementation, preserves the common law policy of 
subjecting transferred rights to the same defences that the insurer had against its 
policyholder403.  The same doctrine applies to the European Communities (Rights 
Against Insurers) Regulations 2002404 and, as we have seen, the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.  Whilst this is eminently justifiable in ordinary 
arms length private contract law, it undermines the social policy objective that 
underscores the compulsory third party motor insurance regime. 
A wrong turn in 1934 
Returning the insurers’ legal challenges that followed the wake of the Road Traffic 
Act 1930, Parliament reacted with surprising speed: it passed a new Road Traffic 
Act 1934 to bolster the protection conferred under the original scheme. 
                                               
399 Section 1 of the 1999 Act requires, inter alia, either an express term conferring a right 
to enforce the contract on the third party or a term that purports to confer a benefit on 
him. 
400 This paraphrases Lord Denning MR’s observation in Post Office v Norwich Union Fire 
Insurance Society Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 577 at 374. 
401 Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 577 at 376. 
402 The 2010 Act continues the work of the Third Parties Rights Against Insurers Act 1930 
403 See Section 1 (5) of the 1999 Act. 
404 See regulation 3(2) ....’ that insurer shall be directly liable to the entitled party to the 
extent that he is liable to the insured person’. 
208 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
It is interesting to note from the official note of a Cabinet Office405 meeting on 11 
January 1934 recorded by the Minister for Transport406, that the Government 
wanted the insurance companies to agree to the following amendments to the 
Road Traffic Act in 1934: 
    “ a)  Right of action shall not abate on the death of the insured; 
b) Where a certificate of insurance has been issued, purporting to cover 
the driver in the circumstances of any particular accident, it shall not be 
open to the insurer to repudiate liability on the ground of 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure in the proposal form; 
c) Any condition in a policy to the effect that the insurer is not liable if the 
vehicle is driven when unsafe or damaged shall be void, so far as any 
third party is concerned who has suffered personal injury or death; 
d) The injured party shall have a direct remedy against the insurer; 
e) .... 
As regards (b), (c) and (d), that there should be a right of recovery by the insurer 
against the insured.” 
Unfortunately the Government’s will did not prevail.  The proposals at (b), (c) and 
(d) appear to anticipate the European directive by several decades. 
Section 10 of the 1934 Act imposed a new statutory duty on motor insurers to 
satisfy judgments “notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or 
cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled the policy”, (under what is now Section 
151 of the RTA).  This statutory duty was qualified by what is now set out in 
Section 152 of the RTA: requiring notice of commencement of proceedings; 
exempting policies surrendered before the event giving rise to the claim and also 
where the insurer obtained a court declaration that the policy was void for non 
disclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact.   
                                               
405 Mr Matthew Channon, research Phd student at the Faculty of Law in Exeter, is 
thanked for supplying the author with the relevant papers. 
406 None other than Mr Leslie Hore-Belisha, who gave his name to the distinctive 
pedestrian crossing indicator 
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Section 11 of the 1934 Act shored up third parties rights against insurers by 
providing that the bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured party would have no 
affect on insurable liability under section 36 of the 1930 Act407.   
Whilst there is little that is intrinsically wrong with any of the above, the following 
measure contained a serious flaw in the comprehensive nature of the protection 
it afforded to third party victims.  Section 12 listed eight types of policy restriction 
that were deemed to be void against a third party.  This survives as Section 148 
(1) and (2) in the RTA.  Arguably, this particular provision was unnecessary, given 
the widely scoped wording of section 10 and the anomaly of its complete absence 
in the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981408.  According to Sir Felix 
Cassell’s 1937 report409, these contractual restrictions and exclusions had all 
been previously upheld against third party victims.  It seems plausible that far 
from seeking to limit the scope of protection to third parties, the aim of Section 12 
had been to shore up their protected status under the newly coined direct right 
under Section 10 by overturning those decisions. 
Unfortunately, the necessary implication of the Section 12 wording is that by 
providing a finite list of nullified restrictions, it made it possible to argue that all 
other policy limitations and exclusions, not so nullified, remained effective against 
a third party and serve as an effective bar the new statutory remedy under Section 
10. 
It soon became apparent that instead of providing for a new independent statutory 
right to compensation (free from any contractual restrictions or exclusions), 
Parliament appears to have endorsed a qualified entitlement.  This exposed third 
party victims to the vagaries of the insurer / policyholder relationship; a matter 
over which they had absolutely no knowledge or control.   
When Sir Felix Cassell’s reviewed these arrangements in his 1937 report he 
identified this failing and he recommended that Section 12 be replaced by a short 
list of permitted exclusions410; the default position being that no other restrictions 
                                               
407 Section 36 of the 1930 Act specified the requirements for the third party policies made 
compulsory by section 35 (1) of that Act. 
408 The 1981 Order is designed to replicate in Northern Ireland our national provision for 
compulsory third party insurance. 
409 Board of Trade report of the Committee on Compulsory Insurance, 1937 [Cmd. 5528] 
410 Such as use of the vehicle by unauthorised persons and a short list of unauthorised 
uses, such as speed testing and racing. 
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or exclusions should be effective against a third party.  Unfortunately, his 
recommendations were not adopted. 
A very British muddle 
As previously stated, our modern domestic law provision for guaranteeing third 
party compensatory protection is set out in an eclectic mix of different statutory 
and extra-statutory initiatives411, each developed and refashioned in response to 
various discrete issues and bolted on as accretions to the whole, sometimes 
without any apparent concern for the way they interact with one another.  The 
end result of this convoluted assortment of residual common law, legislative and 
executive provision is that it has attracted its own extensive body of case 
authorities that more often than not fails to interpret it properly412.  Small wonder 
then that such a regime should have its flaws or that some victims’ should fall 
through the gaps that such an empirically derived regime inevitably produces.   
So whilst law abiding, insurance premium paying members of the public might be 
excused for thinking that the quid pro quo for their expensive premiums is the 
reassuring certainty that if they are unfortunate enough to be injured by a careless 
driver, then their full compensatory entitlement is guaranteed, independently of 
the driver at fault’s ability to pay, the reality is rather different.  What began as a 
legislative measure devoted to protecting accident victims has, in its application, 
become increasingly biased towards enhancing the commercial interests of 
motor insurers, at the expense of the original social policy objective.   
Restrictions in the geographic scope of cover 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that the precision with which the 
Parliamentary draftsmen defined the geographic and technical scope of the third 
party insurance requirement was overly prescriptive.  Both the statutory and extra 
statutory schemes are restricted to the use of motor vehicles ‘on a road or other 
public place’.  This excludes private property, forecourts and shared parking 
areas, farm lanes and driveways leading onto public highways.  The exactitude 
employed within the statute has prevented the common law from adapting the 
                                               
411 Part VI of the RTA and the Uninsured Drivers Agreements 1999 & 2015 and the 
Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003. 
412 See below under Exclusions of Liability and Duty to apply a European law consistent 
interpretation. 
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scope to accommodate new hazards introduced through technological and social 
change413.   
Limitations in cover 
The extent to which the underlying social policy aim of the 1930 legislation has 
been compromised is vividly illustrated by the Court of Appeal in EUI v Bristol 
Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267.  This case is the unfortunate legacy 
of Section 12 of the 1934 Act; now Section 148 of the RTA. 
In EUI an ostensibly fully insured motorist determined on his suicide by 
deliberately driving his car at a very high speed into a department store in Bristol.  
Mercifully he failed in his bid but the ensuring collision not only caused extensive 
damage to the building he had targeted but it also seriously injured another 
motorist.  The Court of Appeal held, unanimously, that the insurer’s policy term 
that excluded liability for deliberate damage was effective against third party 
victims because it was not one of the exclusions expressly nullified by the RTA.  
The Court of Appeal justified its reasoning by relying on the well established 
proposition that policy exclusions are valid against a non contracting party; first 
from the fact that this is the position at common law and secondly inference from 
the way the RTA only nullifies certain specific exclusions414.  The correlative logic 
of these specific exceptions is that all other contractual limitations were deemed 
to be valid against third party. 
So the property insurer came away empty handed in EUI because not only did 
the Court deem the driver to be uninsured but also it opined the loss was of a 
kind that fell outside the remit of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999, which 
purports to exclude subrogated claims415. 
                                               
413 Such as the present ubiquity of 4x4 recreational vehicles and other off-road motor 
vehicles such as motorised go carts, quad bikes, golf buggies, ride on mowers and even 
hoverboards.  See also the comments on Clarke v Kato under Limits to consistent 
interpretation. 
414 Section 148 RTA prevents an insurer from relying on a limited range of exclusions 
against third parties and these are listed in subsection 2 (such as the invalidation of any 
restrictions on the age or physical or mental condition of the driver)  The only other 
nullifications are set out in section 151.  Section 151 (2) applies to unauthorised users 
and 151 (3) makes void any restriction of cover to persons holding a driving licence. 
415 See clause 6(1)(c)(ii) of the 1999 Agreement. 
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The ruling appears to give insurers a free hand to restrict or exclude their statutory 
liability to third party victims; save where expressly precluded from doing so by 
the RTA.   
A frustrated policy aim 
One wonders how these limitations in the protective measures for third party 
victims can possibly serve the wider public interest.  They expose seriously 
injured accident victims to the risk of remedial destitution and long term 
dependency on the uncertain good offices of the National Health Service, 
increasingly hard pressed local authority social services and on the charity of 
friends and relatives.  Not only is it not possible to reconcile these deficiencies 
with the original Parliamentary intention of the 1930s but it clearly and 
unequivocally undermines the effectiveness of the comprehensive protective 
principle required by the Directive.  The only beneficiaries of these failings seem 
to be the authorised motor insurers that operate in this highly regulated captive 
market. 
 
Simpler, clearer, fairer European law 
It will be readily appreciated from the preceding sections that the qualified and 
restrictive nature of our national law provision contrasts sharply with the 
legislative aim of the European directives on motor insurance that the UK national 
law provision is supposed to implement.   
As we have noted above416, the basic premise of this European law is that third 
party cover should be good for any use made of motor vehicle, provided that use 
is consistent with its normal function417.   
The directives do not seek to interfere with the ability of the contracting parties to 
set limits on the contractual scope or extent of the indemnity.  This enables an 
insurer to impose almost any conditions it likes on its insured, provided however 
that they do not undermined the effectiveness of the protection extended to third 
                                               
416 See above under the heading Culminating principles. 
417 See Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d.d. [2014] CJEU Case C-162/13, 
considered below. 
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party motor victims.  Insurers therefore retain the ability to differentiate the 
contractual risk and to set appropriate premiums.   
The directives expressly stipulate that an insurer’s liability to compensate a third 
party victim is independent of any contractual restriction between the insurer and 
the policyholder418.  So under European law (and subject to one proviso, 
mentioned below) as long as the vehicle has some insurance in place, the insurer 
on risk must satisfy a third party claim, regardless of any contractual law defence 
it may have against its policyholder.  This necessarily confines the scope of the 
MIB’s role, as Article 10 compensator, to two scenarios: (i) where there was 
absolutely no insurance in place and (ii) claims featuring unidentified vehicles419. 
As previously indicated under ‘A purposive interpretation’ a consistent line of 
Court of Justice rulings, originating in Bernaldez [1996] and Candolin [2005] 
through to Case C-442/10 Churchill [2011] confirms that under European law only 
one exclusion of liability is capable of affecting a motor insurer’s liability to 
compensate a third party.  This single derogation from the mandatory third party 
cover requirement is confined to a passenger whom the insurer can prove 
actually knew the vehicle he was riding in was stolen420.  
All this makes perfect practical sense from a social policy and common sense 
perspective.  It protects the state as well as the victims’ immediate family from 
having to support and care for innocent victims who might otherwise be left 
destitute.  It also furthers the twin European legislative objectives of facilitating 
free movement between different member states and protecting victims. 
The obligation that these European directives impose on every member state is 
to put in place suitable measures to ensure that third party victims’ compensatory 
entitlement is guaranteed.  It is a commonplace that the Road Traffic Act 1988 
and both MIB Agreements are intended to implement this European law.  
Unfortunately, there are over 50 instances where our defective national law fails 
to fully implement this simple imperative. 
                                               
418 See Recital 15 in the Sixth consolidating European Directive on Motor Insurance 
(2009/103/EC) 
419 See above under the subheading Csonka beneath the A purposive interpretation 
heading and Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy 
Evans v Equity Claims Limited [2011] ECJ Case C-442/10, para 41. 
420 See the second sub paragraph of Article 13 of the Sixth Directive (2009/103/EC). 
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Comparative law analysis 
The United Kingdom’s failure to fully implement the minimum standards of 
compensatory protection are not confined to the limited geographic scope of the 
insurance obligation and the ability of insurers to compromise the third party 
protection by imposing contractual restrictions in cover.   
These failings can conveniently be listed under ten broad categories.  What 
follows is offered as an illustrative appraisal; not an exhaustive statement. 
1. Restrictions in scope  
The geographic restriction has already been alluded to.  This is incompatibility 
with the Article 3 requirement421 applies not just to the duty to insure and the 
extent of cover required under Sections 143 and 145 of the RTA but it also effects 
the UK implementation of the Article 18 direct right of action in Regulation 2 
European Community (Rights Against Insurers Regulations) 2002 as well as both 
MIB schemes as they rely on the RTA definitions when stipulating the MIB’s duty 
to compensate.  What is striking about this irregularity is that it seems fairly clear 
that the Parliamentary draftsman are well aware of the need for a wider scoped 
geographic definition.  That much is evident from the Regulation 2 (2) (ii) of The 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Fourth Motor Insurance Directive) 
Regulations 2002 )  that defines a “relevant contract of insurance” as a contract 
of insurance against damage arising out of or in connection with the use of motor 
vehicles on land (other than carrier’s liability)”.  It is difficult to conceive of a 
scenario where the Department for Transport’s legal advisors, in counselling the 
minister to depart from the standard UK formula that restricted to the geographic 
scope of the insurance obligation imposed under the European law, failed to alert 
him about the basic incompatibility of its existing provision under the RTA that is 
supposed to implement the same European law. 
It is also worth noting that Regulation 2 also wrongly restricts the direct right of 
action to accidents occurring in the United Kingdom.  Furthermore the 
requirement in Regulation 2(3) that the insurance policy must comply with Section 
145 RTA prevents a foreign registered insurer of a vehicle responsible for causing 
                                               
421 Of the Directive. 
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an accident in the UK from being the subject of the direct right of action.  This is 
because this requires the insurer to be a member of the MIB. 
The compulsory insurance requirement imposed by section 143 RTA is further 
restricted in the way it only applies to motor vehicles that are ‘intended or adapted 
for use on a road’422.  This exempts many off-road motor vehicles from the duty 
to insure, even when used on public highways.   
The geographic and technical limitations both conflict with the Vnuk decision.  
2. Exclusions of liability 
Unlawful exclusions of liability pepper the UK’s statutory and extra statutory 
implementation of the Directive.  There is only space to allude to a handful of 
these instances. 
Section 151.4 allows a motor insurer to exclude its statutory liability to 
compensate a third party passenger who 
‘at the time of the use which gave rise to the liability, was allowing himself 
to be carried in or upon the vehicle and knew or had reason to believe that 
the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken, not being a person who—   
(a) did not know and had no reason to believe that the vehicle had 
been stolen or unlawfully taken until after the commencement of his 
journey, and   
(b) could not reasonably have been expected to have alighted from 
the vehicle.’   
This exclusion is much wider in scope than the single permitted contractual 
exclusion permitted by Article 2.1 of the Second Directive, now Article 13 of the 
Directive.  It has three defects: (i) its remit extends beyond actual knowledge to 
embrace constructive knowledge or negligent ignorance, (ii) it permits a temporal 
shift as to the time when that state is to be judged, not just at the time of entering 
the vehicle but subsequently and (iii) it also applies to knowledge that the vehicle 
has been unlawfully taken or borrowed423.   
                                               
422 Sections 143 and 145 RTA use the definition of motor vehicle given in section 185. 
423 See above for the discussion on Candolin under the subheading The Fifth Directive 
under the An evolving legislative scope heading. 
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Another unlawful statutory exclusion is to be found in the over-prescriptive car 
sharing provisions within Section 150 RTA.  Here, any car sharing arrangement 
that does not conform to its highly prescriptive terms is deemed to constitute 
business use and as such is an excluded liability under the standard terms of the 
vast majority of all motor insurance policies issued in the United Kingdom424.  The 
unfortunate legacy of the unanimous of decision of the Court of Appeal in EUI 
has already been considered above under the Limitations in cover subheading. 
All three current MIB Agreements (the Uninsured Drivers Agreements 1999 and 
2015 and the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003) unlawfully exclude liability 
where there is constructive knowledge or negligent ignorance that the vehicle is 
uninsured.  These agreements are infested with numerous conditions exclusions 
of liability that conflict with the single permitted exclusion referred to above.  
These are also sometimes described as conditions precedent to liability, such as 
the unlawful requirement in clause 13 of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 
that the victim must have reported the responsible driver to the police if no 
insurance information is provided, or the strictly enforced requirement under 
clause 4.3(c) Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003 that the victim must have 
reported the accident to the police within 5 days (for property claims) or 14 days 
(for injury claims) or as soon as reasonably possible thereafter on penalty of the 
entire claim being excluded.  To this author’s personal knowledge this has been 
applied against a four year old infant so as to bar any entitlement to compensation 
under the 2003 Agreement, in a decision that was later upheld on appeal to the 
arbitrator.   
There is also the exclusion of liability under both MIB schemes where the death, 
bodily injury or damage to property was caused by, or in the course of, an act of 
terrorism.  The problem here is that the UK statutory definition of ‘terrorism’ 425is 
so widely drawn that it is capable of applying against a victim escaping from a 
fleeing anti GM crop activist who has committed arson.  This is capable of 
producing perverse anomalies and is in any event unlawful as it does not conform 
to the single permitted exception in Article 13 of the Directive.  
                                               
424 Which are restricted to social domestic and recreational use. 
425 See section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
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Unlawful exclusions of liability are also rife within the motor insurance policies, as 
the discussion above under the ‘Limitations in cover’ heading.  It is unfortunate 
that the Court of Appeal’s decision in EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership was not 
appealed and so this misconceived ruling remains as an unwelcome obstacle to 
further legal challenges due to the UK common law principle of stare decisis. 
The problem is also found in the common law policy precept of ex turpi causa 
non oratur action that operates as a complete bar to any claim where the 
claimant’s criminality has caused the injury.  Whilst there is much to commend in 
this judicially devised pragmatism, its application as an automatic and complete 
bar to any compensation appears to be at odds with the CJEU’s judgment in 
Candolin426. 
 
3. Procedural mechanisms that undermine the effectiveness of the 
directives 
Section152(2) RTA enables an insurer to apply to the court for an order declaring 
the policy void, after the event giving rise to the claim. 
 
For policies issued on or before 5 April 2013 
This statutory remedy is highly prescriptive.  The insurer commences an action 
for a declaration that it is entitled to avoid the policy for material non disclosure 
or misrepresentation, or to confirm that it has avoided the policy on these 
grounds.  The application must be made before, or within three months after, the 
commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment was given   
A material non disclosure used to be perceived to be fatal to any claim under the 
policy because, under the common law (now amended by the Consumer 
Insurance Act 2013) an insurance contract was deemed to be a contract of utmost 
faith, uberrima fides, this vitiated the policy ab initio at common law.  Any risk that 
influenced or induced the insurer to underwrite the risk or which influenced the 
                                               
426 See above under The Fifth Directive subheading under the An evolving legislative 
scope heading. 
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premium and its conditions was deemed a ‘material’ risk that entitled the insurer 
to avoid the contract.   
As the non disclosure and misrepresentation provisions of s152 reflect the 
common law and because the European directives on motor insurance do not 
seek to harmonise the civil law provision of the member states, this provision 
does not conflict with the protection required under the directives on motor 
insurance in as obvious a manner as some of the other infringements considered 
above and below.  This provision made it relatively easy for motor insurers to 
avoid liability by seeking a s152 declaration that the policy was void and then to 
rely on the exemption from the s151 statutory indemnity (set out in s151(2)) by 
complying with the notice requirements in s151(3).   
However there are increasing concerns expressed by some academics and 
practitioners that this remedy is capable of being abused by insurers imposing 
preconditions of cover to reduce their risk of exposure and only raising these 
points when a claim was presented.  
In Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 the defendant insurers, Tradewise, 
successfully obtained a declaration under s152 on the ground the claimant had 
failed to disclose the following material facts: that he was a diabetic, he was 
suffering from depression and that he had a cannabis dependency.  According to 
widely published statistics there are thought to be over 4.7 million individuals 
suffering from depression427 and 3 million diabetics428 in the United Kingdom. 
 
For policies issued after 6 April 2013 
Avoidance under s152 has been made a little more difficult for insurers following 
the coming into force of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012 (CIDRA 2012) on 6 April 2013.  This act replaces the 
common law and the previous statutory provision that governed insurance 
contracts generally (the Marine Insurance Act 1906) and it applies to all consumer 
insurance contracts entered into after that date.   
                                               
427 BBC website, Depression up ‘by half a million’ 17 October 2012 
428 BBC website, Diabetes cases in UK hit high of three million, 4 March 2013 
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Section 1 defines a consumer insurance contract as one entered into by “an 
individual who enters into the contract wholly or mainly for purposes unrelated to 
the individuals trade, business or profession.”   
This definition excludes policies issued to motor trade dealers and car hire 
companies, who are now covered by the Insurance Act 2015. 
The 2012 Act makes important changes to the s152 RTA 1988.     
The act does not dispense with the need for an insurer to commence the s152 
application before or within 3 months of the commencement of the claimant’s 
action under s153 (2) and to notify the claimant of the s152 declaration, if made, 
within 7 days of the claimant issuing proceedings, s152(3).  
The overwhelming majority of motor policies are issue to private consumers.  
Henceforth it will be possible, albeit probably difficult, for a consumer insurance 
policyholder to argue that an undisclosed material fact did not, in the 
circumstances, amount to a misrepresentation. 
This act provides a more nuanced approach.  It imposes a duty of the consumer 
‘to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the insurer before 
the contract is made’.  There is no longer the ‘duty of utmost good faith’, the 
uberrima fides common law principle no longer applies.  Section 2(4) goes as far 
as to explicitly override the old law by expressly stating that it replaces ‘...any duty 
relating to disclosure or misrepresentation by a consumer to an insurer which 
existed in the same circumstances before this Act applied.’ 
The 2012 Act also abolishes the policyholder’s obligation to disclose all material 
facts.  
The Act distinguishes between: 
 a careless misrepresentation  
 and a reckless or deliberate representation. 
The Act prevents an insurer from avoiding a contract for misrepresentation except 
where: 
 It was careless and the insurer would not have entered the contract at all 
had the truth been known or it would have done so only on different terms 
 It was deliberate or reckless 
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A qualifying misrepresentation is only deliberate or reckless if the consumer— 
(a) knew that it was untrue or misleading, or did not care whether or not it 
was untrue or misleading, and 
(b) knew that the matter to which the misrepresentation related was 
relevant to the insurer, or did not care whether or not it was relevant to the 
insurer. 
The burden of proving these matters is on the insurer  However the consumer’s 
conduct is judged by an objective standard and, furthermore, he is presumed to 
understand that where the insurer has put a clear specific question on any issue, 
that  this is a relevant  to the insurer, see s5(4) of the Act . Otherwise the 
misrepresentation is deemed to be careless.   
The Insurer can avoid the policy and retain the premium, unless it would be unjust 
to keep it, where the consumer’s misrepresentation was deliberate or careless. 
Where the misrepresentation was only careless, then the insurer can only avoid 
the policy if it can show that it would not have entered the contract on any terms 
had it known the relevant facts.  In which case it must return the premium. 
Where a careless misrepresentation does not as fundamental to the contract, so 
the insurer is left arguing that it would have insisted on different terms, then the 
Act deems the contract to be been agreed on those different terms.  It imposes a 
formula that allows the insurer to make a reduction in is liability by applying the 
following : X = Premium Actually Charged ÷ Higher Premium x 100 
The standard of care is an objective one, namely that of the reasonable 
consumer. Furthermore, instead of a material misrepresentation, we now have a 
new term:  a ‘qualifying misrepresentation’ which is defined as either ‘deliberate 
or reckless” or “careless’.  
Insurers have become adept at asking pertinent questions in their online and 
telephone sales and in requiring the consumer to check the accuracy of the policy 
statements on receipt of the certificate.   Obviously much will turn on whether an 
insurer will able to prove a misrepresentation to be reckless or deliberate.  
Otherwise, it will only be able to obtain a s152 declaration where it can satisfy the 
court that it would not have offered any cover, had it known the truth.   
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We are likely to see a raft of cases that will clarify the practical implications of this 
reform.  Even so, the power of a court to declare a policy void ab initio after the 
accident giving rise to the third party’s claim appears to conflict with the overriding 
protective purpose of the Directive and in particular recital 15: 
‘It is in the interest of victims that the effects of certain exclusion clauses 
be limited to the relationship between the insurer and the person 
responsible for the accident.  ...’ 
In Evans v Secretary of state for Transport and the Motor Insurers Bureau [2003] 
Case C-63/01 the Court of Justice was asked to decide, amongst other things, 
whether the UK’s Untraced Drivers Agreement429 was consistent with the Second 
Directive and in particular whether the lack of provision for interest on damages 
was lawful.  Its ruling was grounded on a basic Community law principle, without 
explicit reliance on the equivalency principle, to the effect that compensation must 
take into account the passing of time as this can reduce the value of the principle 
sum430.  It then ruled that the Second Directive should be interpreted as requiring 
the compensating body, in effect, to pay interest on its compensatory awards but 
left it to the UK to implement this requirement.  The Agreement was subsequently 
amended to allow interest. 
Raising a European law challenge against an ostensibly unfair procedural 
provision on the other hand is more problematic because the Directive confers a 
reasonably wide discretion as to the procedural rules and form in which its 
objectives are implemented.  In Evans the court explained the European law 
principle of equivalence at para 45: 
“It is settled case-law that in the absence of Community rules governing 
the matter it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to 
designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the 
detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which 
individuals derive from Community law, provided, however, that such rules 
are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (the 
principle of equivalence) and do not render virtually impossible or 
excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (the 
                                               
429 The 1972 version of the Untraced Drivers Agreement applied to the claim. 
430 At paragraph 68 of Evans. 
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principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, Case C-120/97 Upjohn [1999] 
ECR I-223, paragraph 32).” 
This somewhat abstruse explanation is put into the context of an MIB claim under 
the Untraced Drivers Agreement431 by the Court’s prefatory observations at 
paragraph 28:  
“It must nevertheless be emphasised that, to meet the requirements of the 
Second Directive, the body responsible for awarding compensation does 
not necessarily have to be placed, as far as civil liability is concerned, on 
the same footing as a defendant such as the driver of an identified and 
sufficiently insured vehicle.” 
The House of Lords has provided some welcome additional insight to the 
application of the equivalence principle in Preston & Others v. Wolverhampton 
Healthcare N.H.S. Trust & Others [2001]432: 
“25. In deciding that question "the national court must take into account 
the role played by that provision in the procedure as a whole, as well as 
the operation and any special features of that procedure before the 
different national court (Levez v T H Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd (Case C-
326/96) [1999] ICR 521, 545, paragraph 44): see [2000] ICR 961, 999. 
    The court further ruled, at pp 999-1000: 
"62. It follows that the various aspects of the procedural rules cannot be 
examined in isolation but must be placed in their general context. 
Moreover, such an examination may not be carried out subjectively by 
reference to circumstances of fact but must involve an objective 
comparison, in the abstract, of the procedural rules at issue. 
"63. In view of the foregoing, the answer to the third part of the second 
question must be that, in order to decide whether procedural rules are 
equivalent, the national court must verify objectively, in the abstract, 
whether the rules at issue are similar, taking into account the role played 
                                               
431 As Mr Evan’s injury was sustained on Christmas Day in 1991 his claim would have 
been presented under the terms of the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1977. 
432 Preston & Others v. Wolverhampton Healthcare N.H.S. Trust & Others and Fletcher 
& Others v. Midland Bank Plc [2001] UKHL 5 
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by those rules in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation of that 
procedure and any special features of those rules.” 
The Evans case featured an untraced driver claim where there was no obvious 
comparable procedure.  This was due to the complete absence of any identifiable 
defendant who could be pursued through legal process.  This presented obvious 
difficulties in identifying a suitable comparator by which to measure the 
equivalency of the provision under the Untraced Drivers Agreement.  That 
difficulty has been mitigated by the introduction of what is now the Article 18 of 
the Directive which confers the direct right of action against the insurer, where 
the procedural roles of the insurer and the compensating body share many 
common factors. 
On the issue of whether the private contract format of the Untraced Drivers 
Agreement was capable of implementing the Second Directive’s objectives 
relating to the compensating body, given that the agreement itself conferred no 
right of action on the victims it is intended to benefit, it ruled:  
‘The fact that the source of the obligation of the body in question lies in an 
agreement concluded between it and a public authority is immaterial, 
provided that that agreement is interpreted and applied as obliging that 
body to provide victims with the compensation guaranteed to them by the 
Second Directive and as enabling victims to address themselves directly 
to the body responsible for providing such compensation.’433 
It went on to qualify this by restating the importance of conformity with the 
European law principle of legal certainty: 
‘...it is essential for national law to guarantee that the national authorities 
will effectively apply the directive in full, that the legal position under 
national law should be sufficiently precise and clear and that individuals 
are made fully aware of all their rights and, where appropriate, may rely on 
them before the national courts (Case C-365/93 Commission v Greece 
[1995] ECR I-499, paragraph 9, and Case C-144/99 Commission v 
Netherlands [2001] ECR I-3541, paragraph 17)’  
                                               
433 At paragraph 34 of Evans. 
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On the basis of the apparently limited and arguably one sided account of the way 
the Untraced Drivers Scheme operated, the Court concluded that its procedural 
arrangements and in particular its arbitral appeal procedure did not render it 
practically impossible or excessively difficult for applicants to exercise their right 
to compensation under the Second Directive. 
This makes it very difficult for UK legal practitioners to challenge the numerous 
procedural knock out provisions in both MIB compensation schemes.  However, 
where a procedural requirement amounts to a substantive law infraction then a 
legal challenge is much easier to substantiate.  Examples of which are clause 13 
of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999434 and clause 4(3) of the Untraced 
Drivers Agreement 2003435.  These provisions appear to impose a clear and 
unequivocal impediment on a claimant’s right to compensation. 
4. Insurers’ right of recovery 
In Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson436[2011] the Court of Justice was asked to rule 
on whether Section 151.8 RTA conflicted with the Directives protective purpose.  
This was a conjoined appeal in which the common facts in both cases were that 
the persons injured were travelling as passengers in vehicle that they owned and 
which they were insured to drive, but the negligent drivers of these vehicles were 
not insured. In Ben Wilkinson’s case that permission was given in the knowledge 
that the driver was uninsured; in Tracey Evans’s case the permission was given 
without any thought to that question.   
The key issue concerned a preliminary point of law on the interpretation of 
Section 151(8) RTA.  This enables an insurer to recoup its outlay where it has 
                                               
434 Clause 13 entitles the MIB to refuse to compensate a claimant who has failed to 
request insurance information from the defendant driver or for failing to use all 
reasonable endeavours to obtain this information or to report the failure to provide that 
information to the police. This subverts the parliamentary objective behind s 154 of RTA 
1988 which is to increase, not diminish, the prospects of a victim recovering their 
compensatory entitlement.  The 1999 Agreement remains in force for all accidents that 
predate 1 August 2015. 
435 Clause 4.3 (c) Imposes as a condition precedent of any MIB liability a requirement 
that the applicant has reported the accident to the police with 5 days (property) or 14 
days (injury) or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter.  A High Court judge has 
upheld an arbitrator’s finding that ‘reasonable practicability’ has nothing to do with the 
victims’ belief that the driver has been properly identified; even where such a belief was 
reasonably held. It has also been applied against an infant. 
436 Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson; Evans v Equity Claims [2011] CJEU C-442/10 
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acted as a statutory insurer under Section 151 where the policyholder caused or 
permitted the vehicle’s use by the uninsured driver.  Were the injured passengers 
in these cases, (who were entitled to be compensated by their negligent drivers 
but where those drivers were not covered to drive the vehicle under the terms of 
the insurance policy in place) in effect to be denied their statutory guarantee of 
payment under section 151(5) of RTA because they, as policyholders, are in 
breach of their policy terms for permitting their vehicles to be driven by an 
uninsured driver?  
The Court of Justice’s ruling responded to the specific questions that the Court of 
Appeal had referred to it.  It ruled as follows: 
 “The only situation in which a third party who has been a victim of an 
accident may be excluded from insurance cover is that specified in the 
second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the Second Directive” [para 38]437 
 The Directives must be interpreted as precluding “national rules whose 
effect is to omit automatically the requirement that the insurer should 
compensate a passenger who is a victim of a RTA when that accident was 
caused by a driver not insured under the insurance policy and when the 
victim, who was a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident, was 
insured to drive the vehicle himself and who had given permission to the 
driver to drive it.” [para 44] 
The Court observed that it was irrelevant whether the insured victim was aware 
that the person to whom he gave permission to drive the vehicle was not insured 
to do so, whether he believed that the driver was insured or whether or not he 
had turned his mind to that question438. 
When the case was referred back to the Court of Appeal Section 151.8 RTA was 
purposively construed so as to add notional wording not present in the original 
text to restrict the insurer’s right of recover to an amount proportionate to the 
circumstances of the case.  No explanation has been give as to what 
“proportionate” means in practical terms. 
                                               
437 Now Article 13 of the Directive.  This sets out the knowledge that the vehicle is stolen 
vehicle exclusion. 
438 Evans, para 47. 
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It is noteworthy that section 148.4 RTA provides an almost identical claw back 
provision that applies where the effect of an exclusion clause is nullified against 
a third party victim in one of the eight types of exclusion clause listed there.  This 
provision has not been modified; notionally or otherwise despite this being drawn 
to the minister’s attention439.   
5. Direct right against insurers 
Deficiencies in the European Communities (Rights Against Insurers) Regulations 
2002 have already been alluded to above under the following headings: The Third 
Party Rule, a common law anachronism and under Restrictions in geographic 
scope. 
Regulation 3 (2) ECRIR 2002 confers a qualified right to compensation: a 
claimant enjoys no greater right against an insurer than its insured, in keeping 
with the common law rule considered above.  It provides, amongst other things 
that:  
‘...(the) insurer shall be directly liable to the entitled party to the extent that 
he is liable to the insured person’. 
This appears to conflict with recital 15 in the Directive and the raft of CJEU rulings 
from Bernaldez in 1996 to Vnuk in 2014, also considered above. 
6. No provision for victims of derogated vehicles  
Section 144(1) RTA allows the minister to exempt a body that provides security 
of £500,000 from the duty to insure under s143.  It is not known whether this 
power has ever been exercised.  However the amount is clearly insufficient to 
satisfy the minimum cover requirement imposed under article 9.  
Section 144(2) provides an extensive list of derogated bodies that are also 
exempted from the duty to insure under section 143.  However there is no national 
law provision that extends to the Article 3 compensatory protection to a third party 
victim injured or suffering loss through the unauthorised use of such vehicles as 
the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 only meets claims in circumstances 
                                               
439 In the author’s detailed response to the minister’s own 2013 consultation on the MIB 
Agreements. 
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where the RTA require third party motor insurance.  There appears to be no other 
alternative provision for these such claims440. 
Article 5.2 of the Directive allows member states to derogate certain categories 
of motor vehicle from the insurance obligation provided suitable provision is made 
for the compensating body to compensate third party victims.  The MIB 
Agreements do not extend to vehicles that do not conform to the Section 185 
RTA definition of ‘motor vehicle’.441  The author’s own enquiries of the 
Department for Transport reveal that no vehicle types have been identified as 
exempted from the duty to insure under article 5.2.  This exposes victims to the 
hazard posed by numerous off road vehicles which under our national law are 
not subject to the third party cover requirement. 
7. Misallocation of insured claims as uninsured claims 
In EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership442 (see above under Limitations in cover) the 
Court of Appeal court also came to the conclusion that whilst motorists must 
ensure that any use they actually make of a vehicle is always covered by third 
party insurance443, there is no corresponding obligation on motor insurers to 
provide such a wide ranging scope of cover.  One obvious flaw here is that the 
common law precludes insurance for illegal or bye purpose, so the driver in EUI 
would not have been able to obtain insurance to cover the consequences of his 
suicide attempt.  Whilst Ward LJ’s decision in EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership 
makes complete sense when viewed from the perspective of the contracting 
parties, it has the effect of undermining the consistency of the compensatory 
protection afforded to the third party victims. 
Every year thousands of motor victims’ claims are treated by insurers as though 
they were claims against completely uninsured drivers.  These claims are 
commonly described Article 75444 claims and run by the insurer on risk for the 
                                               
440 In which case this fails to comply with Article 5 that requires member states to set up 
appropriate measures to ensure compensation is paid. 
441 See above under the subheading Restrictions in scope. 
442 EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267, paragraphs 68 and 69 
443 At paragraph 38. 
444 Article 75 of the Articles and Memorandum of Association of the Motor Insurers 
Bureau is a private intra-insurer arrangement and is regularly misconstrued as imposing 
an obligation on third party victims of insufficiently insured drivers to pursue their claim 
for compensation under the highly prejudicial terms of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 
1999; whereas there is no legal basis for this position. 
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vehicle concerned, nominally as the MIB’s agent, under the terms of the 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 or 2015, even though some insurance cover 
was in place at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim.  Judges up and 
down the country routinely describe these scenarios as ‘Article 75 claims’, lending 
credibility to the insurer’s pretentions.  However there is no basis in law to justify 
a third route.   
Arguably a modicum of authority for the UK’s approach is to be found in the highly 
influential opinion of Advocate General Lenz445  In his opinion to the Court of 
Justice in Bernaldez he expressed the view that if the Court minded to rule that 
a policy term that excluded cover where the driver is intoxicated was permitted 
by the Directives, contrary to his advice, then member states would be free to 
extend the competence of the compensating to act as a fail-safe measure to 
ensure victims are compensated.  However this was an entirely hypothetical 
postulation premised on a scenario446 that ran counter to his explicit advice that 
the protective aim of the directives required contractual exclusions to be invalid 
against third party victims.  Unfortunately this hypothetical opinion was adopted 
by Jay J in his attempt to square the circle of the UK’s non conformity with the 
Directive in the following passage in Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport 
[2014] EWHC 1785 (QB)  
“Were it not for the manner in which the MIB operates in this jurisdiction, 
this state of affairs would have the tendency to place the UK in breach of 
its obligations under the Directives - if that were not already clear enough 
from the wording of the Directives themselves, a swathe of ECJ decisions 
state that (subject to specified exceptions) any attempt by an insurer to 
avoid third-party liability is of no effect.”447 
Later on in the same judgment he paraphrases the Advocate Generals thesis: 
“...although the scheme of the Second Directive is such that the insurer (if 
it exists) and not the national body should pay compensation, provided 
                                               
445 Advocate General Lenz’s opinion delivered on 25 January 1996 in Bernaldez Case 
C-129/94, paragraph 51. 
446 Namely that the compensatory protection of third party victims are capable of being 
affected by contractual terms agreed between the policyholder and the insurer. 
447 Delaney v SoS for Transport, paragraph 21.  See also paragraphs 66 & 67 of Ward 
LJ’s judgment in EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 in which a 
unanimous Court of Appeal expressed a similar view. 
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that the system as a whole ensures complete protection for victims there 
may be no objection in principle to the national body having an enhanced 
role.  This is exactly the position which obtains in this jurisdiction on 
account of section 152(2) of the RTA 1988. However, the logical corollary 
must evidently be this: that the national body, here the MIB, must pay 
compensation in circumstances where the insurer - "for whatever 
reasons", which must include the avoiding of the insurance policy for 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure by the insured - owes no liability in 
respect of the victim's claim.”448 
This disregards the Advocate General’s clearly articulated view, following a 
review of the way the motor insurance requirement had evolved, that:   
“the body is in no way conceived as a general catch-all, providing 
compensation upon the occurrence of any excluded events. Nor 
does the provision simply refer to the absence of insurance to which 
the national court alludes. Everything therefore indicates that, within 
the framework established by the directives, the person who has 
suffered harm as a result of an accident must recoup his loss from 
the insurer.” 
As we have seen from the review of the Bernaldez case above, the Court of 
Justice did not need to consider the Advocate General’s hypothesis as it adopted 
his primary position.  However, it is worthwhile repeating the following extract 
from this seminal judgment: 
“18. In view of the aim of ensuring protection, stated repeatedly in the 
directives, Article 3(1) of the First Directive, as developed and 
supplemented by the Second and Third Directives, must be interpreted as 
meaning that compulsory motor insurance must enable third-party victims 
of accidents caused by vehicles to be compensated for all the damage to 
property and personal injuries sustained by them, up to the amounts fixed 
in Article 1(2) of the Second Directive.  
19. Any other interpretation would have the effect of allowing Member 
States to limit payment of compensation to third-party victims of a road-
                                               
448 At paragraph 39. 
231 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
traffic accident to certain types of damage, thus bringing about disparities 
in the treatment of victims depending on where the accident occurred, 
which is precisely what the directives are intended to avoid. Article 3(1) of 
the First Directive would then be deprived of its effectiveness.  
20. That being so, Article 3(1) of the First Directive precludes an insurer 
from being able to rely on statutory provisions or contractual clauses to 
refuse to compensate third-party victims of an accident caused by the 
insured vehicle.” 
It is a regrettable fact that the Court of Appeal’s unanimous decision in EUI v 
Bristol Alliance Partnership accurately reflects long established UK jurisprudence 
and practice in this area.  This enables insurers to qualify the compensatory 
protection conferred on third parties by permitting reliance, against third parties, 
of contractual exclusions and restrictions in cover save, where expressly 
precluded from doing so within the RTA.   
As we have seen above, this approach is incompatible with the Directive, as 
interpreted by the CJEU.  Where a responsible vehicle is identified then there are 
only two permitted routes to the compensatory guarantee.  First, if there is some 
Article 3 cover in place that cover should fit for purpose to meet a third party claim 
(subject to the single exception in Article 13).  The second route is reserved for 
vehicles that have no insurance in place at all, only then can the claim be 
categorised as an uninsured claim, in which case it must be handled by the Article 
10 compensating body (the MIB).  European law imposes a stark binary scenario; 
there is no third way449.   
This misallocation of claims might not matter quite so much if the government’s 
extra statutory regime for uninsured drivers provided an equivalent level of 
protection to a fully insured defendant but it doesn’t.  Unfortunately the Uninsured 
and Untraced Driver Schemes are riddled with vicious, oppressive and 
disproportionate, strike out clauses that permit the MIB to escape any liability 
even for the smallest procedural infraction.  They also exclude liability for certain 
heads of loss450 and permit deductions from an applicant’s proper compensatory 
                                               
449 See Churchill v Wilkinson [2011] CJEU Case C-442/10, para 41 where the CJEU 
described the Article 10 body “as a measure of last resort.” 
450 See below under Unlawful deductions. 
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entitlement in situations that would not be permitted in a normal civil action 
against an insured driver.  These are decidedly inferior schemes which insurers 
regularly exploit to evade or reduce their liability to third parties in numerous 
scenarios.   
This practice survives in the UK, notwithstanding its obvious non conformity with 
European law, seemingly for no other compelling reason that it something a great 
many practitioners have become used to over a very long time. 
8. Discrimination of minors and protected parties 
Of grave concern is the complete absence of any proper safeguards to ensure 
that children and the mentally incapacitated are treated fairly by the MIB.  The 
MIB have admitted to settling numerous childrens’ personal injury claims without 
any independent legal advice having been given; let alone court approval being 
sought.  451 
In Dunhill v Burgin 2014 UKSC 18 The United Kingdom Supreme Court ruled that 
in a normal contentious claim governed by the Civil Procedure Rules children and 
other protected parties are entitled to a sophisticated multi-faceted degree of 
protective measures.  It ruled that these were necessary not just to protect these 
vulnerable individuals against their opponents but also from their own legal 
representatives.   
Claims under the Untraced Drivers Agreement are not classed as contentious 
claims but this ruling clearly applies to equivalent scenarios, such as a direct 
action under Article 18 of the Directive and to a settlement in a claim under the 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 because those are contentious claims that 
are subject to by the Civil Procedure Rules.  So there are clear comparators by 
which the equivalency and effectiveness of this process is to be judged. 
Clause 3 of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 and clause 2 of the Untraced 
Drivers Agreement 2003 impose a binding authority on the representative of a 
child or mentally incapacitated claimant / applicant to make decisions and to 
conclude agreements:  ‘....as if it had been done to or by, or made to or in respect 
                                               
451 In a letter to the author dated 4 February 2014 the MIB stated “For the years 2011 – 
2013 inclusive we have paid a total of 2,259 claims from infants under the Untraced 
Agreement.  Of those, ... 72 cases which were neither seen by an arbitrator nor a 
solicitor.” 
233 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
of an applicant of full age and capacity’.  This contrasts with the common law 
position and the Civil Procedure Rules and so appears to conflict with the 
equivalence principle.   
The absence of any provision for (i) independent legal representation and (ii) 
court approval of settlements - for children and mentally incapacitated applicants 
under the 2003 Agreement for untraced driver claims also appears to conflict with 
European law equal treatment and equivalence principles and arguably with the 
European Convention on Human Rights452.  
9. Unlawful deductions from or reductions in compensation 
Mention has already been made of the purported exclusion of MIB liability for 
subrogated claims which are expressly excluded under the Uninsured Drivers 
Agreement 1999 and impliedly so under the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015 
and the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003.  Furthermore, the Agreements also 
purport to entitle the MIB to deduct any other sums received by the claimant by 
as a result of the accident.453  It is extraordinary, shocking even, that these 
particularly vulnerable individuals should be exposed to decisions made by 
unqualified insurance personnel who have had no judicial training and where 
there is a complete absence of any supervision or control454. 
Article 10 of the Directive requires the authorised body to compensate victims ‘at 
least up to the limits of the insurance obligation for damage to property or 
personal injuries’.  However the very same provision goes on to qualify the 
equivalent compensation principle by stating that it is:  
“without prejudice to the right of the Member States to regard 
compensation by the body as subsidiary or non-subsidiary and the right to 
make provision for the settlement of claims between the body and the 
person or persons responsible for the accident and other insurers or social 
security bodies required to compensate the victim in respect of the same 
                                               
452 The right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention 1950 as 
amended and transposed into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998. 
453 Clause 17 Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999; Clause 6 Untraced Drivers Agreement 
2003 and Clause 6 *2) and (3) Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015. 
454 In a letter to the author dated 29 July 2013 the Department for Transport stated:”The 
MIB is an independent organisation and is neither controlled nor supervised by the 
Department for Transport.” 
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accident.’ There is no definition or case law on what is meant by 
‘subsidiary’.” 
Even so, Article 10 does not appear to envisage the victim being left 
undercompensated in comparison to an equivalent claimant in an action against 
an identified and fully insured defendant.  Under UK common law455, certain 
insurance payments are disregarded when assessing damages, for example an 
accident, health or life insurance policy or pensions or mortgage protection plan 
which the victim has funded in kind, through services or where he has paid the 
premiums.  One obvious point to mention here is that the payments made under 
these policies are not deemed in law to be payments made ‘to compensate the 
victim’ for the accident. Such payments are in reality an independently 
predetermined contractual sum conferred under a policy term that happens to be 
triggered by the accident; there is a world of a difference.  It cannot be the 
objective of the Directives to discriminate against victims of uninsured and 
untraced drivers in this way. 
Similar issues arise elsewhere, such as under Section 1(4) Third Party Rights Act 
1930 and Section 10 Third Party Rights Act 2010 (not yet in force) which preserve 
an insurer’s right to plead breaches of warranty or condition by its policyholder 
against a third party. 
10. Lack of legal certainty 
The author has notified the Secretary of State for Transport and the European 
Commission of at least eighty instances where the UK national law provision 
appears to conflict with the minimum standard of compensatory protection 
required under the Directive.  Some of these inconsistencies represent different 
aspects of a single breach.  However in this author’s view approximately fifty of 
these constitute, separate and potentially actionable infringements of European 
law in the sense that these inconsistencies are capable of either reducing or 
extinguishing completely a third party victim’s entitlement to compensation in 
circumstances not permitted by the Directive.  It follows from this that the UK 
transposition of the Directive is so extensively flawed that it simply cannot be 
taken at face value.   
                                               
455 See Parry v Cleaver 1970 AC 1; Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington AHA 1980 AC 
174 and Page v Sheerness Steel 1995 PIQR Q 26. 
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The fact that some provisions are so obvious or egregious that they are capable 
of being remedied by a Court applying a European consistent interpretation does 
little to address the problem.  Such is the complexity that it is unlikely that no well 
educated and informed lay person could reasonably be expected to discern their 
true legal entitlement from reading the convoluted and highly technical and in 
places contradictory provisions of the UK implementation of this Directive.  
Furthermore, it is unreasonable to expect a lay person to succeed where so many 
eminent jurists from the senior appellate courts have so signally failed456.   
 
Ongoing developments  
The UK’s failure to properly implement the Directive has been the subject of a 
number of different initiatives that are part of a wider campaign for comprehensive 
reform.  This paper will review these developments roughly in chronological order 
but a degree of artificiality cannot be avoided as some of them overlap or are 
concurrent. 
1. The ongoing public awareness campaign for law reform 
On 6 June 2007 the legal profession was given a timely reminder, in Mr Flaux J’s 
judgment in Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport [2007] EWHC 1268 
(QB), that it was possible to challenge provisions in the MIB Agreements on the 
ground that they conflicted with superior European law in the form of the 
European Council’s directives on motor insurance457.  This led to private 
discussions with the MIB which the author participated as a member of a working 
party set up by the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers in 2007.  The primary 
                                               
456 See for example the Court of Appeal’s approach in Delaney v Pickett [2011], where 
the Court elected to ignore the possibility that the RTA might not conform to the minimum 
standards required under the Directive, or Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport 
[2007] EWHC 1268 (QB) where the Court appears to have been misled on the European 
jurisprudence affecting the proper construction of the Untraced Drivers Agreement or the 
wrong turn taken by the Court of Appeal in EUI v Bristol Alliance. 
457 Flaux J held that the strict and absolute three-year time limit for applying to the MIB 
under the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1972 was not consistent with European law that 
required a limitation period no less favourable than that which applies to the 
commencement of proceedings by minors for personal injury in tort against a traced 
driver ie the limitation provision in s 28 of the Limitation Act 1980.  See paragraph 37 of 
the judgment.  It was unfortunate that the judge took the view that it was not open to him 
to undertake a Marleasing style purposive construction of the agreement, see below 
under the Emerging issues heading. 
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concern was with the numerous procedural anomalies that provided insurers and 
the MIB with compensatory windfalls at the expense of third party victims.  
However, even at that stage the MIB was asked to ensure that its national law 
provision conformed to the minimum standards of protection required under the 
relevant Directives on motor insurance.  Nothing came of those meetings.  
Consequently the author determined on raising awareness within the legal 
profession about the potential procedural pitfalls and substantive law irregularities 
to be found in the UK transposition of these directives through his lectures and 
articles458.  Eventually this lead to a more holistic review of the UK’s transposition 
of the Directive published in the New Law Journal in February 2013459 that 
attracted the attention of the Law Commission460. The Law Commission later 
consulted the author who prepared a detailed paper setting out the infringements 
of European law and making recommendations.  Unfortunately the Law 
Commission’s further involvement was blocked by the Department for Transport. 
2. The Department for Transport’s Review of the MIB Agreements 
In late February 2013 the Secretary of State for Transport published a 
consultation paper setting out his proposals for reforming the MIB Agreements.  
The proposals included some elements of the procedural changes that had been 
raised with the MIB back in 2007 but it failed to deal with the substantive law 
defects.  A campaign was organised and a number of special interest groups 
whoo supported the author’s call for wide ranging reform right across the UKs 
national law measures implementing the directives on motor insurance.  These 
calls were ignored.  In July 2013 the Department for Transport issued a statement 
indicating that it was constrained in what it could do by its need to secure the 
cooperation of the MIB.  Calls for a dialogue with the minister to discuss the need 
for reform were made by a number of parties, including the author, but these 
approaches were also ignored. 
  
                                               
458 Reforming the MIB, Nicholas Bevan, Journal of Personal Injury Law issue 1 of 2011, 
Why the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 Needs to be Scrapped, Nicholas Bevan, 
Journal of Personal Injury Law issue 2 of 2011.   
459 Published in serial form as four separate articles in the New Law Journal On The Right 
Road? Nicholas Bevan 8 -21 February 2013 
460 The Law Commission is an independent body created by the Law Commissions Act 
1965 to keep the law under review and to recommend reform where it is needed. 
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4. Infringement Complaint 
When the Department for Transport failed even to implement its own proposals, 
the author filed a formal infringement complaint with the European Commission.  
The complaint was lodged in August 2013461.  It presented a detailed comparative 
law analysis of the UK’s transposition of the Directive and it set out and explained 
numerous instances where UK national law is inconsistent with the minimum 
standards of compensatory protection required under the Directive.  It asked the 
Commission to persuade the UK Government to remedy these defects rather 
than take legal action. 
The UK’s failure to fully implement the Directive extends to its predecessors and 
it is a phenomenon that goes back over a quarter of a century.  It undermines the 
legal entitlement of millions of citizens in the UK as well as the rights of visiting 
foreign EU nationals.   The list of incompatible provisions has been updated from 
time to time and now exceeds 80 instances.  
It is also worth noting that a number of the issues complained of have since been 
vindicated in the clearest possible way by the Court of Justice’s rulings in Csonka 
and Vnuk and by the UK Court of Appeal’s Francovich award in Delaney v 
Secretary of State for Transport 2015 EWCA Civ 172.  
It is understood that the Commission has communicated its concerns to the UK 
Government and embarked on a preliminary investigation.   
4. Revisions to the Uninsured and Untraced Drivers Agreements 
Any hopes of a Damascene change of mind by the Department for Transport in 
the wake of the Vnuk and Delaney decisions appear to have been misplaced.  
After a delay of more than two years from its aborted 2013 consultation, the 
Government announced on 6th July that it had agreed a new scheme with the 
MIB.  The new agreement was presented as a fait accompli; coming into effect 
on 1 August.   
However, by approving the latest version of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement the 
Secretary of State introduced entirely new unlawful provisions that breached the 
Directive as well as perpetuating numerous others.  What is truly extraordinary 
                                               
461 The complaint was registered under CHAP(2013)02537 and its reference under the 
EU Pilot scheme for handling complaints is 5805/13/MARK. 
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about its release was that, despite its ongoing discussions with the Commission 
arising out of the complaint, the Commission was kept completely in the dark.  
The first the Commission knew about this unlawful agreement was when it was 
announced to the general public ion 6 July 2015.  In the writer’s view, this exposed 
the minister’s bad faith.  By introducing new and clearly unlawful provisions and 
failing to rectify numerous longstanding infractions that he was warned about not 
only in response to his own consultation in April 2013 but also presumably once 
more by the Law Commission sometime in late 2013 or early 2014 and again by 
the Commission itself, he was effectively flouting the authority of the Commission 
and the European law it is tasked with enforcing. 
The new agreement was presented as the product of the 2013 consultation 
exercise, this is misleading.  It is probably best described as a chimera made up 
of (i) the MIB’s original proposals, (ii) the minimum changes necessary to 
implement the more obvious implications Delaney without risking an outright 
accusation of bad faith and (ii) new provisions that present the MIB with further 
opportunities for windfalls that clearly conflict with European law.   
The official statement announcing the changes studiously ignores the numerous 
calls for wide-ranging reform to bring the UK’s statutory and extra statutory 
implementation of the European directive on motor insurance into line with the 
minimum standards of compensatory protection required under that law.  Not only 
does this new scheme fail to remove all the clear and obvious obstacles to full 
compliance in its 1999 predecessor but it compounds its default by introducing 
entirely new infractions.   
Some welcome changes 
One significant innovation is the excision of the two unlawful passenger exclusion 
clauses which it was warned about by a number of parties in the consultation 
responses.  Yet these are presented as being introduced solely to comply with 
the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Delaney; which rather suggests that the 2013 
consultation was no more than window dressing.   
Other welcome changes include the curbing of some of the MIB’s powers to strike 
out valid claims for the least trivial procedural infraction.  For example, the 
draconian strike out rules for not providing the MIB with various notices as the 
claim progressed are removed, as is the bizarre condition precedent in Clause 
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13 that barred any claim if the victim failed to report the uninsured driver to the 
police.  The unnecessarily complicated claims process has also been simplified 
and brought much closer into line with a normal civil claim.  Claimants are no 
longer confronted by the misleading similar but subtly different notice 
requirements between Sections 152 and Clause 9, which the MIB exploited for 
decades to full effect to reject numerous claims.  The excision of these provisions 
is a positive step and they make what was a tediously prolix and Byzantine claims 
scheme that much shorter and simpler.   
Whilst this is gratifying for those who have campaigned for the removal of these 
disproportionately harsh anachronisms, they should never have been permitted 
in the first place.  No attempt has been made to revoke their application to the 
thousands of claims left to run under the current discredited regime that remains 
in force for all accidents predating 1 August 2015. 
Serious flaws 
Unfortunately the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015 contains a number of 
serious breaches of European law as well as some basic drafting blunders for 
good measure.  These include a number of exclusions of and restrictions in the 
MIB’s liability to compensate that are not only unjust, in so far as they prejudice 
the legal entitlement of accident victims, but they also conflict with European law.  
Take for example the unlawful provision in Clause 6 that purports to allow the 
MIB to offset life assurance or other such payments, discussed above.   
Then there is the flagrant introduction of the terrorism exclusion in Clause 9, also 
mentioned above.  It is hard to see how this makes any sense in policy terms.  
Presumably car bombs are the chief threat it envisages but as such use is clearly 
inconsistent with the normal function of a motor vehicle, we know from Vnuk, that 
it is excluded from the insurance requirement under European law anyway.  It is 
hard to envisage what public good is achieved from the arbitrary distinction that 
allows a claim by a child cyclist who is grievously injured by an uninsured get-
away driver escaping from a bank heist where a cashier has been murdered but 
not where the uninsured driver is an anti-GM crop saboteur who has just fired a 
warehouse containing a consignment of GM seed corn.   
There are also grave concerns about the way Clause 17 removes the right to 
appeal the reasonableness of the MIB’s decisions to the Secretary of State for 
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Transport and substituting this with a paper appeal process to an arbitrator whose 
decision will be final and determined on the strict wording of the agreement 
without reference to the European law context.  This offends basic rule of law and 
HRC principles.   
5. Indecision by the European Commission 
The Commission has been asked to escalate its investigation of the infringement 
complaint against the UK, to reach a determination and to enforce compliance of 
the Direction by legal action if necessary.  No discernible progress has been 
made. 
The Commission’s own protocol requires it to reach a determination on a 
complaint within one year of the complaint being accepted462; now over two years 
ago.  Thus far the Commission has declined even to express a view on any of 
the issues raised in the complaint.   
One of the Commission’s primary roles is to enforce compliance with European 
law.  It can discharge this role in several ways.  If persuasion fails, it can make a 
determination, issue an infringement action or refer an issue to the European 
Court of Justice.  It has been confronted with longstanding and apparently 
deliberate failure by a member state to properly implement the Directive after 
having been exhaustively briefed on each and every defect.  The issues raised 
concern readily accessible conflicts of law, they do not require extensive 
investigation, merely an appraisal of the comparative law analysis already 
undertaken on its behalf.  So far all the Commission has done is to hold a series 
of private discussions and meetings with the UK officials.   
6.  
  
                                               
462See: Updating the handling of relations with the complainant in respect of the 
application of Union law, Brussels, 2.4.2012, COM(2012) 154 final, see subheading 8. 
Time limit for investigating complaints. 
241 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
Possible consultation on the Untraced Drivers Agreement and the 
implications of Vnuk 
In its July 2015 announcement the Department for Transport announced that it 
was in discussions with the MIB with a view to agreeing a new Untraced Drivers 
Agreement.  There has also been some mention, unofficially, that the Department 
intends to consult on the implications flowing from the Vnuk ruling on the technical 
and mechanical scope of the insurance requirement.  As indicated above, the UK 
has not elected to derogate any unusual vehicle types from the insurance 
obligation.  Given that it was warned about this back in early 2013 and then failed 
to act, no early announcement is anticipated. 
7. Judicial Review 
The Secretary of State on being informed that his 3 July revisions to the MIB 
Agreements included provisions that were unlawful chose to do nothing.  His 
department wrote to indicate that there were no plans to introduce any changes.   
Public law actions challenging a decision by the executive must be brought before 
the court very promptly.  Fortunately, a road safety charity (which had joined the 
author in calling for wide ranging reform of the UK transposition of the Directive 
back in 2013) agreed to apply to the Administrative Court for permission to 
judicially review the minister’s actions.   
The proceedings challenge his decision to approve the changes to the MIB 
Agreements without first undertaking a comparative law review of its entire 
implementation of the Directive and for authorising provisions that were unlawful.  
The author has an advisory role and is constrained from divulging any further 
particulars at this juncture other than to indicate that the application has been 
issued and the proceedings are ongoing. 
8. Emerging issues 
When a member state failes to properly implement a European directive in a way 
that impinges on the legal rights conferred on individuals so as to cause them 
loss, it is well established that there are three potential routes to redress under 
European law.    
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The curative effect of consistent interpretation 
The first recourse is to challenge the provision in the national courts by seeking 
a European law consistent interpretation, applying the Marleasing463 principle as 
developed by Pfeiffer464.  In this way a European directive is said to be capable 
of having indirect effect.  Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson, considered above 
under the Insurers’ right of recovery heading, demonstrates just how far a 
consistent interpretation can go in remedying an inconsistent domestic provision.   
Unfortunately, the UK’s track record in this area is inconsistent.  Mention has 
already been made of EUI v Bristol Alliance above under the Limitations in cover 
heading.  Other unsatisfactory outcomes are not difficult to find.  In Byrne v MIB 
& Secretary of State for Transport [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB) an experienced High 
Court judge came to the erroneous conclusion that the court’s duty to apply a 
Marleasing style purposive construction did not apply to the Untraced Drivers 
Agreement.  His judgment is notable for its absence of any mention of Pfeiffer.   
In Pfeiffer the CJEU ruled that national courts have a positive duty when 
construing a national law or rule intended to give effect to a Directive 465 to 
“presume that the Member State, following its exercise of the discretion afforded 
it under that Article, intended entirely to fulfil the obligations arising from the 
Directive”.  Furthermore it has to consider “the whole body of rules of national law 
and to interpret them, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose 
of the directive in order to achieve an outcome consistent with the objective 
pursued by the directive.”   
Unfortunately neither the first instance trial judge nor the three appellate judges 
in Delaney thought it necessary to apply a European law consistent interpretation.  
One of the practical difficulties in enforcing a reliable and constant approach to 
interpretation of EU law in UK jurisprudence is the passivity rule that confines a 
judge’s role to determining only those issues raised by the parties.  The UK 
judiciary have limited training outside the extensive expertise acquired in their 
                                               
463 Case C-106/89Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA 
[1990] ECR I-4135 -  
464 Case C-397/01 to C-403/01, Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 
Kreisverband Walshut eV; [2004] ECR 1-8835 
465 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut eV: [2—4] 
CJEU Case C-397/01 to C-403/01 para  
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earlier careers as advocates.  It is unclear whether a UK court has the power, of 
its own motion, to impose a European law consistent interpretation against the 
will of the parties. 
Seeking compensation from the state 
The second remedy is to bring a claim in damages against the UK Government, 
as occurred in Byrne and Delaney.  However, for the average private citizen, this 
is an exceedingly time consuming, costly and uncertain endeavour.  Funding 
such a claim is beyond the means of most private citizens, especially now that 
state funded legal aid has been all but abolished and, not being a personal injury 
action, qualified one way cost shifting is not there to protect the individual from 
the risk of facing a potential liability for ruinous legal costs466.  It also requires 
specialist expertise in public law and European law challenges and even if a 
claimant succeeds in establishing personal loss caused by a clear breach of a 
directive, one that is unconditional and sufficiently precise in its conferral of rights 
on individuals so that it is capable of having direct effect, his right to damages is 
still subject to extraneous considerations that determine whether the breach is 
sufficiently serious to warrant state liability; on this latter point, the observations 
of the Court of Justice in Evans are worth quoting: 
‘[86] In that connection, all the factors which characterise the situation 
must be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, the clarity 
and precision of the rule infringed, whether the infringement or the damage 
caused was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was 
excusable or inexcusable, and the fact that the position taken by a 
Community institution may have contributed towards the adoption or 
maintenance of national measures or practices contrary to Community 
law... 
[87] Those criteria must in principle be applied by the national courts in 
accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Court...’ 
                                               
466 In Evans, see below, this appears to have been the outcome of this claimant’s  
unequal contest, first with the MIB, then with the Secretary of State.  Although he won 
the right for victims of hit and run drivers to recover interest on their general damages, 
he lost on other issues; the effect of which was to wipe out his personal entitlement. 
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In the UK this guidance is to be found in the House of Lords ruling in R v Secretary 
of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others ([2000] 1 AC 524.  In 
Lord Clyde’s judgment he sets out the following multi-factored objective test, it is 
a nuanced test where no one factor is likely to be decisive by itself.  These factors 
include the following considerations: (i) the importance of the principle breached; 
(ii) the clarity and precision of the rule breached; (iii) the extent to which the 
breach is excusable; (iv) the existence of settled Court of Justice case law; (v) 
the behavior of the infringer, after it was clear that an infringement had occurred; 
(vi) The persons affected by the breach, and (vii) the position taken by a 
European Union institution. 
Clearly, a privately funded citizen will be at a significant disadvantage when 
confronted by the ample financial resources and expertise of that the State can 
call upon.  He is unlikely to be able to discover, without considerable time and 
expense, the degree of compliance in other member states, whereas the State is 
likely to have this information at its finger tips.  In the Evans case, the claimant 
was injured on Christmas day in 1991 by a hit and run driver but he did not receive 
his Francovich award for being wrongly refused interest on his award until after 
the Court of Justice’s ruling of 4 December 2003; some 12 years later.  The UK 
is celebrating the 800th anniversary of the Magna Carta this year and one of its 
principles seems particularly apt: ‘that Justice delayed is Justice denied’.  There 
have been other litigation ‘nightmares’467 associated with bringing a Francovich 
claim against the state.468  The technical ability to present a Francovich claim is 
no proper answer to a member state’s failure to fully implement a directive or to 
satisfy legal certainty in so doing. 
Direct effect against the authorised body 
                                               
467 In Evans v Secretary of State for Transport [2001] EWCA Civ 32 judge JL delivering 
judgment in the Court of Appeal described the case as an interminable nightmare for the 
claimant. 
468 See for example Spencer v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWCA 
Civ 750, which was a conjoined appeal in which Steven Moore’s Francovich action was 
dismissed, 11 years after his running down injury, on the uncertain ground that the six 
year limitation period for bringing such a claim began at the date of the accident instead 
of the MIB’s erroneous determination of his claim under the Untraced Drivers Scheme. 
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The third remedy is potentially even more problematic and it is the subject of an 
ongoing reference to the Court of Justice469.  This route involves seeking direct 
effect of all the rights conferred under Articles 3 and 10 of the Directive against 
the Article 10 compensating body, which in the UK is the MIB.   
If direct effect of the Directive does apply to a public body such as the MIB, then 
is capable of influencing the MIB’s liability not just for matters falling within the 
compensatory role that the MIB agreed to discharge under the various 
compensation schemes470 with the Secretary of State for Transport but also, so 
it seems, for the State’s transposition failings, even though these are matters that 
the MIB has no constitutional authority to influence or control.  In the latter case, 
for example, this involves the UK’s evident failure to fully implement the 
Directive’s proper geographic and mechanical scope of cover.  This exposes 
victims to the risk of falling between two stools, as it were, protected neither by 
the State’s provision for compulsory third party motor insurance nor the MIB’s 
safety net. 
Direct effect involves making the MIB liable (‘vicariously’ so to speak) to 
compensate motor accident victims where a European law consistent 
interpretation of both the RTA and the relevant MIB Agreement establish that the 
event giving rise to the claim ought to have been subject to the duty to insure471 
but wasn’t.  One then applies the wording of article 10472 to arrive at the proper 
role of the MIB.  If the Directive requires the circumstances that gave rise to 
liability in the claim to be covered by insurance and, for whatever reason, the 
incident was not, then the natural corollary of this is that it is an uninsured driver 
claim.  It is then but simple logic that the MIB is liable to discharge its 
compensatory role under Article 10 in those circumstances.   
                                               
469 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, The Minister for the Environment and the Attorney 
General Case C-413/15 
470 That is to say within the Uninsured Drivers Agreements 1999 and 2015 and the 
Untraced Drivers Agreements 2003 as amended by five supplemental agreements, and 
potentially their predecessors. 
471 And in cases where there is some cover but it is insufficient in circumstances where 
the requires such cover, such as in EUI v Bristol Alliance. 
472 As interpreted by the CJEU and shaped by the various European law principles 
considered above, such as the Directives protective objective and the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. 
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Direct effect allows individuals to rely on the precise wording Articles 3 and 10, 
purposively construed, in preference to any inconsistent wording in the MIB 
agreement itself, to compel the MIB to respond to a claim that falls outside the 
scope of its contract with the Secretary of State, where the Directive requires it.  
The Courts have a positive duty when construing a national law or rule intended 
to give effect to a Directive 473 to “presume that the Member State, following its 
exercise of the discretion afforded it under that Article, intended entirely to fulfill 
the obligations arising from the Directive”.  Furthermore it has to consider “the 
whole body of rules of national law and to interpret them, so far as possible, in 
the light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to achieve an 
outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the directive. In the main 
proceedings.” 
The chief difficulty with this alternative route to redress is that in June 2007 Flaux 
J, a High Court judge with considerable experience in public international law, 
ruled unequivocally that the MIB is not an emanation of state and that the 
Directive is not capable of having direct effect against it474.  Furthermore, his 
decision drew on the weighty support of a number of authoritative obiter dicta by 
several senior appellate jurists.   
That said, it is this author’s view that the learned judge’s decision is, quite simply, 
wrong.  An article is in preparation475 that argues that the judge failed to consider 
all of the relevant European law, that the European law principles he did apply476 
were subordinate to the superior governing principles he left out of account477 
and, in any event, they were applied too rigidly478 and furthermore, that had he 
been properly appraised of the full facts and circumstances relevant to the proper 
classification of the MIB, he would have come to a different view, notwithstanding 
his strict adherence to the yardstick guidance he used to determine the issue.   
                                               
473 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut eV: [2—4] 
CJEU Case C-397/01 to C-403/01 para  
474 Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB), 
475 Which the author commits to offer for publication in the British Insurance Law 
Association Journal within the next three months. 
476 Case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas [1991] ICR 84. 
477 Case 8/81 Becker v. Hauptzollamt Muenster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53 
478 For the correct, nuanced, approach to applying the Foster guidelines, see Blackburn 
J Griffin and others v. South West Water Ltd [1995] IRLR 15.   
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It is also relevant to note that that this very issue479, whether the Article 10 
authorised body is an emanation of state, is the subject of a referral by the Irish 
Republic’s Supreme Court to the Court of Justice in Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, 
The Minister for the Environment and the Attorney General, 1997/10802P.  The 
injured claimant is no longer involved as she was fully compensated by the Irish 
MIB after Birmingham J ruled in the Irish High Court that the Irish MIB was an 
emanation of state.  This enabled here to be compensated by the Irish MIB even 
though she was a passenger in part of a vehicle which under Irish national law 
did not require third party motor insurance cover.  That decision was delivered in 
January 2008 and now in 2015 the remaining protagonists are the MIB and the 
Irish Government.  The reason for this prolonged litigation probably arises from 
the fact that the remaining parties recognise the wider implications of Birmingham 
J’s decision, especially following the Vnuk ruling which has exposed many 
member states implementation of the geographic and technical scope of Article 
3 as wanting.  This is in fact the second reference to the Supreme Court in this 
case480.  The Court of Justice’s judgment is imminent but it is very unlikely to 
result in any decisive conclusion on the status of the Irish MIB.  As it pointed out 
in the first reference in this case in its judgment of 19 April 2007, it is not the role 
of the Court of Justice to make findings of fact481.   
It is however worth ending this paper with Waller JL’s observation, when he 
sought guidance from the Court of Justice back in July 2008482: ‘It is difficult to 
think that a body such as the MIB or its equivalent should be an emanation of the 
state in one member country and not in another483.’   
 
Nicholas Bevan,  Solicitor, 29 November 2015 
  
                                               
479 On how to apply the guidance in Foster v British Gas. 
480 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, The Minister for the Environment and the Attorney 
General Case C-413/15, which asks the Court of Justice to elucidate on how the Foster 
test is to be applied. 
481 Case C-356/05 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty & Others 2007, paragraph 44.  
482 McCall v Poulton & Ors [2008] EWCA Civ 1263; this case was settled before the issue 
could be considered by the Court of Justice. 
483 Ibid, paragraph 47. 
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8. Bridging the gap. 
BILA Journal, issue 129, October 2016484 
 
Abstract 
This article argues the case for the application of direct vertical effect of Article 
10 of the European Council Directive 2009/103/EC on motor insurance against 
the UK’s Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB).  It discusses the European doctrine of 
state liability under the principles formulated by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Becker485, Johnston486 and Marshall487 and the proper 
approach to fixing liability on public authorities and other emanations of the state, 
considering the criteria devised by the Court of Justice in Foster v British Gas 
plc488   The article recommends an approach that concentrates primarily on the 
public service delegated to the body, rather than the organisation itself; 
contending that the doctrine of state responsibility, properly applied, extends to 
the MIB. 
 
Preface 
In Mind the Gap!489, this author reviewed the minimum standard of protection 
imposed by the European Council Directive 2009/103/EC490 on motor insurance 
(the Directive), explaining how the European insurance requirement has evolved 
over the years into a widely scoped free-standing principle.  It then identified ten 
different areas of nonconformity in the UK’s domestic transposition of that law 
and attempted to explain the underlying causes of that disparity.  It considered 
                                               
484 First published by BILA journal online in March 2016 
485 Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] CJEU Case 8/81 
486 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] CJEU Case 
222/84. 
487 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1993] 
Case C-271/91 
488 Foster and others v British Gas plc [1990] CJEU Case C-188/89 
489 British Insurance Law Association Journal, January 2016 
490 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability 
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the various obstacles to legal redress, including the evident reluctance by 
successive UK governments to remedy these longstanding infringements of 
European law.   
The extensive cost, litigation risk and delay involved in presenting a Francovich491 
action for damages against the state for failing to fully implement the Directive 
can be a daunting prospect for an individual492.  Furthermore, as we shall see 
from the analysis of Byrne v MIB and the recent decision in UK Insurance v 
Holden below, the UK courts cannot be relied on to cure defective national law 
provisions through a European law consistent interpretation.  This paper identifies 
what promises to be a more direct and certain route to redress that enables motor 
accident victims to access their full legal entitlement under European law.  It 
allows individuals adversely affected by legislation or other national law 
provisions that fail to properly implement the Directive, to rely directly on the 
wording of the Directive itself against the MIB, in its capacity as the UK’s 
authorised compensating body.   
On the nature of the MIB 
The issue as to whether or not the MIB is an emanation of the state is said to 
determine whether individuals can rely directly on the wording of the Directive in 
a civil action against the MIB, instead of indirectly through the national law 
provisions that are supposed to implement that law.  The Department for 
Transport and the MIB itself both contend that the MIB is merely a private 
company contracting at arm’s length with the State to discharge various 
outsourced public services.  Their common position is that the MIB’s 
responsibilities are defined by its contractual obligations to the state and no more.   
It is certainly true that the MIB is a privately owned corporation limited by 
guarantee.  From the little we know of its day to day affairs, it would appear that 
                                               
491 Francovich and Others [1991] CJEU Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 
492 Francovich claims can be hazardous.  They are public law actions where a claimant 
does not enjoy the protection conferred by qualified one-way cost shifting that the Civil 
Procedure Rules impose in a normal personal injury claim; if pursued as a separate 
action, it can add years to the litigation; it usually features a significant disparity in the 
respective parties’ resources and know-how, and the Factortame criteria for assessing 
whether a breach of European law was sufficiently serious often confers a wide 
discretion on the court.  Another potential disadvantages is that the award is assessed 
on a loss of chance basis rather than the tort law restitutio in integrum principle, which 
can result in a lower award 
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these are conducted and managed free from any overt state control.  It is a 
consortium: one exclusively owned and managed by every motor insurer 
authorised493 by the government to provide insurance in the UK.  In this sense 
the MIB is indisputably an emanation of the commercial interests of what 
collectively could be described the motor insurance industry.  It is said to 
discharge its role as the body appointed by the State to compensate victims of 
uninsured and untraced drivers by fulfilling its contractual obligations to the 
Secretary of State for Transport, in keeping with many other outsourced service 
providers.  The contractual arrangements are found in a succession of private 
law contracts with the Secretary of State for Transport494.  
This has led a number of senior judges to opine that the MIB is no more than a 
privately owned and managed contractor.  Few could be more eminent or 
emphatic than Hobhouse LJ’s obiter comments in the conjoined appeal in Mighell 
v Reading495.  When considering whether the Directive was capable of direct 
effect against the MIB in an untraced driver claim, he said: 
“In my judgment the correct view to take of the role and status of the Bureau is 
that it is a private law contractor and no more and as such is not capable of being 
covered by any direct effect the Directive496 may have.”497 
.... 
“The Bureau is not constitutionally an emanation of the state: it is a private law 
company. It is not functionally an emanation of the state: it acts on its own behalf 
in the commercial interest of its members not on behalf of the state or as a 
delegate of the state. It enters into commercial private law contracts with inter alia 
the Secretary of State.” 
                                               
493 The Secretary of State for Transport is responsible for regulating every motor insurer 
in the UK, membership of the MIB and contributing to its compensation guarantee fund 
are preconditions of their authorised status 
494 Currently the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2003 and the Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreements 1999 and 2015 
495Mighell v Reading and Another; Evans v Motor Insurers' Bureau; White v White and 
Another (1998) Times, 12 [1999] 1 LLR 30 
496 Hobhouse LJ is referring to the Second Council Directive on Motor Insurance 
(84/5/EEC), the relevant provisions of which are incorporated into article 10 of the 
Directive (2009/103/EC) 
497 Mighell, p. 1272 
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Although his colleagues, Schiemann and Swinton Thomas LJJ, were less strident 
in declining to classify the MIB as an emanation of state498, they nevertheless 
supported the view that the Directive’s predecessors were not capable of direct 
effect against it.   
These weighty opinions were a highly influential factor in the deliberations of an 
able High Court judge, experienced in public international law.  Flaux J had been 
specifically tasked with establishing whether the MIB was an emanation of the 
state and thus subject to the direct effect of the Directive.  In June 2007 he ruled 
in Byrne  v MIB499 that, not only was the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 1972 no 
more than a private law agreement, but that as such it was not subject to a 
Marleasing500 style European law consistent construction.  He also held that as 
the MIB was not an emanation of the state the Directive was incapable of having 
direct effect against it.  As this decision remains the only UK authority on these 
points, it presents an obstacle to victims seeking to cure the numerous unlawful 
exclusions and restrictions in MIB liability in the two schemes it operates.   
Against this orthodoxy, it is just as clear that the MIB also possesses 
characteristics in keeping with a public body, a state agency and even a public 
authority.  For a start, its genesis predates its formal constitution as a private 
limited company in 1946 and it is one that has a distinctly public service nature.  
The MIB owes its existence to an accommodation reached in 1945 between the 
state and every motor insurer then authorised by the state to conduct business in 
the UK.  This agreement is usually referred to as the “Principal Agreement”, by 
which the motor insurance sector collectively agreed to incept and become 
members of a “central body” with the express purpose of entering into a 
subordinate agreement with the state with the ultimate aim of funding the 
obligations imposed under it to compensate victims of uninsured vehicles.   
                                               
498 If only because of the ambiguity as to what constitutes an emanation of state 
499 Byrne (a minor by his litigation friend, Byrne) v Motor Insurers Bureau and another 
[2007] EWHC 1268 (QB) 
500 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135 
- Case 106/89, where the CJEU ruled I4135 the CJEU ruled that: '… in applying the 
national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after the 
Directive, the national court called upon to interpret is required to do so, as far as 
possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive in order to achieve 
the result pursued by the latter and thereby comply with the third paragraph of article 
189 [now art 249 EC]. 
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The Principal Agreement requires the “central body”, subsequently incorporated 
as the MIB, to fulfil two separate public service roles.  First, to satisfy any 
outstanding judgment in respect of a liability which is required to be covered by a 
policy of insurance or security under what was then Part II of the Road Traffic Act 
1930 but is now Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988; whether or not any insurance 
was in place for the vehicle responsible, whenever a relevant judgment is 
outstanding for seven days.  Its secondary role was to compensate victims of 
foreign visiting motorists.   
This focus of this paper is the domestic arrangements for guaranteeing the 
compensatory entitlement of motor accident victims other than the responsible 
driver.  The first of these subordinate agreements was the Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreement of 1946.  There are now two sets of agreements that set out 
successive compensatory regimes: currently the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 
2003 and the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreements of 1999501 and 2015502. 
The Principal Agreement anticipates the MIB’s obligation to compensate third 
party victims as being distinct from the obligations of the contracting parties, 
where such a policy existed.  It expressly preserves the contractual autonomy of 
authorised insurers to agree terms with their policyholders as well as affirming an 
insurer’s right to recoup its outlay outside the scope of cover from a defaulting 
assured party503. 
Important features of the Principal Agreement are that the subordinate agreement 
it anticipates must be in a form approved by the Minister for War Transport504 and 
that disputes about the reasonableness of a requirement imposed by the MIB that 
any particular step be taken to obtain judgment against other tortfeasors should 
be referred to the minister, whose decision will be final505.  These provisions 
reserve of a high degree of potential control by the state over the way the MIB 
                                               
501 Which applies to motor accidents that occurred between1st October 1999 and 31 
July 2015. 
502 Which applies to motor accidents that occurred on or after 1 August 2015 
503 See clause 3 of the Principal Agreement 
504 Whose role is now exercised by the Secretary of State for Transport 
505 See clause 4(2) supra 
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discharges its role.  The Department of Transport have confirmed that the 
Principal Agreement is still in effect506.   
As indicated above, it is commonly perceived that the MIB’s classification as an 
emanation of the state is a pivotal requirement.  The answer is said to determine 
whether private individuals can rely upon the legal rights conferred on them by 
Article 10 of the Directive in legal proceedings against the MIB507.  If they can 
then this would entitle them to invite the court to disregard much of the present 
non conformity with the Directive that peppers our national provision508 that is 
supposed to guarantee compensatory protection of motor accident victims but 
which all too often serves to obstruct them from accessing their basic legal rights 
conferred under European law.   
Part of the difficulty in making a correct attribution is due to the imprecision 
associated with what is meant by an “emanation of state”.  The term is not an 
autonomous European law term or principle.  It is more of a means to an end – 
an empirically derived shorthand developed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) to define a person or organisation that is not part of 
central government but which is nevertheless so closely connected with a state 
controlled public service as to justify extending the special rule that enables 
individuals to benefit from the rights conferred on them by the directive itself as 
though it been fully transposed into national law.  This doctrine is intended to 
prevent member states from evading liability for failing to properly implement a 
directive by outsourcing or otherwise delegating its obligations under that 
directive to a third party and then washing its hands of all responsibility.  In 
consequence, emanation of state status has something of an elusive “‘I know it 
when I see it” 509 quality that is easy to miss if one adopts an overly formulaic 
approach.  This is why it is necessary to open our enquiry with a review of first 
principles on state liability.  
                                               
506 It is unclear on what basis precisely it could be enforced as many if not all of the 
original contracting parties have since changed.  It was still mentioned in the recitals to 
every MIB Agreement prior to 2003 but not thereafter 
507 See below under the heading “On the role entrusted to the Article 10 compensating 
body” 
508 Including the relevant primary and secondary legislation as well as the minister’s 
private law agreements with the MIB itself 
509 Per Mr Justice Potter Stewart, in his Supreme Court judgment in Jacobellis v Ohio 
378 U.S. 184 (1964) 
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This paper challenges prevailing judicial orthodoxy that the MIB is not an 
emanation of state.  Furthermore, it also challenges the assumption that it is 
necessary to demonstrate that the MIB itself is under the control of the state as a 
precondition of the Directive having direct effect.  This paper offers a modified 
approach to deciding the latter issue.  It argues that the proper focus of any 
enquiry into the direct effect of the Directive against the MIB should centre on the 
public service devolved, as opposed to the organisation charged with its 
performance.  There is however an obvious overlap between the two, especially 
in view of the MIB’s origin as a body set up specifically to compensate victims of 
uninsured drivers, so it is important to have a basic understanding of what kind 
of its constitution and activities. 
The MIB has a surprisingly diverse range of commercial and public service 
interests.  Its extensive scope of operations has a chimera-like quality that makes 
it difficult to categorise simply.  The MIB is a not for profit organisation, in keeping 
with its public service ethos.  However its CEO is a highly innovative and the 
organisation is involved in a number of commercial undertakings.   
The MIB’s annual reports indicate that it provides training, auditing, compliance 
and management services.  Presumably the revenues generated by these 
enterprises are applied to offset its operating costs, serving ultimately to reduce 
the amount of the levy it imposes on its members to fund the two compensatory 
schemes it is tasked with managing.   
Against this, according to the Chairman’s opening statement in its 2014 annual 
report, the MIB has a “strategic aim of achieving a reduction in the level and 
impact of uninsured driving in the UK coupled with ensuring that the victims of 
uninsured and ‘hit and run’ drivers receive fair and prompt compensation”.  This 
openly articulated public service role is also borne out by the way it works in 
partnership with various government departments and agencies (primarily the 
Department for Transport and the Ministry of Justice).  These activities include 
anti-fraud initiatives, managing the Claims Portal, playing a significant role in 
developing and managing the Medco Scheme510, managing the Employers’ 
                                               
510 That regulates the commissioning and disclosure of medical reports in soft tissue 
injury claims introduced under the Ministry of Justice’s Pre-Action Protocol for Low 
Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents 
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Liability Tracing Office, operating a helpline to assist the police identify whether 
vehicles are insured, developing and operating askCUE511, and it acts as the UK 
appointed body to maintain the Insurance Database512.  From this it will be 
appreciated that the MIB has diversified its activities significantly since its 
inception nearly seventy years ago, in 1946.   
The superior law governing the MIB’s compensatory role now derives from 
Europe and is set out in the Directive.  This is considered later under “On the role 
entrusted to the Article 10 body”. 
The MIB is a consortium owned and managed by the multi-billion pound motor 
insurance sector, where licence to operate is made conditional upon membership 
and where each member is obliged to pay a hefty contribution every year to its 
levy.  Allied to this is the MIB’s close and extensive working relationship with the 
government in the fields of activity identified above which allows it to act akin to, 
if not in actuality, as a quasi motor insurers’ civil service and a very effective 
lobbyist of its members’ interests.   
The MIB has extensive and exclusive links with central government in keeping 
with its important role; something not enjoyed by ordinary citizens.  A recent 
Freedom of Information Act request that sought to ascertain the extent of this 
relationship was declined on the ground that it would be too expensive to provide 
statistics even of high level contact between the government and the MIB.   
Account must also be taken of the MIB’s public law status conferred under: (i) 
under the Green Card Scheme, incepted in 1949, where the MIB acts as the UK’s 
handling bureau tasked with compensating victims of foreign drivers by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe, and its membership of the Council 
De Bureau and (ii) the additional European law roles it has assumed under the 
Directive.  As to the latter, see below under “On the role entrusted to the Article 
10 compensating body”. 
This paper argues that any properly informed court should recognise the MIB for 
what it is: a public body charged with an important public service that is under the 
control of the state and for which purpose it is conferred with special powers; and 
                                               
511 This is an online service that enables claimant representatives to check the number 
of previous personal injury claims made by their clients 
512 Which member states are required to maintain under the Directive 
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that the current narrative that presents the MIB as no more than a private 
independent contractor is overly simplistic.   
Yet another difficulty with classifying the MIB’s proper legal status has to do with 
the way previous forensic enquiry has placed far too great an emphasis on the 
nature of the MIB itself (the legal formalities associated with the way it operates, 
the degree of control exerted over it by the State in its day to day affairs, its special 
powers and so forth), all arguably at the expense of any sufficient analysis of its 
public service role as a state authorised compensating body discharging the role 
set out in Article 10 of the Directive.  The debate as to whether the MIB is an 
emanation of state risks obscuring a proper European consistent analysis that 
depends on superior European law principles being applied independently of this 
ambiguous labelling.  
Accordingly, the author’s analysis will open by identifying the relevant European 
law governing state liability for infringements of directives and how this has been 
extended to embrace certain organisations so closely connected to the state to 
warrant, at least for these purposes, being identified with it for the purposes of 
direct effect.  It will review the European and national jurisprudence on the 
conditions necessary for direct vertical effect to apply before moving on to 
address the legal position of the MIB itself, both on Flaux J’s own terms513 and 
independently thereof.   
 
First principles on state liability 
It is a commonplace and fundamental principle of European law that directives 
are addressed to the member states and that it is the responsibility of each 
member state to implement a directive’s objectives into its national law514.  
Member states have a treaty obligation “to achieve the result envisaged by a 
directive and their duty ....is to take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation...”515   
                                               
513 Whose primary focus was on the nature of the MIB as opposed to the public service 
devolved to it 
514 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] CJEU Case 14/83 
515 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] CJEU Case 
222/84, para 6 
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The directive requires every member state to implement into its own law the rights 
it confers on individuals but it does not automatically entitle the intended 
beneficiaries to rely on those provisions in their home court.  Consequently, a 
claimant’s first recourse is to look to the national law implementation of the 
directive for his or her legal remedy.  Unfortunately, the UK’s transposition of the 
Directive is riddled with defects that detract from the minimum standard of 
compensatory protection prescribed by its provisions516.  It is also well known that 
where a directive’s objectives have not been properly implemented a claimant 
may be able to argue for a European law consistent interpretation of the defective 
national law, in so far as this is possible517.  Failing that, an individual may in 
certain prescribed circumstances claim damages against the member state under 
Francovich518 principles for the loss caused by its failure to fully implement the 
directive’s objective.   
Unfortunately, as intimated above, our national courts have an inconsistent track 
record in delivering a purposive construction of the UK’s implementation of the 
Directive and Francovich action can be fraught with difficulty.     
The principle of state liability for loss and damage caused to individuals by a 
breach of EU law is inherent to EU Treaty law519.  This is a fundamental doctrine 
of which the principles of state liability under Francovich and direct effect of 
directives under Foster v British Gas 520 are subordinate manifestations.  The 
following extract from the CJEU ruling in Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt 
521 explains this: 
                                               
516 See the author’s earlier article, Mind The Gap!, British Insurance Law Association 
Journal February 2016 
517 See Aikens LJ’s helpful analysis of the principles applied by the UK courts to the 
consistent construction in Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson 
and Tracy Evans v Equity and Secretary of State for Transport [2012] EWCA Civ 1166, 
see Part VI of the judgment: Principles of interpretation of national laws which are 
based on EU Directives 
518 Francovich and Others [1991] CJEU Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90; See the 
footnote to this case above in the Preface alluding to these difficulties. 
519 See Francovich para 35 
520 Foster and others v British Gas plc [1990] CJEU Case C-188/89 
521 Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] CJEU (Case 8/81),followed in 
Francovich paras 11 and 12 
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“21 .....that whilst under Article 189522 regulations are directly applicable 
and, consequently, by their nature capable of producing direct effects, that 
does not mean that other categories of measures covered by that article 
can never produce similar effects.  
22 It would be incompatible with the binding effect which Article 189 
ascribes to directives to exclude in principle the possibility of the 
obligations imposed by them being relied on by persons concerned.  
23 Particularly in cases in which the Community authorities have, by 
means of a directive, placed Member States under a duty to adopt a 
certain course of action, the effectiveness of such a measure would be 
diminished if persons were prevented from relying upon it in proceedings 
before a court and national courts were prevented from taking it into 
consideration as an element of Community law523.  
24 Consequently, a Member State which has not adopted the 
implementing measures required by the directive within the prescribed 
period may not plead, as against individuals, its own failure to perform the 
obligations which the directive entails. Thus, wherever the provisions of a 
directive appear, as far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be 
unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may, in the 
absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed period, 
be relied upon as against any national provision which is incompatible with 
the directive or in so far as the provisions define rights which individuals 
are able to assert against the State.” 
 
A modified principle 
Accordingly, the principle by which a directive can be said to have direct effect 
against a state is an exception to the basic rule524.  To be exercised, the nature 
                                               
522 Referring to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, Article 198 Maastricht consolidated 
version 
523 See also Francovich para 32 which requires national courts, where they have 
jurisdiction, to give full effect to EU law and to protect the rights it confers on individuals 
524 Mustill LJ provides a clear explanation for the basic rule in Doughty v Rolls Royce 
Plc [1991] EWCA Civ 15. In para 10 he states: “It is axiomatic that an individual cannot 
rely on the Directive merely by asserting rights against another individual which would 
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of the right conferred under that directive must satisfy the following threshold 
criteria: first it must be a right conferred on individuals; second, it must be 
unconditional and sufficiently precise to enable a court to determine what rights 
have been conferred, and finally there must be a direct causal link between the 
state’s failure to implement the directive and the loss sustained525.   
The way such state liability works is analogous to the common law principle of 
estoppel.  However in this instance, individuals gain a positive right to rely on the 
rights conferred on them by a directive, against the State, on the basis that a 
State is prevented from relying on incompatible national provisions perpetuated 
by its own failure to fully implement the directive conferring those rights526. 
There can be little, if any, doubt that Articles 3 and 10 of the Directive satisfy 
these threshold conditions.  Article 3 requires every member state “to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles 
normally based in its territory is covered by insurance”527.   
The comprehensive nature of this obligation was self-evident from the language 
of the wording of the Directive’s predecessors in 1990528, if not earlier.  Any 
scintilla of doubt both as to its meaning and the high importance placed on the 
legislative objective of protecting individuals was removed following the CJEU’s 
ruling in Bernaldez529 in 1996.  A raft of CJEU rulings have since endorsed 
Bernaldez, culminating in the most recent judgment in Vnuk v Triglav 530 in 2014.  
Indeed it is hard to envisage how any serious challenge could now be raised in 
this regard.  
In 2006 the CJUE ruled in Farrell531 that Article 1 of the Third Directive on motor 
insurance (90/232/EEC) satisfied the threshold criteria for direct effect532.  That 
                                               
be secured to him if the European legislation had been domestically put into effect. It is 
the fact that the Member State is itself relying on the disconformity as against the 
individual which brings the doctrine into play.” 
525 Francovich para 11 
526 Becker para 25 
527 Article 10 is considered below 
528 The year in which the third European directive on motor insurance (90/232/EEC) 
was approved 
529 Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] CJEU (Case C-129/94) 
530 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d.d., [Case C-162/13] 
531 Farrell v Whitty & MIB [Case C-356/05] 
532 Farrell, para 37 
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provision, now consolidated in Article 12.1 of the Directive, extends the benefit of 
the Article 3 insurance obligation to “passengers other than the driver, arising out 
of the use of a vehicle”.  Article 10 defines the role of the compensating body 
which every member state must adopt or incept with the object of compensating 
victims of uninsured and unidentified vehicles at least up to the limits of the Article 
3 insurance obligation533.   
An extended exception 
Where many commentators and members of the judiciary are less certain is 
whether the MIB is subject to the doctrine of direct effect; the broad consensus is 
that it isn’t.  Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to review the 
way state liability for failing to properly implement a directive has been extended, 
so as to embrace organisations that are not part of central government. 
The principle in Becker has been applied in a number of important CJEU 
judgments including, most notably, Marshall v Southampton and South-West 
Hampshire Area Health Authority534 and Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary535 and Foster and others v British Gas plc.536.   All three of 
these cases were referred for preliminary rulings from the UK and featured claims 
by individuals affected by the defective implementation of the Equal Treatment 
Directive537 . 
In Marshall, The CJEU applied the doctrine to a local health authority and 
ruled that once this doctrine was triggered the concept of direct effect was 
indivisible, so that: 
“....  where a person involved in legal proceedings is able to rely on a 
directive as against the State he may do so regardless of the capacity in 
which the latter is acting, whether employer or public authority. In either 
                                               
533 This equally unconditional and precise provision is considered in more detail below. 
534 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1993] 
CJEU Case C-271/91  
535 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] CJEU Case 
222/84 
536 Foster and others v British Gas plc. [1990] CJEU Case C-188/89 
537 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions 
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case it is necessary to prevent the State from taking advantage of its own 
failure to comply with Community law”538. 
Accordingly the CJEU ruled in Marshall that no distinction was to be drawn in this 
respect between the actions of a public authority in the discharge of its public 
service role, in this case acting as an area health authority, and its private 
arrangements with its employees. 
In the Johnston case the Equal Treatment Directive was adjudged capable of 
having direct effect against the chief constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 
notwithstanding the fact that his office was constitutionally independent of state 
control.  The court ruled:  
“....an official responsible for the direction of the police service.  Whatever 
its relations may be with other organs of the state, such a public authority, 
charged by the state with the maintenance of public order and safety, does 
not act as a private individual. It may not take advantage of the failure of 
the state, of which it is an emanation, to comply with Community law". 
The significance of Marshall and Johnston lies in the way they extended the 
application of this doctrine beyond what many would consider to be central 
government or state authorities.  This development is explained by Advocate-
General van Gerven in his opinion of 8 May 1990 in Foster.  Although the court 
did not apply the test he recommended539 for determining the direct effect of a 
directive, his legal analysis on state liability is so eloquent as to warrant repetition 
in full: 
“...the point of departure must be the reasoning lying behind the Marshall 
and Johnston cases: a Member State, but also any other public body 
charged with a particular duty by the Member State from which it derives 
its authority, should not be allowed to benefit from the failure of the 
Member State to implement the relevant provision of a directive in national 
law.  That, however, raises the question how far the expressions "public 
body", "charged with a particular duty" and "from which it derives its 
authority" precisely extend.  Moreover, it is not entirely possible to give 
                                               
538 Marshall, para 46 
539 One that focused on the degree of State control influenced over the organisation 
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those expressions a precise Community meaning: whether someone 
forms part of the government, whether a particular duty is a public duty 
and whether someone derives his authority from the State (whether or not 
in the sense that he exercises authority delegated by the State) are difficult 
matters to define, and their meaning differs significantly not just from one 
Member State to another and within each Member State from one period 
to another but also in Community law, in so far as they are used there, 
according to the matter in issue. 
In the cases I have referred to, the Court did not attempt to define those 
concepts in the abstract, and I think it was right not to do so.  
Nevertheless it appears from those cases that the concept of a public 
body must be understood very broadly and that all bodies which 
pursuant to the constitutional structure of a Member State can exercise 
any authority over individuals fall within the concept of "the State ". In that 
respect it is immaterial how that authority (which I shall call public 
authority) is organized and how the various bodies which exercise 
that authority are related .  In the light of the Marshall, Johnston and 
Costanzo judgments (and the judgment in Auer (43) which preceded them) 
there can be no doubt that they all fall under the concept of "the State", 
and there is no need for any criterion of delegation or control by other 
public authorities.  That much is certain.”540      [emphasis 
added] 
  
                                               
540 See para 21 of Advocate General van Gerven’s opinion in Foster 
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Emanations of the state or public bodies by another name 
This then begs the question: what other organisations are caught by the Becker541 
principle?  As this is primarily a question of fact it is left to the national courts of 
each member state to make a determination542.  It is, as we shall see, a concept 
that is capable of extending beyond the conventional state apparatus such as the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary.  It has the potential to include all the 
organs of state including public bodies, local authorities and agencies employed 
by the state.   
Even so, this only takes us so far.  Epithets such as “public body”543, “public 
authority”544, “state agency”545 and “emanation of the state”546 tend to be used 
interchangeably in this context as convenient pegs on which to hang the concept 
of a public entity fixed with the extended application of the Becker exception that 
confers direct effect of a directive.  Furthermore, they are not free-standing 
precisely defined concepts.  For example, whilst “public authority” is given a 
highly prescriptive definition in the context of the Freedom Of Access To 
Information Directive547 the same term is used in a different and more colloquial 
sense in other contexts.   
In Doughty v Rolls-Royce Plc548 Mustill LJ noted the ambiguity associated with 
the concept of “emanation of state”.  He said that it has one meaning in public 
international law and he thought quite possibly another in the context of a body 
potentially fixed with direct effect in this context.  That led him to question whether 
this term was helpful at all.  He recommended the simple expedient of sticking to 
the test laid down by the CJEU in Foster, which incidentally makes no reference 
to emanations of the state549.  However, it should be noted that an overly rigid 
adherence to the Foster test goes against the grain of European jurisprudence 
                                               
541 Supra 
542 Foster and others v British Gas plc. [1990] CJEU Case C-188/89, para 15 
543 Used interchangeably with public authority in the Opinion of Mr Advocate General 
Van Gerven’s in Foster, para 21 
544 Foster v British Gas [1991] 2 A.C. 306, per Templeman LJ para 1 
545 See Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15, para 82 
546 Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB), paras 48 
and 57 
547 See Article 2(2) of the Freedom Of Access To Information Directive (2003/4/EC) 
548 Doughty v Rolls-Royce Plc [1992] IRLR 126 CA 
549 Doughty, para 29 
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and in particular the way the CJEU has consistently striven to avoid a formulaic 
approach to this issue550. 
The European law approach is governed by principle not form.  Whilst the 
principle of subsidiary means that the European Union will not interfere in the way 
member states organise themselves551, this must not be at the expense of 
undermining the effectiveness of its legislation and the state’s Treaty obligations.  
Thus in Evans v Secretary of State for Transport and the MIB the CJEU described 
the MIB as a “public authority” and held that it did not matter that the Secretary of 
State had chosen to implement what is now the Article 10 obligation to 
compensate victims of uninsured and unidentified vehicles by means of a private 
law agreement.  What mattered was that the compensatory guarantees conferred 
under Article 10’s predecessor552 could be accessed by victims from that body 
directly553.  The court went on to declare that “...it is for each Member State to 
ensure that individuals obtain reparation for loss and damage caused to them by 
non-compliance with Community law, whichever public authority is responsible 
for the breach and whichever public authority is in principle, under the law of the 
Member State concerned, responsible for making reparation”.   
In this the CJEU relied on an earlier ruling, in Klaus Konle v Republik 
Österreich554, to the effect that member states must ensure that individuals are 
able to obtain compensation caused by a failure to comply with EU law, whichever 
public authority is responsible555.  That same court also declared that a “member 
state cannot, therefore, plead the distribution of powers and responsibilities 
between the bodies which exist in its national legal order in order to free itself 
from liability on that basis”.556  
It will be recalled that the Becker exception is capable of applying to a body that 
is constitutionally independent of the State, as in Johnston.   
The Foster guidance on direct effect 
                                               
550 See the extract from Advocate-General van Gerven’s opinion in Foster, cited above 
551 Evans v SoS for Transport and MIB [2003] CJEU Case C-63/01 
552 Article 1(4) of Directive 84/5/EEC 
553 Evans, para 34, see also the CJEU’s comments in Francovich at para 17 
554 Klaus Konle v Republik Österreich [1999] CJEU Case C-302/97 
555 Konle, para 62 
556 Konle, para 63; applied in Haim v. Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein 
[2000] CJEU (Case 424/97) [2002] 1 CMLR 247, para 28 
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Notwithstanding the CJEU’s reluctance to devise a definitive test for determining 
whether a defectively implemented directive has direct effect against a given 
organisation, it has been asked for guidance on at least three occasions.   
The chief authority is the CJEU’s judgment in Foster and others v British Gas557 
in which it sets out the factors to be considered when deciding whether a body 
was capable of being subject to the direct effect exception.  The leading UK 
authority is also conveniently to be found the same case558 where Templeman LJ 
elaborated on the CJEU approach to the fact-finding exercise when it returned to 
the House of Lords from the CJEU in 1991.    
In Foster, the CJEU was asked by the House of Lords to provide a preliminary 
ruling on whether Council Directive 76/207/EEC on equal treatment was directly 
applicable against a publicly owned utility company like the British Gas 
Corporation.  Although the Court left it to the national courts to make its finding of 
fact it provided guidance on the approach to be taken when determining the kind 
of public body subject to the direct effect of a directive.   
Although the CJEU adopted a different test to that recommended by the Advocate 
General559 it was clearly influenced by his analysis of the relevant European 
jurisprudence, beginning with Becker.  The key passages in Foster are important 
enough to be recited in full: 
“18 On the basis of those considerations560, the Court has held in a series 
of cases that unconditional and sufficiently precise provisions of a directive 
could be relied on against organizations or bodies which were subject to 
the authority or control of the State or had special powers beyond those 
which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between 
individuals.  
19 The Court has accordingly held that provisions of a directive could be 
relied on against tax authorities (the judgments in Case 8/81 Becker, cited 
above, and in Case C-221/88 ECSC v Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni (in 
                                               
557 Foster and others v British Gas plc. [1990] CJEU Case C-188/89 
558 Foster v British Gas [1991] 2 A.C. 306 
559 We have already had cause to note the opinion of Mr Advocate General Van Gerven 
in this case, see above   
560 i.e. of the need to prevent member states from taking advantage of their own failure 
to comply with Community law 
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liquidation) [1990] ECR I-495), local or regional authorities (judgment in 
Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839), 
constitutionally independent authorities responsible for the maintenance 
of public order and safety (judgment in Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief 
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651), and public 
authorities providing public health services (judgment in Case 152/84 
Marshall, cited above).  
20 It follows from the foregoing that a body, whatever its legal form, which 
has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the 
State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has 
for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal 
rules applicable in relations between individuals is included in any event 
among the bodies against which the provisions of a directive capable of 
having direct effect may be relied upon.” 
.... 
22 The answer to the question referred by the House of Lords must 
therefore be that Article 5(1) of Council Directive 76/207 of 9 February 
1976 may be relied upon in a claim for damages against a body, whatever 
its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure 
adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of 
the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which 
result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals.” 
        [Emphasis added] 
It will be observed that there is an apparent discrepancy here.  On the one hand, 
at paragraph 18 the Court summarises the earlier authorities as propounding that 
the Becker principle is capable of applying to organisations which are either (i) 
subject to the authority or control of the State or (ii) have special powers.  The 
criteria are clearly presented as alternatives and there is no mention of the 
organisation needing to fulfil a public service.  On the other hand, at paragraphs 
20 and 22, the criteria feature the provision of a public service and more to the 
point, in what is the operative part of the judgment, we are given three seemingly 
cumulative components.  The body subject to direct effect must: (i) perform a 
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public service, (ii) which service is under the control of the state and (iii) for which 
the body possesses special powers.   
These textual inconsistencies have caused a certain amount of controversy about 
whether this guideline criteria is to be read as offering alternative qualifying 
scenarios or whether they are to be applied as a composite check list.  Further 
doubt was caused by the CJEU’s judgment in Kampelmann v 
Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe561 where it applied the criteria as 
alternatives rather than as a composite.  However, Kamplemann does not appear 
to have been followed by the CJEU elsewhere.     
Schiemann LJ provides an illuminating analysis of the rationale underscoring the 
Foster criteria, one that also uses the term “emanation of the state”, in National 
Union of Teachers v The Governing Body of St Mary’.  At paragraph 15 he 
explains: 
“The ECJ has not promulgated a formula which can be applied to all 
situations. It has preferred to adopt the approach of the common law and 
of the French Conseil d'Etat of moving from case to case to establish 
principles and refine them as it goes along. Most of the case law has been 
developed on references to the ECJ under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. 
The only ineluctable task of the ECJ on such a reference is to provide a 
ruling in sufficiently wide terms to enable the national court to reach a 
decision in the case in which the reference was made. There is a perpetual 
tension between the desirability of legal certainty which militates towards 
the laying down of broadly framed rules and the desire to move cautiously 
and to take stock of the effect of rulings. It is also important to remember 
that while the decision whether or not a particular body is properly 
regarded as an emanation of the state is a matter for the national court, 
the proper development of the Community requires that all national courts 
should proceed upon the same principles when applying Community law”. 
The issue as to whether all three of the Foster criteria must each be established 
as essential preconditions to direct effect is the subject of an ongoing referral to 
                                               
561 Kampelmann v Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe [1997] CJEU Joined cases C-
253/96, C-254/96, C-255/96, C-256/96, C-257/96 and C-258/96. 
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the CJEU made on 27 July 2015 by the Irish Supreme Court in Farrell v Whitty562.  
The Supreme Court also asked whether there is “a fundamental principle 
underlying the separate factors identified in that decision which a court should 
apply in reasoning an assessment as to whether a specified body is an emanation 
of the State?”  This case is proving to be something of a saga563.  It is the second 
referral to the CJEU in a case that has rumbled on for over a decade.   
The facts of Farrell justify a digression from our consideration of Foster because 
of its particular relevantce to the MIB. 
An Irish digression 
This first reference to the CJEU in Farrell564 occurred back in 2006.  It concerned 
Article 1 of the Third Directive on motor insurance565 which provides that the 
compulsory insurance required by Article 3(1) of the First Directive566 must cover 
liability for personal injuries to all passengers, other than the driver, arising out of 
the use of a vehicle.   
The Farrell case facts are worth recounting.  They featured a passenger who was 
seriously injured whilst travelling as a passenger in the loading bay of a small van 
that was only fitted with seating in the front.  The driver was uninsured and 
furthermore, the national law provision in the Republic did not require compulsory 
third party cover for those parts of a vehicle not designed or equipped with 
seating.  She presented a claim for compensation to the Irish Republic’s Article 
10 compensating body, the Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland (MIBI), who rejected 
her claim.  They relied on the fact that the MIBI’s agreement with the Irish 
Republic only required it to compensate victims in circumstances where the 
statutory compulsory third party insurance requirement applied.  As this appeared 
to conflict with the Article 3 insurance requirement the case was ultimately 
referred by the Irish High Court to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on two 
                                               
562 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty & MIB [2015] CJEU Case C-413/15 
563 One of the three questions raised in Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, The Minister for the 
Environment, Ireland and the Attorney General, Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland Case 
C-413/15 is whether the different elements listed in Foster are to be read conjunctively 
or disjunctively 
564 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty & MIB [1996] CJEU Case C-356/05 
565 Council Directive 90/232, now now Article 12(1) of the Directive 
566 Nor Article 3(1) of the Directive 
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questions in order to determine the extent of the insurance requirement imposed 
by the Directive.   
The Court answered the first question by ruling that a national law that restricted 
compulsory third party cover to those parts of a vehicle that had been designed 
and constructed with seating accommodation for passengers did not comply with 
Article 1 of the Third Directive567.  This was because member states did not have 
any legislative discretion to exclude persons from the protection afforded to 
passengers by the Directive.  On the second question it ruled that the obligation 
in Article 1 was capable of having direct effect against the Irish State.   
However, on the thorny issue as to whether this European law provision could 
also be relied on directly by an individual in the national courts against the MIBI, 
the court referred the case back to the Irish court to make the finding of fact, after 
restating the Foster formula as a cumulative test:  
“a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, 
pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service 
under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers 
beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations 
between individuals.”  
When this issue was tried by Birmingham J in Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty568, he 
applied the guidance in Foster and found that Article 1 of the Third Directive was 
directly effective against the MIBI as an emanation of state.  The trial judge’s 
comprehensive review of the CJEU, Irish and UK jurisprudence on direct effect 
deserves careful reading.  Ms Farrell duly recovered her compensation without 
further ado.    
The ongoing dispute is something of a battle of Titans over who is ultimately 
liable.  Is the Irish Republic responsible for failing to properly implement the 
Directive? Alternatively, is it the MIBI, on the basis that its role is prescribed by 
directly effective European law, regardless of whatever private law agreements 
subsist between it and the Irish State?  The outcome has major implications, 
                                               
567 Which expressly includes passengers within the concept of third parties intended to 
be protected by Article 3 cover, this is now consolidated within Article 12 of the 
Directive 
568 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, the Minister for the Environment, Ireland and the 
Attorney General and the Motor Insurance Bureau of Ireland [2008] IEHC 124 
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especially following the CJEU’s landmark ruling in Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica 
Triglav d.d.569 which has exposed both the Irish and UK governments’ 
transposition of the geographic and mechanical scope570 of the Directive’s 
insurance requirement as being defective571.  Not only is the remit of the Article 
10 compensating bodies in each state inadequate, but millions of motor policies 
in both jurisdictions fail to comply with the unqualified and holistic scope of the 
Directive in this respect.   
The Foster guidance continued 
Returning now to Foster, when that case was referred back to the House of Lords 
in 1991572, Templeman LJ provided the only reasoned opinion.  It is notable that 
he tested the role of the respondent gas company by all three of the Foster 
criteria, namely: (i) public service, (ii) control by the state and (iii) special powers.   
The first characteristic was fairly self-evidently present as the defendant was a 
publicly owned utility company, so no determination was required there.   
As to the second and third criteria, he warned against a narrow or strained 
interpretation of either of these terms.  He explained: “I decline to apply the ruling 
of the European Court of Justice, couched in terms of broad principle and 
purposive language characteristic of Community law in a manner which is, for 
better or worse, sometimes applied to enactments of the United Kingdom 
Parliament”.   
On the issue of control, he ruled that although the defendant had day to day 
control over its own affairs that did not render it independent, it was under the 
control of the state because not only was the minister able to give the company 
general and even specific directions but the company was accountable to him in 
                                               
569 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d.d., [2014] CJEU Case C-162/13 
570 In both jurisdictions the primary legislation confines the scope of compulsory third 
party cover to public property and to vehicles intended or adapted for use on roads, 
which is inconsistent with the Vnuk 
571 Both the Irish (Road Traffic Act 1961) and UK statutory provisions permit motor 
insurers to qualify the cover provided for third party motor claims, save where expressly 
nullified. This conflicts with the unqualified free standing nature of the insurance 
requirement, see section 62(c) RTA 1961 and Ward LJ’s judgment in EUI v Bristol 
Alliance Partnership Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 on the necessary implication of 
sections, 148, 151(2)(b) and 151(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which this author 
critiqued in “Marking The Boundary” JPIL issue 3 of 2013 
572 Foster v British Gas plc [1991] 2 A.C. 306 
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those respects.  This approach suggests that it is important not to be misled by 
form but to take into account the substance of the relationship.  Obscured soft 
power and influence can be just as potent a lever as other forms of documented 
control, although there could be some difficulty in establishing that in court.   
On the third criteria he described the corporation’s monopoly as “a special power 
which could not have resulted from transactions between individuals”.  In this he 
took account of the CJEU ruling in Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary573 which also concerned the Equal Treatment Directive574 
and whether it had direct effect against a chief constable in Northern Ireland.  The 
court had ruled that regardless of the way in which the police service interacted 
with other organs of the state, “as a public authority, charged by the state with 
the maintenance of public order and safety, [it] does not act as a private 
individual”.  As such, it could not be allowed “to take advantage of the failure of 
the state, of which it is an emanation, to comply with Community law.”  This 
reveals the CJEU’s consistent concern with substance over form575 when it 
comes to applying the Becker principle.    
In Foster the House of Lords reached the unanimous decision that the directive 
was directly effective against the British Gas Corporation.   
Incidentally it is important to note that neither the CJEU nor the House of Lords 
felt it necessary to categorise the defendant as an “emanation of state”.  This 
suggests that the term is no more than a convenient label that has become 
associated with Foster’s non-exhaustive list of criteria (one that is itself intended 
merely to serve as a yardstick) when approaching the task of identifying which 
organisations are so closely connected with the State as to confer direct effect of 
a directive under the Becker principle. 
Templeman LJ’s analysis, excellent as it is, has a potentially misleading 
characteristic in common with the CJEU judgment in that case.  It has to do with 
the unusually homogeneous nature of British Gas.  Not only was it a state owned 
monopoly but to all intents and purposes it supplied one product: gas.  Whilst it 
                                               
573 Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1987] CJEU Case 
222/84 
574 Council Directive (76/207/E.E.C.) 
575 See the first sentence in para 20 of the CJEU’s judgment in Foster, quoted above 
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can be presumed that this entailed numerous individual components, such as the 
supply, delivery, installation, maintenance and servicing of boilers and burners, 
these were all subsidiary to its core business of supplying gas.  Unfortunately, 
this led this learned judge to refer to the organisation and its public service in 
almost synonymous terms: 
“... I can see no justification for a narrow or strained construction of the 
ruling of the European Court of Justice which applies to a body “under the 
control of the State” ... Similarly, I can see no justification for a narrow or 
strained construction of the ruling of the European Court of Justice which 
applies to a body which has “special powers beyond those which result 
from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals.” 
The problem with this passage is twofold.  First, there are very few organisations 
possessing the monolithic monoculture of the kind to be found in pre-privatised 
British Gas, which arguably militates against the unqualified application of this 
House of Lords’ ruling in today’s less centralised economy.  This is particularly 
relevant if we are to apply the criteria to a diverse and multifaceted entity such as 
the MIB.  Secondly, as we have seen above the CJEU’s emphasis in paragraphs 
20 and 22 is on the public service role as opposed to the organisation delivering 
it. 
Other UK authorities 
The next UK authority is a Court of Appeal decision which featured, yet again, 
the Equal Treatment Directive but this time the defendant was Rolls Royce, a 
privately owned commercial enterprise, which was accused of running a 
discriminatory pension policy that infringed the directive.  In Doughty v Rolls-
Royce Plc576 the only reasoned judgment is provided by Mustill LJ which provides 
further helpful insight into the approach to be taken when applying the Foster 
criteria.  All three criteria were considered.  He was prepared to accept a prima 
facie case for the company being subject to a degree of state control.  However, 
he was unable to accept that this commercial enterprise discharged a public 
service or had special powers.  Consequently, although the directive satisfied the 
threshold criteria for direct effect against the State, that doctrine did not apply to 
                                               
576 Doughty v Rolls-Royce Plc [1992] IRLR 126 CA 
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a commercial entity like Rolls Royce.  He rejected the appellant’s assertion that 
the control test alone was sufficient to trigger the doctrine.   
Mustill LJ’s judgment is also of interest because he also expressed doubts as to 
the reliability of terms such as “emanation of the state”.577  Furthermore, in 
applying the Foster criteria it was clearly the function discharged by the company 
that was the focus of his attention, as the following excerpt reveals:   
“... it must follow that the doctrine can be relied upon in a case such as the 
present only if the acts of the entity against which the individual proceeds 
are in some sense to be regarded as the acts of the Member State”578. 
Even more significant are Mustill LJ’s observations about the status of the criteria 
laid down by the CJEU in Foster.  His view (one endorsed by his fellow Lord 
Justices) was that the Foster test was not intended to provide the answer to every 
category of case.  He cited the phrase “...is included among...” in paragraph 20 
its judgment to denote that other factors may be relevant.  He then ruled that 
although the Foster criteria must always be a starting point and it will often be a 
finishing point of any analysis, the absence of one of the three factors is not 
automatically fatal to a positive diagnosis.  However, where one of the factors is 
missing, then it will be necessary to identify some other suitable characteristic not 
contemplated by the formula before the Marshall principle can be brought into 
play. 
Two further UK authorities provide a useful gloss on our national law approach to 
applying the Foster criteria, extending the Becker doctrine of direct effect.   
In Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd 579 Blackburne J found that the 
Collective Redundancies Directive580 75/129 had direct effect against a privatised 
public utility company despite his finding that it was not subject to the direct 
control by the state.  It was nevertheless responsible for providing a public service 
under the supervision of the state where it had special powers not enjoyed by 
ordinary individuals, such as to impose hosepipe bans.  On the control condition, 
                                               
577 “...although the concept of an 'emanation of the statestate' is an important feature of 
public international law, I am not wholly satisfied that it has the same meaning in the 
field with which we are here concerned.” Per Mustill LJ, Doughty para 29 
578 Doughty, para 10 
579 Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15 
580 The Collective Redundancies Directive 75/129 (as amended by Directive 92/56) 
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he applied a teleological approach that focused on the function discharged by the 
organisation as opposed to the legal formalities involved.  In doing so he made 
the following helpful observations: 
“1. The question is not whether the body in question is under the control 
of the State but whether the public service in question is under the control 
of the State. 
2. The legal form of the body is irrelevant. 
3. The fact that the body is a commercial concern is also irrelevant. 
4. It is also irrelevant that the body does not carry out any of the traditional 
functions of the State and is not an agent of the State. 
5. It is irrelevant too that the State does not possess day-to-day control 
over the activities of the body.” 
In this author’s view this analysis is faultless, based as it is on the primary doctrine 
to be found in Becker and Marshall and from a proper, policy driven, appreciation 
of the CJEU’s judgment in Foster.   
NUT v St Mary’s581 casts additional light on the approach to be taken when 
applying what was described as a tri-partite test.  It turns on two of the criteria: 
state control and special powers.  The case arose out of the dismissal of three 
teachers where the employer’s board of governors had failed to consult, contrary 
to The Business Transfers Directive582.  The claimant appealed against the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT)’s decision dismissing the claim.  The 
tribunal took the view that the Becker doctrine of direct effect did not extend to a 
board of governors as: (i) they were too remotely connected with the State to be 
deemed to be under its control, notwithstanding that the supervising local 
education authority could properly be regarded as an emanation of the state and 
(ii) it possessed no special powers.  In doing so, the tribunal made the error of 
applying the kind of literal or checklist approach to the three criteria in Foster that 
the CJEU has been at pains to avoid.   
                                               
581 National Union of Teachers & Ors v The Governing Body of St Mary’s Church of 
England School [1997] IRLR 242 
582 The Business Transfers Directive 77/187 
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Schiemann LJ delivered the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal which 
overturned the EAT decision.  He held that the tribunal had been wrong to apply 
the triple test in Foster as though it were a statutory definition583.  The school was 
part of the State system, the governors were a public body charged by the State 
with running the school in keeping with the national curriculum and it was subject 
to the voluntary funding scheme.  The governors derived their powers from the 
authority of an executive order issued by the minister in the exercise of his 
statutory powers.  It was not necessary for the governors to be under the control 
of central government for them to satisfy Foster’s control criterion.   
Even more noteworthy is the Court of Appeal’s unanimous disregard of the 
absence of any special powers. It ruled that it was wrong to apply the tripartite 
Foster test as though it were a statutory definition. 
The NUT case confirms that when it comes to applying “the Foster criteria” it is 
important not to treat them as though they are inflexible statutory preconditions 
of direct effect, to be rigidly conformed to without regard to the underlying EU law 
principles in Becker from which they derive.  It should be borne in mind that the 
Foster criteria were formlated in the context of case featuring a state owned public 
utility company.  The core operating principle remains one of preventing the 
injustice caused to individuals by member states taking advantage of their own 
failure to comply with EU law as a defence584.  
The law in this area is fluid and probably still evolving.  As indicated above, a 
second reference has been made to the CJEU in Farrell585 by the Irish Supreme 
Court which asked the following questions:  First, are the three factors in the 
Foster test to be applied conjunctively or disjunctively? Second, is there a 
fundamental principle underscoring the Foster test which courts should also take 
into account?  Finally, is it sufficient that a broad measure of responsibility has 
been transferred to a body by a member state for the ostensible purpose of 
meeting obligations under European law for that body to be an emanation of the 
                                               
583 NUT v St Mary’s, para 41 
584 See para 49 Marshall v Southampton AHA [1986] Case C 152/84, see also Case 
14/83 Von Colson and Kamann V Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891 and 
Haim v. Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein (Case 424/97) [2000] E.C.R. I-
5123, paras 25 to 28 
585 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, The Minister for the Environment, Ireland and the 
Attorney General, Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland Case C-413/15 
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member state or is it necessary, that such a body additionally have (a) special 
powers or (b) operate under direct control or supervision of the member state?586 
In this author’s view the CJEU ruling is likely to continue to resist devising a rigid 
formula.  It is hoped and expected that the CJEU will refer to the Becker, Marshall 
and Johnston cases which refined the overlying principle and that it will 
emphasise the overriding importance of analysing the public service role as 
distinct from the organisation responsible for its discharge.  It seems unlikely to 
concur with the final proposition as a broad statement of principle as that would 
appear to go against the grain of its ruling in Foster. 
Conclusions on the correct principles 
Before we move on to consider the available evidence, it might be helpful to 
summarise these European law principles. 
The approach to determining whether an organisation is caught by the Becker 
exception, so as to make a directive directly effective against it, is a two stage 
enquiry.   
Stage one looks to the nature of the directive under consideration.  It examines 
whether the obligation imposed by the directive is sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional to trigger the Becker principle of direct effect against the state.  Only 
if that test is satisfied is it appropriate to move on.   
Stage two is to determine whether a particular organisation (not obviously part of 
central government) is subject to the direct effect of the directive, because either 
(i) the body is itself subject to the control or the state or has special powers or, (ii) 
where (as in the case of the MIB) it has been made responsible by the state for 
discharging a public service that is under the control of the state and for which it 
has special powers.  In the latter scenario, the nature of that entity itself is not 
actually the fulcrum of the enquiry.  In Foster, both the Advocate General and the 
CJEU were in agreement in saying that it is the public service discharged by the 
organisation that was the primary consideration. 
                                               
586 Professor Robert Merkin QC recently commented to the author that in his view it 
might have been better to have asked the CJEU to rule on whether emanation of the 
state status is a necessary characteristic of any authorised body discharging the role of 
compensating victims under Article 10 of the Directive 
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As to the second stage, Mustill LJ’s instruction in Doughty that it is always 
necessary to commence any analysis by considering the Foster criteria arguably 
places too much emphasis on guidance that is subordinate to the governing 
principles set out in the Advocate General Van Gerven’s helpful summary 
repeated above587.   Furthermore, whilst the CJEU in Foster is very authoritative, 
we are instructed by the Court of Appeal588 that Foster offers guidance that should 
not be applied strictly as though it were a statutory precondition.   
Foster is merely an indicator as to how to apply a superior principle in practice 
and it is one devised in response to the special facts of a case featuring a state 
owned public utility.  It is certainly true that if all three factors listed in Foster apply, 
then it is highly likely that the direct effect exception in Becker will extend to the 
body under consideration.  If one of the factors does not apply then it will be 
necessary to look to some other characteristic or circumstance that justifies 
extending Becker.   
It is important to avoid being distracted by formalities as this might jeopardise the 
teleological approach that is integral to the Becker exception.  Any construction 
which places too much emphasis on factors such as the constitutional set up of 
an organisation, its contractual arrangements and the degree of state control over 
the organisation (as opposed to the public service it performs) risks obscuring the 
true purpose of the exercise which is to prevent the state, including its 
emanations, from taking advantage of its failure to properly implement a directive.  
Such considerations may well be relevant but they are not determinative.  The 
Becker exception, as extended by Konle, Marshall and Foster, is partly about 
ensuring administrative probity by discouraging executive malfeasance589 and 
partly about ensuring that individual citizens receive fair treatment and redress 
under European law. 
It is also important not to attach too great a significance to legal jargon.  Terms 
such as “emanation of state”, “public body” or “public authority” can be elusively 
                                               
587 See under The Foster guidance continued 
588 In the NUT case, supra 
589 In the sense that it is intended to deny member states the ability to divest 
themselves of responsibility for complying with European law by devising ever more 
complicated circumlocutory devices to obstruct or otherwise frustrate access to rights 
conferred under European law on individuals. See Haim, para 28 
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amorphous when employed as a generally applicable term.  It is noteworthy the 
CJEU avoided this kind of restrictive labelling in Foster.   
The focus of the enquiry prescribed by Foster is on the public role or function 
entrusted to the organ, body or individual by the state; not the body itself.  The 
court should enquire: (i) whether the role or function devolved amounts to a public 
service; (ii) whether the state has the ability to control or influence the discharge 
of that service in any significant respect and (iii) whether the discharge of that 
function necessitates or otherwise involves the exercise of special powers 
beyond those ordinarily enjoyed by individuals.   
Where some of the Foster criteria are not present (as in the Griffin and the NUT 
cases) this is not fatal to direct effect but it will be necessary to consider whether 
any other factors make it expedient to apply the Becker exception.  One such 
factor could be the importance attached to the Directive’s protective purpose (as 
shown by the CJEU in its ruling in Damijan Vnuk590 in 2014.  In any event, the 
enquiry should be undertaken in a purposive or teleological manner, reflecting 
the underlying principle applied in Becker, Marshall and Johnston. 
The MIB’s public service role has already been considered at under “On the 
nature of the Motor Insurers Bureau”.  It has also been observed that it is not 
necessary to establish that the MIB itself or that its activities as a whole conform 
strictly to the thumb rule criteria devised in Foster.  Even so, it is instructive to test 
the MIB’s role under article 10 against the Foster criteria.  
 
On the role entrusted to the Article 10 compensating body 
Article 10 provides, inter alia: 
“3.1. Each Member State shall set up or authorise a body with the task of 
providing compensation, at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation 
for damage to property or personal injuries caused by an unidentified 
vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligation provided for in 
Article 3 has not been satisfied. 
…..” 
                                               
590 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d.d., [Case C-162/13] 
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Unlike the Equal Treatment Directive, this provision is very specific in the way it 
imposes an obligation on every member state first to adopt or incept an institution 
to serve as the authorised compensating body and second in the prescriptive 
terms defining its role.  This puts this particular Directive in a distinctly different 
category to the directive featured in Foster, Doughty, Johnston and others, which  
(i) feature provisions in a directive that had general effect591 and (ii) concerned 
the potential liability of organisations not directly anticipated by that legislation.  
There seems to be at least an arguable case to put Article 10 is in a distinctly 
different class to these other directives, because of the precision and specificity 
of the legislative objective.  In which case, this factor alone ought to be a highly 
significant and persuasive indicator of direct effect, independently of the Foster 
criteria.  Becker’s imperative of preventing member states from relying on their 
own failure to implement European law is made that much more compelling in the 
context of Article 10.  
Even so, the Foster criteria are not to be discounted and so each of its 
components need to be addressed in turn.  As the Article 10 role involves a public 
body providing a compensatory guarantee to motor accident victims, it is self 
evident that it properly categorized as a public service.592   Accordingly the public 
service nature of the Article 10 compensating body will not be considered further 
here. 
  
                                               
591 E.G. The Equal Treatment Directives 76/207/EEC & 2000/78/EC 
592 However it should be noted that the MIB has disputed this in the past, see “Byrne a 
case in point” below 
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A public service under the control of the state 
The UK has a treaty obligation “to take all appropriate measures, whether general 
or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising under Community law” 
593.  As such, it is clear that in order to fully implement Article 10, the UK must 
retain the ability to supervise, control and influence the way the MIB fulfils its 
contractual obligations under the two schemes it has devised to discharge the 
Article 10 role.   
State control is applied through the terms of the MIB agreements themselves.  
Furthermore, there is abundant evidence that the UK government regularly 
exercises its prerogative to impose changes to both MIB agreements in its 
(inconsistently applied594) attempt to keep them in line with European law 
developments.   
A couple of examples will suffice.  In 2001 the House of Lords ruled in White v 
White & MIB595 that the MIB’s exclusion of passenger liability in clause 6 of the 
Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 1988 was unlawful.  The MIB were then persuaded 
to amend its notes for guidance that accompanied the agreement to correct this 
illegality, despite having trenchantly defended the legal challenge that 
precipitated this revision.   
Again, when on 22 May 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld Flaux J’s first instance 
finding in Byrne596 that the MIB’s inflexible three year limitation period for bringing 
a claim under the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement was unlawful (because it did not 
take proper account of the dispensation allowed in a equivalent civil action for 
                                               
593 see Francovich and Others [1991] CJEU Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, para 35 
594 One example of many instances will suffice: when the Department for Transport 
found it necessary to amend the inflexible three year time limit for victims of untraced 
drivers to apply for compensation (see Byrne a case in point, below), it achieved this by 
making the necessary revision to clause 4 (3) of the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003 
to its provision into line with the Limitation Act 1980 in a supplemental agreement in 
2008 and once more in a differently phrased revision in 2013.  However it failed then or 
later to remove its unlawful exclusion in clause 4(3)(c) of any liability where the victim 
fails to report the incident to the police within 14 days or as soon as reasonably 
convenient, when such term makes no allowances for minors or mentally incapacitated 
victims and operates as an alternative limitation period by proxy  
595 White v White & MIB [2001] 1 WLR 481 
596 Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB), considered 
at greater length below 
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minors and protected parties597) the agreement was duly amended by a 
supplemental agreement (dated 30 December 2008).  As the commentary below 
indicates, the MIB had mounted a vigorous, if misguided, defence and so was 
clearly opposed to this revision. 
In both cases, these amendments work against the mutualised interests of the 
motor insurers who comprise the MIB’s management and membership.  It is 
therefore a reasonable assumption that these revisions were imposed on an 
unwilling MIB, in the same way as we are likely to see significant alterations to 
the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2003 and the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 
2015 as a result of an ongoing judicial review.   
Against this the Department for Transport has informed this author that it neither 
controls nor supervises the way the MIB implements these agreements.   
However, as has already been noted above, control over the MIB’s day to day 
activities is not required by the Foster test; it is control over the relevant public 
service that matters and it is hard to see how it could be argued that this is not 
achieved through the through the Principal Agreement with the MIB’s 
membership and the MIB Agreements themselves.  Furthermore, the minister 
also exerts a peripheral degree of operational control over the MIB in its 
appointment of arbitrators598 to hear appeals against certain decisions and in 
determining disputes as to the reasonableness of any request for information by 
the MIB under clause 19 of the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 1999.    
There is also clause 4(2) of the Principal Agreement of 1945 which provides:  
“ IN the event of any dispute as to the reasonableness of a requirement by 
the M.I.A599 that any particular step should be taken to obtain judgment 
against other torfeasors it shall be referred to the Minister whose decision 
shall be final.” 
The Department also exercises extensive indirect influence over the MIB by virtue 
of its executive power to regulate all the motor insurers whom it authorises to 
                                               
597 See the reference to Section 28 Limitation Act 1980 and the comments under Byrne, 
a case in point below 
598 See for example clauses 20 and 21 of the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2003 
599 The reference to M.I.A. in this agreement referrs to the nominal title of the company 
intended to manage the mutualised compensatory fund that ultimately was constituted 
as the MIB in 1946 
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conduct business in this jurisdiction.  An interesting insight into the holistic way 
the CJEU is likely to view this discrete ability to control and influence the MIB can 
be found in its recent judgment in Fish Legal v Information Commissioner and 
ors600.   
Fish Legal featured a reference to the CJEU arising out of a legal challenge by 
environmental activists who sought to rely inter alia, on the Aarhus Convention601 
and Article 2(2) of the 2003 Directive on access to environmental information602 
to obtain data on pollution levels from various water utility companies.  In 
particular the CJEU was asked to determine what was meant by a person being 
“under the control of a body or person falling within Article 2(2)(a) or (b)” of that 
Directive and whether a body that satisfies the CJEU’s criteria in Foster for 
“emanation of the state” status is caught by the duty it imposes to provide 
environmental information. 
Article 2(2) of Directive 2003/4 defines a ‘public authority’ as follows: 
“... 
(a) government or other public administration, including public advisory 
bodies, at national, regional or local level; 
(b) any natural or legal person performing public administrative functions 
under national law, including specific duties, activities or services in 
relation to the environment; and 
(c) any natural or legal person having public responsibilities or functions, 
or providing public services, relating to the environment under the control 
of a body or person falling within (a) or (b)”. 
The reader will readily appreciate the close affinity between Article (2)(2)(c) and 
the Foster tripartite test.  In Fish Legal the court ruled that Article 2(2) was 
intended to cover “a set of entities, whatever their legal form, that must be 
regarded as constituting public authority, be it the State itself, an entity 
                                               
600 Fish Legal v Information Commissioner, United Utilities Water plc, Yorkshire Water 
Services Ltd and Southern Water Services Ltd [2013] Case C-279/12 
601 The European Community by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 
(OJ 2005 L 124, p. 1) (“the Aarhus Convention”) 
602 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2003 on public access to environmental information 
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empowered by the State to act on its behalf or an entity controlled by the State”.  
It went on to elucidate:  
“The manner in which such a public authority may exert decisive influence 
... is irrelevant in this regard. It may take the form of, inter alia, a power to 
issue directions to the entities concerned, whether or not by exercising 
rights as a shareholder, the power to suspend, annul after the event or 
require prior authorisation for decisions taken by those entities, the power 
to appoint or remove from office the members of their management bodies 
or the majority of them, or the power wholly or partly to deny the entities 
financing to an extent that jeopardises their existence”603. 
Accordingly we can deduce from Fish Legal that the concept of State control over 
the MIB includes the ability, now or at some time in the future, to vary, terminate 
or annul the MIB Agreements604 and the potential power to act or omit to take 
action to enforce the levy that the MIB depends on to discharge its roles under 
Articles 10 and 25. 
In short, this evidence indicates that in the discharge of its compensatory role 
under the Directive, the MIB lacks any genuine autonomy to act in its own 
exclusive interests free from state control.  It is bound by the terms of its various 
agreements with the state (which are themselves subject to variation at the 
behest of the state) as much as it is bound by the strictly circumscribed role 
imposed on it by European law.  Whist the MIB agreements are to a certain extent 
consensual arrangements, it is also just as clear that the state has a strong hand 
in any negotiations.   
The European jurisprudence is clear - all that is required is the potential for control 
or influence, not evidence of their manifestation605. 
Special powers 
It is perhaps convenient to repeat here the CJEU’s thumb rule criteria set out in 
Foster (considered above) for determining whether an organisation is potentially 
                                               
603 Fish Legal, para 68 
604 Expressly provided for in the notice provisions that apply to all the MIB agreements 
605  “I have already said, the possibility of exercising influence must exist inter alia (or in 
particular) in connection with the matter to which the provision of a directive which has 
not yet been implemented relates or can relate.” per Advocate General Van Gerven’s 
opinion in Foster, para 21 
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subject to the direct vertical effect of a directive.  We have seen that this applies 
to:  
“ a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, 
pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public 
service under the control of the State and has for that purpose 
special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules 
applicable in relations between individuals is included in any event 
among the bodies against which the provisions of a directive capable of 
having direct effect may be relied upon”606        [Emphasis added] 
Special powers conferred under European law 
Where many jurists and commentators appear to have encountered difficulty is 
in seeking to establish whether the MIB has special powers connected with the 
discharge of its role as the Article 10 compensating body. 
The MIB does in fact enjoy extensive special powers that can be said to derive 
independently of the UK State and which result from its supranational legal status 
as the authorised compensating body under Article 10 of the Directive.  It should 
be emphasised that these European devolved powers are not peculiar to the MIB 
as a corporation, indeed they are not intended to be conferred on any 
organisation in its own right.  They are instead integral to whichever organisation 
is charged with fulfilling the role of the Article 10 compensating body607.   
When the MIB acts as the Article 10 body it acts as a public law body whose role 
is defined by European law.  It also discharges additional roles under the 
Directive, for example, where it acts as a compensating body of last resort for 
victims of accidents occurring in a foreign member state under Articles 20 to 26 
of the Directive.  Article 25 confers on the compensating body the right to recoup 
its outlay from foreign insurers and the foreign compensating body.  The latter 
roles featuring foreign third parties are also inextricably connected with its role as 
the Article 23 Information Centre.  All of this requires funding. 
                                               
606 Foster, para 22 
607 And by the same token, whichever organisation discharging the role of compensator 
of foreign EEA accidents under Articles 24.1 and 25 and the custodian of the motor 
insurance database under Articles 23 and 26 of the Directive 
285 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
Additional special powers are conferred on the MIB under Article 24 of the 
Directive.  This entitles the compensating body to recoup its outlay incurred as 
an Article 20 body when compensating a victim of an uninsured or untraced driver 
in a foreign member state608.   
As the UK national law is supposed to fully transpose the Directive, this means 
that both the Directive and the CJEU’s interpretation of that law have precedence 
over any inconsistent national law provision.  Because Articles 10 and 20 through 
to 26 are so comprehensively prescriptive, they furnish the superior law defining 
this aspect of the MIB’s role, lending it a truly supranational or international status 
in the discharge of these specific European law derived obligations.   
It is also worth noting that where a UK insurer provides cover specifically intended 
for use in a foreign member state’s territory609, then the UK is obliged by the 
Solvency II Directive of 2009 to ensure that every foreign motor insurer providing 
such cover in this jurisdiction becomes a member of its guarantee fund, to wit the 
MIB, and that they contribute to its levy610.  This highly prescriptive requirement 
effectively confers a special power under European law on the MIB as it is the 
MIB and not the UK State that is the direct beneficiary of those funds.  These 
foreign accident provisions, although distinct from the MIB’s domestic Article 10 
role, remain a relevant factor due to the indivisible nature of Becker principle611.  
It stands to reason that any individual or organisation set up or authorised by the 
Secretary of State to discharge the Article 10 role must be provided with the 
wherewithal with which to fund its compensatory role.  Although Article 10 confers 
a wide discretion on individual states as to how this is to be achieved, the 
inescapable corollary of its provisions is that a body discharging the Article 10 
role must have some recourse at law by which to ensure that it has sufficient 
means to undertake its responsibilities.  Such a right must necessarily transcend 
any limitations that might be imposed under domestic law.   
                                               
608 See Article 24(2) of the Directive 
609 As distinct from the provision in Article 14 that requires a domestic policy to cover 
use abroad in the European Union 
610 See Article 150 of the Solvency II Directive, aka Directive2009/138/EC of 25 
November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and 
Reinsurance (Solvency II) 
611 Per Marshall, supra 
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In 2005 in Candolin612the CJEU delivered the following broad statement of 
principle concerning the basic Article 3 insurance requirement:  
“27     The Member States must exercise their powers in compliance with 
Community law …..  
28     The national provisions which govern compensation for road 
accidents cannot, therefore, deprive those provisions of their 
effectiveness.” 
This statement of law applied a well established European law precept - the 
principle of effectiveness613 - to the motor insurance directives.  Accordingly, were 
the UK to take action to prevent or otherwise, through inaction, obstruct the MIB’s 
ability to enforce an appropriate levy on its members, thereby undermining its 
ability to fund the compensation of victims of uninsured and untraced drivers, then 
the UK would be acting unlawfully.   
Given that the UK is treaty bound to fully implement the Directive and that the 
wording used in Article 10614 is unconditional and precise in what it is required 
to do, it would appear that any action or omission by the state which jeopardises 
the MIB’s ability to discharge that role is something that the MIB could challenge.  
The MIB presumably has the ability to take the following steps: an action for 
specific performance of one or other of its contractual arrangements (either with 
the Secretary of State for Transport or its own members), judicial review of the 
minister’s act or omission or an infringement action or complaint to the European 
Commission.  This European derived status is peculiar to the authorised body 
discharging the role of the Article 10 compensating body; not one capable of 
being exercised by ordinary private individuals. 
  
                                               
612 Katja Candolin and Others. v Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtiö Pohjola and Others Case 
C-537/03 
613 Upjohn [1999] E Case C-120/97, paragraph 32 
614 An extract from Article 10 is set out above under “On the role entrusted to the Article 
10 compensating body” 
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Special powers conferred by the executive 
As it happens, the MIB does not need to resort exclusively to public international 
law for its special powers because its entitlement to enforce a levy from its 
members is guaranteed through a combination of statutory provision and private 
contract law.  Section 143(6) Road Traffic Act 1988 imposes a precondition to 
authorised insurer status that every motor insurer be a member of the MIB.  The 
MIB’s Articles of Association require its members to contribute to its levy.  Even 
if the MIB’s Articles of Association, properly construed, do not confer on it an 
express power to initiate formal proceedings to enforce its levy or to expel a 
member for failing to contribute does nothing to detract from, or diminish the 
potency of, its ability to call on the Secretary of State to enforce this special power 
on its behalf.   
The fact remains that the MIB, to remain operationally effective, needs to know 
that, one way or another, it has the power to call upon the Secretary of State to 
ensure it continues to receive the levy.   
Looked at another way, the UK national provision, obscurely devised as it may 
be, nevertheless effectively confers on the MIB a licence to impose an indirect 
form of taxation on all law abiding motor insurance premium paying members of 
the public.  A constant refrain of the MIB in recent years has been that the cost 
of uninsured driving results in an average surcharge on each policy of £30.  The 
ability to impose and enforce such a levy on the public, indirectly through its 
members, is a special power beyond that exercised by ordinary individuals.615 
The MIB also enjoys considerable power to influence government policy though 
its close and preferential relationship with the Secretary of State.  The MIB’s 
influence is so strong that it sometimes seems as though it is in the driving seat 
(metaphorically speaking), not the minister.  Take for example the Department 
for Transport’s apology in July 2013 for failing to address the serious issues 
raised in its February 2013 consultation on the MIB agreements.  The 
announcement stated: “We must ensure we balance reducing the Department’s 
exposure to risk with agreements that are workable for the MIB to implement. 
                                               
615 Whether realised through an action for specific performance, judicial review or on an 
alternative basis applying the tri-partite test in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 
UKHL 2 
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...The agreements cannot be changed unless both parties agree”.  It should be 
noted that the UK’s obligation to fully implement the Directive is not conditional 
on its administrative convenience616.  These difficulties are largely of the 
minister’s own making.  He was advised, in response this consultation on the MIB 
Agreements, to abandon their anachronistic private agreement format by 
substituting them with a properly drafted codified scheme, he chose to ignore that 
advice.  Instead it looks very much as though it is the MIB who draft the 
agreements, which are then signed off by the ministers.  
The latest version of the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015 is replete with 
exclusions and limitation of liability, and reductions of the proper compensatory 
entitlement that blatantly conflict with the minimum standard of compensation 
required by the Directive617 and the original social policy aim of the Road Traffic 
Act 1930 that initiated the concept of mutualising the risk posed by motor vehicle 
risk.  It is difficult to conceive of a properly qualified statutory draftsman blithely 
ignoring the European law it is supposed to implement in the same way and to 
the same degree as exists here. 
Special powers conferred under the MIB agreements 
The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreements 1999 and 2015 
The following are some of the special powers that can be said to have been 
conferred on the MIB by the UK Government which are clearly intended to enable 
it to discharge its role as the Article 10 compensating body.  These observations 
are restricted to the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 1999618 and they are not listed 
in order of importance, nor are they intended to be a comprehensive account. 
First there are the curious provisions that bind the applicant to anything said and 
done by their solicitor or agent619 that have no parallel under the Civil Procedure 
Rules and which appear to be intended to replicate the common law.  However, 
this is then augmented in the way it purports to bind minors and persons acting 
                                               
616 The Secretary of State was advised by this author in his response to the Department 
for Transport’s 2013 consultation in the MIB Agreements to abandon the anachronistic 
MIB Agreement in favour of a properly drafted codified system   
617 Currently the subject of a judicial review 
618 Which remains in force, nothwithstanding its numerous illegalities, for all claims 
featuring accidents that predate 1 August 2015; which in all probability still accounts for 
the majority of uninsured driver claims at the time this paper was prepared 
619 Clause 2.3 
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under a mental incapacity to things said or done on their behalf.  This conflicts 
with Part 21 of the Civil Procedure Rules and the common law position 
considered recently by the Supreme Court in Dunhill v Burgin620.  Ordinary 
defendants have no right to take advantage of a party’s incapacity in this way.   
There is also the special evidential presumption that clause 6.3 purports to 
impose on the applicant621, whom it will be remembered is a non contracting 
party.  Once again this has no parallel under the Civil Procedure Rules and sets 
a worrying precedent by seeming to confer a special preferential legal status on 
the MIB not enjoyed by any other litigant under our national law.  
There is the power conferred on the MIB to recoup its outlay incurred in settling 
an uninsured driver claim from a responsible driver, notwithstanding the fact that 
in most cases the MIB does not receive any co-operation from the defendant 
driver let alone a signed authority to act on his behalf.   
The exclusions of liability in clauses 6(1)(c)(ii)622, 6(1)(e)623 and 17624 in the 1999 
Agreement purport to confer on the MIB the ability to impose exclusions or to 
make deductions from the victims’ compensatory entitlement that are not 
permitted under the normal common law rules for assessing damages.  Whilst 
these provisions appear to breach the European law equivalence principle, they 
can also be viewed as constituting special powers not enjoyed by other 
defendants.    
Clauses 7 to 12 confer extraordinary powers on the MIB to reject genuine claims 
in their entirety for seemingly the most trivial of procedural infractions625.  No such 
draconian powers exist under the Civil Procedure Rules.  The disproportionately 
unjust nature of these provisions are well illustrated by the requirement that 
applicants must complete the MIB claim form which contains a disclosure 
                                               
620 Dunhill v Burgin [2014] UKSC 18 
621 As to the passenger’s state of mind when entering an uninsured vehicle 
622 Relating to subrogated claims 
623 Guilty passenger knowledge 
624 Relating to sums received as a result of the accident 
625 After years of campaigning by this author, since 2007, the procedural preconditions 
to any liability have been removed from the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015 
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mandate so offensively intrusive and excessively extensive as to conflict with the 
victim’s Human Right Convention to privacy626.   
Clause 13 purports to entitle the MIB to reject any claim, however genuine or 
extensive, simply because the victim has failed to report a defendant’s failure to 
provide their insurance details as soon as reasonably practical (which term is not 
defined).  No such defence extends to insured defendants or indeed to any other 
party, and rightly so.   
These provisions transcend the procedural and substantive law rights of 
individual citizens. 
The Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2003 
The MIB enjoys extensive quasi-inquisitorial and judicial powers to investigate 
claims and to require the co-operation of the applicant which go far beyond 
anything that an ordinary insurer would be entitled to impose in a comparable 
action issued under the direct right conferred by Article 18 of the Directive and 
Articles 9 and 11 of the Brussels I Regulation627.    
The Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2003 is an unsatisfactory, unjust scheme that 
places innocent victims at a considerable disadvantage in comparison to a normal 
civil action.  Take for example the complete absence of any safeguards for 
children and the mentally handicapped.  Every other litigant must conform with 
the triple protection imposed under Part 21 of the Civil Procedure Rules628. 
 
Byrne, a case in point 
Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport629 provides a useful and vivid 
illustration of the reluctance by some judges to cure a defective provision through 
a European law consistent construction.  It is also important as it is the only 
                                               
626 See section 12 of the obligatory MIB application form and clause 7 of the 
Agreement, which breaches Article 8 of the HRC 
627 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
628 Namely the appointment of personal representatives, the commission of a barrister’s 
written opinion on the suitability of the proposed settlement and the court’s formal 
approval of the settlement. See Dunhill v Burgin,  
629 Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB) 
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English authority on whether the Directive is capable of direct effect against the 
MIB. 
The case featured a 3 year old child injured by an untraced driver whose claim 
was submitted to the MIB during his minority.  Liability was not disputed.  However 
the MIB rejected the claim, relying on the 1972 version of the Untraced Drivers’ 
Agreement that imposed an inflexible 3 year time limit for submitting applications.   
Section 28 of the Limitation Act 1980 suspends the limitation period in a civil 
personal injury action where, at the time the cause of action arose, the claimant 
was under a disability: a term that embraces both minors and the mentally 
handicapped.   
However the claimant’s lawyers were alive to the fact that this strict three year 
time limit was unlawful because it breached the European equivalency 
principle630.  The Secretary of State took the MIB’s side. 
The MIB argued that, as a private contractor who had negotiated its agreement 
with the Secretary of State in good faith, it was only obliged to adhere to the terms 
of its contract.  In reality it is very likely that this provision was insisted upon by 
the MIB when it submitted its draft proposals to the minister for approval631.  Both 
the minister and the MIB contended that the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement was 
no more than a private law agreement and as such that any European law 
inconsistency in the agreement could not be cured by a Marleasing style 
purposive interpretation632.   
Flaux J was required to determine four issues.  First, whether the MIB’s 3 year 
time limit was permitted under the European law that the Untraced Drivers’ 
Agreement was supposed to implement.   Secondly, if not, whether the 
agreement could be given a purposive construction that was capable of rectifying 
the defect identified.  Thirdly, if the term was defective but incapable of being 
rectified through a European law consistent interpretation, whether the terms of 
the Directive could be relied on by the claimant directly against the MIB so as to 
                                               
630 That requires any national law implementation of rights conferred under European 
law to be equivalent to and as effective as those conferred under comparable 
proceedings 
631 However, without proper public scrutiny or proper disclosure of the Department’s 
records, we shall never know for certain 
632 This is now often referred to as a European law consistent interpretation 
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allow the court to reach a determination that was in conformity with the Directive.  
Finally, if neither the second nor third remedies were available, whether the UK 
State was liable to compensate the claimant for its failure to implement the 
Directive properly under Francovich/Factortame633 principles. 
The first and fourth issues were determined in the claimant’s favour.  The judge 
found that the imposition of a strict three year time limit against a child was 
inconsistent with the rights conferred under European law and in particular by the 
Directive.  On the fourth issue he also held that the breach of European law was 
sufficiently serious to warrant damages because it was clear from the little 
correspondence disclosed that “...in December 1988, that the Department did 
appreciate that a three year time limit which was less than the corresponding 
limitation period for a claim against an insured driver in court would be precluded 
by art 1(4)634”.  So the Department of Transport was aware of the gap in protection 
for children and the mentally handicapped, that this was unlawful but chose to 
support the MIB in its unjustified defence.   
The claimant received his compensation and the MIB was later obliged to 
concede a revision635 to the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement that conferred a 
limitation period no less favourable than conferred in other tort actions against 
identified defendants.   
Where Byrne v MIB went wrong 
However learned and experienced a judge might be, no judge is omnipotent.  Just 
outcomes depend on a degree of collaboration between professional 
representatives and the court; our adversarial civil justice system 
notwithstanding.  Our civil courts depend on the legal representatives identifying 
the issues in dispute, and then presenting these along with the relevant law and 
evidence to the court for the judge to arrive at a just outcome.  This in turn 
depends on the protagonists themselves providing full and proper instructions to 
their legal representatives just as much as on the legal professionals identifying 
the correct law.   
                                               
633 Francovich and Others [1991] Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90; Brasserie du 
Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 
634 Referring here to to Article 1(4) of the Second Directive on motor insurance which is 
now consolidated in the Directive as Article 10 and which defines the role of the MIB 
635 See the MIB’s Supplemental Agreement dated 2008 
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It is regrettable the learned judge’s findings on the second and third issues were 
based on misconceived law and inadequate disclosure of evidence and as such 
they are erroneous.  Their unfortunate legacy has remained unchallenged as a 
misleading precedent for nearly nine years.   
Whilst it is not the author’s intention to wag an admonishing finger from an ivory 
tower or to attempt an exhaustive autopsy of a long interred trial, it is necessary 
to point out where the judgment is unsafe and why.    
On the European consistent interpretation of the MIB agreements 
On the second issue, the judge ruled that the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 1972 
was not capable of being “construed so as to give effect to Article 1(4) of Directive 
84/5/EEC636 and/or the European Community principle of equivalence”. 
Unfortunately, although the judge’s attention was drawn to the CJEU judgments 
in Evans637 and Commission v Greece638 that same court’s seminal judgment in 
Pfeiffer639 is conspicuous by its absence.  After all this time it is impossible to say 
what law was laid before the judge but it seems almost inconceivable that Flaux 
J would have ignored such an important authority had he been made aware of it.  
Instead, the court seems to have been referred to a number of old chestnuts, 
largely rendered obtiose by Pfeiffer, such as Schiemann and Hobhouse LLJ’s 
observations in Mighell v Reading 640 to the effect that the MIB’s agreements are 
no more than a private law contracts and as such are not subject to a Marleasing 
style purposive construction.   
Although this jurisprudence faithfully applies Nicholls LJ dicta in the House of 
Lords in White v White & MIB641, one suspects that no one appears to have 
actually read the judgment.  Had they done so, they would have appreciated that 
the Marleasing or no, the House of Lords was still able to apply a purposive 
construction of the agreement by applying conventional rules of construction, to 
                                               
636 Now Article 10 of the Directive 
637 Supra, under “Emanations of the state or public bodies by another name” 
638 Supra, under Special powers conferred under the MIB Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreements. 
639 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut eV: [2—4] 
CJEU Case C-397/01 to C-403/01, see in particular paras 114 to 119. 
640 Mighell v Reading and Another; Evans v Motor Insurers' Bureau; White v White and 
Another (1998) Times, 12 [1999] 1 LLR 30 
641 White v White & MIB [2001] UKHL 9, see paras 21 & 22. 
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give effect to the presumed intention of the contracting parties642.  It is notable 
that there is no mention in Byrne of the fact that the House of Lords had, six years 
previously, cured a defect in an MIB agreement in this way by striking out an 
offending exclusion of liability that conflicted with European law, on the sound 
basis that it was presumed that the minister had not intended to flout European 
law.   
Pfeiffer has extended the compass of purposive or European law consistent 
interpretation into every aspect of a member state’s transposition and it has 
transformed the process of consistent construction in the process.  Paragraphs 
110 to 119 of the Pfeiffer judgment should be compulsory reading for every judge 
and practitioner in this field.  What Nicholls LJ’s common sense and intelligence 
inferred in White v White & MIIB in 2001, Pfeiffer made explicit three years later 
by ruling that national courts, when undertaking this exercise, must presume that 
the state intended to fulfil entirely the obligations arising from the directive 
concerned when implementing it643. Furthermore, it ruled that the national courts 
must, when applying national laws and rules intended to give effect to a directive, 
“ensure that the legal protection which individuals derive from the rules of 
Community law … are fully effective”644.  Paragraphs 116 to 118 are particularly 
instructive from the view point of the MIB Agreements and so they are quoted in 
full here:  
“116  In that context, if the application of interpretative methods recognised 
by national law enables, in certain circumstances, a provision of 
domestic law to be construed in such a way as to avoid conflict with 
another rule of domestic law or the scope of that provision to be restricted 
to that end by applying it only in so far as it is compatible with the rule 
concerned, the national court is bound to use those methods in order to 
achieve the result sought by the directive. “ 
117  In such circumstances, the national court, when hearing cases 
which…. derive from facts postdating expiry of the period for implementing 
the directive, must, when applying the provisions of national law 
                                               
642 See White v White at paras 23 to 27. 
643 Pfeiffer, para 114, referring to even earlier European jurisprudene in Wagner Miret 
[1993] Case C 334/92 paragraph 20. 
644 Pfeiffer, para 111. 
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specifically intended to implement the directive, interpret those provisions 
so far as possible in such a way that they are applied in conformity with 
the objectives of the directive (see, to that effect, the judgment in Case C 
456/98 Centrosteel [2000] ECR I 6007, paragraphs 16 and 17).  
118  In this instance, the principle of interpretation in conformity with 
Community law thus requires the referring court to do whatever lies within 
its jurisdiction, having regard to the whole body of rules of national 
law, to ensure that Directive 93/104 is fully effective, in order to prevent 
the maximum weekly working time laid down in Article 6(2) of the directive 
from being exceeded (see, to that effect, Marleasing, paragraphs 7 and 
13).      [Emphasis added] 
It is clear from this passage that Pfeiffer does not restrict these principles to 
legislation, in contrast to what was commonly inferred from Marleasing.   
The MIB Agreements are part of our national law.  We have already seen 
above645 that unless the UK is prepared to risk wholesale liability for failing to 
implement article 10 at all, the present MIB Agreements must be viewed as part 
and parcel of the UK’s national law implementation of the directive, and as such 
capable of conferring justifiable rights646. Common sense also dictates as much.   
Accordingly, every MIB agreement, being part of the UK law implementation of 
the Directive, must be construed in a European consistent manner647.  Any 
lingering doubts in the mind of the reader as to the wide ranging and cogent 
nature of the duty to apply a European consistent interpretation of national 
provisions implementing a directive, or indeed legislation, will be promptly 
dispelled by reading the Aikens LJ’s analysis of the UK authorities on consistent 
construction techniques in his Court of Appeal judgment in Churchill v 
Wilkinson648 in conjunction with Waller LJ’s Court of Appeal appraisal of Pfeiffer’s 
                                               
645 Supra, under Special powers conferred under the MIB Uninsured Drivers 
Agreements 
646 Non contracting third parties were given a statutory right to sue under a contract 
made for their benefit under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, although 
section 1(3) and 1(4) conflict with the free standing nature of the European protective 
principle and so require a European law consistent interpretation 
647 I.e. and so be construed in a manner that gives effect to the Directive’s legislative 
aim, in so far as possible 
648 Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans v 
Equity and Secretary of State for Transport [2012] EWCA Civ 1166,see Part VI of the 
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significance in McCall v Poulton649 EWCA Civ 1263.  Given the crucial importance 
of Pfeiffer, the court’s finding in Byrne is not only wrong in law but can safely be 
disregarded as one made per incuriam. 
HHJ Waksman QC’s judgment in UK Insurance Ltd v Holden and R&S Pilling650 
EWHC 264 (QB) provides a timely reminder that Flaux J is not alone.  The 
judgment exhibits the same reluctance to amend a national law provision through 
a European law constructive interpretation where this would appear to go against 
the clear wording and ‘presumed intention’651 of the domestic provision.  Although 
there was no need to determine the implications of the Vnuk judgment on the 
statutory geographic scope of the UK’s transposition within the Road Traffic Act 
1988 of the Article 3 third party insurance requirement, the judge nevertheless 
offered his obiter view that it would not be possible to construe Section 145 (3) of 
the Road Traffic Act 1988 consistently with the Article 3(1) insurance requirement 
as this would be going against the grain of the Act.   
Neither Pfeiffer nor the legal presumption he is supposed to apply (in effect that 
Parliament intended by the wording in Section 145 of the 1988 Act to fully 
implement Article 3) receives a mention.  It is also unfortunate that the judge does 
not appear to have been referred to Waller LJ’s excellent analysis of Pfeiffer’s 
impact on the way a European law consistent interpretation applies in the context 
of the Directive, in McCall v Poulton EWCA Civ 1263 652.   
Although HHJ Waksman’s views in the UK insurance case on this point are 
clearly open to criticism653 they nevertheless reflect a widespread reluctance in 
the judiciary to intervene in this way to correct non-compliant national law 
provision.  Furthermore, if the UK referendum results in the UK ceding from the 
                                               
judgment: Principles of interpretation of national laws which are based on EU 
Directives 
649 McCall v Poulton [2008] EWCA Civ 1263, paras 35 to 40 
650 UK Insurance Ltd v Holden and R&S Pilling [2016] EWHC 264 (QB) 
651 Meaning the intention to be gleaned from the natural meaning of the words used 
and without reference to Pfeiffer’s presumptive injunction 
652 McCall v Poulton [2008] EWCA Civ 1263, see paras 35 to 40 
653 If only for the simple but compelling reason that the gravamen of Part VI Road 
Traffic Act 1988 is to prevent accident victims from being unable to recover their 
compensatory entitlement by providing a compensatory guarantee scheme that is 
different in kind to the rights of the contracting parties.  In which case, any lacunae in 
protection, being an exception to that basic principle, should be subject to considerable 
circumspection. 
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European Union, the judiciary are likely to exhibit an even greater reticence to 
cure non-compliant national provisions in this way, even where the accident 
circumstances pre date the legal date effect of the UK’s exit.  These difficulties 
make the case for arguing the direct effect of the Directive against the MIB even 
more relevant, urgent and necessary. 
On direct vertical effect of the Directive against the MIB 
On the third issue in Byrne, Flaux J ruled that the MIB was not subject to the 
direct vertical effect of the Directive.   This erroneous finding can be readily 
dispatched in the light of the European law considered under the preceding 
headings:  “First principles on state liability” and “A modified principle”.  Once 
again, it would seem that the court appears to have been misinformed on the 
correct law and there also seems to have been a serious failure to provide full 
and proper disclosure of the facts relevant to Department’s close working 
relationship with the MIB and its members.   
As to the threshold criteria, Flaux J deftly dismissed the defendant’s arguments 
to the effect that as the Directive left a wide discretion to member states to 
determine the identity of the compensating body, the directive lacked sufficient 
precision.  He found that Schiemann LJ’s obiter views to this effect in the Court 
of Appeal hearing of the Evans case654, which views were supported by Swinton 
Thomas LJ and Hobhouse LJ655, were made obsolete following the CJEU ruling 
in Gharehveran656.  According to Gharehveran, once a member state exercises 
its discretion to appoint such a body, any uncertainty or imprecision relating to its 
identity is thereby removed.  The judge was clearly right to rule that the Directive 
itself was capable of direct effect; so far so good. 
Where the judgment comes unstuck is in second limb of the analysis: in 
establishing whether the Directive has direct effect against the MIB as opposed 
to central government.  Nowhere does the judgment even acknowledge the first 
principles of state liability and the European case law that lays the foundation for 
Foster.  One lesson we can take from Byrne is that the CJEU’s judgment in Foster 
                                               
654 Mighell v Reading, Evans v Motor Insurers' Bureau, White v White [1999] 1 CMLR 
1251 
655 Although less stridently so by Hobhouse LJ 
656 Gharehveran [2001] CJEU (Case C-441/99) [2001] ECR I-7687 
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cannot be properly understood in isolation.  Foster was never intended to stand 
on its own, it is incremental to and not independent of the principle of state liability 
formulated in Becker657 and Marshall658 as augmented by Konle 659.  None of 
these cases are mentioned in Byrne.   
Instead the judgment offers a misleading analysis of the Foster criteria that led 
the judge to erroneously apply the tripartite test on the MIB, as opposed to the 
public service devolved to it.  Arguably, the judgment is also overly reliant on the 
Foster, Doughty660 and Griffin661 cases, all of which feature large monolithic 
entities, not well suited to the facts of Byrne.  It makes no reference to the CJEU 
ruling in Johnston662 nor, even more to the point, Schiemann LJ’s influential Court 
of Appeal’s judgment in the NUT case.   
Of the three criteria in Foster, Flaux J rightly dismissed the defendant’s contention 
that the MIB’s role did not fulfil a public service.  Where he errs is in the application 
of the second and third criteria.  He concluded that the MIB was neither under the 
control of the state nor vested with special powers.  Quite apart from being 
arguably the wrong questions663, any properly informed court would have found 
an embarrassing wealth of evidence664 to the contrary, sufficient to establish the 
case even on those terms. 
On the second criterion, although the judgment makes a passing reference to 
Blackburne J’s judgment in Griffin, it appears that this may only have been given 
superficial consideration; what else could explain this learned judge’s failure to 
address Blackburne J’s succinct and helpful analysis at paragraph 94?  It is so 
pertinent to this particular case as to merit its repetition in full: 
                                               
657 Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] CJEU (Case 8/81) 
658 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1993] 
CJEU Case C-271/91 
659 See also Haim v. Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein [2000] CJEU (Case 
424/97) 
660 Doughty v Rolls-Royce Plc [1992] IRLR 126 CA 
661 Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15 
662 Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1987] CJEU Case 
222/84 
663 As to the correct enquiry, see the concluding paragraphs under the Conclusions 
subheading beneath A modified principle 
664 Considered above under the heading On the role entrusted to the Article 10 
compensating body 
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“The plaintiffs contend, and SWW disputes, that the second of the three 
conditions, the so-called 'control condition', is fulfilled. In considering that 
condition it is necessary, in my view, to appreciate several points: 
1. The question is not whether the body in question is under the 
control of the State but whether the public service in question is 
under the control of the State. 
2. The legal form of the body is irrelevant. 
3. The fact that the body is a commercial concern is also irrelevant. 
4. It is also irrelevant that the body does not carry out any of the 
traditional functions of the State and is not an agent of the State. 
5. It is irrelevant too that the State does not possess day-to-day 
control over the activities of the body. 
See paragraph 20 of the European Court's judgment in Foster [1990] IRLR 353 
(set out above) and Lord Templeman in Foster [1991] IRLR 268 at pp.270–271.” 
More unfortunate yet, the judgment fails to make any mention of the CJEU ruling 
in Farrell v Whitty665, which was delivered the preceding year, whose case facts 
are to all intents and purposes on all fours with Byrne.  As indicted above, Farrell 
featured a near identical candidate for direct effect, namely the Irish Republic’s 
compensating body and it involved almost exactly the same civil law and social 
policy imperatives.   
The CJEU was constrained to rule in Farrell that it was the prerogative of the 
national court, not the CJEU, to make the factual determination as to whether an 
institution in its jurisdiction was an emanation of the state; applying the relevant 
European jurisprudence.  The fact that it did not dismiss outright the notion that 
the MIBI might be an emanation of state was surely something that should have 
been noted and considered.  A fortiori the view of Advocate General Stix-Hackl 
at paragraph 72 of his 5th October 2006 opinion in that case:  
“In conclusion, it seems to me that the MIBI may, as a body authorised for 
the purposes of Article 1(4) of the Second Directive666 responsible for the 
                                               
665 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty and Others [2006] CJEU Case C-356/05 
666 Now Article 10 of the Directive, body responsible for compensation 
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function entrusted to those bodies by that directive, be put on the same 
footing as the State, with the result that Article 1 of the Third Directive667 
may be directly relied upon by individuals before the national courts.” 
Any properly informed court should have been aware of the relevance of the 
Farrell case, the fact that it had been referred back to the national court and the 
fact that Birmingham J’s judgment668, on this very issue the year before, had just 
been published669.  What is interesting about this Irish judgment is that it makes 
the same syntactical error as Byrne670 in the way it construes para 20 of the 
CJEU’s ruling in Foster671 as requiring an analysis of state control over the body 
in whom the public service is vested as opposed to control over the service per 
se.  Properly construed in the light of the superior European law principle set out 
in Becker and other European jurisprudence, whether or not a state happens to 
exerts control over the body is incidental to, not determinative of, the test.  It is 
the public service that must be subject to state control and the public service that 
must involve collateral special powers beyond those enjoyed by ordinary 
individuals.  Notwithstanding this semantic confusion, Birmingham J still ruled 
that the MIBI was an emanation of the state.  He was able to make this finding 
because he was not only aware of the guiding principle in Becker but had also 
been provided with sufficient evidence to come to a just conclusion, all in sharp 
contrast to Byrne. 
One of Byrne’s more astonishing characteristics is the dearth of evidence 
disclosed to the court when, as with any government department, one would have 
anticipated an abundance of material.  After all, the laying of ‘paper’672 trails is 
what some consider to be a bureaucracy’s chief product.  What seems particularly 
inexplicable is the absence of any reference to the 1945 Agreement 673 which 
proves beyond doubt that the authorised motor insurers who comprise and 
                                               
667 Now Article 12 of the Directive, special categories of victim 
668 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, the Minister for the Environment, Ireland and the 
Attorney General and the Motor Insurance Bureau of Ireland [2008] IEHC 124 
669 According to Waller LJ, in McCall v Poulton & MIB [2008] EWCA Civ 1263, 
Birmigham J’s judgment was posted on the internet a matter of days before the trial in 
Byrne, see para 47. 
670 Supra 
671 Supra, under the heading: The Foster guidance on direct effect 
672 Increasingly superseded by emails and electronic documents 
673 See above under On the nature of the Motor Insurers Bureau 
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manage the MIB are subject to state control, a control that includes ultimate 
sanction of divesting any non-compliant member of its authorised status.   
It is apparent from Flaux J’s judgment and from comments made in the Court of 
Appeal674 in Byrne that the Department for Transport claimed that it had very little 
documentary evidence that was capable of casting light on the way it regulates 
the motor insurance sector and its relations with the MIB in particular675.  In this 
author’s view it is likely that a properly conducted search would reveal an 
abundance of internal memoranda, correspondence, diary entries and minutes 
retained at the ministry676.   
As to the final Foster criterion (that requires the body tasked with the public duty 
to possess special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules 
applicable to relations between individuals), Flaux J concluded that the MIB had 
none.   
This finding strikes the author as being counter-intuitive, given what we have 
already noted above.   
The judgment does at least consider section 145(6) Road Traffic Act 1988 which 
imposes membership of the MIB as a condition precedent to authorised status 
but it concluded that this did not confer any special power on the MIB.  This strikes 
the reader as surprisingly naive, especially in view of the matters considered 
above under the heading On the role entrusted to the Article 10 compensating 
body.  In the writer’s view it stands to reason that the MIB must have the power 
to require the Government to ensure that it is properly funded.677   
The judgment does not consider the MIB’s ability to call on the Government to 
compel insurers to provide it with their insurance information to enable it to 
                                               
674 See Carnwarth LJ’s comment in Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport 
[2008] EWCA Civ 574at para 41 
675 This is a phenomenon repeated in another more recent Francovich action against 
the Secretary of State for Transport, which Jay J commented on in the Delaney case, 
supra, at para 89 and 95 – 101 
676 The author’s recent Freedom of Information Act request for data on the relationship 
between the MIB and the Department has been declined on the ground that it would be 
too expensive to provide statistics as to senior management level meetings; this is 
hardly consistent with the almost complete absence of records disclosed to the court in 
Byrne 
677 See above under, “A public service under the control of the state” and the reference 
to the CJEU ruling in Fish Legal v Information Commissioner, United Utilities Water plc, 
Yorkshire Water Services Ltd and Southern Water Services Ltd [2013] Case C-279/12 
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discharge its role under Article 23, nor to consider the implications of this data 
being interrupted.  Neither does it makes any reference to the right of the 
compensating body to claim a reimbursement from a foreign compensating body 
under Article 24.2 of the Directive, nor its rights under Article 25.  Neither was any 
consideration given to the extensive substantive and procedural powers 
conferred on the MIB within the MIB Agreements themselves.   
Conclusions on Byrne 
It seems highly unlikely that had Flaux J been appraised of key authorities such 
as Peiffer, Becker and NUT; the reference to the CJEU in Farrell, the detailed 
workings of the MIB Agreements; the European law rights conferred on the MIB 
by virtue of its role in discharging its responsibilities under Articles 10 and 
elsewhere in the Directive that he would not at least have taken them into account 
in his otherwise meticulous judgment.  One is forced to conclude, applying the 
Occam’s razor principle678 that these matters were not raised.  As indicated 
above, this author considers the judge’s finding on the second and third issues 
were both made per incuriam.   
  
                                               
678 Namely that where there are several competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest 
assumptions should be preferred. 
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Main Conclusions 
The central theme of this paper is that Article 10 of the Directive has direct effect 
against the MIB.  Furthermore, that this issue is not decided by establishing 
whether or not the MIB is an emanation of state679 in its own right.  The proposition 
is governed by the principle of state liability in Becker as elucidated by the 
judgment in Foster but in the knowledge that the case facts are distinguishable.  
Even so, applying the Foster criteria to the MIB it is necessary to decide (i) 
whether the various responsibilities the MIB discharges constitute a public 
service and in particular whether its role as the Article 10 compensating body is 
a public service, (ii) whether those roles have been devolved to it by the state, 
(iii) whether the State has the ability to control or influence those public services 
and (iv) whether these roles, in particular its Article 10 role, involve the conferral 
of special powers not enjoyed by ordinary individuals.  
The fact that an outsourced service provider, such as the MIB, when discharging 
those functions happens also to be acting as an emanation of state is a 
consequence of its role in discharging that public service; no more.   
The overwhelming preponderance of the evidence considered above leads to the 
conclusion that the public service discharged by the MIB, as the appointed Article 
10 compensating body, satisfies to the criteria formulated by the CJEU in Foster 
that tests the applicability of direct effect where certain European law derived 
responsibilities are devolved to third party organisations.  It has also been argued 
on an a priori basis that the MIB is necessarily, by implication of its Article 10 role, 
subject to the direct effect of the Directive, independently of the test in Foster.  
The MIB is clearly an emanation of the motor insurance sector but when it acting 
in its capacity as an Article 10 compensator, it is discharging a public service 
imposed on the State defined by European law and as such it is acting as an 
emanation of the state, and accountable as such.   
However it should be remembered that the CJEU is the final arbiter on the Becker 
principle and Foster’s test and on the jurisprudence as to the correct attribution 
                                               
679 Although this is certainly a relevant factor and one that is capable of triggering direct 
effect, see Foster para 18 above 
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of emanation of state status.  Its latest judgment in Farrell (no 2)680 is awaited 
with interest.  Subject to this important caveat, if one assumes for a moment that 
the Directive does have direct effect against the MIB, then that begs the question: 
with what result? 
Wider Implications 
The MIB’s potential liability under the Becker principle is a large and controversial 
theme, one whose boundaries have not begun to be explored.  It is also one 
complicated first, by emerging pressure from some member states, including the 
UK, for the Directive to be modified, and secondly, by the current uncertainty 
associated with the UK’s continued membership of the European Union and the 
way this is likely to affect the way courts construe non-compliant national 
provision.   
It follows that if the direct effect exception in Becker applies to organisations like 
the MIBI and the MIB, then it also applies to each and every Article 10 authorised 
body across the European Union.  This will have beneficial consequences for 
United Kingdom residents injured in foreign EU member states where the foreign 
applicable law fails to fully implement Articles 3 and 10 of the Directive.  In the 
United Kingdom there are two main areas where direct effect will be felt most.   
 
The MIB Agreements as a subordinate source of law 
The first of these concerns the way direct effect will alter individual victims’ rights 
under the two compensatory schemes set out within the Uninsured and Untraced 
Drivers’ Agreements.  Although this author has argued that they are to be 
construed purposefully so at to give effect, in so far as is possible, to the 
legislative aims of the Directive, the extent to which this is capable of curing flaws 
that seem to go against the grain of these schemes has yet to be fully tested.  
Take for example the way both agreements dove tail their geographic and 
mechanical scope to the Road Traffic Act 1988 definitions imposing the duty to 
insure.  In Mind The Gap! the author argued that those provisions are 
incompatible with the wider scoped geographic and mechanical scope of the 
                                               
680 As indicated above, this is the second reference to the CJEU on this issue in this 
case 
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Article 3 insurance requirement.  Yet it is conceivable, even in a post Pfeiffer 
world, that a court might still take the view that to impose a European law 
consistent interpretation that complies with the much wider ambit indicated by 
Vnuk, would conflict with the contra legem681 principle and thus lie beyond the 
power of the court to confer.  Alternatively, it is possible that a court might be 
persuaded to the view that to apply a wider geographic and mechanical scope to 
the MIB Agreements than has been contemplated by the statute682 would 
effectively be imposing an unacceptable degree of retrospection.   
Putting such fundamental incompatibilities to one side, a European law consistent 
interpretation is still capable of proving very effective in excising the various 
unlawful exclusions and qualifications to liability within the MIB Agreements.  This 
is because Pfieffer requires every court to take a proactive stance.  The 
conventional passivity rule683 is displaced in this context.  The court’s mandatory 
constitutional duty, as an organ of the State, is to “... interpret national law, so far 
as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned 
in order to achieve the result sought by the directive ”684. Furthermore, when 
undertaking this task it must “...presume that the Member State, following its 
exercise of the discretion afforded it under that provision, had the intention of 
fulfilling entirely the obligations arising from the directive concerned…” 685.   
However, the Byrne and UK Insurance cases still confront us, per incuriam 
though they may be.  Notwithstanding Lord Aikens helpful guidance in Churchill, 
this is still a relatively grey area where the judicial discretion makes it difficult to 
predict outcomes.  This is precisely where the ability to rely on the direct effect of 
the Directive against the MIB comes into its own. 
Direct effect does not render the MIB Agreements obsolescent.  Clearly, to the 
extent that they conform with EU law, they will remain the primary source of law, 
                                               
681 See for example the way the House of Lords felt constrained in what they could do 
to cure the unamended version of section 143 Road Traffic Act 1988 in Clarke v Kato 
and Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Ltd [1998] All ER (D) 481 
682 Which the scheme is designed to augment; not surplant 
683 By which the court leaves it to the parties to define the issues it is required to 
consider.  The Civil Procedure Rules 1989 have made considerable inroads into this 
convention, see Part 3 The Court’s Case Management Powers 
684 Pfeiffer, para 113 
685 Pfeiffer, para 112 
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under the well established European subsidiarity principle686.  Even where that 
domestic provision is defective687, a court’s first recourse is likely to be to attempt 
a European law consistent interpretation.  However, it will no longer be confined 
to the constraints imposed by that artificial exercise: of second-guessing what a 
properly informed legislature or minister ought to have intended by words whose 
natural meaning fails to conform to the European law they are supposed to 
implement.  Instead, once a non-conformity is established the court will be able 
to determine an individual claimant’s rights by resorting directly to the wording of 
the Directive itself, as though it were part of the national law, relegating the 
relevance of the actual national law implementation to a subordinate level of 
significance.  Direct effect confers a much greater ability on judges to uphold 
rights on individuals conferred under superior European law, even where they go 
against the grain of the national law.   
MIB liability for non compliant statutory provision 
The second area in which the direct effect of the Directive will be most felt is in 
the way it impacts on the UK’s statutory provision, where that law fails to comply 
with the minimum standard of compensatory protection required under the 
Directive.  In Mind The Gap!688 the following, non exhaustive, list of legislation 
was identified as conflicting with the more generous, wider scoped and free-
standing compensatory guarantee imposed under European law: Part VI of the 
Road Traffic Act 1988, the Third Party Rights Acts 1930 and 2010 and the 
(European Community) Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002689.  
Although the UK Parliament is primarily responsible for statutes and statutory 
instruments that infringe the Directive, and through it the UK government, the 
doctrine of direct effect will also have a profound impact on the MIB’s ultimate 
liability and through it, the motor insurers who contribute to its levy.  As indicated 
above, the geographic and mechanical scope of the MIB’s contractual obligation 
to compensate victims under its two schemes is defined by Part VI of the Road 
                                               
686 By way of example, see the CJEU ruling in Evans, para 34 
687 In the sense that it is incompatible with the Directive 
688 Mind The Gap!, Nicholas Bevan, British Insurance Law Association Journal, January 
2016 
689 To which one might add the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, see earlier 
footnote and Section 1(5) thereof 
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Traffic Act 1988 to which both sets of MIB agreements specifically refer690.  
Unfortunately these statutory provisions do not extend to use of motor vehicles 
on private property nor to vehicles other than those intended or adapted for 
general road use, even where they are actually used on roads.  The CJEU ruling 
in Vnuk has made explicit what was previously clear and obvious, namely that 
the European law obligation imposed under Article 3 of the Directive permits no 
such restrictions to its geographic and mechanical scope. 
The significance of direct effect against the MIB in this context is that it is capable 
of pinning the MIB with liability for the UK government’s legislative failings.   
The MIB, as the Article 10 compensating body, is charged with compensating 
victims of “uninsured vehicles”.  The proper scope of that role is ultimately 
determined by the wording of the Directive; not the UK’s statutory provisions nor 
the minister’s contractual arrangements with the MIB.  Accordingly, regardless of 
whatever redress the MIB may have from the state, it is liable to compensate 
victims of motor vehicles not caught by the Road Traffic Act definitions and of 
motor accidents on private property, notwithstanding that these events clearly fall 
outside the natural meaning of the words used to define the scope of the MIB’s 
contractual arrangements with the State.   Put another way the European 
principle of direct effect pins the MIB with liability for the State’s incompetence, 
for which it is not responsible. 
As Advocate General Gereven explained at para 5 of his opinion in Foster:  
“5 . In Marshall691 the possibility of relying on an unconditional and 
sufficiently precise provision of a directive against a Member State was 
thus clearly linked to the failure of the Member State to implement the 
directive in national law correctly and at the proper time . ( 14 ) Accordingly, 
the principle "the State cannot plead its own wrong" ( 15 ) or the principle 
nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans692  were held to constitute 
the basis for vertical direct effect . At the same time, however, the principle 
                                               
690 These confine the two compensatory schemes to events that require comprehensive 
third party motor insurance, as defined by sections 143, 145, 195 and 192 of the Road 
Traffic Act 1988 
691 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1993] 
CJEU Case C-271/91. 
692 i.e. no one shall be heard, who invokes his own guilt 
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was interpreted broadly : the failure to act can be relied on by individuals 
against the Member State regardless of the capacity in which the State 
acts - as "employer or public authority"; moreover, as also appears from 
later judgments which will be discussed below, the failure to act can be 
relied on by individuals against independent and/or local authorities 
which are not themselves responsible for the failure to implement the 
directive in national law .”       
   [emphasis added] 
Applying this principle to the MIB, as opposed to the MIB agreements per se, it is 
axiomatic that any vehicle which under European law ought to be covered by the 
Article 3 insurance requirement but is not due to the UK’s failure to fully transpose 
that obligation into the Road Traffic Act 1988 falls within the Article 10 definition 
of “a vehicle for which the insurance obligation provided for in Article 3 has not 
been satisfied”.   
The European jurisprudence is clear that there should be no gaps in cover.  
Recital 14 of the Directive explains this imperative: “It is necessary to make 
provision for a body to guarantee that the victim will not remain without 
compensation where the vehicle which caused the accident is uninsured or 
unidentified”. 
It follows therefore that if Article 10 has direct effect then the MIB will also be 
liable not just for its contractual obligations agreed with the minister but also for 
any situation in which a vehicle requiring civil liability cover under Article 3 is in 
fact uninsured.   
As indicated in Mind The Gap! this makes the MIB liable, and through it every 
authorised levy paying motor insurer, to compensate a plethora of exotic off road 
motor vehicles that do not fall within the highly specific definition within Section 
185 of the 1988 Act.  The MIB is also liable to compensate victims of motor 
accidents on private property, which under our national law does not require third 
party motor cover as it is not a public place.  Furthermore many of difficulties 
encountered by accident victims due to the numerous other substantive law 
defects in the statutory and extra-statutory implementation of the Directive, 
effectively fall away.   
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The scale of the problem 
The scale and nature of the UK’s non conformity is a shambles of near epic 
proportions: our national law provision in this area is so profoundly flawed that it 
cannot be taken at face value.  Millions of motor policies contain exclusions and 
restrictions in cover that are not permitted by the Directive.  The UK Insurance 
case reveals that some motor policies do not even conform with Section 145 
Road Traffic Act 1988 which sets out the minimum third party cover requirements.   
The widespread nature of the infringements by the UK in its statutory and extra-
statutory transposition of the Directive have already been mentioned above.  All 
these conflicts of law undermine the principle of legal certainty which is a pre 
requisite of a state’s full and proper implementation of the Directive.  No well 
educated and reasonably informed citizen could be expected to identify the true 
extent of their entitlement to the compensatory guaranteed required under 
European law from even a close and careful study of our national law provision; 
especially if some of our judiciary appear to be unequal to the same task693.   
Legal certainty is vital, not just for the victims who depend on the UK’s proper 
implementation of their legal entitlement under European law but it arguably even 
more acute for the motor insurers operating in this market, as the pricing of 
premiums depends on accurate predictions of the financial risks they underwrite.  
It almost goes without saying that the MIB must now prepare itself for much 
greater scrutiny of the regimes they operate and for a tide of new claims for 
incidents that fall outside the scope of their contractual arrangements with the 
state.   
Years of ministerial inaction are responsible.  The Department for Transport were 
an intervening party in Bernaldez and so should have known, back in 1996, that 
the European insurance requirement was highly prescriptive, leaving no room for 
individual member states to permit their own idiosyncratic exclusions or 
restrictions in cover – but they did nothing.  The Vnuk ruling has been with us 
since September 2014.  The implications of that judgment could not have been 
                                               
693 See for example the unanimous but nevertheless erroneous decisions in EUI v 
Bristol Alliance Partnership Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 and Delaney v Pickett and 
Tradewise [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 
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clearer.  The amendments necessary to bring the geographic and mechanical 
scope of the compulsory third party motor insurance requirement provided for 
under the Road Traffic Act 1988 could hardly be simpler or more obvious.  Yet 
the Department for Transport’s only response, so far, is to indicate in vague terms 
that the minister is contemplating yet another round of consultation; sometime 
soon.  Consultation is no answer to decades of inaction and illegality.  Meanwhile, 
lawyers, judges, insurers and the public must cope as best they can in the entirely 
avoidable hiatus caused by this ministry’s longstanding failure to properly 
discharge its legal responsibility to fully transpose the Directive.    
Further uncertainty results from the impending referendum on the United 
Kingdom’s membership of the European Union but that at least is not the 
Department for Transport’s fault.   
 
  
311 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
  
312 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
C. The New law journal694  
 
9. On the right road? 
Published:  01 February 2013695 
In the first of a special NLJ series, Nicholas Bevan takes the government to task 
over failures to compensate RTA victims 
Last year leave to appeal was sought from the Court of Appeal in three cases 
featuring our national law provision for guaranteeing that victims of motor vehicle 
incidents recover their full compensatory entitlement. It is to be hoped that at least 
one will be heard by the Supreme Court in 2013. If these appeals proceed, the 
Supreme Court will have to grapple with what appears to be a growing divergence 
between our domestic law in this area and the more generous provision required 
by the European Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives. This issue has important 
implications for insurer and victim alike. 
The purpose of this series is to provide timely practical guidance for practitioners 
on how they should interpret our national law provision in this field of practice 
correctly. The need for clarification in this area is urgent as our national courts 
have been approaching the interpretive task from the wrong direction. 
Where to start 
The proper approach to interpreting our domestic law in this area should always 
begin with the relevant Community law. This may seem counterintuitive to many 
tort law practitioners but the purpose of this series is to substantiate a proposition 
that has become common place in the fields of health and safety, employment 
law and human rights. 
It is well known that the UK has ceded a portion of its sovereignty to the European 
Community under a number of consolidated treaties. This is particularly relevant 
to the primacy of Community law principle. Most of us are familiar with Lord 
Denning’s dictum in H.P. Bulmer Ltd v J. Bollinger SA[1974] Ch 401 at 418, to 
                                               
694 Owners, Lexis Nexis Group 
695 N.L.J. 2013, 163(7547), 130-132. 
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the effect that whenever an area of UK law is covered by Community law, it 
becomes part of our national law and “is equal in force to any statute”. 
Community law basics 
The Community has two main legislative processes. Regulations that are binding 
in their entirety and have direct effect in each member state, pursuant to Art 249 
of the Treaty of Rome 1957 (as amended and consolidated). A directive, which 
usually sets out high level policy objectives and confers a wide discretion as to 
how individual member states implement them. They are teleological in nature, 
as Art 249(3) makes clear: “A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each member state to which it is directed but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods.” 
All directives are prefaced by a series of recitals; these state the Community 
policy underscoring the objectives. The operative parts of a directive are set out 
within the articles that follow. 
Interpreting Community law 
When it comes to interpreting a directive, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is 
the ultimate authority (Art 220 of the Treaty). This principle is confirmed by s 3 (1) 
of the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA 1972) which incorporates relevant 
ECJ rulings into UK law. Article 234 of the treaty confers the ECJ’s jurisdiction to 
deliver preliminary rulings on issues referred to it by a national court. When 
interpreting a directive, the ECJ will tend to consider its purpose as opposed to 
applying a literal construction to the words used. Although our national courts 
have jurisdiction when it comes to interpreting our domestic law and the impact 
on it of Community law, s 3 of ECA 1972 requires them to do so by applying the 
relevant rulings of ECJ. 
Article 10 of the treaty imposes a duty on national courts to interpret domestic 
legislation in a way that is consistent with Community law. The purposive 
interpretation principle was enshrined in Marleasing SA v La Comercial 
Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135. It is worth citing a more 
recent ECJ ruling from 2006, Adeneler and Others v Ellinikos Organismos 
Galaktos ECJ Case C-212/04. 
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“When national courts apply domestic law, they are bound to interpret it, 
so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive 
and consequently comply with the third para of Art 249 EC (see Joined 
Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I-8835, para 
113, and the case-law cited). This obligation to interpret national law in 
conformity with Community law concerns all provisions of national law, 
whether adopted before or after the directive in question (see Case C-
106/89 Marleasing[1990] ECR I 4135, para 8, and Pfeiffer and Others, 
para 115). 
 
“The requirement for national law to be interpreted in conformity with 
Community law is inherent in the system of the treaty, since it permits 
national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full 
effectiveness of Community law when they determine the disputes before 
them (see Pfeiffer and Others, para 114).” [paras 108 & 109] 
 
The EU Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives 
Between 1972 and 2005, the European Council enacted five different directives 
with the aim of delivering a consistent approach across the European Community 
by member states to ensure that civil liability for use of motor vehicles is covered 
by some form of insurance provision. 
These directives are not intended to alter civil or criminal liability arising out of the 
use of vehicles. In this, member states retain their autonomy; subject only to the 
principle that their laws must not indirectly deprive the directives of their 
effectiveness. The original requirement in Art 3 (1) of the First Motor Insurance 
Directive: 24/04/1972 (72/166/EC) [now Art 3 of the Sixth Directive] was that 
member states should “ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles 
normally based in its territory is covered by insurance”. That left lots of discretion 
to individual member states as to the terms of scope of the insurance cover they 
provided. This latitude has been restricted by successive directives and ECJ 
rulings to ensure a consistent approach across the Community. These 
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refinements are provided for within: the Second Motor Insurance Directive 
30/12/1983 (84/5/EC); the Third Motor Insurance Directive 14/05/1990 
(90/232/EC); and the Fifth Motor Insurance Directive 2005/14/EC. 
Most recently, these directives were consolidated in the Sixth Directive 2009/103 
EC. The key provisions for these purposes are contained in the following articles: 
1 (definitions); 3 (ensuring cover for civil liability); 9 (derogations from Art 3); 10 
(uninsured and untraced driver claims); 12 (special categories of victim); and 13 
(exclusion clauses). 
Article 2 (1) of the Second Directive [now Art 13 of the Sixth Directive] provides a 
list of policy exclusions which are deemed to be void as against a third party. 
Ordinarily, one might infer from the presence of such a list that all other exclusions 
are prima facie valid. A similar line of reasoning has been advanced in the 
interpretation of s 148 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. However, in Rafael Ruiz 
Bernáldez [1996] Case C-129/94, the ECJ applied a construction that went 
beyond what one would expect of a literal interpretation: it ruled that the list of 
void exclusions (far from being a self-contained list of exceptions to a basic rule) 
merely served to illustrate the kind of exclusions that Art 3(1) prevented. It held 
that Art 3(1) of the First Directive precludes an insurer from being able to rely on 
statutory provisions or contractual clauses to refuse to compensate third-party 
victims of an accident caused by the insured vehicle [para 20]. 
By way of derogation from that obligation, the second sub-para of Art 2(1) 
provides that certain persons may be excluded from compensation by the insurer, 
having regard to the situation they have themselves brought about (persons 
entering a vehicle which they know to have been stolen) [para 21]. 
The ECJ’s restrictive interpretation of Art 2 (1) has been endorsed and approved 
in subsequent rulings, such as in Candolin [2005] ECR I-5745, Case C-537/03.  
In Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz [2004] C-397/01, the ECJ ruled that the 
principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with Community law 
requires a national court to consider national law as a whole to assess to what 
extent it may be applied so as not to produce a result contrary to that sought by 
the directive. 
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Most recently, in Churchill v Wilkinson and Evans [2011] Case C-442/10, the ECJ 
ruled that once insurance is in place, “the only situation in which a third party who 
has been a victim of an accident may be excluded from insurance cover is that 
specified in the second sub-para of Art 2(1) of the Second Directive” [para 38]. 
The seventh recital in the preamble to the Second Directive states that it is in the 
interest of victims that the effects of certain exclusion clauses should be limited 
to the relationship between the insurer and the person responsible for the 
accident. This was an important factor in influencing the ECJ’s ruling inCandolin. 
Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA 1988), the Uninsured Drivers 
Agreements and the Untraced Drivers Agreements all seek to implement the UK’s 
obligations under the Motor Insurance Directives. Whenever a UK court seeks to 
interpret Pt VI of RTA 1988, or one of the aforementioned agreements between 
the Secretary of State and the Motor Insurers Bureau, these must be construed, 
as far as possible, purposively; not only in the light of the relevant directives but 
also in accordance with any ECJ interpretation of those same directives. 
Accordingly, there is a very strong case to argue that under Community law where 
a compulsory motor insurance policy is in place, it covers civil liability for any use 
of the motor vehicle within the territory of the UK, save for the single instance of 
the “stolen vehicle” exclusion mentioned above. 
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10. On the right road? (Pt II) 
Date:  08 February 2013696 
Nicholas Bevan continues his series on compensating RTA victims & finds our 
national law provision wanting 
The terms, scope and workings of the UK government’s compensation guarantee 
has preoccupied legislators, the judiciary and legal practitioners alike since the 
first Road Traffic Act introduced in 1930 (RTA 1930). In the UK this provision has 
evolved over the years to produce four distinct compensatory safety nets. The 
first two consist of statutory rights. Between them, they confer on a victim a direct 
right to recover compensation from the defendant’s insurer and they are to be 
found within Pt VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA 1988). The third and fourth 
are delivered by a completely different route: through two extra-statutory 
compensation schemes devised specifically for victims of uninsured and 
unidentified drivers. The distinction between the two different types of scheme 
(statutory and extra-statutory) is relevant to the way one interprets them because 
different rules of construction are said to apply. This article concentrates on the 
first two statutory schemes. 
The contractual insurer 
Of the two statutory schemes, the first confers on a victim a direct right of action 
against the insurer: this is itself a two-limbed affair. It begins with the obligation 
to insure and scope of cover required. Thus, under s 143 of RTA 1988, any 
person who uses a motor vehicle on a road or other public place must have third 
party motor insurance cover for the use to which the vehicle is put. Section 145 
stipulates that this policy must cover “any liability” for the death of or bodily injury 
to any person or damage to property caused by, or arising out of, the use of the 
vehicle on a road 
 or other public place. There are a number of restrictions on the ability of an 
insurer to limit or restrict its contractual liability, such as can be found within ss 
148 and 150. 
                                               
696 N.L.J. 2016, 166(7701), 13-14. 
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The second limb comes into play when a third party victim secures a judgment 
for loss or damage arising out of such use. A direct right is then conferred by RTA 
1988 against the insurer of the responsible party under s 151 (5). A contractual 
insurer is obliged to satisfy a judgment against its assured by paying the third 
party direct under s 151 (2) (a). 
The vast majority of claims are compensated by motor insurers, acting under their 
contractual obligation. Most of these claims are relatively uncontroversial. 
However, in Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance [1998] UKHL 4 All ER 417 the House 
of Lords had to determine whether a proper construction of s 145 extended the 
scope of cover, beyond what was then confined to “use of a vehicle on a road”, 
to encompass a car park. In the only reasoned judgment, Lord Clyde compared 
the apparently wider scope of the insurance obligation imposed by Art 3(1) of the 
First Motor Insurance Directive (as augmented by the Second and Third 
Directives) with ss 143 and 145 and addressed the apparent disparity head on. 
He concluded that while the Marleasing principle permitted a court to strain to 
give effect to the purpose behind the legislation, this had its limits and in this 
instance could not be stretched so as to permit a court to add the words “or in 
any public place” even if it concluded that this was required under Community 
law. However, he took the view that RTA 1988 did comply with the directives as: 
 the directives permit differences in the precise level of cover that national 
laws can impose; and 
 s 145(3)(b) extends the scope of the insurance cover for a claim involving 
a vehicle normally based in the territory of another member state where a 
wider scope applies. 
However, that ruling ignored the ECJ’s judgment in Bernaldez and predated its 
ruling in Pfeiffer. The Motor Vehicle (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 2000 
were passed shortly afterwards to extend the scope of the duty to insure under s 
143 and the geographic scope of cover under s 145 to a “road or other public 
place”. Accordingly, Cutter must be viewed as being of questionable authority. It 
is possible that even the amended geographic scope may not be sufficiently wide 
to fully implement Art 3 (1) of the First Directive. 
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The contractual third party insurance scheme is augmented by the European 
Communities (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2002. Regulation 3 confers 
on a victim the right to pursue a claim against the defendant’s motor insurer direct. 
This was introduced from 19 January 2003 and is intended to implement Art 3 of 
the Fourth Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive 2000/26/EC. However, it imposes 
two qualifications to the direct right: 
 it is limited to claims arising out of “accidents”; and 
 the insurers’ liability is confined to extent of its contractual liability to 
indemnify its insured. 
Although the term “accidents” is also employed in Art 3 of the Fourth Directive, 
there is a strong case to argue that this is consistent with the primary duty under 
Art 3 (1) of the First Directive (72/166/EC), which is to ensure that civil liability, as 
opposed to criminal liability, is covered by insurance. In Part I of this series we 
saw that in Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829, Case C-129/94 the Court of 
Justice ruled that the Directives permit only one policy exclusion against a third-
party victim, namely under Art 2 (1) of the Second Directive 84/5/EEC (now Article 
13 of the Sixth Directive) which applies where a passenger knows the vehicle he 
is riding in is stolen. Furthermore that, as a derogation from the main principle 
imposed under Art 3 of the First Directive, that one exception should be construed 
strictly. The same court also ruled that Art 3 (1) precludes an insurer from relying 
on statutory provisions or contractual clauses in order to refuse to compensate 
third party victims of an accident caused by the insured vehicle [see para 20]. 
This was approved in Candolin [2005] ECR I-5745;Case C-537/03 and since. 
Accordingly it is arguable that Regulation 3 fails to fully implement the Directive if 
its effect is to deny the direct right where a claim features a deliberate running 
down or trespass to the person; as opposed to purely accidental injury or 
damage. Where Regulation 3 qualifies the direct right, by restricting it to the 
assured’s contractual entitlement, this is clearly not permitted by the Directives, 
save for the single instance permitted under Art 2 (1) above. 
The statutory insurer 
Shortly after RTA 1930 was enacted, it was apparent that further provision was 
required to prevent the compensatory policy aim being undermined by authorised 
motor insurers, who were imposing unduly restrictive policy terms and exclusions 
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of cover. It was deemed necessary to guarantee a victim’s right to compensatory 
cover even where an insured defendant was not contractually entitled to an 
indemnity due to a breach of the policy terms. Accordingly a second statutory 
scheme was devised to supplement the first. 
Because of the empirical way in which this part of the scheme developed, it is 
confined by statute to a limited number of specific instances. It applies where an 
insurer has delivered a third party motor policy issued in accordance with s 145 
but where, in certain prescribed instances, it is entitled to avoid its contractual 
liability to indemnity its assured. An insurer responding to such a claim is 
commonly known as a statutory insurer. A statutory insurer is obliged under s 151 
(5) to satisfy the third party claim despite the insured’s breach of contract. 
However, a literal interpretation of RTA 1988 would appear to confine the 
operation of this scheme to: 
 breaches falling within the list of eight types of policy limitation set out in s 
148(2) (such restrictions on cover as the age or physical or mental 
condition of persons driving the vehicle, plus technical limitations relating 
to the vehicle itself); 
 where under s 151 (2) (b) the only breach of condition was that the driver 
of the insured vehicle was unauthorised; or 
 where under s 151 (3) the vehicle has been used without a driving licence. 
These nullifying provisions only apply to a statutory insurance claim under s 151 
(5). There is no similar provision within the 2002 regulations. 
Where a statutory insurer satisfies a judgment under s 151 (5), RTA 1988, it also 
confers a corresponding statutory right of recovery against a policyholder or 
against anyone that has caused or permitted the unauthorised use of an insured 
vehicle, under s 148 (4) and s 151 (8) respectively. 
The obvious disparities between our national law in this area and the more 
generous level of third party cover required under Community law has been a 
long-running if unresolved issue since Bernaldez in 1996 9 (see Part 1 of this 
series). Then, in the space of one year, there have been three unanimous Court 
of Appeal rulings on s 151. 
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In Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 the court interpreted s 152 at face 
value and ruled that because an insurer had successfully obtained a post-
accident declaration under s 152 to the effect that the motor policy was void 
(presumably on the grounds of nondisclosure of the driver’s alleged drug 
addiction), the insurer was obviated from meeting the injured passengers claim 
under s151. This appears to conflict with the ECJ rulings considered above. It 
then decided to treat the claim as one under the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 
1999 and then compounded its error by misconstruing cl 6 where it is clearly in 
breach of the relevant Community law. 
Next came Churchill v Wilkinson [2012] Civ 1166 where a previous and differently 
constituted Court of Appeal had properly referred to the ECJ for a preliminary 
determination the issue as to whether s 151(8) was compliant with Community 
law. The ECJ confirmed it was not. Accordingly, when the matter was restored to 
the Court of Appeal, the Marleasing principle was applied to s 151 (8) in a way 
which effectively introduced an extensive statutory amendment to this provision: 
one that removed an insurer’s automatic right to full recovery where the 
policyholder is also the claimant. 
Finally, in EUI v Bristol Alliance [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 another set of 
experienced Court of Appeal judges sought to interpret s 151 by reviewing our 
domestic authorities before erroneously seeking to distinguish and marginalise 
the impact of Bernaldez. They ruled that while motorists are obliged under s 143, 
Pt VI of RTA 1988, to purchase third party insurance sufficient to cover “any use” 
they make of the insured vehicle in accordance with s 145, an authorised insurer 
is free to restrict the scope of the policies they sell. The problem is that most 
policies issued under s 145 do not extend to “any use”: a fortiorari, a driver’s 
suicide bid. 
The EUI ruling exposes potential third party victims to the risk of failing to recover 
their compensatory entitlement where a defendant’s use falls outside the scope 
of the cover provided within the policy. Such an arbitrary outcome not only defeats 
the primary objective of Pt VI of RTA 1988 but is also at loggerheads with Art 3 
(1) of the First Directive and the extensive body of superior ECJ jurisprudence. 
Ward LJ’s view was that even though a third party victim’s compensatory 
entitlement was not guaranteed under s 151, the effect of RTA 1988 and the MIB 
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agreements were sufficient to comply with the directives. However, this is 
unsatisfactory because it appeared to deny the claimant in EUI any compensation 
as the property insurer’s subrogated claim was said to be excluded under cl 6 of 
the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 (this view itself appears to conflict with 
the seventh recital and Art 1 of the Second Directive, now Art 10 of the Sixth 
Directive). It ignores the ECJ ruling in Churchill v Wilkinson [2011] Case C-442/10 
that the MIB scheme should be a last resort, applicable only where there is no 
insurance or where the defendant is untraced. 
The inconsistent approaches adopted by the Court of Appeal in these decisions 
only serves to demonstrate the unsatisfactory and shambolic nature of our 
national law provision in this area. 
Reforming our national law provision 
The significance of any Supreme Court ruling in these cases, quite apart from its 
intrinsic value for the proper construction of s 151, is that it is also likely to confirm 
that the UK’s provision for motor vehicle victims is deficient and contrary to 
Community law. 
Other compensatory lacunae 
There is a strong case to argue that the list of void exclusions within s 148 should 
be viewed, post Bernaldez, as merely illustrative of the kind of exclusion that is 
ineffective (see Part 1). This would prevent motor insurers from escaping their 
statutory duty to compensate third party victims by the employment of numerous 
restrictions in their policies. This would be more in keeping with the spirit of the 
Road Traffic Act 1930. It would also be consistent with the Community law, 
considered above, that upholds the right of a third party entitled to compensation 
under civil law to recover his or her compensation from the defendant’s insurer, 
free from the taint of any breach of contract or other such impediment (subject to 
the stolen vehicle exception). 
There is an even stronger case to argue that the insurers right of recovery under 
s 148 (4) should also be subjected to the same kind of qualification as the Court 
of Appeal in Churchill imposed on its sibling in s 151 (8). 
Furthermore, the prescriptive car-sharing provisions in s 150, the exceptions to 
an insurer’s liability to meet a judgment set out within ss 151 and 152 and the 
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way that the derogation from the duty to insure under s 144 exposes victims of 
unauthorised drivers—will all need to be reviewed; the same applies to reg 3 of 
the 2002 Regulations. It is also debatable whether the geographic scope of the 
duty to insure within s 143 and s 192 is compliant. In France, for example, 
compulsory third party insurance is imposed on or off road, on public or private 
land. 
The disarray within our national law provision also extends to the case authorities. 
For example, it is questionable whether Fleming v Chief Constable of Avon and 
Somerset [1987] 1 All ER 318 still provides a valid test for determining whether a 
vehicle should be insured under s 143. Even under RTA 1988 definitions, a test 
which asks “would a reasonable person looking at the vehicle say its general use 
encompassed possible general road use” seems too restrictive. That would tend 
to exclude stripped down off-road scrambler motor bikes and other vehicles ill-
equipped for road use. Whereas the Art 1 definition within the Sixth Directive is 
wider and covers “any motor vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by 
mechanical power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not 
coupled”. 
It is to be hoped the Secretary of State for Transport will instigate a wide-ranging 
review of our national law provision in this area, especially now these issues 
seem likely to be scrutinised by the Supreme Court. 
Difficult as it may be to conceive, our extra-statutory national law provision for 
victims of uninsured and untraced drivers is even more dysfunctional. However, 
that is the subject of a separate article. 
Nicholas Bevan, legal consultant and trainer. 
E-mail: mail@nicholasbevan.com 
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11. On the right road? (Pt III) 
Date:  15 February 2013697 
Nicholas Bevan explains why national law shouldn’t be permitted to undermine 
the effectiveness of Community law 
Uninsured drivers are an unpleasant hazard of modern life. Not only are they 
statistically more prone to accidents, but their inconsiderate approach to 
insurance puts their victims in jeopardy of being denied their compensatory 
entitlement. 
We have seen from the first two articles in this series, highlighting how the 
government is failing to compensate RTA victims, that the primary source of law 
in this area of practice are the six Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID) and 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings that interpret and apply them (see 
NLJ, 1 February 2013, p 94 and NLJ, 8 February 2013, p 130). 
 
The first MVID was adopted by the Community and became law in 1972. The last 
consolidating MVID was adopted in 2009. Both the MVIDs and the ECJ rulings 
have precedence over both our national legislature and judiciary. Between them, 
they serve as a blueprint to enable the UK to transpose the legislative intention 
of the Community into our national law. They represent the higher principle that 
should inform the UK’s statutory and extra-statutory provision. 
It makes sense, therefore, to review the Community law requirements first before 
considering our national provision for the compensatory guarantee afforded to 
victims of uninsured drivers. 
Community law 
The Sixth MVID consolidates, clarifies and replaced the first five MVIDs from 6 
November 2009. The following provisions are of particular relevance to claims 
against uninsured drivers: 
Art 3: Compulsory insurance of vehicles 
                                               
697 N.L.J. 2013, 163(7548), 160-162. 
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“Each member state shall…take all appropriate measures to ensure that 
civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory 
is covered by insurance… The insurance referred to in the first 
subparagraph shall cover compulsorily both damage to property and 
personal injuries.” 
 
Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA 1988) seeks to implement Art 3 of the 
Sixth MVID, as well the subordinate provisions within Arts 1 (definitions), 9 
(minimum amounts), 12 (special categories of victim) and 13 (exclusion of cover). 
These Articles are also relevant to the compensatory provision for victims of 
uninsured drivers’ claims as the guarantee scheme is confined to circumstances 
that require compulsory third party insurance. It was not until the Second MVID 
of 1984 that victims of untraced vehicles were made the subject of Community 
law rules. This was re-enacted as Art 10 in the Sixth MVID which also provides a 
compensatory safety net for victims of identified but uninsured drivers. 
Art 10: Body responsible for compensation 
“1. Each member state shall set up or authorise a body with the task of 
providing compensation, at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation 
for damage to property or personal injuries caused by an unidentified 
vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligation provided for in Art 3 
has not been satisfied. 
“The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to the right of the 
member states to regard compensation by the body as subsidiary or non-
subsidiary and the right to make provision for the settlement of claims 
between the body and the person or persons responsible for the accident 
and other insurers or social security bodies required to compensate the 
victim in respect of the same accident. However, member states may not 
allow the body to make the payment of compensation conditional on the 
victim establishing in any way that the person liable is unable or refuses to 
pay... 
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“4. Each member state shall apply its laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions to the payment of compensation by the body, without prejudice 
to any other practice which is more favourable to the victim.” 
The key provision within Art 10 is in the first subparagraph. This, and other 
provisions within the Sixth MVID, sets the minimum standard by which our 
national provision for victims of uninsured and untraced drivers is to be tested: 
they are to be compensated to the same extent as victims of identified and 
insured drivers under Art 3. The first subparagraph of Art 10 makes this explicit. 
The line of ECJ rulings on the policy objectives and proper construction of the 
MVIDs that were considered in the preceding articles in this series apply with 
equal force to Art 10 of the Sixth MVID. Accordingly, the requirements imposed 
by Art 10 are to be interpreted purposively, to achieve its objectives. Any 
restriction or exclusion of the compensatory right conferred by Art 10 is to be 
construed restrictively. 
Minimum levels of protection 
In Evans v Secretary of state for Transport and the Motor Insurers Bureau: C-
63/01, the ECJ ruled that the legislative intention, of what is now Art 10, is to 
entitle victims of “unidentified or insufficiently insured vehicles” to “protection 
equivalent to, and as effective as, that available to persons injured by identified 
and insured vehicles”. However, the ECJ went on to qualify this by observing that 
the twin Community law principles of equivalence and effectiveness do not confer 
identical provision. Instead they require member states when transposing a 
directive to ensure that the rules it devises to confer Community law rights are no 
less favourable than those governing similar domestic rights (the principle of 
equivalence) and that they do not render the exercise of those rights impossible 
or excessively difficult (the principle of effectiveness). The Evans case featured 
an untraced driver claim where the principle of equivalence was less relevant, 
due to the complete absence of any identifiable defendant that could be pursued 
through legal process. Even so, the court upheld Mr Evans’s entitlement to 
interest on his compensation, which at that time was excluded from the Motor 
Insurers Bureau’s (MIB) untraced driver compensation scheme. 
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Applying these principles to a claim against an identified but uninsured driver, 
then in order to conform with Community law, the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 
1999 (1999 agreement) must confer a comparable level of compensatory cover 
to that which would apply to a normal claim against an insured driver under RTA 
1988. Accordingly, as a rule of thumb, any material departure within the 1999 
agreement from the insurance indemnity guaranteed to third party claimants 
under the RTA 1988, whether substantive or procedural, should be viewed as a 
potentially incorrect transposition of Art 10 MVID. 
Art 10 of the Sixth MVID and its predecessor (Art 1(4) of the Second MVID 
(84/5/EEC)) have been implemented in the UK through successive agreements 
between the secretary of state and the MIB. The MIB administers two extra-
statutory compensation schemes: currently the 1999 agreement and the 
Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003. 
The MIB’s status 
The MIB is a company limited by guarantee incepted in 1946. Its Articles of 
Association confirm that its primary purpose is to compensate victims of 
uninsured or untraced drivers where the loss or damage arose out of 
circumstances that require third party motor insurance, whether imposed under 
Pt VI of the RTA 1988 “or by any other statute...rule, regulation, order, 
directive...”. Every insurance company that underwrites motor vehicle insurance 
in this jurisdiction is required by s 95 of RTA 1988 to be a member and it must 
also contribute towards its compensatory fund. 
In Evans the ECJ confirmed the MIB’s status as the UK’s authorised body under 
Art 10(1). It based this finding on the fact that the MIB is legally obliged to 
compensate victims under the compensatory guarantee conferred by the MVIDs 
through its contractual arrangements with the secretary of state. The fact that the 
source of its obligations are set out in a private law agreement between it and a 
public authority was held to be immaterial. This represents a significant 
development from Hobhouse LJ’s view in Mighell v Reading & MIB & Ors [1999] 
1 CMLR 1251 that the MIB was no more than a private contractor through which 
the state happened to entrust the delivery of its Community law obligations under 
the MVIDs. 
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There has always been a strong case to argue that the MIB is an emanation of 
the state. The relevance of such a classification is that if the MIB is indeed an 
emanation of the state, then any departure from the level of protection afforded 
under Art 10 is enforceable by a court order directed against the MIB itself under 
the Community law doctrine of direct effect, without the need to join in the 
secretary of state as a party. 
The ECJ has ruled in several instances that rights conferred on individuals under 
the MVIDs are capable of having direct effect under Community law principles—
the only live issue being whether this principle applied to the MIB as an emanation 
of state. That issue was considered, but left unresolved by the House of Lords, in 
White v White & MIB [2001] UKHL 9. The only clear ruling, however, comes from 
Flaux J in Byrne (A Minor) v MIB and Secretary of State for Transport [2007] 
EWHC 1268 (QB) where he held that the was not an emanation of state. That 
decision, never very persuasive, was weakened further by Birmingham J’s well 
reasoned judgment in Farrell v Whitty & the MIB [2008] IEHC 124 (delivered by 
the High Court of Ireland). Farrell is the only instance where the ECJ has been 
asked to make a preliminary ruling on this issue (Farrell v Alan Whitty, Minister 
for the Environment and Others, Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland (MIBI): C-
356/05). It is worth noting that the EU Commission submitted an opinion that the 
Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland (MIBI) was an emanation of state. Unfortunately, 
the ECJ was unable to decide the point either way due to the paucity of evidence 
before it, but it did not dismiss this as a possibility. Instead it referred the issue 
back to the Irish High Court for a determination, after setting out the relevant 
Community jurisprudence on this issue. Birmingham J ruled that the MIBI was an 
emanation of state. The MIBI was established on almost identical principles as 
the MIB in the UK. That ruling was never appealed. The judgment provides a 
helpful analysis of the relevant criteria within Foster v British Gas [1990] IRLR 
353 as modified by NUT v St Mary’s Church of England (Aided) Junior School 
[1997] IRLR 242 as well as a review of judicial discussion on the nature the MIB. 
It is also worth noting that in McCall v Poulton [2008] EWCA Civ 1263 the Court 
of Appeal referred the same issue, but this time featuring the MIB itself, to the 
ECJ for a preliminary ruling but it never reached Luxembourg as the claim was 
promptly compromised. 
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The status of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 
The issue as to whether the Uninsured and Untraced Drivers Agreements are no 
more than private law contractual arrangements between the secretary of state 
and an outsourced agent, or whether they are part of our civil law, remains a 
matter of some controversy. The outcome is said to determine whether the courts 
have the power to interpret the 1999 and the 2003 agreements purposively by 
applying the principle in Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135 which is confined to the interpretation of 
national law or whether they are constrained by conventional private law 
construction rules. However, its importance was diminished when the House of 
Lords procured a similar outcome in White v White & MIB by applying 
conventional rules of construction for private law agreements in its interpretation 
of cl 6 of the 1999 agreement. It construed cl 6 in a way that was consistent with 
the fact that both contracting parties were presumed to have intended to comply 
with the MVIDs and, in doing so, it effectively struck out the offending words in 
much the same fashion as it would have done if applying the Marleasing principle. 
The more recent ECJ ruling in Evans provides a strong inference that that the 
MIB agreements form an integral part of the UK government’s national law. At 
para 35, it ruled that if a member state is to comply with the MVIDs ‘it is essential 
for national law to guarantee that the national authorities will effectively apply the 
directive in full, that the legal position under national law should be sufficiently 
precise and clear and that individuals are made fully aware of all their rights and, 
where appropriate, may rely on them before the national courts’. This puts the UK 
in a tight place: since if it wishes to continue to argue that the 1999 and 2003 
agreements are no more than private law arrangements, it risks being accused 
of failing to properly implement the MVIDs. Such a conclusion is certainly closer 
to the view expressed by Lord Denning MR in Hardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau 
[1964] 2 QB 745 that the MIB’s Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement of 1946 was “as 
important as any statute”. 
If the 1999 agreement is indeed part of our national law, as common sense 
suggests, then the Marleasing principle must apply to its construction with equal, 
if not greater, force than to any statute, as it is also arguable that the courts are 
not constrained in its exercise by the contra legem principle. If it is not, then the 
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conventional interpretative approach followed in White v White & MIB seems to 
deliver the same “purposive” outcome as Marleasingregardless. 
 
What constitutes an uninsured vehicle? 
One might suppose this to be a simple question of fact, one that is acte clairand 
capable of being determined by our national courts applying long established 
common law principles. 
Until recently, it seemed the phrase “a vehicle for which the insurance obligation 
provided for in Art 3 has not been satisfied” in Art 10 (1) of the Sixth MVID—
meant the compensating body’s role embraced a scenario where some insurance 
cover is in place but it is insufficient to cover the risk that has materialised. Such 
a view was certainly adopted by the ECJ in Evans. 
However, the recent line of ECJ rulings from Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] ECR 1-1929 
through to Churchill v Wilkinson and Evans [2011] C-442/10 suggest that 
Community law may have moved on. In our first article in this series we noted 
that the Churchill ruling applied an interpretation that extends the scope of the 
primary third party insurance indemnity imposed under Art 3 MVID as requiring 
contractual cover that is good for any use except for the single “stolen vehicle 
exclusion” permitted under Art 13. 
It also opined that “the payment of compensation by a national body is considered 
to be a measure of last resort, provided for only in cases in which the vehicle that 
caused the injury or damage is uninsured or unidentified or has not satisfied the 
insurance requirements referred to in Art 3(1) of the First Directive”. Quite what 
is meant by the final phrase remains unclear. However, if the ultimate effect of 
Art 3 is that motor insurance policies are to be construed as providing a third party 
indemnity that is good for any use to which the vehicle is actually put, then a 
necessary corollary of that would be that the 1999 agreement is confined to 
situations where either there is absolutely no insurance cover in place at the time 
of the incident giving rise to the claim or where the “stolen vehicle exclusion” 
applies. 
From a motor insurance perspective, this could have a profound impact on the 
reserves of those who underwrite the riskier categories of driver as their statutorily 
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imposed liability to third party claimants under s 151 has in effect been 
demutualised. Yet in EUI Ltd v Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 
1267 the Court of Appeal took a diametrically opposed view, one that limited the 
remit of the statutory insurer to narrow confines permitted under s 151. 
Even so, the ECJ has repeatedly ruled that while the MVIDs do not seek to 
harmonise the civil or criminal liability provision of its member states, national 
laws cannot be permitted to undermine the effectiveness of a Community law. 
This issue has yet to be resolved. 
Nicholas Bevan, legal consultant & trainer. 
E-mail: mail@nicholasbevan.com 
Website: www.nicholasbevan.com 
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12. On the right road (Pt IV) 
Date:  22 February 2013698 
In his final article on compensation for motor victims, Nicholas Bevan compares 
& contrasts UK & EU provisions 
There is a strong case to argue that the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 (the 
1999 agreement) is part and parcel of our national law and thus subject to the 
Marleasing interpretive principle (see Marleasing SA v La Comercial 
Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135) and that the normal rules 
of construction that apply to private agreements produce the same purposive 
outcome anyway. Furthermore, as the Motor Insurers Bureau (MIB) is probably 
an emanation of state, any material departure from the minimum levels of 
compensatory protection prescribed by the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives 
(MVIDs) is directly enforceable by the courts.  Even if direct effect does not apply, 
the UK government is liable for losses sustained by claimants through its failure 
to properly implement the MVIDs underFrancovich and others [1991] ECR 1-
5357. 
It is arguable, following the ECJ ruling in Churchill, that the 1999 agreement is 
now confined to the dwindling number of claims where there is no insurance in 
place; as opposed to the increasingly common phenomenon of “fronting” 
unauthorised drivers with superficially legitimate insurance. Accordingly, where 
some insurance is in place, but it is ineffective, then that claim should be dealt 
with by the motor insurer direct, as a statutory insurance claim under s151 (5) of 
the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA 1988) and not under the 1999 agreement. The 
only exception being a passenger claim where the right to compensation is 
nullified by the stolen vehicle exception. 
It is now appropriate to compare the provision under 1999 agreement with the 
minimum standards that required under Community law. The equivalence 
principle requires that the compensatory protection extended under this scheme 
to victims of uninsured drivers should be comparable to the level of protection 
available to victims of insured drivers. As RTA 1988 is an incomplete 
transposition of the MVIDs in several important areas outlined in Part II of this 
                                               
698 N.L.J. 2013, 163(7549), 193-195. 
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series it is necessary to look to the higher standards imposed by the MVIDs, 
considered in Part III of this series. 
Substantive issues 
Below are the key instances where the 1999 agreement breaches the minimum 
compensatory standard imposed by the Sixth MVID. 
Scope 
The right to compensation is restricted to a “relevant liability” which the 
interpretive clauses define as “a liability in respect of which a contract of 
insurance must be in force to comply with Pt VI of RTA 1988”. This is sensible 
but it necessarily inherits the geographic restrictions  considered previously under 
ss 143 and 192 of RTA 1988. There is an argument that this also conflicts with 
the wider scope imposed under Art 3 of the Sixth MVID (the directive). 
Exclusions and limitations of liability 
The 1999 agreement is packed with exclusions of liability which conflict with the 
Community law minimum standard. 
Under cl 6.1(a) and (b), claims involving a vehicle exempted from the requirement 
to take out motor insurance under s 144 of RTA 1988 are excluded. However, we 
saw in Part II that leaves the victims of unauthorised users exposed to recovering 
no compensation at all. Article 5.1 of the directive requires appropriate measures 
to be taken to ensure that compensation is paid in respect of any loss or injury 
caused by vehicles belonging to persons exempted from the insurance 
requirement. 
Under cl 6.1(c), assignees of a claimant’s right of action and subrogated 
claimants (such as credit hire charges and sick pay) are excluded. Neither the 
directive, the RTA 1988 or our common law impose such exclusions. Any 
departure from the basic compensatory principle conferred by the directive must 
be construed restrictively. Subrogated claims should not be confused with the 
provision within the second subparagraph of Art 10.1 of the directive. There, the 
MIB’s right to deduct “subordinated” claims from a victim’s compensation is 
confined by the use of the phrase: “…other insurers or social security bodies to 
subrogated claims by insurance undertakings and state run social security 
bodies”. That permits the avoidance of double recovery through the deduction of 
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state benefits, such as under the Social Security Recovery of Benefits Act 1997 
and it also takesinto account any interim payments made under a victims 
comprehensive policy of insurance. 
The directive does not confer a general right to deduct subrogated claims  nor 
does it permit a departure from the basic full compensation principle. This was 
challenged in McCall v Poulton & MIB [2008] EWCA Civ 1263 Where the Court 
of Appeal referred this point to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling along with the 
question of whether Marleasing should be used to interpret the 1999 agreement 
and whether, following Farrell v Whitty, the MIB was an emanation of state. 
McCall was promptly settled before this issue could be determined by the ECJ. 
The exclusion under cl 6.1(d)(i) for claimants other than passengers who knew, 
or ought to have known, that the vehicle was uninsured is unsustainable. There 
is no equivalent provision under the directive. 
Clause 6.1(e) lists four instances where liability is excluded for passengers. Only 
two of these are permitted by the directive and even then, their validity is 
dependent on a purposive construction to repair its misleading draftsmanship.  
Article 10(2) permits an exclusion of liability in only one circumstance, and this 
applies to “persons who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the damage 
or injury when the body [ie, the MIB] can prove that they knew it was uninsured”. 
Whereas the cl 6.1(e) exclusion provides: “...a claim which is made in respect of 
a relevant liability described in para (2) by a claimant who, at the time of the use 
giving rise to the relevant liability was voluntarily allowing himself to be carried in 
the vehicle and, either before the commencement of his journey in the vehicle or 
after such commencement if he could reasonably be expected to have alighted 
from it, knew or ought to have known that– 
1. the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken, 
2. the vehicle was being used without there being in force in relation 
to its use such a contract of insurance as would comply with Pt VI of RTA 
1988, 
3. the vehicle was being used in the course or furtherance of a crime, 
or 
337 
©Nicholas Bevan 1 November 2016 
4. the vehicle was being used as a means of escape from, or 
avoidance of, lawful apprehension.”.  
In White v White & MIB [2001] UKHL 9, the House of Lords ruled that as the 
directive requires actual (not constructive) knowledge, the 1999 agreement had 
to be construed and applied in such a way as to disregard the references in cl 
6.1(e)(ii) to “ought to have known”. In that case, as the MIB was unable to prove 
that the uninsured driver’s brother had actual knowledge that he was uninsured, 
it was unable to exclude that claim. The law lords ruled that actual knowledge 
includes turning a deliberate blind eye and not asking when one suspects 
something. Accordingly, excepting a passenger with actual knowledge that the 
driver is uninsured and the possible permitted exclusion of a passenger who 
knows that the vehicle has been stolen, all the other exclusions are unsustainable 
under the superior Community law as they conflict with the directive policy aim of 
ensuring a consistent compensatory guarantee scheme across the different 
member states. 
 
While the second subparagraph of Art 13 permits an insurer to exclude liability to 
indemnify those “who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the damage 
or injury, when the insurer can prove that they knew the vehicle was stolen” that 
is not the same as taking without consent under cl 6.1(e)(i) or proscribing any 
insurance indemnity for such persons. It may be a commonly employed term but 
if there is no insurance in place,  the MIB must establish this is a normal insurance 
term before it can rely on cl 6.1(e)(i). 
Deductions from compensation 
Under cl 17, the MIB is allowed to deduct from the claimant’s compensatory 
entitlement sums received from any of these sources: 
• the Policyholders Protection Board (which is now defunct); 
• from an insurer under any agreement or arrangement; 
• from any other source....where those sums were paid in respect of 
the injury loss or damage claimed in the proceedings. 
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This goes way beyond the limited deductions permitted by Art 10(1) of the 
directive and conflicts with our common law rules on the quantification of 
damages. Clause 17 constitutes a clear breach of the Community law 
equivalence principle. 
Procedural issues 
If one wished to illustrate the unequal struggle between the civil servants advising 
successive secretaries of state for transport on the one hand, and the motor 
insurance industry leaders who comprise the MIB board on the other, one need 
only look at the 1999 agreement. It’s arcane terminology and its structure (replete 
with abstruse definitions, exclusions of liability, unjustified conditions precedent 
to liability and excessive notice provisions) resembles an insurance policy a lot 
more than anything one might recognise as a compensatory scheme for victims. 
This suggests the Ministry of Transport conceded more or less to whatever 
demands were made of it by the insurance lobby. This exposes successive UK 
governments not just to the accusation that the rights of victims has been 
sacrificed to insurance industry’s commercial interests but the form and content 
of this scheme are so unjust to those it is supposed to protect as to risk 
infringement proceedings. 
The 1999 agreement has a number of Draconian procedural conditions 
precedent that have no parallel under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR) or 
RTA 1988. If these conditions are not met, then the MIB escapes any liability to 
compensate; however trivial the infraction or grave the injury. For example: 
• Under cl 7, for failing to use the MIB’s own application form when 
applying for compensation or to provide such information as the MIB may 
reasonably require. This, even though the current version of the MIB’s 
extensive application form and questionnaire requires an applicant to 
consent to the release of a wide range of personal information that goes 
far beyond anything any litigant is entitled to under the CPR and which 
arguably breaches Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
• Under cl 13, for failing to request insurance information from the 
defendant driver or for failing to use all reasonable endeavours to obtain 
this information or to report the failure to provide that information to the 
police. This subverts the parliamentary objective behind s 154 of RTA 
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1988 which is to increase, not diminish, the prospects of a victim 
recovering their compensatory entitlement. 
• Under cl 9, for failing to provide “proper notice” to the MIB of the 
commencement of proceedings in a time window that is subtly, but often 
fatally, different from that required under s 152(1) of RTA 1988: not prior 
to commencement but within 14 days after commencement. Furthermore, 
“proper notice” requires an extraordinary amount of disclosure of material 
under cl 9.2, some of which is clearly not material to the issues, and in a 
form that is not required under RTA 1988 or under the CPR. Fortunately 
the worst excesses of these particular provisions have been mitigated by 
the MIB’s revised notes for guidance which the MIB honours. 
• Under cls 10 and 11, for failing to inform the MIB within seven days 
of various developments, once proceedings have commenced or, within 
the same period, such additional information as the MIB may reasonably 
require. The MIB’s amended notes for guidance waive some of these 
requirements where the MIB is added as a party to the proceedings. Even 
so, no equivalent to these extreme measures exists elsewhere in our civil 
justice system. 
 
Claimants wanting to claim compensation from the MIB are referred to the MIB 
direct by the government information site. The prospects of lay claimant being 
able to successfully identify, navigate and interpret different and often conflicting 
sources that make up the UK’s extra-statutory provision for victims of uninsured 
drivers, is bleak. If our national courts are unable to apply a consistent approach 
to a purposive construction of what is in many respects a highly misleading 
scheme, what chance the lay client? 
Call for reform 
Before the UK’s accession to Europe in 1973, if the government of the day 
thought it just or expedient to either restrict access to or to limit the level 
compensation extended to uninsured drivers then it could do so, and with 
impunity. 
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However the government’s position following its accession is a different matter. 
In the words of Lord Denning: “The Treaty [of Rome, 1957] does not touch any of 
the matters which concern solely England and the people in it. These are still 
governed by English law. They are not affected by the Treaty. But when we come 
to matters with a European element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows 
into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back, Parliament has 
decreed that the Treaty is henceforward to be part of our law. It is equal in force 
to any statute.”—H.P. Bulmer Ltd v J. Bollinger SA[1974] Ch 401 at 418. 
After 1973, the government faced a choice: it could either revise its existing 
arrangements or legislate to ensure that our domestic provision complied with the 
MVID; doing nothing was not an option. 
The ECJ has ruled that it is essential for national law to guarantee that the 
national authorities will effectively apply the directive in full, that the legal position 
under national law should be sufficiently precise and clear and that individuals 
are made aware of all their rights and, where appropriate, may rely on them 
before the national courts. Failure to deliver a compensatory regime that meets 
these requirements is also breach of Community law, Commission v Greece 
[1995] ECR I-499 (Case C-365/93). 
 
The UK government’s provision for uninsured drivers is in dire need of reform. 
The Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1988 was clearly long past its shelf life by the 
time of the ECJ’s ruling in Bernáldez in 1996. What the secretary of state did in 
1999 was to replace the 1988 agreement with something just as unfit for purpose 
and the ECJ’s development of the law in this area has only compounded the 
problem. He must act now to completely reform the UK’s statutory and extra 
statutory provision in this area, or face the consequences of his prevarication. 
 
Nicholas Bevan, legal consultant & trainer. 
E-mail: mail@nicholasbevan.com 
Website: www.nicholasbevan.com 
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13. Self-driving vehicles: the road ahead 
Date: 2 September 2016 
 
 
Road traffic accident practitioners are no doubt monitoring closely the rapid 
advance of automated motor technology.  These increasingly sophisticated 
systems have important implications not just for road safety but also for legal 
practice as well as the regulatory framework that governs motor liability and 
insurance. 
Transport revolution 
We have become inured to the stubbornly high casualty statistics associated with 
road transport.  The Department for Transport (DfT) inform us that there were 
1,732 fatalities on our roads last year and several hundred thousand other 
casualties.  Yet, this could be set to change.  We are about to witness a revolution 
in transport, which by first restricting and ultimately removing entirely the scope 
for human driver-error, offers the prospect of dramatically improved road safety 
and, in consequence, cheaper motor insurance.   
Last month the DfT published its latest proposals for revising the regulatory 
framework for motorised transport of various ‘near to market technologies’.  
Pathway to Driverless Cars invites responses from interested parties on three 
broad aspects of this emerging technology: compulsory insurance; construction 
and use regulation and the Highway Code.  It is a thought provoking paper that 
makes some sensible suggestions.   
The DfT believes that we are likely to see the introduction on our roads of semi- 
automated vehicles (AKA ‘advanced driver assistance systems’) within the next 
two to four years.  These systems will be able to replace direct human control of 
motor vehicles in certain highly prescriptive scenarios: such as in maintaining a 
course in motorway traffic, remote control parking and, for convoys of heavy 
In Brief 
 Important regulatory reform for automated vehicles 
 RTA practitioners have until 9 September to respond to government proposals 
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goods vehicles run in close formation and controlled by a single lead driver.  
Presumably there will be further innovations along these lines.  These systems 
will still require constant vigilance by the vehicle users: who must at all times be 
ready and able to resume control: either at the completion of the semi-automated 
process or in response to an exigency that requires human intervention.  Because 
a degree of human control is retained, primary responsibility for safe driving will 
continue to rest on the user. 
The DfT also anticipates that self-driving vehicles (AKA ‘automated vehicle 
technology’) could be on our roads sometime in the 2020s.  Clearly this will 
require a very different regulatory framework as their users will effectively be no 
more than passengers.  Unless a user fails to maintain the vehicle, disobeys the 
manufacturer’s instructions, breaches the Highway Code, or resumes direct 
control, then under normal common law rules it is hard to see how they could be 
held responsible for an accident caused by such an automaton.  This technology 
looks set to change vehicle ownership, at least in the inner-cities, as consumer 
expectations shift from a personal driving experience to a Uber-style auto-taxi 
service.  However, despite the recent media hype, this futuristic concept may be 
some way off.  Accordingly, the DfT paper plans a rolling programme of regulatory 
reform.   
The DfT’s proposals concern the ‘near to market’ motorway assist and remote 
control parking systems of semi-automated vehicles.  Its preference is making 
‘the minimum changes required to ensure clarity, to give victims easy access to 
compensation, and to give the market certainty without influencing or preventing 
different models being developed in the future.’   
White paper inaccuracies 
One should not expect in a consultative white paper the technical precision of a 
draft bill however the government’s proposals appear to feature a number of 
inaccuracies.  This is one reason why practitioners should invest the time to 
respond to this consultation.   
One of these misconceptions is that our law on third party motor insurance needs 
to be extended to include product liability [para 1.3].   It is likely that Section 145 
Road Traffic Act 1988 (the Act) when properly construed in the light of the Article 
3 of European Directive 2009/103 on motor insurance, that it is intended to 
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implement, already effectively requires such cover.  The Court of Justice ruling in 
Damijan Vnuk and the recent European Commission’s Road Map communique 
of 8 June are explicit on the European law requirement.  This European law will 
continue to govern UK law on motor insurance for at least two more years and, 
most probably post Brexit, in a less direct but still tangible fashion.  
The problem is our national law transposition of this European law is that it is 
systemically defective.  The dictionary meaning of Section 145 (3) of the Act is 
that the cover is restricted to ‘any liability which may be incurred by him’ – in other 
words: driver liability.  The European law concept of use is much wider and our 
courts are required to import this wider scope, in so far as is possible. 
This inconsistency naturally extends to third party motor polices issued in 
compliance with section 145.  These tend to cover individual users’ liability, as 
opposed to the continental practice that covers vehicles.  Accordingly, if a hidden 
technical fault causes an accident (one undiscoverable through inspection or 
maintenance) so that the owner or user is blameless, some policies will not 
respond.  Others purport to exclude liability where the vehicle is unroadworthy.  
Even so, the statutory liability of an insurer under section 151 (2) (b) of the Act is 
drawn in such wide terms that it is theoretically capable of covering product 
defects in conjunction with a European law consistent construction of section 145.   
Another problem we can anticipate is that as various driving functions become 
increasingly automated so too will the tendency and opportunity for users to point 
an exculpatory finger at them.  Furthermore, for every fool-proof device there 
always seems to be a fool greater than the device.  So it is inevitable that some 
users will tamper with the systems or fail to maintain them and yet others will 
simply misapply them.  User fault and product liability issues are likely to arise 
concurrently.  These have the potential to result in expensive, technically 
complicated and lengthy multi-party actions that would at the very least delay 
compensation.  Even where a mechanical or technical defect is held to be 
responsible, the manufacturer may be able to evade the strict liability conferred 
by the Consumer Protection Act 1987 by deploying a section 4 ‘state of the art’ 
defence, particularly where extensive research, road testing and regulatory 
compliance is established.  Expensive expert evidence will be required and has 
already made an appearance in some cases, perhaps most recently in Sparrow 
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v Andre [2016] EWHC 739 (QB).  The unequal struggle between individual victims 
and powerful corporate manufacturers and suppliers could undermine public 
confidence in the safety and suitability of newly introduced automated systems.  
This leads us on to another possible misconception. 
The DfT believe that there is no need to revise the common law or statutory 
provision governing primary liability in this area [para 2.20].  This author is not so 
sure.  The product liability regime is fraught with complication, featuring as it does 
contract law, tort law and as well as consumer legislation.  Arguably what is 
required is strict liability for producers accompanied by a statutory provision that 
imposes an absolute duty on all motor insurers to satisfy any claim caused or 
contributed to by a product defect associated with the vehicle’s use in terms 
analogous to but distinct from the strict liability that applies to an employer under 
the Employers’ Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969.  The insurer will not be 
deemed to be negligent and the existing law on product liability need not be 
altered.  Further statutory provision should be made to allow the insurer to recoup 
its outlay as a subrogated claim from a producer, supplier or other third party, 
wholly or partly responsible for the defect that caused or contributed to the 
accident.  This would ensure that innocent victims recover their compensation 
relatively promptly from the insurer involved, or in default, from the Motor Insurers 
Bureau (MIB). 
What at first blush seem to be an unprecedented imposition on motor insurers, 
may well be feasible, desirable even, in the light of the following: 
 There is already precedent for direct insurer liability as sections 148 and 
151 of the Act require insurers to satisfy judgments even for non-
contractual liabilities, these measures were first introduced in 1934.  Then 
in 1946 the industry agreed to meet claims arising out of uninsured driving; 
 It has already been argued above that section 151 (2) of the Act already 
imposes insurer liability for mechanical defects; 
 The DfT concede that insurers should meet third party claims where a 
defect results from user misuse or neglect [para 2.25]; 
 Motor insurers benefit from a highly artificial state-enforced multi-billion-
pound captive market where its customer base is guaranteed and the 
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basic insurable risk already well established.  They are best placed to 
cope;  
 Given that the government’s first responsibility in this context is to ensure 
the safety of the general public through rigorous testing and regulation of 
these new technologies as well as the introduction of the necessary 
infrastructure, is seems reasonable to expect (if not anticipate) that the risk 
actually posed by this new technology should no greater than the existing 
risk posed by human error; insurers net outlay might even diminish;   
 Insurers are free, within reason, to adjust their premiums to accommodate 
the as yet unknown risk posed by this new technology; 
 The government could offer to underwrite any unforeseen catastrophic 
event caused by this nascent technology, perhaps triggered where the 
losses exceed a certain level.  This might be particularly relevant to the 
deployment of HVG convoys; 
 Motor insurers will retain greater control of claims and costs and they are 
better placed to take informed decisions on whether to pursue subrogated 
product liability claims.  The MIB could assume a valuable role as a centre 
of expertise in investigating, assessing and handling such claims on its 
members’ behalf. 
Third party cover failings 
In the writer’s view it would be a mistake to introduce separate legislation in this 
area without also addressing the numerous failings in third party motor cover that 
pepper our entire national law transposition of directive 2009/103 on motor 
insurance.  The DfT was warned about these infringements by various parties in 
its earlier flawed consultation on the MIB agreements in February 2013.  This is 
now the subject of a wide ranging judicial review by RoadPeace because it 
ignored that advice.  Our domestic law in this area is patchy, inconsistent, 
tediously long and unnecessarily complicated.  This is in large measure the 
cumulative effect of decades of empirical development.  Bolting on separate 
product liability cover will only compound the problem.   
We need a fresh start: clearly articulated provisions that give effect to the 
Parliamentary objective of guaranteeing the prompt compensation of third party 
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victims through insurance.  Part VI of the Act should be repealed and the MIB 
agreements rescinded.  The entire corpus of third party provision should be 
incorporated within a new Modern Transport Bill.  
Consultation 
Practitioners have a rare opportunity to influence government policy by 
responding to this paper on or before 9 September. 
 
